Is the church's teaching that "life begins at conception" scientific and not a matter of faith/morals?

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I disagree. The MATERIAL for new life comes from preexisting life, but that material is not ittself living. Sperm and eggs do not contain, on their own, the necessary components to be considered living things: a complete DNA code, the potential for growth, etc. Scientifically, life is considered to begin to exist when these things are present. This happens upon conception. So while new life must be preceded by a preexisting life, there is still a decisive moment when that particular life, with its unique DNA, begins to exist, and that is at the moment of conception. I think you took that quote out of context.
but theyre alive… theyre not dead…
 
Life begins at conception:

CCC 2322 From its conception, the child has the right to life. Direct abortion, that is, abortion willed as an end or as a means, is a “criminal” practice (GS 27 § 3), gravely contrary to the moral law. The Church imposes the canonical penalty of excommunication for this crime against human life.

The soul is created immediately:

CCC 366 The Church teaches that every spiritual soul is created immediately by God - it is not “produced” by the parents - and also that it is immortal: it does not perish when it separates from the body at death, and it will be reunited with the body at the final Resurrection.

If I look at these two teachings in my opinion there can only be one way to interpret them and that is that the soul is created immediately when life begins and that is at conception.
 
Life begins at conception:

CCC 2322 From its conception, the child has the right to life. Direct abortion, that is, abortion willed as an end or as a means, is a “criminal” practice (GS 27 § 3), gravely contrary to the moral law. The Church imposes the canonical penalty of excommunication for this crime against human life.

The soul is created immediately:

CCC 366 The Church teaches that every spiritual soul is created immediately by God - it is not “produced” by the parents - and also that it is immortal: it does not perish when it separates from the body at death, and it will be reunited with the body at the final Resurrection.

If I look at these two teachings in my opinion there can only be one way to interpret them and that is that the soul is created immediately when life begins and that is at conception.
How does your interpretation of CCC 366 explain the creation of two spiritual souls for one cell if that cell is destined to become two identical twins? Does the second soul get created when the ball of cells becomes recognizable as two embryos? Or are both souls created at the moment the first cell is fertilized?
 
How does your interpretation of CCC 366 explain the creation of two spiritual souls for one cell if that cell is destined to become two identical twins? Does the second soul get created when the ball of cells becomes recognizable as two embryos? Or are both souls created at the moment the first cell is fertilized?
God works in mysterious ways - and it looks like we mortals don’t have all the answers.🙂
 
maybe his ways are even more mysterious than that, and you know less than you think you do about when life starts.
 
How does your interpretation of CCC 366 explain the creation of two spiritual souls for one cell if that cell is destined to become two identical twins? Does the second soul get created when the ball of cells becomes recognizable as two embryos? Or are both souls created at the moment the first cell is fertilized?
Very good point. Here modern science, it has seemed to me since I learnt of this reality at my Catholic school in 1972, is a strong antidote to too simplistic an understanding of “soul and body” by the faithful (which is most of us, including myself).

(The traditional theological understanding of soul and body (and their relationship) is very deep and difficult. It certainly cannot be understood without understanding Aristotle’s philosphy of Hylomorphism from which it was derived by medieval theologians.)

If it is accepted that the very first clump of divided cells generated after fertilisation of the ovum (I won’t say “conception” because not everybody seems to accept this definition) can be “teased out” with a needle and each sub-clump or single cell will then become an identical twin embryo if left separated … then we seem to have a new theological problem.

We have a further problem if it is also accepted that these separated clumps (with their gelatinous coatings) can be easily stuck together again by human intervention and will still become that single embryo it was destined to be before “teasing out.” This is an even bigger difficulty for simplistic soul/body understanding.

Are we to say that we are one moment causing God to create human souls by means of a needle and then the next moment, when we push these identical cells together again,
they are being sent to limbo? And if the sub-clumps get pushed together again which soul “wins” … is it the original soul before the break-up, one of new souls, or yet another new soul?

(Scholastic theologians would not have seen this as a problem because they would say no eternal human soul is involved in early stages of pregnancy - we are only dealing with finite vegetative or animal “souls”).

And if the above apparantly luidicrous theological positions are not acceptable then when does a single, unique human soul actually get created?

Is it when the clump of cells can no longer be teased out successfully? Or is it when the initial repeated cell division into identical cells eventually stops and cell differentiation then begins within this “clump” instead? If so, then this is clearly at a time well after fertilisation of the ovum!

