Is Morality Relative?

[hatsoff]

The code of the natural law codified in the OT and NT.

The law is universal, planted in us by God, but distorted by the lies we tell each other and ourselves.

Okay, great. I’m glad we’re clear on that point. And as soon as I find sufficient evidence that your claim is true, I’ll get on board with it.

 

[Syntax]

As for your explanation of why my evidence is wrong…that is all good and well, but as I said before, it is more evidence than I have for objective morality…which is none.

I get it. Suppose we have no evidence that the world is round. And suppose that one group of people think the world is a cube. and another group of people think the world is a tetrahedron, and some others think the world is a trapezoid, and finally, some people think the world is a snake resting on an elephant, then all of this disagreement is evidence that makes it highly likely that the world is *not *actually a global sphere? I don’t think so…lol!

Uhh, yes I could. Objective morality is something where as subjective morality is not. Subjective morality is just the absence of objective morality, but objective morality is NOT the absence of subjective morality. Do you see the difference?

NO. Your position doesn’t have any luxury of being the default positions over other positions. You are not “exempt” from having to defend your position. It is not even self-evident at all. Quite the contrary, most of the world disagrees with you. So if you are going to offer such a non-obvious and counterinituitive view on the table as something everyone is called upon to rationally believe, then you need to offer REASONS for thinking it is true. So far, you have provided none. To most of the world your view is not obvious whatsoever. And because you are in the minority, the burden of proof is definitely on you just as it is on everyone else. So i suggest you change your approach to this position, otherwise you won’t ever be taken seriously.

 

[Syntax]

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Objectivism_(Ayn_Rand)#Ethics:_rational_self-interest

That doesn’t sound like the natural objective moral law you are talking about.

“Rand’s explanation of values presents the view that an individual’s primary moral obligation is to achieve his own well-being - it is for his life, and his self-interest in it that an individual ought to adhere to a moral code.[48] Egoism is a corollary of setting man’s life as the moral standard.[49] A corollary to Rand’s endorsement of self-interest is her rejection of the ethical doctrine of altruism—which she defined in the sense of Auguste Comte’s altruism (he coined the term), as a moral obligation to live for the sake of others. Rand did not use the term “selfishness” with the negative connotations that it usually has, but to refer to a form of rational egoism:”

But Rand was still a moral objectivist. She erected the moral principle that “one ought to always pursue one’s own self interest.” In case you haven’t noticed, that’s called objective egoism.

 

[Syntax]

Syntax

But Hitler was insanely evil (a condition of the purest subjectivity), so how could he be expected to recognize objective morality when he saw it?

In his own mind he was doing good, but his mind was objectively disordered. The only way you could say that it was not disordered would be to agree with the rightness of his fantasies.

Of course! I’m not disagreeing at all!. But this is precisely the counterintuitive consequence on our hands that makes it highly unlikely that moral subjectivism is true. I’m positive that if any of these spoiled and self-gloating relativists had the opportunity to watch their own children be gased and tortured, they would abandon this wildly absurd hypothesis. Only pampered, leisurely, and hedonist cultures such as ours have the presumptuous ego to drum up an idea as preposterous as thinking that Hitler’s actions were “morally permissible for him.” It takes a person such as Hellopeople to be in the worst form of denial to think this is even remotely true. Perhapse Hellopeople would have no moral qualms about joining the SS? After all, Hellopeople thinks morality doesn’t exist. And if he decided to join the SS then he would be perfectly within his moral rights to do so without any guilty conscience. And none of us could find him guilty or responsible for his crimes…

 

[Syntax]

Here is Hello’s argument so far.

I think morality is likely subjective.
Therefore, morality is likely subjective.

 

[Syntax]

Suppose persons A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, and J agree that torturing babies for fun is morally wrong. And suppose person Z believes that torturing babies for fun is morally permissible.

Assuming the phenomenon of consensus and disagreement are **any **indication (or evidence) of the actual truth of the matter at hand, the evidence actually supports the claim that morality has a 9/10 chance of being **objective **and a 1/10 chance of being subjective with respect to the claim “torturing babies for fun is wrong.” I am fully confident the relativist has a very slim chance for demonstrating his case against the very basic moral truths which almost the entire world accepts–just like the one given here. Does he honestly think that only 50% of the world believes “torturing babies for fun is morally wrong” is true? I seriously doubt it. But his worldly poll, presuming he ever actually decides to perform one, is going to have to yield results within the 50% range before he can make any plausible case against the likelihood of moral objectivity with respect to the claim that “torturing babies for fun is wrong.”

 

[hatsoff]

Uhh, yes I could. Objective morality is something where as subjective morality is not. Subjective morality is just the absence of objective morality, but objective morality is NOT the absence of subjective morality. Do you see the difference?

Perhaps it would be beneficial if you explained a bit more about what you mean by “objective morality.” Because it seems to me that objective codes have indeed been formulated by people throughout history.

Consider, for example, a maxim not to kill any living thing, great or small. Thankfully not too many people live by such a maxim, but for those who do, it’s usually a clear-cut matter for them. There’s not much room for subjective interpretation. Indeed, there is an objectively-determined truth of whether or not a person’s behavior conforms to that maxim.

To a lesser extent, the same can be said for religious law. While all laws demand some measure of subjectivity, it is also the case that they can be objectively interpreted—within what you might call an interpretive error bound. I think it’s an objective matter of fact, for instance, that a married man who sleeps with another woman has broken the seventh commandment. Maybe neither of them cares about the seventh commandment, and maybe the social groups to which they belong don’t care, either, but the fact remains they have broken it.

