Is Philosophy Without Metaphysics Dead?

[a_priori]

Is philosophy without metaphysics dead?

 

[Theophorus]

Yup.
Philosophy without a solid metaphysics first becomes an epistemology of sorts and then degenerates into word games whereupon it is no longer really philosophy.

 

[paziego]

Metaphysics, like epistemology, is only a branch of philosophy. I wouldn’t say all philosophy is dead without metaphysics, only metaphysics. In ethics, for example, we will often have to put metaphysical issues aside in order properly explore the questions.

There have been philosophers in the past - most famously Hume - who reject metaphysics altogether.

My personal belief is that there aren’t any metaphysical questions, and that any that seem truly metaphysical are only epistemological. Most discussions in metaphysics have to do with scientifically inaccurate problem cases (such as brain/personality transplants) where the issue is ultimately empirical, or are simply a case of semantics, where two philosophers are making the same point in slightly different words or with different language.

 

[4love2God]

paziego said it pretty well** : “Metaphysics, like epistemology, is only a branch of philosophy.”**

This is like asking if Mathematics is Dead without Trigonometry.
Without Trig, you will be UNABLE to perform certain Mathematical computations.
But, you WILL still be able to calculate all of the other Mathematical problems.

So, Philosophy is alive-and-well without Metaphysics.
But, a person will not be able to make certain Philosophical arguments (or proofs), without resorting to Metaphysics.

 

[Richca]

Metaphysics, like epistemology, is only a branch of philosophy. I wouldn’t say all philosophy is dead without metaphysics, only metaphysics. In ethics, for example, we will often have to put metaphysical issues aside in order properly explore the questions.

There have been philosophers in the past - most famously Hume - who reject metaphysics altogether.

My personal belief is that there aren’t any metaphysical questions, and that any that seem truly metaphysical are only epistemological. Most discussions in metaphysics have to do with scientifically inaccurate problem cases (such as brain/personality transplants) where the issue is ultimately empirical, or are simply a case of semantics, where two philosophers are making the same point in slightly different words or with different language.

Hello paziego,
Metaphysics deals with immaterial being and especially the First Being, God and the ulitimate causes of things. Now if you take away God you take away the ultimate cause of things and you are left with an assortment of material particular causes which the natural sciences deal with. The natural sciences deal with material substances. As I said, metaphysics deals with immaterial substances and especially God who is the First Being and cause of all. St Thomas Aquinas demonstrates in his summa theologica that there is a First Mover and a First efficient cause of all that we call God. And he also demonstrates that the First Mover cannot be a body or a material being.

 

[polytropos]

My personal belief is that there aren’t any metaphysical questions, and that any that seem truly metaphysical are only epistemological.

This strikes me as a difficult position to hold. Epistemology is the study of knowledge. There are, presumably, objects of our knowledge.* Epistemology studies the extent to which we can know those objects. But it does seem to presuppose those objects. In other words, epistemology is parasitic upon ontology.

*If not (ie. for a solipsist), then the absence of such objects is a metaphysical, rather than epistemological, fact.

 

[ccmnxc]

What answer you might receive could depend on whether the person giving the answer is a realist or an idealist.
Regardless, once one gets rid of metaphysics, you seem to put big dents into other areas of philosophy. Philosophy of nature and philosophy of science would, in my opinion, become completely unintelligible without a metaphysic in place to make sense of them .I think philosophy of mind would be similarly impaired, since metaphysics will often influence one’s starting point (whether it be materialism, dualism, emergentism, etc). Also, it seems metaphysics will affect meta-ethics, which will affect ethical theory, which will affect applied ethics, so it seems even ethics is not spared. There is obviously a contention regarding how much, if at all, epistemology would be affected, and I’m not particularly inclined to get into that whole debate, but it epistemology is really the only “man” standing with the rejection of metaphysics, then I would say yes, philosophy would be essentially dead.

 

[paziego]

This strikes me as a difficult position to hold. Epistemology is the study of knowledge. There are, presumably, objects of our knowledge.* Epistemology studies the extent to which we can know those objects. But it does seem to presuppose those objects. In other words, epistemology is parasitic upon ontology.

*If not (ie. for a solipsist), then the absence of such objects is a metaphysical, rather than epistemological, fact.

You are very right. In that sense there are metaphysical questions (even to doubt metaphysics is to raise a metaphysical question). But it is as you say: epistemology presupposes objects - it is not dependant on the metaphysical questions being answered to do its work, but it leaves them aside.

Perhaps what I meant is that we don’t really have the means to explore these questions the same way we can with epistemology or logic, or other branches of philosophy.

 

[a_priori]

Interesting comments. Thank you. It seems to me that philosophy without metaphysics is eviscerated and lifeless. At that point one is left only with matter, energy and spacetime to produce universals. Philosophy without metaphysics is just physics.

 

[paziego]

That seems perhaps a little bit harsh on the rest of philosophy. What of all those philosophers in universities right now, who have chosen not to specialise in metaphysics but are making valuable contributions in other fields of philosophy?

