Is the Golden Rule a Foundational Moral Principle or A Rule of Thumb?

[Bradski]

Again, like Roscoe’s response, this is a tautology. “A creature has dignity because it is sentient” and “Because it is sentient, a creature has dignity”.

But I didn’t say that a creature has dignity because it is sentient. I said: ‘Bestowing dignity is recognising that a sentient creature has worth, or value’.

Sentience in itself is not what bestows dignity. It’s the fact that a sentient creature is perceived to have worth in itself. I used the qualifier ‘sentient’ because I wanted to differentiate anything that has worth in itself with things that have worth, for example, as part of the eco-system. Plankton has value because it’s part of the food chain but no-one is going to argue that an individual plankton could be described as dignified.

So if you perceive that something has worth in itself (a dog for example), then you can consider that creature to have dignity. As opposed to an individual plankton, which doesn’t.

Again, this proves my point that morality is quite a different matter from empathy and explaining how people might come to feel empathy for others does not explain why moral obligations exist.

I’m finding it difficult to envisage a situation where I felt morally obliged to a course of action that didn’t involve a third party with whom I would feel empathy. Morality cannot happen in a vaccum. If I asked you if it was morally wrong to kill Tribbles, then you wouldn’t be able to answer unless you knew what a Tribble was. Then your answer would depend on whether you thought a Tribble had worth in itself. If it did, then you would feel empathy for its situation if someone was going to kill it.

 

[Bradski]

So are you of the opinion that someone whose morality is different than yours has different obligations?

If so, then you must see that you could never tell a person, “You can not do [A]” or “You must do B]”?

My morality is slightly different to yours. Therefore we have different obligations. It cannot possibly be any other way. I obviously think that my morality is correct and that, therefore, yours, in certain areas, is not.

So why can’t you tell me that I am wrong and vica versa?

I can’t see that there can be two equally correct answers to a moral problem. Therefore one is wrong (or less right). Therefore I feel entirely at ease telling you, or anyone else, that what they are doing is wrong. As far as I’m concerned. And I can give valid reasons for me being able to do so.

Just because you can make an argument that a racist has, what is for her, a valid morality, doesn’t mean that you have to accept it as being correct. In fact, if it’s different to yours, then you would certainly think that it’s wrong.

 

[PRmerger]

Do you veiw morality as telling other people what to do?

Morality, in general, is a paradigm which says, “[A] is what we must do as moral agents” and " B] is what we must not do as moral agents".

Now, could you please address my question?

So are you of the opinion that someone whose morality is different than yours has different obligations?

If so, then you must see that you could never tell a person, “You can not do [A]” or “You must do B]”.

Is that your paradigm, Roscoe?

 

[PRmerger]

The commonality between groups would be some sort of internal consistency in explaining how the morality dictated by the group makes rational sense both to the members of the group and to members of other groups,** who may not entirely agree with it**.

I don’t understand this part, friend.

How can something “make rational sense to…[members] who may not entirely agree with it”?

 

[PRmerger]

But I didn’t say that a creature has dignity because it is sentient. I said: ‘Bestowing dignity is recognising that a sentient creature has worth, or value’.

Fair enough.

Sentience in itself is not what bestows dignity. It’s the fact that a sentient creature is perceived to have worth in itself

Perceived by whom?

This would, again, appear to be tautological: “A creature has dignity when it is perceived to have dignity.”

Why does a human person have inherent dignity?

I used the qualifier ‘sentient’ because I wanted to differentiate anything that has worth in itself with things that have worth, for example, as part of the eco-system. Plankton has value because it’s part of the food chain but no-one is going to argue that an individual plankton could be described as dignified.

Right.

And why is that? What makes a human person “valuable and worthy” but a plankton “valuable but not worthy”??

You said it’s not sentience that is the qualifier.

So what is it that gives an entity its inherent worth?

So if you perceive that something has worth in itself (a dog for example), then you can consider that creature to have dignity. As opposed to an individual plankton, which doesn’t

Tautological, friend.

 

[PRmerger]

My morality is slightly different to yours. Therefore we have different obligations. It cannot possibly be any other way. I obviously think that my morality is correct and that, therefore, yours, in certain areas, is not.

Interesting.

You feel that there are some areas in which I am incorrect in my discernment of what is moral and immoral.

So there is an objective morality to which you appeal, yes?

IOW: morality is less like, “I think turnips are the best root vegetable, and you don’t. That’s fine for you. Not for me.”

And more like, “This is a circle, and if you think it’s a square you are incorrect”, yes?

https://encrypted-tbn2.gstatic.com/...cfzA-z1uC_D_yc8u8OXPk0bYsz-sYMLROgP8KapO_bvWU

 

[Roscoe_Turner]

I realize Roscoe can speak for himself, but I don’t think he means that one’s own behavior determines morality. Rather it seems he means that the moral code of the group to which one belongs may differ from that of another group. The commonality between groups would be some sort of internal consistency in explaining how the morality dictated by the group makes rational sense both to the members of the group and to members of other groups, who may not entirely agree with it. This sounds like moral relativism, and perhaps it is, but I can understand within certain limits how it might apply. For example, the contentious issues of abortion, euthanasia, suicide, just war, and others involve differences of belief and faith, even within a single faith, grounded in their own perspectives of morality.

