Is the distinction between subjective and objective bogus?

[Prodigal_Son]

Consider the statement: “There is a hat over there.” Conventionally, we say that this statement is either true or false, and this depends upon the way things are in the world. Now consider the statement “There is a hat over there, and it exists independent of all minds.”

This statement is certainly either true or false, but is there any way that this statement could possibly be based on experience? I suppose you could say this: Suppose there is something (a shoe, perhaps) that exists independent of all minds. Some mind apprehends this shoe, and then says that “That shoe exists independent from my mind.” In this case, their statement is based on experience.

But in order to say that such a case exists, you must first stipulate the assumption that the shoe exists independent of all minds. What reason do we have to make that assumption? It is not necessary for practical purposes, because we can very well believe that nothing exists independent of mind and yet function within a mind-dependent reality that does not rely on our whims, but rather on our observations. This reality would be the “object” of our knowledge, but it would not be objective in the sense of “independent of all minds”. Neither would reality be subjective (at least not from the human perspective); it would clearly be organized in a way that we cannot control, and our experiences would be “indexed” to fit together nicely with all other experiences.

“Prodigal,” you might now be saying, “you have been duped! You have fallen for idealism, and idealism in the most pernicious sense! Surely you jest?”

But I’m not jesting. Neither, however, am I advocating idealism. I am simply saying that I see no evidence to distinguish between the claims of realism and idealism. Why should I not withhold judgment?

Nevertheless, if you’d like to convince me (or yourself) that there is an external world, I would invite you to communicate to me what you mean by “external world”. How did you ever get the idea of a world that exists independent of human minds? It did not occur to you, certainly, because of any experience. Does the fact that we can imagine something independent of mind give us any reason to believe it is possible for something to actually be independent of mind?

Believe it or not, I *haven’t *been reading Berkeley. But I’m beginning to understand why he claimed his strategy was to save the Western mind from skepticism. Many of the subject/object distinctions demanded by realism are *not *demanded by logic, and they tend to warp our view of reality – case in point, the so-called conflict between science and religion. (But, in the interests of keeping this thread alive, let’s not go there.)

What think ye?

 

[Betterave]

I’ve discussed this issue with a certain “enlightened” atheist and here’s the deal: in the pursuit of knowledge we only need one assumption: reality is real.

…yeah, you’re right: he doesn’t understand the issue.

Anyway, the distinction isn’t bogus, but the way people tend to think that it is an absolute distinction is a major cause of confusion around here. (Especially among the ‘subjective’ moralists.)

 

[AntiTheist]

Nevertheless, if you’d like to convince me (or yourself) that there is an external world, I would invite you to communicate to me what you mean by “external world”. How did you ever get the idea of a world that exists independent of human minds? It did not occur to you, certainly, because of any experience. Does the fact that we can imagine something independent of mind give us any reason to believe it is possible for something to actually be independent of mind?

Naturally, it’s possible that what we call the “external world” is really just a part of my consciousness and I’m dreaming this whole thing called life. It’s also possible that the world was created last Tuesday by mischievous pixies and we were all given memories of events that supposedly took place before then. It’s also possible that the universe is created, destroyed, and re-created every nanosecond by microscopic insectoid creatures. Etc., etc.

Any of those things could be true. The fact of the matter is: 1) We have no way to figure out if reality is “real” or not, and 2) For all practical considerations, it’s irrelevant whether reality is “real” or not.

If the world is an illusion, it’s a remarkably consistent illusion that obeys certain regular laws and admits no variation of them.

So, when I speak of the “external world,” I mean nothing more than the part of my personal experience that I label as having the appearance of not depending on any conscious mind. I make such labelings based on the best evidence available to me, always willing to change that label to account for evidence. For example, I light a match and walk out of the room; regardless of what I think, the room burns to the ground. The fire does not depend on my thoughts.

Certainly, the fire could be unreal and part of my consciousness; certainly, the fire could be a manifestation of lundar beasts from dimension X who assume the forms of flame; certainly, it could be that I’m in a mental hospital dreaming about the fire.

None of those considerations actually matter for practical purposes: I am perfectly capable of labeling the fire as something that has the appearance of operating without the necessity of any conscious mind.

 

[Magnanimity]

Nevertheless, if you’d like to convince me (or yourself) that there is an external world, I would invite you to communicate to me what you mean by “external world”. How did you ever get the idea of a world that exists independent of human minds? It did not occur to you, certainly, because of any experience. Does the fact that we can imagine something independent of mind give us any reason to believe it is possible for something to actually be independent of mind?