Since the above is largely uncontroversial (I should think, anyway), I’m going to wager a guess that you’re referring to some other concept when you talk about objective morality. But what is that concept? I’d appreciate some clarification on what you mean by the term.

 

[Charlemagne_II]

hellopeople

Ayn Ran was a moral objectivist, and if you still don’t think so after reading that commentary you cite in wikipedia, read her essay “The Cult of Moral Grayness.” Here is the opening sentence:

"One of the most eloquent symptoms of the moral bankruptct of today’s culture, is a certain fashionable attitude toward moral issues best summarized as: "There are no blacks and whites, there are only grays. *The Objectivist Newsletter *June, 1964

 

[Syntax]

I must not be seeing what you’re trying to get at here, because it’s quite obvious that different people (including trained philosophers) have dramatically different understandings of what moral terms like “right” and “wrong” mean. So, in what sense are you claiming that the meanings don’t vary?

I misspoke. I intended to say that no matter how different a moral code may be from one society to the next, every culture takes their own fundamental normative activities of praising and blaming to be implicitly appealing to an objectively binding moral code which dictates right and wrong. My point was that people find actions and intentions right and wrong is what is common, even though *what *they find right and wrong may vary in some respects. Though now that I understand better what you are saying, I am sure you would agree.

On the contrary, as long as we have a particular and relevant code of conduct in mind when we utter such a statement, that statement may indeed may be a matter of fact.

Ok. But like I asked very early on, if the objectivity of moral codes are defined by the boundaries of a given cultural domain, how do you propose to resolve cross-cultural asymmetries in opposing judgments? Culture A believes X, culture B believes not-X. There is no objective morally binding codes outside of cultures. Therefore, when one culture A criticizes another culture B, there is no culturally independent moral principle to which A can hope to make a case against B for which A thinks B should accept instead of his own.

Question: should we be tolerant of other cultures?

I cannot defend a position I do not hold.

I am merely trying to figure out what your epistemic reason is for denying there are really existent moral codes independent of culture. What’s your reason?

 

[hatsoff]

I misspoke. I intended to say that no matter how different a moral code may be from one society to the next, every culture takes their own fundamental normative activities of praising and blaming to be implicitly appealing to an objectively binding moral code which dictates right and wrong. My point was that people find actions and intentions right and wrong is what is common, even though *what *they find right and wrong may vary in some respects. Though now that I understand better what you are saying, I am sure you would agree.

Maybe. I’m still not completely sure what you mean, but as long as you’re not objecting to something I wrote, then we can move on.

Ok. But like I asked very early on, if the objectivity of moral codes are defined by the boundaries of a given cultural domain, how do you propose to resolve cross-cultural asymmetries in opposing judgments? Culture A believes X, culture B believes not-X. There is no objective morally binding codes outside of cultures. Therefore, when one culture A criticizes another culture B, there is no culturally independent moral principle to which A can hope to make a case against B for which A thinks B should accept instead of his own.

Question: should we be tolerant of other cultures?

“Should” is determined by values. My own personal values drive me to condemn some other cultures as backwards and immoral—according to my own ethical perspective, of course. I expect yours do as well, which is to say that our values overlap, and we could potentially work together to serve them.

I am merely trying to figure out what your epistemic reason is for denying there are really existent moral codes independent of culture. What’s your reason?

When did I deny that? Anyone can construct an ad hoc moral code independent of culture. It’s just that the most popular moral codes seem to be those which act as cultural identifiers.

 

[Syntax]

Maybe. I’m still not completely sure what you mean, but as long as you’re not objecting to something I wrote, then we can move on.

Perhaps it is important to get on the same page with this. I am making an observation about what most people take themselves to be doing when they pass objective moral judgments. I think it is very plausible to say that when a person from any culture passes the judgment, for instance, that,

“torturing babies for fun is wrong”

he is *taking himself *to be saying,

“torturing babies for fun is always wrong for all cultures, and ought to be wrong even if a different culture may not believe this,”

not,

“torturing innocent babies is wrong for *at least *my own culture, even though other cultures may disagree.”

This distinction will be spelled out further below.

My own personal values drive me to condemn some other cultures as backwards and immoral

What do you mean by “drive” you? That you are “inclined” to judge that other cultural practices can be, in fact, immoral across the board regardless of what that other culture thinks? Or that you are inclined to judge that other cultural practices are, in fact, immoral, but only according to your own point of view and not theirs?

In other words, what exactly is the **content **of your judgment when you criticize another culture’s practices? That they “ought not to be doing X regardless”? Or, that “***if ***they were part of my culture, then they ought not to be doing X”?

—according to my own ethical perspective, of course. I expect yours do as well, which is to say that our values overlap, and we could potentially work together to serve them.

Ok, sure. But be sure you recognize that if a culture believes that torturing innocent babies for fun is morally permissible, then relativism (if it is true) forces you to concede that torturing innocent babies for fun is, in fact, morally permissible too. So torturing innocent babies for fun both is, and is not, morally permissible.

When did I deny that?

That’s what cultural relativism is. If you are having difficulties understanding this consequence, it is because you don’t understand your own view. If objective moral principles can exist independently of a cultural code, then moral principles are not merely cultural codes.

Anyone can construct an ad hoc moral code independent of culture.

If cultural relativism is true, then this new moral code would just be another cultural code.

But, if this “ad hoc” moral code has a truth value independent of any cultural code, then this moral code is not identical to any cultural code–hence this would not actually be cultural relativism.

It’s just that the most popular moral codes seem to be those which act as cultural identifiers.

??

“Should” is determined by values.

What do you mean by “determined”? Do you mean to say that as soon as I (and others) value X that my (and others) very own valuing X establishes a moral fact that everyone should value X?