Piggybacking here,

I can recognize that different groups have different moralities, without prescribing to another.

Circumcision as an example. It can be looked at as a moral outward covenant with the Creator, a cosmetic surgery, or immoral genital mutilation, depending on which moral code you prescribe.

All three moralities can and do function within the United States.

 

[Peter_Plato]

My morality is slightly different to yours. Therefore we have different obligations. It cannot possibly be any other way. I obviously think that my morality is correct and that, therefore, yours, in certain areas, is not.

So why can’t you tell me that I am wrong and vica versa?

I can’t see that there can be two equally correct answers to a moral problem. Therefore one is wrong (or less right). Therefore I feel entirely at ease telling you, or anyone else, that what they are doing is wrong. As far as I’m concerned. And I can give valid reasons for me being able to do so.

Just because you can make an argument that a racist has, what is for her, a valid morality, doesn’t mean that you have to accept it as being correct. In fact, if it’s different to yours, then you would certainly think that it’s wrong.

There is an inconsistency here because you say

1. “…we have different obligations. It cannot possibly be any other way”

But then add

1. “I can’t see that there can be two equally correct answers to a moral problem. Therefore one is wrong (or less right)”

The question you seem to be dancing around is whether “being wrong” means the racist is obliged to change her behaviour even though she may think there is nothing morally wrong with it. This is the question, at heart, that Roscoe was asking and PR is implying is the case.

Roscoe asked whether anyone has a right to tell others what to do. In a sense, this is a meaningless question because it is not a person that “tells” another what is right or wrong, it is morality itself that does. The person relaying their position is merely the agent for morality and is simply passing on the answer to the question in much the same way as a scientist passes on the truth about physics or chemistry, to the best of their ability.

As rational beings, we are obliged to accept the truth whether that be in science or morality. If something is morally wrong, we are obliged to live by that knowledge.

I suspect what underlies this issue is the difference between obligation (or permissibility) and culpability.

A human being who has grown up in a culture where the practice of cannibalism is sanctioned by their society may be less culpable for killing and eating another human, but that is not the same as being morally permitted to engage in killing simply because their social group deems it so.

If killing and eating another human being is impermissible for human moral agents then it is as impermissible for this group of human moral agents as it is for any other group.

Ignorance of morality may render individuals in the group less culpable for doing something impermissible than human individuals in other groups, but it certainly doesn’t entail that they are morally permitted to engage in the action. The moral rules don’t change because of circumstance. If something is immoral, it is so for all human moral agents.

A three year old child who steals from another is still doing something impermissible (morally wrong) even though his age and immaturity may mitigate his culpability. He may not be culpable for his actions, but that does not mean he is thereby permitted to engage in them.

Where this question becomes foggy is with issues that are somewhat contentious, but that is to admit that in our present state of existence, we have not found a satisfactory answer to some moral questions. This would also be true in science where open questions exist.

The moral dilemma surrounds the question of obligation with issues that are, in fact, contentious. All humans would still be obligated to the correct moral view (as it becomes clear) even though the culpability of those who espoused some other view may have been lessened.

All that, however, does not mean we can, as human moral agents, simply ignore those questions as unimportant. We are obligated to find the moral answer by discourse and reason and then live by it.

Given this, a human being being who claims others “do not have a right to tell him what is moral” simply does not understand what morality means. Indeed, we have an obligation to make morality clear to each other and to seek clarity where differences exist. I would argue that we are obligated to listen to differing viewpoints as an aspect of moral deliberation.

It is never correct to focus the dispute onto the person by claiming they “have no right.” The focus ought to be on the correctness of the moral position itself and the “right” it has to impose an obligation on me.

The person presenting the viewpoint is irrelevant concerning my obligation. To claim another person has no right to impose their morality is committing what is akin to the genetic fallacy in logic. The fact that they are proposing a viewpoint is largely inconsequential to whether the viewpoint is the correct one.

 

[Peter_Plato]

Piggybacking here,

I can recognize that different groups have different moralities, without prescribing to another.

Circumcision as an example. It can be looked at as a moral outward covenant with the Creator, a cosmetic surgery, or immoral genital mutilation, depending on which moral code you prescribe.

All three moralities can and do function within the United States.

These aren’t moralities. They are moral viewpoints on the practice of circumcision.

It does not mean any one of them is the correct viewpoint. In fact, it may be that circumcision is not a moral question at all and that raising it as a moral question is simply making a category mistake.

Some may believe it to be a religious obligation, others a health issue and others an undesirable and painful procedure.

Someone who thinks it to be morally objectionable would have to make a moral case against the practice. That case, if it is founded merely on personal distaste, would be as weak as their threshold for pain. Something is NOT immoral merely because it is painful or stressful.