I do not know the answer. But what it does seem to mean, by extension, is that even in ordinary “scientific” debate use of concepts like body and soul may not be appropiate or helpful tools if we try to use them too forcefully or “scientifically”.

It seems, at the time of conception, we may not really know what these words/concepts mean or how they apply to the scientific facts as we understand them.
 
…And if the above apparantly luidicrous theological positions are not acceptable then when does a single, unique human soul actually get created?..
I submit that it does not really matter for us. We cannot observe the creation of a soul while we are in the world, and the creation of a soul cannot affect us right now in any measurable way. The only reason this question even came up is as a defense of the sanctity of life from the moment of conception. I submit that the principle of sanctity of life can stand on its own without any dubious support of concepts about associate souls. I maintain that such life is sacred whether or not God has chosen to bind a soul to it at that time. Can’t we just let this aspect of God’s creation just be a mystery and leave it a that? What difference would it make to our theology if God decided to create a soul one year before conception? Or one month after? God does not have to tell us everything he is doing.
 
While science may coincide with Church teaching, the Church is not teaching science. The Church is stating a doctrinal truth of faith and morals about human life. It is based on the human person being made in the image and likeness of God-- i.e., presence of a spiritual soul.
The Church can and does comment on science since it deals with the whole person as a physical reality. Life begins at conception.

lifenews.com/2011/11/18/scientist-human-life-begins-at-conception-fertilization/

epm.org/resources/2010/Mar/8/scientists-attest-life-beginning-conception/

Peace,
Ed
 
I submit that it does not really matter for us. We cannot observe the creation of a soul while we are in the world, and the creation of a soul cannot affect us right now in any measurable way. The only reason this question even came up is as a defense of the sanctity of life from the moment of conception. I submit that the principle of sanctity of life can stand on its own without any dubious support of concepts about associate souls. I maintain that such life is sacred whether or not God has chosen to bind a soul to it at that time. Can’t we just let this aspect of God’s creation just be a mystery and leave it a that? What difference would it make to our theology if God decided to create a soul one year before conception? Or one month after? God does not have to tell us everything he is doing.
LeafByNiggle
Yes I agree absolutely. The principle of the sanctity of life does stand on its own merits and this aspect of God’s creation is a mystery that isn’t well defended by loose use of “soul talk.”

(BTW souls don’t really get “bound to a body”, nor can they exist before its own concpetus is formed … at least not in Catholic philosophy).
 
Or are both souls created at the moment the first cell is fertilized?
That’s precisely the problem. Unfortunately, a lot of people are so enamoured with it has unique human DNA so it must be human notion than they do not realize they are completely missing the soul in the picture.

And there’s an even bigger problem with cloning. With cloning, you take an ovum, remove its genetic material, and replace it with a genetic material from an adult individual. There’s no fertilization to speak of. And, the DNA of the new entity is identical to that of the original. However, the cloned individual is obviously a seperate individual. Logically, it should have its own soul, no? So tying soul to conception (and DNA) leads to a contradiction.

Next, consider a procedure known as intracytoplasmic sperm injection, where a single sperm is directly injected into the ovum. This creates a fertilized egg. (That egg may, or may not develop.) However, if we take the extreme “soul at conception” view, then the egg after ICSI is ensouled. But, this leads to another problem, because the conception happened artificially – hence, God would have to create the sould precisely at the moment human operator chose. This leads to conclusion that God is not omnipotent.

So it appears to me that we would have to revert back to the idea of delayed ensoulment. However, if we do so, then the whole “human life begins at conception” mantra goes out of the window, because unensouled biological material (despite being technically alive) cannot be considered human.

After thinking about the issue I have a disturbing impression that the religious opposition to in vitro fertilization (or cloning) is, at least partially, fueled by the fact that the mere feasibility of in vitro fertilization creates a lot of theological problems.
 
I submit that the principle of sanctity of life can stand on its own
You’ve just introduced a new axiom of the Catholic faith.
Can’t we just let this aspect of God’s creation just be a mystery and leave it a that?
Can’t we just let the problem of planetary motion be a mystery and leave it at that?
What difference would it make to our theology if God decided to create a soul one year before conception? Or one month after?
Actually, quite dramatic as far as moral implications are concerned. Without soul, you just have a lump of cells, not a human. So delayed ensoulment severely weakens (if not outright nullifies) the arguments against early abortion or embryo selection.
 