IF this is what you mean, then does a moral principle always get established as soon as a culture values something? For instance, a culture may highly value its automobiles, but I doubt that implies the culture thinks everyone within that culture ought to be valuing automobiles.

What happens when a culture decides one value, and not another, gets erected as something that ought to be pursued, avoided, or left to the own individual’s personal choices? How is this decided? Are there fundamental moral principles to which a culture will appeal in order to distinguish which values are morally obligatory and which are not?

 

[hatsoff]

Perhaps it is important to get on the same page with this. I am making an observation about what most people take themselves to be doing when they pass objective moral judgments.

I’m not overly concerned with what most people take themselves to be doing. Most people haven’t thought through the issues, and I suspect that most people wouldn’t be able to do so effectively even if they cared to try (which they apparently don’t).

If a person states, “Torturing babies is wrong,” then, under most circumstances, I take them to be saying one of two things: Either they mean

(1) “Most or all of the people belonging to some group G desire to prevent the torture of babies,”

or else they might mean,

(2) “Moral code C directs all people to avoid torturing babies,”

or some variation on one of these.

Notice that each of these restatements has a truth value. Notice also that to evaluate the truth or falsity of each restatement, we look, in the case of (1), at the subjective values of a particular person or group of people, or in the case of (2), at some contextual code of conduct (e.g. God’s supposed moral law).

It is also possible for people to have other concepts in mind when they talk about morality. Unfortunately, I cannot read minds, and even if I could know precisely what they mean, their ideas are not necessarily coherent. So I generally assume a meaning which makes sense to me, and which helps me interact constructively with them.

If you have an alternative definition, I would be happy to consider it.

I think it is very plausible to say that when a person from any culture passes the judgment, for instance, that,

“torturing babies for fun is wrong”

he is *taking himself *to be saying,

“torturing babies for fun is always wrong for all cultures, and ought to be wrong even if a different culture may not believe this,”

not,

“torturing innocent babies is wrong for *at least *my own culture, even though other cultures may disagree.”

This distinction will be spelled out further below.

Okay, but those restatements aren’t really helpful because they still make use of the moral language we wish to define. Can you convert them into statements which avoid terms like “right,” “wrong,” “should,” “ought,” and “obligatory”?

What do you mean by “drive” you? That you are “inclined” to judge that other cultural practices can be, in fact, immoral across the board regardless of what that other culture thinks? Or that you are inclined to judge that other cultural practices are, in fact, immoral, but only according to your own point of view and not theirs?

In other words, what exactly is the **content **of your judgment when you criticize another culture’s practices? That they “ought not to be doing X regardless”? Or, that “***if ***they were part of my culture, then they ought not to be doing X”?

The content is as follows: I dislike the adoption of certain values (e.g. martyrdom values of Muslim terrorists), and because of my personal dislike, I speak out and might potentially take action against those who hold such values. Given the opportunity, I will attempt to persuade them to avoid acting on them, and I will also try to condition them to drop those values.

But you will notice that my statement is ultimately about my own personal subjective feelings about certain behaviors, AKA my social values. In other words, I’m using definition (1) given above, with G = { me }. This is not true for everyone who makes similar statements, of course. Some people have the values of an external group (G) in mind, or they might be referring to some contextual code of conduct (cf. (2) above).

Ok, sure. But be sure you recognize that if a culture believes that torturing innocent babies for fun is morally permissible, then relativism (if it is true) forces you to concede that torturing innocent babies for fun is, in fact, morally permissible too. So torturing innocent babies for fun both is, and is not, morally permissible.

Torturing babies can be permitted by some code of conduct X, and disallowed by another code Y.

That’s what cultural relativism is. If you are having difficulties understanding this consequence, it is because you don’t understand your own view. If objective moral principles can exist independently of a cultural code, then moral principles are not merely cultural codes.

I don’t really have a strong preference for how you choose to label my position, but if the label does not fit, perhaps you will find it easier to stop using it.

Because I regard human beings as the only extant intelligent agents, I am willing to say that all moral codes therefore have their origins in human activity. But this does not have to be the case. If God exists, then he can construct moral codes, too. Regardless, though, I would not characterize every last moral code as a cultural project. As I said previously, people are free to construct their own ad hoc moral codes. You might even be able to design a computer program which generates novel moral codes, although I can’t imagine why anyone would wish to do so.

If cultural relativism is true, then this new moral code would just be another cultural code.

But, if this “ad hoc” moral code has a truth value independent of any cultural code, then this moral code is not identical to any cultural code–hence this would not actually be cultural relativism.

Moral codes don’t have truth values at all. They are prescriptive entities, not descriptions which can be correct or incorrect.

??

Moral codes may be used to help define a social group. For example, if a particular tribe of people condones cannibalism, then that moral view is part of what distinguishes their culture from ours.

What do you mean by “determined”? Do you mean to say that as soon as I (and others) value X that my (and others) very own valuing X establishes a moral fact that everyone should value X?

IF this is what you mean, then does a moral principle always get established as soon as a culture values something? For instance, a culture may highly value its automobiles, but I doubt that implies the culture thinks everyone within that culture ought to be valuing automobiles.

What happens when a culture decides one value, and not another, gets erected as something that ought to be pursued, avoided, or left to the own individual’s personal choices? How is this decided? Are there fundamental moral principles to which a culture will appeal in order to distinguish which values are morally obligatory and which are not?

No, that’s not what I’m saying. Rather, if I have a particular value, then I may use moral language to talk about it. So, instead of saying that I strongly disapprove of some behavior, I may use moral language and say that the behavior in question is “wrong,” or that one should avoid it.