The great American pragmatist, C.S. Peirce, once quipped of Berkeley that he “argues the whole with a cleverness which every reader admits, but which few are convinced by.” I think history has shown Peirce to have been correct on both counts. Berkeleyan idealism is very clever and bolstered by powerful arguments, yet almost no one believes that it is true (or even that generic idealism is true).

Ravi Zacharias argues, and I happen to agree with him, that any philosophical system must be “experientially relevant.” At least one major problem with idealism is that it is experientially irrelevant. Idealism has very little ability to account for two common ways in which we all naturally become realists.

You challenge your reader, and somewhat beg the question, how did we ever get the idea of a world that exists independently of the human mind? First, we are all natural realists surely not on the basis of philosophizing, but rather through our experience. And there are, as I claim above, two common experiences which readily incline us to what we call the fact (not ‘idea’) of the distinction between our minds and external objects perceived by our minds.

The first common support for realism and objectivity is through our experience of newly perceived objects, especially when such objects have little obvious relation to objects previously perceived such that we are surprised by our perception in these instances. The second common support for realism is found in mistaken perceptions (eg, illusion and/or hallucination). The meaning of illusion begins to break down within idealism, yet illusion or misperception is a universal experience of the world which readily and frequently reminds us that our minds (subjects) and things external to them (objects) are distinct from one another.

 

[James_S_Saint]

The discussion of subjectivity vs objectivism is the same discussion as relativity vs absolutism.

In relativity, all measurements are relative, but what is being measured is not. In subjectivity, all perceptions are relative, but what is being perceived is not.

The relativist extends the notion of relativity to the exclusion of absolutes and proclaims that what is being measured is no more than its measurement. The subjectivist (solipsist) extends subjectivity to the exclusion of objects and proclaims that what is being perceived, the objects, are no more than their perception.

In relativity, it is noted that the speed of light is independent of the observer and thus is not relative. This occurs because the observer is made of the very same propagation that determines that speed of light. To every observer, the speed of light measures the same. As the observer travels faster, he changes and thus his measurement standard changes leaving the propagation speed of light from him appearing to be the same. He thinks slower, but the light is still leaving him. This is the clue that something is absolute and it is *only *the measurements of an observer that are relative. There is an absolute, unchanging, non-relative relation between the observer and the observed.

In subjectivity, it is noted that every subject perceives that same objects and thus there is something that is not subjective. This occurs because the subject senses that same stimuli that determines what is perceived. To every subject, the object appears the same. As the subjects senses or perception change, how they perceive the object changes in detail, yet it is still a perception of an object. He merely perceives it differently, but it is still an “it”. This is the clue that something is objective and it is *only *the perception that is subjective. There is an objective, unchanging, non-subjective relation between the perception and the perceived.

In relativity, what caused the absolute relation between the propagation and the observer?

In subjectivity, what causes the objective relation between the perceived and the perception?

The **absolute **is that the only things that are relative, are measurements. And the **objective **truth is that the only things that are subjective, are perceptions.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

Any of those things could be true. The fact of the matter is: 1) We have no way to figure out if reality is “real” or not, and 2) For all practical considerations, it’s irrelevant whether reality is “real” or not.

But what on earth do you mean by the question “Is reality real?” People tend to assume statements like “a dream isn’t real” are true, but why? There are certain statements that would be true or false in a dream. When we say a dream isn’t real, we are really saying that a dream is contained, and that its inhabitants were not sentient.

Reality is real, because certain statements are true about it. We believe that “other people experience life roughly like I do” is one such true statement. The better question is this: is reality contained or uncontained?

Certainly, the fire could be unreal and part of my consciousness; certainly, the fire could be a manifestation of lundar beasts from dimension X who assume the forms of flame; certainly, it could be that I’m in a mental hospital dreaming about the fire.

But you’re mistaking me for Descartes here. I’m not saying that our ability to imagine “unreal” scenarios gives us reason to doubt our conventional views. No, rather, I am asking: when you say there is an “external” world, what are you talking about? How did you ever get an idea of such a thing? All I know of is the world of experience, and experience communicates objects that seem to act independently of my conscious mind.

In other words, **I would propose we use the word “independent” for objective, and “dependent” for subjective. ** But as soon as we say this, it becomes clear: what is independent of one person may be dependent upon another. “Subjectivity” and “objectivity” depends on your point of view.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

Ravi Zacharias argues, and I happen to agree with him, that any philosophical system must be “experientially relevant.” At least one major problem with idealism is that it is experientially irrelevant.