And there’s an even bigger problem with cloning. With cloning, you take an ovum, remove its genetic material, and replace it with a genetic material from an adult individual. There’s no fertilization to speak of. And, the DNA of the new entity is identical to that of the original. However, the cloned individual is obviously a seperate individual. Logically, it should have its own soul, no? So tying soul to conception (and DNA) leads to a contradiction.
This is silly. The purpose of making a big deal of the fact that the new life has a different set of DNA is that it helps identify the baby as a separate human life in 99% of cases. Your supposed “problem with that” is a technicality and totally ignores the spirit of what is being identified here. The rationale of pointing out the difference in DNA is to point out that you have a separate human life from the mother (which is how most babies come into the World).

The “DNA argument” is used to counter the idea that the baby is just a “blob of tissue” and not a separate human life. In the case of cloning you provided you still have a separate human life, even if that life is a copy of another.

After this point is established you can then go onto argue what “stage of development” is necessary before that life is worth protecting like any other life. At no point though can you deny you have a separate human life.

You could say that it is Church teaching that every human life has a right to life.
2258 “Human life is sacred because from its beginning it involves the creative action of God and it remains for ever in a special relationship with the Creator, who is its sole end. God alone is the Lord of life from its beginning until its end: no one can under any circumstance claim for himself the right directly to destroy an innocent human being.”
Unless you wish to redefine human life, I don’t see why this is difficult to grasp. The only difference between the Church’s position and others is that the Church views all human life as equal, where as others wish to categorize it and treat it differently based on a variety of variables.
 
This is silly. The purpose of making a big deal of the fact that the new life has a different set of DNA is that it helps identify the baby as a separate human life in 99% of cases. Your supposed “problem with that” is a technicality and totally ignores the spirit of what is being identified here.
Again, the problem is that we have two definitions of human:
  • theologically, a human has a soul. It follows that if something does not have a soul, than it is not human.
  • biologically, a human is a separate organism which has human DNA.
The issue is that at early stages of development, while the organism is, biologically speaking, human, things can happen which (in some views) preclude the possesion of soul by such organism. So the “person at conception” worldview hits me as purely materialistic.

Paradoxically though, the self-described materialists believe exactly the opposite. One commenter over at the PZ Myer’s blog put it succintly:
The biological machinery that will build a person is not equivalent to a person. Personhood is a status of sapience and sentience that requires an advanced CNS. Fetal tissue is part of the chemical process that produces a person. Aborting fetal tissue from the body of a living person is no more murder than aborting construction half way through is equivalent to trashing a car.
 
There are legitimate issues of metaphysics that need to be informed by science, if we are ever to be able to address the key issue in Roe v. Wade – that prior to the point of fetal viability, Section 1 of the first part of the 14th Amendment (passed alongside the abolition of slavery), requires that “due process of law” be followed in enforcing any ban on abortion. Prior to viability, and any time early in pregnancy, it is difficult for an outsider (such as law enforcement) to prove that a woman is pregnant, so state laws interfering with her getting an abortion necessarily infringe on the privacy of the doctor-patient relationship.

The metaphysics of the status of a baby in utero, prior to being viable outside the womb, must be established in such a way that establishes its legal standing. DNA, by itself, does not establish the metaphysical status of the baby – gene expression (e.g., protein synthesis) does, and that’s heavily influenced by the environment in which a cell exists. Hence, from cells that would normally grow into a fully-developed baby in utero, you have human embryonic stem cell lines that continue to be pluripotent, without differentiation into organ systems. The key issue in the legal standing of pre-viable unborn life is that if you remove the environment (e.g., the body of the mother), the DNA and fetal cells, by themselves, are insufficient to grow into a person of legal standing. Catholic metaphysics recognize the sufficiency of ensoulment to grant a right to life, not on the basis of physical phenomena, but on the basis of theology.

In the U.S. legal system, in general, we recognize rights under what in my view is a system of Kantian metaphysics, which focuses heavily on the consciousness of individuals. Individuals who are not conscious, such as persons in vegetative states, are not granted defensible rights under the constitution.