 

[Syntax]

I’m not overly concerned with what most people take themselves to be doing. Most people haven’t thought through the issues, and I suspect that most people wouldn’t be able to do so effectively even if they cared to try (which they apparently don’t).

If a person states, “Torturing babies is wrong,” then, under most circumstances, I take them to be saying one of two things: Either they mean

(1) “Most or all of the people belonging to some group G desire to prevent the torture of babies,”

or else they might mean,

(2) “Moral code C directs all people to avoid torturing babies,”

or some variation on one of these.

Notice that each of these restatements has a truth value.Notice also that to evaluate the truth or falsity of each restatement, we look, in the case of (1), at the subjective values of a particular person or group of people, or in the case of (2), at some contextual code of conduct (e.g. God’s supposed moral law).

I agree. Both (1) and (2) are true. But (1) and (2) are just 3rd-person reports about what we take people to be doing, not a direct re-wording of what they are saying in the 1st-person. So it is clearly false that (1) and (2) are even the contents of their judgments at all.

When I say “No one should torture babies” I didn’t just say “Most or all people belonging to some group G desire to prevent the torture of babies.” I said exactly what I **meant **to say, namely,

“No one should torture babies.”

You can disagree with me all you want, but I seriously doubt you have some priviledged access to my own intentions that I don’t have. It’s presumptuous to think otherwise.

It is also possible for people to have other concepts in mind when they talk about morality. Unfortunately, I cannot read minds, and even if I could know precisely what they mean, their ideas are not necessarily coherent. So I generally assume a meaning which makes sense to me, and which helps me interact constructively with them.

Explain why I am saying something allegedly incoherent when I say “No one should torture babies for fun.” Is it because you just think cultural relativism is true? But that would be special pleading for your view.

If you have an alternative definition, I would be happy to consider it.

Moral “ought” and “ought not” are properly basic semantic terms of their own. They mean something on the lines of “morally permissible and impermissible”, one “should or should not” be doing X. When someone does a wrong action X, there is a **moral law **being broken (not a natural or human law). When I say “Hitler should not have killed 6 million Jews” I am implying

(a) Killing 6 million Jews is bad.
(b) Hitler was an evil person.

but, above all I mean exactly this,

(c) It was *wrong of *Hitler that he killed 6 million Jews.

Okay, but those restatements aren’t really helpful because they still make use of the moral language we wish to define. Can you convert them into statements which avoid terms like “right,” “wrong,” “should,” “ought,” and “obligatory”?

Why must I have to? So you can make them scientifically measurable? So that you can reduce moral terms to some very narrow definition accessible to a psychopath like Charles Mansion? They are properly and semantically basic. It is not my problem if you don’t understand them. We can list many synonyms for morally basic terms, just as we define other words in the lexicon of English words. But somehow I suspect that still won’t satisfy you.

The content is as follows: I dislike the adoption of certain values

Stop. That’s what I thought. You are actually proposing *non-cognitivism *as I defined it already in post #67. You are claiming that when I utter the sentence, “No one should be torturing babies” I really mean “I don’t like it when people torture babies.”

But like I said, I will just disagree with you. What makes you think you have some priviledged epistemic access to the content of my own mental states that I don’t have? Where’s your evidence that your alternate proposal of linguistic meaning is actually contained in my intention behind uttering these words here, and that I am incorrect about what I **think **am saying when I utter the sentence “No one should torture babies”?

(e.g. martyrdom values of Muslim terrorists), and because of my personal dislike, I speak out and might potentially take action against those who hold such values. Given the opportunity, I will attempt to persuade them to avoid acting on them, and I will also try to condition them to drop those values.

Sure. It is quite natural that I will find someone else’s actions very disagreeable when I make a moral judgement . But to make the claim that the **linguistic meaning **of “wrong” is identical to the linguistic meaning of “I don’t like” is going to require much more work here because I don’t see how they mean the same thing at all.

But you will notice that my statement is ultimately about my own personal subjective feelings about certain behaviors, AKA my social values. In other words, I’m using definition (1) given above, with G = { me }. This is not true for everyone who makes similar statements, of course. Some people have the values of an external group (G) in mind, or they might be referring to some contextual code of conduct (cf. (2) above).

No, this is not obvious. “No one should torture babies” does not have the same transparent linguistic meaning as “I don’t like it when people torture babies.” You need to defend that more.

Torturing babies can be permitted by some code of conduct X, and disallowed by another code Y.

Agreed. So?

I don’t really have a strong preference for how you choose to label my position, but if the label does not fit, perhaps you will find it easier to stop using it.

It’s up to you, not me. I’m just trying to figure out your position. So if you intend to make any sense of your view to me, I suggest you clarify your position. You also need to understand what exactly the thesis of cultural relativism is. You are swaying back and forth between

(1) A cultural moral realism. (moral judgments have a cultural-contextual truth value)
(2) A cultural non-cognitivism. (moral judgments do not have a truth value at all. Instead, they are merely identical to subjective belief reports about tastes and preferences. And the latter ARE truth-valuable)

Because I regard human beings as the only extant intelligent agents, I am willing to say that all moral codes therefore have their origins in human activity. But this does not have to be the case. If God exists, then he can construct moral codes, too. Regardless, though, I would not characterize every last moral code as a cultural project. As I said previously, people are free to construct their own ad hoc moral codes. You might even be able to design a computer program which generates novel moral codes, although I can’t imagine why anyone would wish to do so.

Moral codes don’t have truth values at all. They are prescriptive entities, not descriptions which can be correct or incorrect.

Ahhh…but you said earlier that they DO have a truth-value–a **culturally contextual **truth-value that shifts depending on which culture one is in. That’s why I asked you about it a couple days ago. So maybe you need to think more about what you are trying to say?