Interesting. But I don’t see how realism is experientially relevant either. At any rate: Idealism plus God equals realism. Short of that, I’m not even certain what “realism” means.

The first common support for realism and objectivity is through our experience of newly perceived objects, especially when such objects have little obvious relation to objects previously perceived such that we are surprised by our perception in these instances.

You would have the same experience if you were contained within the world of Middle Earth, that was created by Tolkien’s mind. The objects of perception exist independently of your experiencing them, but it does not follow that they exist independent of *all *experience.

The second common support for realism is found in mistaken perceptions (eg, illusion and/or hallucination). The meaning of illusion begins to break down within idealism, yet illusion or misperception is a universal experience of the world which readily and frequently reminds us that our minds (subjects) and things external to them (objects) are distinct from one another.

Once again, this is a problem for idealism without some independent entity to define it. As soon as you have an Author for the work of the universe, it is not surprising that a character might be deceived in the course of the story.

 

[AntiTheist]

But what on earth do you mean by the question “Is reality real?”

I’m trying to respond to the intellectual dribble that is idealism. By “reality,” I simply mean things that possess the appearance of existing independently of all minds, so far as I can tell. I agree that the question “Is reality real?” is a nonsense, pointless question, for reasons that I will repeat below the next quote.

The better question is this: is reality contained or uncontained?

Again, we have no way of knowing if reality is “contained,” and even if it is “contained,” it has no bearing on the way that we interact with the “contained” reality, which appears to be perfectly consistent and appears to operate even when people aren’t thinking about it.

when you say there is an “external” world, what are you talking about?

A label. “External” is a label for a part of my completely subjective experience. It means nothing other than “that part of my experience that I label as having the appearance of operating independently of all minds.” It matters not one bit whether it is ultimately independent of all minds

How did you ever get an idea of such a thing?

Our idea of externality is a mental model we use to facillitate survival. There’s almost certainly an evolutionary advantage afforded by the ability to conceive of the world as something external to the self, regardless of whether it’s ultimately true or not.

All I know of is the world of experience, and experience communicates objects that seem to act independently of my conscious mind.

Precisely. “Real” and “external” are my labels for things that seem to act independently of my conscious mind and the mind of others – to the best of my knowledge, always subject to change.

In other words, **I would propose we use the word “independent” for objective, and “dependent” for subjective. **

That’s what I mean by objective and subjective.

But as soon as we say this, it becomes clear: what is independent of one person may be dependent upon another. “Subjectivity” and “objectivity” depends on your point of view.

Could you give a concrete example of what you mean here? From where I sit, it’s trivially easy to determine that, to the best of my knowledge, my coffee mug does not depend on anyone’s mind. Again, it may be that it depends on my neighbor’s mind, or something like that, but without any evidence for that or good reason to think that, I’m not going to. I’m going to continue to label my mug as “external,” which means “a part of my completely subjective experience that I label as having the appearance of not depending on any minds.”

 

[Betterave]

I’m trying to respond to the intellectual dribble that is idealism.

“Intellectual dribble that is idealism”? What are you referring to? (I can’t help but suspect that you know very little about idealism.)

 

[Magnanimity]

Interesting. But I don’t see how realism is experientially relevant either. At any rate: Idealism plus God equals realism. Short of that, I’m not even certain what “realism” means.

Idealism plus God equals Berkeleyanism where God gets to fill in all the gaps in idealism itself. I’m referring to the way in which realism accounts readily for the common human experiences I alluded to. Idealism plus God only accounts for it in a filling-in-the-gaps sort of way. Whence the illusion? God did it!

You would have the same experience if you were contained within the world of Middle Earth, that was created by Tolkien’s mind. The objects of perception exist independently of your experiencing them, but it does not follow that they exist independent of *all *experience…Once again, this is a problem for idealism without some independent entity to define it. As soon as you have an Author for the work of the universe, it is not surprising that a character might be deceived in the course of the story.

The God of the gaps in Berkeleyanism… A significant problem with these suggestions, other than them being no improvement on realism, is that one does not have to grant your starting point. I alleged earlier that you framed your original question in a way that would already lead you toward the answer you want to give-“where did you get the idea…,” but the realist can and will reject that idealistic starting point. To suggest that a distinction between subject and object is an “idea” is to already be halfway toward the position of idealism. But who would naturally say it’s an “idea?”