For a right to be enforceable in the U.S., it must be demonstrated that (1) an individual has been harmed, (2) by the actions of another individual (or the state), and (3) that legal intervention in the actions of the offending individual will make the offended individual whole (either through constraints on their actions, punishment, or reparation). The problem in the U.S. is that an individual right to life rests on the metaphysical status of the unborn individual. Unfortunately, from my naive “pop science” understanding of it, Catholic metaphysics has yet to have the scientific heft needed to establish the legal right, given privacy.

In my eyes, the key metaphysical questions to grapple are:
(1) What, short of consciousness [which can’t be proven *in utero] is sufficient to establish a legal standing of rights?
(2) Given that in utero, development depends on the environment of the mother’s body, what are potential handholds of in utero rights if the mother wishes to deny the use of her womb for in utero development?
(3) What biological processes must be better understood to establish (1) and (2)? What is the current state of understanding of these processes?
 
Aborting fetal tissue from the body of a living person is no more murder than aborting construction half way through is equivalent to trashing a car.
This is flawed, though. First, because a car does not grow, it is an assembly. A person (even if you recognize personhood at infancy) continues to grow. It is an entity that grows and matures until death. The zygote grows and matures until death. It is a human being.

Second, even if a car did grow after assembly, once the car is ‘put together’ it is a car. A human being is a human being once it is ‘put together’ by the union of sperm and egg.
 
Again, the problem is that we have two definitions of human:
  • theologically, a human has a soul. It follows that if something does not have a soul, than it is not human.
  • biologically, a human is a separate organism which has human DNA.
The issue is that at early stages of development, while the organism is, biologically speaking, human, things can happen which (in some views) preclude the possesion of soul by such organism. So the “person at conception” worldview hits me as purely materialistic.

Paradoxically though, the self-described materialists believe exactly the opposite. One commenter over at the PZ Myer’s blog put it succintly:
First off many would tell you that every living thing has a “soul” that animates it and gives it life. If something is alive, then by definition it has a soul. If we are talking about a human life, then we are talking about an immortal soul. Now I doubt your going to deny that at conception we have something that it is alive correct? And it certainly is a human life, yes? Thus you have your answer.
 
Can’t we just let the problem of planetary motion be a mystery and leave it at that?
The big difference is that planetary motion is subject to experimental verification, while ensoulment at conception is not. I’m not saying it isn’t true. I’m just saying that knowing whether it is true or not makes no difference in what we should do here. I have no trouble treating newly conceived life as sacred even without explicitly thinking about souls.

I am still waiting for someone to answer the question of how many souls are created at conception if the cell is destined to become identical twins. It is not twins yet. It is still one cell. But it will become twins - with two souls. So do both souls exist at initial conception? Or does it become two cells when the embryo divides into two separate embryos?
 
Again, the problem is that we have two definitions of human:
  • theologically, a human has a soul. It follows that if something does not have a soul, than it is not human.
The logic above may not be quite airtight. Animals have souls. Vegetative matter has soul. Anything alive has to have a soul, that is why its alive and not a heap of organic chemicals. It was beleived the conceptus/embryo was successively vivified by a vegetative (cellular) soul then an animal soul then finally an eternal human soul. Yet even if the primitive embryo did not have a human soul (i.e. it perhaps had an animal soul) it still possessed some “human potentiality” even in its “animality” that meant it was on the way to soon have a human soul.
  • biologically, a human is a separate organism which has human DNA. ]:
I believe numerous other different definitions have been assumed in this thread as well.

The Catechisms Implicit Definition of “Human” in Abortion Section
The most important one, for the purposes of this discussion, is probably the one implied in the Catholic Catechism. I usually find that formal Catholic moral teaching is pastoral and pragmatic in intent/explanation and does not usually try to justify itself by adopting any particular metaphsyic or scientific system/theory/considerations.

It tends to be based on traditional church practise and references to Scripture or the Church Fathers (sometimes in a less than exact manner, not that that matters greatly). It is reticent to rest on prevailing mainstream philosophy or science of the day and such use, when made, often seems indirect. And this intuition is probably sound given the changability of such philosophical/scientific “orthodoxy” over time.

In the section on Intentional Homicide [CC 2268-2269]) I find it interesting that under this heading (i.e. Homicide) Infanticide is listed as especially grave but Abortion is not. A whole section is then given to Abortion under its own heading (and there it is considered an abominable crime along with Infanticide). Is this strange ommission an ongoing “vestigal” sentiment from ancient mainstream theology which held, perhaps due to incorrect scientific embryonic understanding at the time, that abortion’s crime wasn’t always “homocide” - the killing of a human. Or are we being too analytical here.