Moral codes may be used to help define a social group. For example, if a particular tribe of people condones cannibalism, then that moral view is part of what distinguishes their culture from ours.

Agreed. So cultural and moral codes are cultural boundary indicators. So? That doesn’t say anything about whether moral principles themselves have a cutlural dependent, or independent, truth-value.

No, that’s not what I’m saying. Rather, if I have a particular value, then I may use moral language to talk about it. So, instead of saying that I strongly disapprove of some behavior, I may use moral language and say that the behavior in question is “wrong,” or that one should avoid it.

Again, this sounds like non-cognitivism. There are several positions you need to keep in mind that are influencing your position. Cultural relativism can swing several ways with respect to the following dichotomies:

(1) Realism/anti-realism
(2) Cognitivism/non-cognitivism
(3) Cultural moral realism/objective moral realism

 

[hatsoff]

I agree. Both (1) and (2) are true. But (1) and (2) are just 3rd-person reports about what we take people to be doing, not a direct re-wording of what they are saying in the 1st-person. So it is clearly false that (1) and (2) are even the contents of their judgments at all.

It’s not “clearly false” at all. And, for better or worse, that is how I use and interpret moral language.

When I say “No one should torture babies” I didn’t just say “Most or all people belonging to some group G desire to prevent the torture of babies.” I said exactly what I **meant **to say, namely,

“No one should torture babies.”

You can disagree with me all you want, but I seriously doubt you have some priviledged access to my own intentions that I don’t have. It’s presumptuous to think otherwise.

Indeed I would be foolish to tell you what you think, and so I would never venture to try. But until you can tell me what you mean by “should,” then I am at a loss to interpret your statement unless I shoehorn my own definition onto it.

Explain why I am saying something allegedly incoherent when I say “No one should torture babies for fun.” Is it because you just think cultural relativism is true? But that would be special pleading for your view.

I’m not accusing you of making incoherent statements or having incoherent beliefs. In fact, I have no idea what you think about morality. If you want me to critique your view, you have to share it first!

Moral “ought” and “ought not” are properly basic semantic terms of their own. They mean something on the lines of “morally permissible and impermissible”, one “should or should not” be doing X. When someone does a wrong action X, there is a **moral law **being broken (not a natural or human law). When I say “Hitler should not have killed 6 million Jews” I am implying

(a) Killing 6 million Jews is bad.
(b) Hitler was an evil person.

but, above all I mean exactly this,

(c) It was *wrong of *Hitler that he killed 6 million Jews.

The problem with declaring that your terms are semantically basic is that communication cannot proceed unless I also understand the terms as you do. Clearly in this case I do not. From my perspective, and from the perspective of anyone else who does not already happen to have the same undefinable understanding of those terms, you might as well not be saying anything at all.

Why must I have to? So you can make them scientifically measurable? So that you can reduce moral terms to some very narrow definition accessible to a psychopath like Charles Mansion? They are properly and semantically basic. It is not my problem if you don’t understand them. We can list many synonyms for morally basic terms, just as we define other words in the lexicon of English words. But somehow I suspect that still won’t satisfy you.

You claim to have an idea which is inexplicable. That may be great for you, but what is it to me?

If you can figure out how to communicate that idea to me, feel free to let me know. Until then, I can’t really say much more about it.

Stop. That’s what I thought. You are actually proposing *non-cognitivism *as I defined it already in post #67. You are claiming that when I utter the sentence, “No one should be torturing babies” I really mean “I don’t like it when people torture babies.”

Not necessarily. You could also be appealing to a contextual code of conduct. And in either case, your statement has a truth value. This view is incompatible with your definition from post #67, which asserts that non-cognitivists deny that moral statements bear truth.

Or you could be talking about an idea wholly unknown to me, as you claim to be doing.

But like I said, I will just disagree with you. What makes you think you have some priviledged epistemic access to the content of my own mental states that I don’t have? Where’s your evidence that your alternate proposal of linguistic meaning is actually contained in my intention behind uttering these words here, and that I am incorrect about what I **think **am saying when I utter the sentence “No one should torture babies”?

Again, I’m not trying to tell you what you believe. I’m only telling you how I am able to interpret and respond to you.

Sure. It is quite natural that I will find someone else’s actions very disagreeable when I make a moral judgement . But to make the claim that the **linguistic meaning **of “wrong” is identical to the linguistic meaning of “I don’t like” is going to require much more work here because I don’t see how they mean the same thing at all.

No, this is not obvious. “No one should torture babies” does not have the same transparent linguistic meaning as “I don’t like it when people torture babies.” You need to defend that more.

I have told you quite plainly what I mean when I use these moral terms. You don’t have to follow my example and use those terms in the same way, but you can understand what I mean when I use them, because I have provided you with clear definitions. I only wish you could communicate the same information to me regarding your own usage.

Agreed. So?

So now we can be clearer about the limits of our agreement.

It’s up to you, not me. I’m just trying to figure out your position. So if you intend to make any sense of your view to me, I suggest you clarify your position. You also need to understand what exactly the thesis of cultural relativism is. You are swaying back and forth between

(1) A cultural moral realism. (moral judgments have a cultural-contextual truth value)
(2) A cultural non-cognitivism. (moral judgments do not have a truth value at all. Instead, they are merely identical to subjective belief reports about tastes and preferences. And the latter ARE truth-valuable)

Clarify how? I have already been very clear and unambiguous in this thread about how I use and interpret moral language. For example, I have repeatedly stated that moral terms often (but not necessarily always) do have truth values, and I have explained precisely in what sense that may be the case—i.e., how to evaluate their truth or falsity. If you require further information, just let me know what you need, I will be happy to provide it to the best of my ability.

