M
MysticMissMisty
Guest
Salvete, omnes!
The Catholic Encyclopedia (the text of which can be found on the New Advent website) describes the following kind of hatred:
CE goes on to say that this kind of hatred is not sinful and may even be the sign of a spiritually sensitive conscience.
This definition seems also to allow, at least to some extent, for the hatred to be directed at a person himself, though, as it says “secondarily” or “derivatively”.
What do folks here think of this particular definition, especially the part that seems to permit some degree of hatred for the actual person?
After all, most of us today, I think, would say that absolutely NO hatred of a person, only hatred of a sin, is permissible, period.
I am wondering also where CE comes up with the “qualification” for its definition, what sources it uses.
Since CE is an older sources, has this part of the teaching somehow been revised to exclude even this qualification? Was this qualification even ever a part of official Church teaching or was it simply derived from “unofficial” moral theological speculations? Has there been any official (or even infallible?/“sensus fidei”) teaching on this subject that would by necessity exclude this qualification?
Furthermore, what, exactly, does the qualification even mean? I mean, if we simply say that we hate th sin and love the sinner, aren’t we really saying that we hate the abstraction of each sin and that we are not connecting it at all with the person? Such a thing would be absurd, IMO, in that, when we are angry at a person, we are angry not only about the effects of the sin but at the person for committing it. So, in some sense, we direct our anger not just at the sin but at the actual person for committing it. However, I’m not sure that the same can be said in regard to hatred. Is it indeed possible to “hate” (in the sense of “thoroughly dislike”) a person for having committed a sin but, at the same time, to feel/act in Christian charity toward him?
I am indeed wondering whether the term “hate” in today’s meaning, has become more the sinfl type of hatred described by CE as follows:
So, then, is it possible, or, at least, would it have been possible up until recent times, to say that “I hate Person X”, and possibly adding the qualification “for doing Y” without sinning and if it meant an extreme dislike or disgust at him?
What got me to thinking about this was, once again, my classical reading. (And, of course, this is a secular/pagan ancient source, but I think it could still contribute to this discussion.) The Roman statesman Cicero is chastising the seditious Catiline for his famous conspiracy. In this oration, Cicero claims that there is no-one within the city of Rome who does not either fear or “hate” him. Cicero makes no objection to this hatred, at least not in this speech, and, thus, would, arguably, seem to lend tacit support to it, possibly even considering it appropriate. If the moral law, at least in its basic form, is even written on the heart of “Gentiles” (we might say non-Jews of Cicero’s day and non-Christians in our era), then one should expect at least some, if not many, people would object to feling such hatred even against Catiline, unless, that is, the “nasty” type of hatred was at that time considered by most non-Jews/Christians ignorantly/misguidedly to be a proper response to immorality such as Catiline’s.
So, again, what are folks’ thoughts on “hating” someone, as defined by CE above, as sometimes being appropriate? Do folks agree? Disagree? Why or why not?
Also, would folks care perhaps to elaborate on the qualification stated in CE under the first definition (“odium abominationis”) as to precisely what is its meaning?
Gratias vobis maximas.
The Catholic Encyclopedia (the text of which can be found on the New Advent website) describes the following kind of hatred:
(my own emphasis added)
CE goes on to say that this kind of hatred is not sinful and may even be the sign of a spiritually sensitive conscience.
This definition seems also to allow, at least to some extent, for the hatred to be directed at a person himself, though, as it says “secondarily” or “derivatively”.
What do folks here think of this particular definition, especially the part that seems to permit some degree of hatred for the actual person?
After all, most of us today, I think, would say that absolutely NO hatred of a person, only hatred of a sin, is permissible, period.
I am wondering also where CE comes up with the “qualification” for its definition, what sources it uses.
Since CE is an older sources, has this part of the teaching somehow been revised to exclude even this qualification? Was this qualification even ever a part of official Church teaching or was it simply derived from “unofficial” moral theological speculations? Has there been any official (or even infallible?/“sensus fidei”) teaching on this subject that would by necessity exclude this qualification?
Furthermore, what, exactly, does the qualification even mean? I mean, if we simply say that we hate th sin and love the sinner, aren’t we really saying that we hate the abstraction of each sin and that we are not connecting it at all with the person? Such a thing would be absurd, IMO, in that, when we are angry at a person, we are angry not only about the effects of the sin but at the person for committing it. So, in some sense, we direct our anger not just at the sin but at the actual person for committing it. However, I’m not sure that the same can be said in regard to hatred. Is it indeed possible to “hate” (in the sense of “thoroughly dislike”) a person for having committed a sin but, at the same time, to feel/act in Christian charity toward him?
I am indeed wondering whether the term “hate” in today’s meaning, has become more the sinfl type of hatred described by CE as follows:
This is the type that CE condemns. Perhaps “hatred” in earlier days of English and, indeed, in the languages of other cultures including, say, the Hebrew, the Greek, the Latin, used the word that we today translate as “to hate” as simply meaning an intense dislike or disgust with a person, primarily because of his sinful actions?
So, then, is it possible, or, at least, would it have been possible up until recent times, to say that “I hate Person X”, and possibly adding the qualification “for doing Y” without sinning and if it meant an extreme dislike or disgust at him?
What got me to thinking about this was, once again, my classical reading. (And, of course, this is a secular/pagan ancient source, but I think it could still contribute to this discussion.) The Roman statesman Cicero is chastising the seditious Catiline for his famous conspiracy. In this oration, Cicero claims that there is no-one within the city of Rome who does not either fear or “hate” him. Cicero makes no objection to this hatred, at least not in this speech, and, thus, would, arguably, seem to lend tacit support to it, possibly even considering it appropriate. If the moral law, at least in its basic form, is even written on the heart of “Gentiles” (we might say non-Jews of Cicero’s day and non-Christians in our era), then one should expect at least some, if not many, people would object to feling such hatred even against Catiline, unless, that is, the “nasty” type of hatred was at that time considered by most non-Jews/Christians ignorantly/misguidedly to be a proper response to immorality such as Catiline’s.
So, again, what are folks’ thoughts on “hating” someone, as defined by CE above, as sometimes being appropriate? Do folks agree? Disagree? Why or why not?
Also, would folks care perhaps to elaborate on the qualification stated in CE under the first definition (“odium abominationis”) as to precisely what is its meaning?
Gratias vobis maximas.