In any case, in the Abortion section [2270-2275] it is crystal that the conceptus must be given full right to life (the same as any human individual) and treated as fully human. This seems accorded on the basis of an assumed “teleology” (“purpose” if you will) inherent in the conceptus itself; it will become like us in the natural course of events.

In other words the Catachism seems curiously less concerned about defining what/when “true human life” begins. Sometimes the “embryo” is spoken about impersonally, sometimes it isn’t. However the teaching becomes very categorical in asserting that (whatever mystery is at work in the process of creating) the mysterious cells which will become a human child … that “life” has the same right to life as you and I.
The issue is that at early stages of development, while the organism is, biologically speaking, human, things can happen which (in some views) preclude the possesion of soul by such organism. So the “person at conception” worldview hits me as purely materialistic. ]:
It may not be materialistic if a transient “animal soul” was posited? However the Catholic church does not seem to endorse this theology any more so maybe we shouldn’t talk about “ensoulment” at all if we aren’t prepared to allow for vegetable or animal souls as well.
 
The big difference is that planetary motion is subject to experimental verification, while ensoulment at conception is not. I’m not saying it isn’t true. I’m just saying that knowing whether it is true or not makes no difference in what we should do here. I have no trouble treating newly conceived life as sacred even without explicitly thinking about souls.

I am still waiting for someone to answer the question of how many souls are created at conception if the cell is destined to become identical twins. It is not twins yet. It is still one cell. But it will become twins - with two souls. So do both souls exist at initial conception? Or does it become two cells when the embryo divides into two separate embryos?
LeafByNiggle
Perhaps you may need to brush up on present understanding of initial embryonic development to fully understand the implications of above discussion in this regard.

My understanding (which I haven’t checked up on for some years but I believe is still sound) is as follows. If I have this wrong somebody please correct me.

The initial cell is not “destined” to become twins. While twins can come about in a number of ways I believe “identical twins” can only come about in one way as follows:

When the fertilised ovum develops it divides into two identical cells. Then each of these cells does the same until you have a large mass of perfectly identical cells. At some stage this process changes and we start to get the production of differentiated cells and the building of internal structure. An embryo.

However at the very early stages (say when we have 2,4, or 8 identical cells) these cells can, rarely, become split off from each other due to natural means (or human manipulation) because they are only loosely/lightly “glued” to each other. If they continue to develop separately (and don’t “glue” back together again) they will develop into identical twins.

The difficulty for “human ensoulment at conception” talk by lay people is that we seem to be talking about the mass creation/destruction and perhaps re-commitment of souls all at the whim of cellular “glue” and a fine needle. That sounds fanciful.

Personally I have never come across a Thomistic theologian writing about “human en-soulment at the moment of conception” who tackles these issues. If someone can find something I would be interested to see it. There is much ancient theological speculation about “vegetative en-soulment” at this stage of life (not that they knew about such cellular development).

If people must drag out the medieval theology of “en-soulment” to “solve” the problems of modern day science and the abortion debate about when “human life begins” then maybe we should be consistent and talk about “vegetative en-soulment” not “human en-soulment” wrt the conceptus. That would probably clear up the above conundrum quite nicely but it would mean we can no longer use the “en-soulment argument” against advocates of abortion or for defining when human life begins.

Actually we probably never could any way.
To say that human en-soulment occurs at conception therefore human life begins at conception is little more than a tautology, a word game. It isn’t science. I am not yet convinced it is even correct application of philosophy/theology so far as scholastic definitions of “body and soul” are concerned. (Though I would like to be corrected on this matter).
 
I’m actually curious when human life ends. When is someone dead?
I know the rote answer is “when the soul leaves the body,” so when does that happen?

If I suffer head trauma, but my heart is beating, my liver filtering, and my lungs breathing I am still alive, yes?
But if the head trauma is severe enough that they take me to be an organ donor… my organs are all still functioning. The geographic distribution is a bit broader, by my heart is still beating, my liver filtering, and my lungs breathing. Am I dead now?

What exactly makes the difference? After which organ was removed did my soul leave?

Also, if all living things have souls, and single-celled organisms are living, does that mean all my cells have their own souls?
 
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