Ahhh…but you said earlier that they DO have a truth-value–a **culturally contextual **truth-value that shifts depending on which culture one is in. That’s why I asked you about it a couple days ago. So maybe you need to think more about what you are trying to say?

I never said that moral codes have truth values. Rather, moral statements may have truth values, and those truth values often depend on a contextual moral code (cf. posts #50, 53).

Hopefully that helps clear up any misunderstanding.

Agreed. So moral codes are cultural boundary indicators. So?

So you asked me what I meant, and I told you. I wish you could do the same, but you claim that your moral terms are “semantically basic” and thus elude any explanation.

Again, this sounds like non-cognitivism. There are several positions you need to keep in mind that are influencing your position. Cultural relativism can swing several ways with respect to the following dichotomies:

(1) Realism/anti-realism
(2) Cognitivism/non-cognitivism
(3) Cultural moral realism/objective moral realism

Again, you are welcome to apply whatever formal labels to me you wish, so long as they fit. Without familiarity with academic literature, I cannot do so myself. I can only do what I have been doing, and explain plainly how I use and interpret moral language. It would be very nice indeed if you could do the same.

 

[AntiTheist]

There’s no such thing as morality. When someone says, “Action X is good,” that person means nothing more than the fact that he happens to like action X. Similarly, when someone says, “Action X is bad,” that person means nothing more than the fact that he happens not to like action X.

Liking or not liking an action is informed by an individual’s set of values, which is something shaped in large part by the society in which one grows up in. Values are informed by biological drives (empathy among them), rational decisions made that promote order and social cohesion (which are ultimately good for the members of societies), and tradition (those decisions that have worked in the past, become codified, and passed on).

Given all of that, it’s not surprising that the vast, vast majority of people in our culture would not like torturing babies. It’s something that our biological empathy resists, and the very idea of inflicting pain unnecessarily is something that conflicts with the values embedded in us by our upbringing.

In other words, the way that people behave and the moral judgments they make are explained adequately by the existence of human values and value judgments. I see no reason to presume that there is anything more than these natural forces in operation.

Some people claim that there is something more than these natural forces – they claim that there is a supernatural force at work that makes some things “objectively” moral for all people, in all places, at all times. I would like to see the evidence for the claim that such supernatural, “objective” morality exists. In the absence of such evidence, I will continue not to believe in it.

 

[Syntax]

It’s not “clearly false” at all. And, for better or worse, that is how I use and interpret moral language.
Indeed I would be foolish to tell you what you think, and so I would never venture to try. But until you can tell me what you mean by “should,” then I am at a loss to interpret your statement unless I shoehorn my own definition onto it.I’m not accusing you of making incoherent statements or having incoherent beliefs. In fact, I have no idea what you think about morality. If you want me to critique your view, you have to share it first!

You can insist all you want you don’t understand what it means when I say “torturing babies is morally wrong because it violates a moral law that resides in the human conscience” but I will just contend you are hiding your head in the sand, which I thoroughly believe that you are doing.

This is the problem with moral relativism–it pretends it is like a blind man that has never seen the color of red. Can you define “red”? No. It is semantically basic. So we can only point to it, not offer measurable definitions. We can only offer it what’s called “ostensible” defintions by drawing it back to your own conscience presuming you have one.

The problem with declaring that your terms are semantically basic is that communication cannot proceed unless I also understand the terms as you do. Clearly in this case I do not. From my perspective, and from the perspective of anyone else who does not already happen to have the same undefinable understanding of those terms, you might as well not be saying anything at all.

Do you understand that “bachelor” means “unmarried man”? I’m sure you do. Why can you not understand that “an action is morally wrong” means “an action violates a moral law contained within the human conscience”?

You claim to have an idea which is inexplicable. That may be great for you, but what is it to me? If you can figure out how to communicate that idea to me, feel free to let me know. Until then, I can’t really say much more about it.

Have you ever seen Charles Manson interviewed? He says the EXACT same thing. I’m completely serious.

So I’m not here to help you see the color red. If you don’t get it, then that’s not my problem.

Not necessarily. You could also be appealing to a contextual code of conduct. And in either case, your statement has a truth value. This view is incompatible with your definition from post #67, which asserts that non-cognitivists deny that moral statements bear truth.

An implicit appeal to a code of conduct by my act of uttering a judgment is not the same as the linguistic meaning of the content of the judgment itself.

Further, I have not contradicted myself. You just don’t understand the view. According to non-cognitivism:

(1) “Torturing babies makes me feel bad” is truth-valuable.
(2) “Torturing babies is wrong” is truth-valuable too, **only if **it means “torturing babies makes me feel bad.”
(3) If “Torturing babies is wrong” means exactly what I say it means, namely, “torturing babies is wrong” then non-cognitivism says this statement does **not **have a truth-value.

**Cognitive **Cultural relativism says:
(1) “Torturing babies is wrong” is true if and only if a culture says it is.
(2) “Torturing babies is wrong” is not true or false independent of what a culture actually believes. So the statement has a contextually determined truth value.

So please tell me your actual view.

Or you could be talking about an idea wholly unknown to me, as you claim to be doing.

Ok, Charles.

I have told you quite plainly what I mean when I use these moral terms. You don’t have to follow my example and use those terms in the same way, but you can understand what I mean when I use them, because I have provided you with clear definitions. I only wish you could communicate the same information to me regarding your own usage.

And I am saying your defintions are incorrect since, if they were true, then I am not meaning what I intend to mean by my moral judgments. So of course I am going to object.