There is no evidence to suggest that realism, being the view of nearly everyone, is arrived at philosophically and thought of as an idea. The common way of speaking about the distinction between my mind and that which is external to it is to speak of it as a fact borne out of my experience of the world, not an idea. On the other hand, theistic idealism, I would grant, is arrived at philosophically, but no one naturally gets to that position through experience of the world. Plenty are realists, however, through everyday experience of the world.

 

[Betterave]

Idealism plus God equals Berkeleyanism where God gets to fill in all the gaps in idealism itself. I’m referring to the way in which realism accounts readily for the common human experiences I alluded to. Idealism plus God only accounts for it in a filling-in-the-gaps sort of way. Whence the illusion? God did it!

The God of the gaps in Berkeleyanism… A significant problem with these suggestions, other than them being no improvement on realism, is that one does not have to grant your starting point. I alleged earlier that you framed your original question in a way that would already lead you toward the answer you want to give-“where did you get the idea…,” but the realist can and will reject that idealistic starting point. To suggest that a distinction between subject and object is an “idea” is to already be halfway toward the position of idealism. But who would naturally say it’s an “idea?”

There is no evidence to suggest that realism, being the view of nearly everyone, is arrived at philosophically and thought of as an idea. The common way of speaking about the distinction between my mind and that which is external to it is to speak of it as a fact borne out of my experience of the world, not an idea. On the other hand, theistic idealism, I would grant, is arrived at philosophically, but no one naturally gets to that position through experience of the world. Plenty are realists, however, through everyday experience of the world.

Of course if we beg all the questions, it’s easy to refute idealism. But why should an idealist grant that “no one naturally gets to that position through experience of the world”? Are you going to say that this proposition is not an idea either? That the meaning of “naturally,” “experience,” and “world” are simply facts?

 

[Betterave]

From where I sit, it’s trivially easy to determine that, to the best of my knowledge, my coffee mug does not depend on anyone’s mind. Again, it may be that it depends on my neighbor’s mind, or something like that, but without any evidence for that or good reason to think that, I’m not going to. I’m going to continue to label my mug as “external,” which means “a part of my completely subjective experience that I label as having the appearance of not depending on any minds.”

…so “external” is a completely “internal” designation? Sounds like Berkeley to me (sans Dieu, bien sur, so there’s certainly no defense against skepticism to be found in Anti’s version of idealism)!

 

[Magnanimity]

Of course if we beg all the questions, it’s easy to refute idealism. But why should an idealist grant that “no one naturally gets to that position through experience of the world”? Are you going to say that this proposition is not an idea either? That the meaning of “naturally,” “experience,” and “world” are simply facts?

I disagree that idealism, not least Berkeley’s version, is easy to refute. I agree with Peirce, Berkeley argues the whole position with an excellent amount of clever and sophisticated arguments. I remember them well from undergrad. But, this fact only supports my contention that you get to such an idealistic view of things where you deny the existence of matter and admit the existence of Plato’s Ideas (which Berkeley does both) through philosophizing.

Perhaps I need to state the claim I made earlier more pointedly. The only person who would even frame the question like this, ‘Where did you get the idea that there are objects which are external to your mind even when you’re not perceiving them?’ is a person who is already starting from a position of idealism. Joe the plumber takes
the ball he sees to be external to his mind as a brute fact, a given of experience. Or, would you suggest that Joe would really utter (or even think in terms like this) “I have an idea that the ball I presently perceive is external to my mind”?

So, big surprise, huh?! You start with a question with obvious idealistic underpinnings and you end up with idealism.

 

[Betterave]

I disagree that idealism, not least Berkeley’s version, is easy to refute. I agree with Peirce, Berkeley argues the whole position with an excellent amount of clever and sophisticated arguments. I remember them well from undergrad. But, this fact only supports my contention that you get to such an idealistic view of things where you deny the existence of matter and admit the existence of Plato’s Ideas (which Berkeley does both) through philosophizing.

Perhaps I need to state the claim I made earlier more pointedly. The only person who would even frame the question like this, ‘Where did you get the idea that there are objects which are external to your mind even when you’re not perceiving them?’ is a person who is already starting from a position of idealism. Joe the plumber takes
the ball he sees to be external to his mind as a brute fact, a given of experience. Or, would you suggest that Joe would really utter (or even think in terms like this) “I have an idea that the ball I presently perceive is external to my mind”?

So, big surprise, huh?! You start with a question with obvious idealistic underpinnings and you end up with idealism.