Yes, it can be argued that if reality is rooted in metaphysics, then anything which studies reality (philosophy, then) must start in metaphysics. But to say that without establishing answers to these questions we cannot address other ones would be false (I think this is called a Socratic fallacy). It is perfectly possible for us to have meaningful discussions in other areas of philosophy (or anywhere for that matter) without first having answers to the underlying metaphysical questions.

For example, I have a plastic chair in my room. Although I don’t know what the chair is exactly made of, what its chemical composition is, how it came to be, or whether it is a three or four dimensional object which either perdures or persists through time, I am still able to have a meaningful discussion on it.

If anything, leaving aside metaphysical questions is what allows us to have other philosophical questions; but that would be misrepresenting the issue. Metaphysics exists as an isolated discipline and is not a perquisite for further discussion. In my personal experience It has proven to be the branch of philosophy with the least bearing on other philosophical discussions.

To my knowledge, metaphysics is the only branch of philosophy to have been doubted or rejected throughout history by a number of philosophers.

Maybe there is some confusion between how the word metaphysics is understood in philosophy and how it is understood in theology. In theology, yes, it is necessary and it is a perquisite, because religion entails a particular metaphysical understanding of reality (and accepts revelation as a source of knowledge). In philosophy, however, a metaphysician may well conclude that there is only physics. (This confusion of two understandings of the same word, with all its consequences and apparent differences of opinion, is a classic example of what underlies many metaphysical discussions).

 

[Jim_Baur]

In addition to what has been discussed, physical scientists need to use the metaphysics, idealist, rationalist to help them access additional dimensions of reality. The portion of reality that is really what forms the physical.

 

[polytropos]

What of all those philosophers in universities right now, who have chosen not to specialise in metaphysics but are making valuable contributions in other fields of philosophy?

It’s not a moratorium on other disciplines. But take an example. J.C.C. Smart’s mind-brain identity theory requires an event rather than constituent ontology. He then argues that it is simpler to suppose that minds and brains are identical. But if we don’t accept an event ontology (which is a question of metaphysics), then the question of simplicity is moot. That’s not to say that the argument isn’t a valuable contribution to philosophy of mind (or that Smart didn’t also address metaphysical issues). But is can’t be fully extricated from the metaphysics.

But to say that without establishing answers to these questions we cannot address other ones would be false (I think this is called a Socratic fallacy). It is perfectly possible for us to have meaningful discussions in other areas of philosophy (or anywhere for that matter) without first having answers to the underlying metaphysical questions.

We can have discussions in other disciplines without answers to all of the metaphysical questions. But it is often the case that discussions in other disciplines will depend on a certain metaphysical stance. To say that metaphysics is indispensable to philosophy is not to say that philosophy can only be done if metaphysics is first completed and agreed upon.

 

[levinas12]

Hello paziego,
Metaphysics deals with immaterial being and especially the First Being, God and the ulitimate causes of things. Now if you take away God you take away the ultimate cause of things and you are left with an assortment of material particular causes which the natural sciences deal with. The natural sciences deal with material substances. As I said, metaphysics deals with immaterial substances and especially God who is the First Being and cause of all. St Thomas Aquinas demonstrates in his summa theologica that there is a First Mover and a First efficient cause of all that we call God. And he also demonstrates that the First Mover cannot be a body or a material being.

Aristotle (and Plato and the other ancient Greek philosophers) do address “immaterial being and especially the First Being and the ultimate causes of things”. But that does not exhaust the subject of metaphysics.

Metaphysics can be credited with the art of making certain types of significant distinctions (see Robert Sokolowski on this). These distinctions are not made “per se” in other disciplines but often presupposed and implicit. Another issue: these distinctions are based on a notion of “nature” or “intelligibility” which is foreign to modern science (this is a topic for a different thread maybe).

Consider the “metaphysical” distinction between essence and accident. This “move” in the game is profound. Everything has a “point” or a “gist”. For example, when we say that a human being is a rational animal, we are trying to pin down what is “essential” as opposed to what is “accidental”. Whether the human being is tall or short is irrelevant - we want to go to the “gist”, the “sine qua non”.

Again, consider the distinction between “beings” and "Being (the “to be”, “esse”, act of existence). This is another breakthrough. And metaphysics is the place where this “distinction” first appeared. By the way, this particular distinction has a long and distinguished history all the way down to the 20th century. For example, Heidegger spent his entire life thinking about what the “to be” means.

But, you might reply, Heidegger is associated with the “death” or the “destruction” of metaphysics. I think this is often misunderstood. Heidegger did not want us to stop reading Aristotle - on the contrary, he insisted that we study Aristotle (and the ancient Greek philosophers) very closely. What was needed was to return to the question of the “to be” in a deeper way, not to quash the question summarily.

 

[paziego]

It’s not a moratorium on other disciplines. But take an example. J.C.C. Smart’s mind-brain identity theory requires an event rather than constituent ontology. He then argues that it is simpler to suppose that minds and brains are identical. But if we don’t accept an event ontology (which is a question of metaphysics), then the question of simplicity is moot. That’s not to say that the argument isn’t a valuable contribution to philosophy of mind (or that Smart didn’t also address metaphysical issues). But is can’t be fully extricated from the metaphysics.