Clarify how? I have already been very clear and unambiguous in this thread about how I use and interpret moral language. For example, I have repeatedly stated that moral terms often (but not necessarily always) do have truth values, and I have explained precisely in what sense that may be the case—i.e., how to evaluate their truth or falsity. If you require further information, just let me know what you need, I will be happy to provide it to the best of my ability.

I’m still confused what you mean. Take non-cognitivism. Suppose the following scenario were to happen. You wake up tomorrow and the entire world suddenly believes torturing babies for fun is morally permissible, and everyone begins to open up restaurants serving deep-fried child liver for lunch. If cultural codes have a truth-value, then when you say “Eating babies for fun is wrong” you would making a judgment that was false since the cultural context disagrees.

Further, if “eating babies for fun is wrong” just means “eating babies for fun displeases me,” then presumably your own private report about your feelings would be true, but “Eating babies for fun is wrong” would be false. Therefore, “eating babies for fun is wrong” does NOT mean “eating babies for fun displeases me.” So non-cognitivism is false.

I never said that moral codes have truth values. Rather, moral statements may have truth values, and those truth values often depend on a contextual moral code (cf. posts #50, 53).

A moral code just consists of a set of moral statements. What else would it be?
You presumably want to say moral codes are identical to cultural codes. I am saying this false since statements within a cultural code can be incorrect about the what the correct moral principles are.

 

[hatsoff]

You can insist all you want you don’t understand what it means when I say “torturing babies is morally wrong because it violates a moral law that resides in the human conscience” but I will just contend you are hiding your head in the sand, which I thoroughly believe that you are doing.

Do you understand that “bachelor” means “unmarried man”? I’m sure you do. Why can you not understand that “an action is morally wrong” means “an action violates a moral law contained within the human conscience”?

What “moral law that resides in the human conscience”? Are you making the same claim as Charlemagne II—that God exists, constructed his own moral code, and designed us to have an instinctual desire to recognize its principles, and to keep them—? If so, then I would need some pretty good evidence before I got on board with that.

This is the problem with moral relativism–it pretends it is like a blind man that has never seen the color of red. Can you define “red”? No. It is semantically basic. So we can only point to it, not offer measurable definitions. We can only offer it what’s called “ostensible” defintions by drawing it back to your own conscience presuming you have one.

I beg to differ.

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red

Maybe you’re referring to so-called qualia, in which case I’d point you to Dennett’s objections.

Have you ever seen Charles Manson interviewed? He says the EXACT same thing. I’m completely serious.

So I’m not here to help you see the color red. If you don’t get it, then that’s not my problem.

That’s quite an assumption. You claim to have access to some kind of mysterious idea which eludes any attempt at explanation. How do you expect me to respond to that?

Suppose I told you that borogoves is a semantically basic term, and if you deny understanding it then you’re just hiding your head in the sand. You’d dismiss my claim as nonsense, and you’d be right to do so.

An implicit appeal to a code of conduct by my act of uttering a judgment is not the same as the linguistic meaning of the content of the judgment itself.

Further, I have not contradicted myself. You just don’t understand the view. According to non-cognitivism:

(1) “Torturing babies makes me feel bad” is truth-valuable.
(2) “Torturing babies is wrong” is truth-valuable too, **only if **it means “torturing babies makes me feel bad.”
(3) If “Torturing babies is wrong” means exactly what I say it means, namely, “torturing babies is wrong” then non-cognitivism says this statement does **not **have a truth-value.

**Cognitive **Cultural relativism says:
(1) “Torturing babies is wrong” if and only if a culture says it is.
(2) “Torturing babies is wrong” is not true or false independent of what a culture actually believes.

So please tell me your actual view.

I don’t hold to any of those views exclusively. Moral language has a wide variety of usage. I gave you two common uses of a certain kind of moral statement, but that is by no means an exhaustive list.

As I said before, people have all kinds of different things in mind when they talk about morality. We do the best we can to interpret their statements. Sometimes we succeed, other times not. If I am to accept your claim that you really do have some kind of inexplicable definitions of right and wrong at your disposal, then this is one such case of failure. But either way, I have no reason to accept your claim, other than your word.

Do you think that’s enough?

And I am saying your defintions are incorrect since, if they were true, then I am not meaning what I intend to mean by my moral judgments. So of course I am going to object.

Definitions are not true or false. They are useful or not useful, common or uncommon, attractive or unattractive, etc. But if I stipulate a definition, I am free to use it.

Like I said, you don’t have to follow suit. I’m not insisting that you use my definitions. But the fact remains that I use them.

I’m still confused what you mean. Take non-cognitivism. Suppose the following scenario were to happen. You wake up tomorrow and the entire world suddenly believes torturing babies for fun is morally permissible, and everyone begins to open up restaurants serving deep-fried child liver for lunch. If cultural codes have a truth-value, then when you say “Eating babies for fun is wrong” you would making a judgment that was false since the cultural context disagrees.

Further, if “eating babies for fun is wrong” just means “eating babies for fun displeases me,” then presumably your own private report be true, but “Eating babies for fun is wrong” would be false. Therefore, “eating babies for fun is wrong” does NOT mean “eating babies for fun displeases me.” So non-cognitivism is false.

There are many different ways, as I have repeatedly said, to interpret moral statements. Different interpretations may indeed lead to different conclusions. However, this does not mean that both interpretations are always inappropriate. It just means that only one interpretation can be correct at any given time—but we knew that anyway.

In your example, you offer two possible interpretations: (a) the speaker is referring to his own subjective social preference; and (b) the speaker is referring to the general feeling of his culture. Which does the speaker intend? In such a situation, we may simply have to ask him if we wish to discover that. And there are plenty of other possible interpretations, too, but nothing forcing us to attribute all of them to him simultaneously.