Well the point is that Joe the plumber can certainly understand the utterance you suggest and that he can understand this based on his experience of the world. The philosophy/ experience of the world dichotomy doesn’t stand up to scrutiny, and Joe’s at least rudimentary ability to understand ‘philosophical’ ideas proves this. You seem to be forced to maintain that one’s starting point is a brute dichotomous fact: it’s idealism *or *it’s experience of the world. Do you think Joe will be easily convinced of that? (To what extent is that relevant?) Suppose the brute fact of this dichotomy is not obvious, how would you propose to explain it?

 

[Leela]

The discussion of subjectivity vs objectivism is the same discussion as relativity vs absolutism.

These two discussion are related in that once we drop the subject-object picture of reality, we no longer think to ask, “is it absolute or relative?” The issue doesn’t get solved so much as dissolved.

With regard to the title of the thread, I would say that the subject-object distinction is not false but it is just one possible way of thinking about experience. These notions are not metaphysical “givens” but are instead tools that we have developed for coping with the world that are useful for certain purposes.

 

[Betterave]

These two discussion are related in that once we drop the subject-object picture of reality, we no longer think to ask, “is it absolute or relative?” The issue doesn’t get solved so much as dissolved.

With regard to the title of the thread, I would say that the subject-object distinction is not false but it is just one possible way of thinking about experience. These notions are not metaphysical “givens” but are instead tools that we have developed for coping with the world that are useful for certain purposes.

Is it *possible *to drop the “subject-object picture of reality” (i.e., the concepts of subjectivity and objectivity as being pertinent for understanding reality)? Is it possible to drop the up-down picture of reality, or the land, sea, and sky picture of reality, the better-worse picture of reality, etc.? What kind of possibility are we talking about here?

 

[Leela]

Is it *possible *to drop the “subject-object picture of reality” (i.e., the concepts of subjectivity and objectivity as being pertinent for understanding reality)? Is it possible to drop the up-down picture of reality, or the land, sea, and sky picture of reality, the better-worse picture of reality, etc.? What kind of possibility are we talking about here?

Some more philosophically interesting alternatives besides land-see-sky might be ying-yang or Brahman-Atman or patterned-unpatterned or past-future or self-other…but I kinda like your better-worse.

I think that there is no pre-ordained requirement for us to think of the primary division of reality as into subjects and objects. We don’t have to think that there is any single primary division into which reality demands to be sliced. Any intellectual slicing we do is done because human being have the desires they have. Different dualisms can serve different purposes without privileging any one way of slicing as the essence of how reality really is in itself.

Best,
Leela

 

[Betterave]

Some more philosophically interesting alternatives besides land-see-sky might be ying-yang or Brahman-Atman or patterned-unpatterned or past-future or self-other…but I kinda like your better-worse.

I think that there is no pre-ordained requirement for us to think of the primary division of reality as into subjects and objects. We don’t have to think that there is any single primary division into which reality demands to be sliced. Any intellectual slicing we do is done because human being have the desires they have. Different dualisms can serve different purposes without privileging any one way of slicing as the essence of how reality really is in itself.

Best,
Leela

I hate to be a boor, but have you answered my question?

 

[Leela]

I hate to be a boor, but have you answered my question?

I thought I did with a “yes.”

The distinction between metaphysical categories of “things that are objective” and “things that are subjective” is, for example, replaceable by a continuum between “things that are easy to get agreement on” to “things that are hard to get consensus about” though this replacement may itself not count among the things that are easy to get agreement on right now since our culture is steeped in the objective/subjective mindset.

Best,
Leela

 

[Betterave]

I thought I did with a “yes.”

The distinction between metaphysical categories of “things that are objective” and “things that are subjective” is, for example, replaceable by a continuum between “things that are easy to get agreement on” to “things that are hard to get consensus about” though this replacement may itself not count among the things that are easy to get agreement on right now since our culture is steeped in the objective/subjective mindset.

Best,
Leela

Yes, I hear your yes, but I didn’t just ask yes-no questions. That’s obviously a distinction that we can’t really maintain - it’s yes or it’s no. (Or is it? Probably it’s not - i.e., I’m coming down on the “no” side of the ‘yes-no continuum’ here - and noting that it’s a ‘continuum’ has nothing to do with suggesting it might be possible to drop it!)

Anyway, I think you’ve given a simple reductive definition for the distinction between subjective and objective that is completely untenable. What does “ease of getting agreement” have to do with “objective things”? I think you’ve made a category mistake here. “Subjective” and “objective” are correlative concepts; they are not epistemic descriptors of “things” (whatever you mean by that). Their popular use as epistemic terms of appraisal, it seems to me, has nothing to do with their meaning in metaphysics (i.e., qua categories for understanding reality). But I suppose you may demur… Can explain your position further then?