We can have discussions in other disciplines without answers to all of the metaphysical questions. But it is often the case that discussions in other disciplines will depend on a certain metaphysical stance. To say that metaphysics is indispensable to philosophy is not to say that philosophy can only be done if metaphysics is first completed and agreed upon.

Philosophy of mind cannot be extricated from metaphysics because it is a branch of metaphysics. The question is whether it can add anything meaningful to our understanding of the mind outside of empirical investigation.

It is true that when discussing other philosophical issues we will be doing so from a particular metaphysical stance. But since we may not have consciously adopted our stance (or even be aware of it), yet still be able to “do” philosophy, I don’t believe that philosophy is dead without metaphysics.

 

[polytropos]

Philosophy of mind cannot be extricated from metaphysics because it is a branch of metaphysics. The question is whether it can add anything meaningful to our understanding of the mind outside of empirical investigation.

It seems as though it can (though that’s another topic). Godelian considerations, and considerations from the theory of computation, (among other things) would seem to suggest that it is impossible for the brain to be a Turing machine in any straightforward sense.

But since we may not have consciously adopted our stance (or even be aware of it), yet still be able to “do” philosophy, I don’t believe that philosophy is dead without metaphysics.

But philosophy done with an unconscious metaphysical stance is not philosophy without metaphysics.

 

[a_priori]

That seems perhaps a little bit harsh on the rest of philosophy. What of all those philosophers in universities right now, who have chosen not to specialise in metaphysics but are making valuable contributions in other fields of philosophy?

Yes, it can be argued that if reality is rooted in metaphysics, then anything which studies reality (philosophy, then) must start in metaphysics. But to say that without establishing answers to these questions we cannot address other ones would be false (I think this is called a Socratic fallacy). It is perfectly possible for us to have meaningful discussions in other areas of philosophy (or anywhere for that matter) without first having answers to the underlying metaphysical questions.

For example, I have a plastic chair in my room. Although I don’t know what the chair is exactly made of, what its chemical composition is, how it came to be, or whether it is a three or four dimensional object which either perdures or persists through time, I am still able to have a meaningful discussion on it.

If anything, leaving aside metaphysical questions is what allows us to have other philosophical questions; but that would be misrepresenting the issue. Metaphysics exists as an isolated discipline and is not a perquisite for further discussion. In my personal experience It has proven to be the branch of philosophy with the least bearing on other philosophical discussions.

To my knowledge, metaphysics is the only branch of philosophy to have been doubted or rejected throughout history by a number of philosophers.

Maybe there is some confusion between how the word metaphysics is understood in philosophy and how it is understood in theology. In theology, yes, it is necessary and it is a perquisite, because religion entails a particular metaphysical understanding of reality (and accepts revelation as a source of knowledge). In philosophy, however, a metaphysician may well conclude that there is only physics. (This confusion of two understandings of the same word, with all its consequences and apparent differences of opinion, is a classic example of what underlies many metaphysical discussions).

Definitions are always a problem. Is philosophy possible in a strictly mechanical universe? I’m having difficulty with that one, hence the question.

 

[levinas12]

Metaphysics can be credited with the art of making certain types of significant distinctions (see Robert Sokolowski on this).

questia.com/library/journal/1G1-20927690/the-method-of-philosophy-making-distinctions

This is a cite to at least an excerpt from the Sokolowski article.

 

[paziego]

It seems as though it can (though that’s another topic). Godelian considerations, and considerations from the theory of computation, (among other things) would seem to suggest that it is impossible for the brain to be a Turing machine in any straightforward sense.

But philosophy done with an unconscious metaphysical stance is not philosophy without metaphysics.

Metaphysics isn’t something which can be present but running in the background, as philosophy is a conscious act and not a subroutine. A philosophy with what I called an “unconscious metaphysical stance” basically means ignoring the metaphysical considerations outright in favour of whatever feels intuitively right about reality, giving the nature of reality no further consideration, and then successfully philosophising in some other area. It is philosophy without metaphysics. Of course, to an outside observer all this would be happening within a metaphysical context; but all this means is a reality with a metaphysical background (I don’t deny this. I believe this may be casing some misunderstanding). As far as the person doing the philosophical act is concerned - and philosophy must always be an act - metaphysics does not enter the question. Therefore one can “do philosophy” without metaphysics.

I don’t really know anything about theory of computation; it is something I will have to learn about. It sounds quite heavy.

 

[paziego]

Definitions are always a problem. Is philosophy possible in a strictly mechanical universe? I’m having difficulty with that one, hence the question.

I would say Aristotle himself had a very mechanical view of the universe. Even what he meant by “soul” and what we take it to be now are very different things.

Aristotle’s conception of the soul is unlike our modern one; it is not a notion of one’s true self or a metaphysical being dwelling in a bodily vessel. Rather, it is a conceptual property that attributes the function of life to a body, transforming it from potential to actual being.

 

[levinas12]

Is philosophy without metaphysics dead?

I love your Euripedes and Eumenides “tailorism”!