A moral code just consists of a set of moral statements. What else would it be?
You presumably want to say moral codes are identical to cultural codes. I am saying this false since statements within a cultural code can be incorrect about the what the correct moral principles are.

I don’t even know what you mean by “cultural code.” Do you just mean a set of moral principles uniquely popular in a particular culture? If so, then I believe I have already told you that not all moral codes are used by large numbers of people, and that anyone can construct his own ad hoc moral code.

 

[Syntax]

What “moral law that resides in the human conscience”? Are you making the same claim as Charlemagne II—that God exists, constructed his own moral code, and designed us to have an instinctual desire to recognize its principles, and to keep them—? If so, then I would need some pretty good evidence before I got on board with that.

I do happen to believe that. But it is beside the point. One does not have to believe in God to recognize objectively binding moral principles. And FYI, many atheists would agree with me too.

I beg to differ.

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red

Maybe you’re referring to so-called qualia, in which case I’d point you to Dennett’s objections.

Oh, I see. Like Dennet, you think that lack of scientific evidence for something gives us sufficient warrant to conclude it does not exist? That’s a whopper you need to argue for.

I’ve already written on Dennett’s eliminative materialism numerous times, and it is a poorly argued for assumption. But we can do without qualia anyway. The point is that every word in any language is going to be brought down to a set of interdefinable set of synonymns that is either wide or narrow in scope. And I am merely proposing that “right” “wrong” “good” “bad” are words that are narrowly definable but which you pretend not to understand.

That’s quite an assumption. You claim to have access to some kind of mysterious idea which eludes any attempt at explanation. How do you expect me to respond to that?

That’s not an “assumption”! It is intuitively obvious! Mathematical axioms and logical laws of thought are all undefinable “assumptions” but that doesn’t make them totally irrational or arbitrary or meaningless.

Suppose I told you that borogoves is a semantically basic term, and if you deny understanding it then you’re just hiding your head in the sand. You’d dismiss my claim as nonsense, and you’d be right to do so.

Lol! That’s totally disanalogous and you know it. There is no frame of reference, no meaning, but a string of meaningless symbols. We wouldn’t even be able to talk about it if “wrong” was just as ridiculoulsy unqualified as “borogoves.”

On the contrary, moral vocabularly is meaningful. An action is right if and only if it is conformable to an objectively binding law of conscience. An action is wrong if and only if it is directly contrary to an objectively binding law of conscience.

So you are telling me you don’t know what “wrong” means because you don’t understand what “conscience” means?

Are you telling me that you don’t understand the word “point” means because it is not even definible at all? We can only subtract spatial decriptions from the meaning of the word “point” by saying “a point lacks heighth, depth, and width”–so it is certainly not even definable at all. And you don’t understand what “love” means because you, like Dennett, can’t observe, quantify, measure, or define it? Yes, you ARE putting your head in the sand if you’re human.

I don’t hold to any of those views exclusively. Moral language has a wide variety of usage. I gave you two common uses of a certain kind of moral statement, but that is by no means an exhaustive list.

As I said before, people have all kinds of different things in mind when they talk about morality. We do the best we can to interpret their statements. Sometimes we succeed, other times not. If I am to accept your claim that you really do have some kind of inexplicable definitions of right and wrong at your disposal, then this is one such case of failure. But either way, I have no reason to accept your claim, other than your word.Do you think that’s enough?

Define “Love.” I imagine you will list different instances of it, but fail to offer a good defintion. But that doesn’t entail love is NOT a common element in all different types of expressions OF it. And most importantly, it is NOT tied to any particular instance of it. Just as a the meaning of “wrong” is NOT tied to any particular instance of what a culture will find to be a wrong action.

Definitions are not true or false. They are useful or not useful, common or uncommon, attractive or unattractive, etc. But if I stipulate a definition, I am free to use it.

Sure. And?

Like I said, you don’t have to follow suit. I’m not insisting that you use my definitions. But the fact remains that I use them.

But you will have a hard time making a *moral case *against Hitler. And if everyone around you was a Nazi your use of terms like “right” and “wrong” would have no utility if you think they only mean “what a culture finds valuable and invaluable.” They would just point out that you were clearly behaving unlike the herd, namely, non-culturally.

There are many different ways, as I have repeatedly said, to interpret moral statements. Different interpretations may indeed lead to different conclusions. However, this does not mean that both interpretations are always inappropriate. It just means that only one interpretation can be correct at any given time—but we knew that anyway. In your example, you offer two possible interpretations: (a) the speaker is referring to his own subjective social preference; and (b) the speaker is referring to the general feeling of his culture. Which does the speaker intend? In such a situation, we may simply have to ask him if we wish to discover that. And there are plenty of other possible interpretations, too, but nothing forcing us to attribute all of them to him simultaneously.

Then please illustrate further what you mean here. I am not understanding.

I don’t even know what you mean by “cultural code.” Do you just mean a set of moral principles uniquely popular in a particular culture?

Something like that. A code that a culture unanimously agrees upon as a guide to how people, in fact, behave. But notice, if “ought” is meaningless, then I can’t say “a code that a culture unanimously agree upon as a guide to how people ought to behave.”

If so, then I believe I have already told you that not all moral codes are used by large numbers of people, and that anyone can construct his own ad hoc moral code.

What do you mean by “ad hoc”?

And I’ve already said this “ad hoc” moral code would be false if cultural relativism is true.

 

[hellopeople]

Syntax is on the debate team…

 

[Syntax]

Syntax is on the debate team…

?? I can still see you are incapable of intelligent (name removed by moderator)ut.