Actually there are not three moral viewpoints on the question. There can only be two.

1. Circumcision is morally impermissible because …
2. Circumcision is morally permissible (or obligatory) because…

Any other view is merely an expression of some non-moral position.

 

[meltzerboy]

I don’t understand this part, friend.

How can something “make rational sense to…[members] who may not entirely agree with it”?

There are several moral as well as social and political issues which I can find rational from more than one perspective, including the issues I mentioned: abortion, euthanasia, suicide, just war, as well as same-sex marriage, the belief or non-belief in G-d, and others. There may be two, three, or more sides to each of these issues, and people frequently debate their positions using rational (and emotional) arguments. Even if I think that my own position is more rational, it doesn’t mean other points of view are irrational or that I cannot understand the rational sense of these views. Some might call this moral relativism. I prefer to call it cognitive complexity: a psychological term that means we humans have the ability to think of complex issues in terms of gray areas and ambiguities rather than necessarily in black and white.

 

[PRmerger]

There are several moral as well as social and political issues which I can find rational from more than one perspective, including the issues I mentioned: abortion, euthanasia, suicide, just war, as well as same-sex marriage, the belief or non-belief in G-d, and others. There may be two, three, or more sides to each of these issues, and people frequently debate their positions using rational (and emotional) arguments. Even if I think that my own position is more rational, it doesn’t mean other points of view are irrational or that I cannot understand the rational sense of these views. Some might call this moral relativism. I prefer to call it cognitive complexity: a psychological term that means we humans have the ability to think of complex issues in terms of gray areas and ambiguities rather than necessarily in black and white.

Ah, very good, then. I see your point.

However, in the end, when dealing with issues of morality, one must come to a decision. [Behavior A] is either moral or immoral. We may be able to see the “sides” which complicate the issue, but that does not mean that morality is not objective.

For example, I may see the “side” in the pro-choicer’s camp which states, “No woman ought to be forced into motherhood!”

However, the objective truth is: motherhood is “forced” upon all women who are already mothers. For example, all mothers have probably thought, “I didn’t sign up for this waking up every 20 minutes to calm a crying baby.” Yet, there is no morally sane person who would say, “Therefore, a woman should not be forced to remain a mother. It is morally permissible for her to kill her baby.”

 

[meltzerboy]

Ah, very good, then. I see your point.

However, in the end, when dealing with issues of morality, one must come to a decision. [Behavior A] is either moral or immoral. We may be able to see the “sides” which complicate the issue, but that does not mean that morality is not objective.

For example, I may see the “side” in the pro-choicer’s camp which states, “No woman ought to be forced into motherhood!”

However, the objective truth is: motherhood is “forced” upon all women who are already mothers. For example, all mothers have probably thought, “I didn’t sign up for this waking up every 20 minutes to calm a crying baby.” Yet, there is no morally sane person who would say, “Therefore, a woman should not be forced to remain a mother. It is morally permissible for her to kill her baby.”

In certain areas of morality, such as the example you give, most (sane) people come to the decision that a mother does not have a right to kill her baby just because the baby is an inconvenience to her lifestyle. However, in other areas of morality, there are diverse moral viewpoints, such as the criteria for a just war and the morality of war altogether, as well as most of the other issues I referred to in the previous posts. Does one need to come to a moral decision on these issues? I suppose so, particularly if the issue affects one personally. If it does not, however, one has the privilege of philosophizing and presenting intricate hypothetical situations, such as we do a lot here in the Philosophy Forum.

 

[Roscoe_Turner]

I was merely asking if PR thought of morality as dictating the behavior of others. It is my position is a mantle or cross that we choose to adhere to. We are to represent our morality.

Because I choose to indulge in certain behaviors that other find immoral, drinking alcohol, dancing, eating pork, etc doesn’t mean I am amoral. Nor does It mean I am compelled to make them engage in my behaviors. They have chosen a more restrictive morality. I can make my case and they theirs but as the old saw goes my right to swing my arm ends at the other guys nose. (in the inverse as well)

I can choose not to steal because I fear retribution, legal or eternal or I can choose to not steal because I can see that I wouldn’t want others to steal from me so I will not steal from others. (golden rule ) I find the latter to be the moral position, the former reactive and not internally driven, so lacking as a moral position.

In the case of your cannibals, a moral case could be made for a group like the Donner party acted in a moral way by indulging in cannibalism. It is situationally dependent.

To return to the case of circumcision. A moral case can be made for or against. I wouldn’t characterize either position as amoral. They are both stating a moral case. They are each functioning within their sense of morality.

I agree that only if someone finds the argument for a moral position compelling will they follow the morality of it. In defense of our “own nose” in the midst of swinging arms we are obligated to state our position.

 

[Peter_Plato]

In certain areas of morality, such as the example you give, most (sane) people come to the decision that a mother does not have a right to kill her baby just because the baby is an inconvenience to her lifestyle. However, in other areas of morality, there are diverse moral viewpoints, such as the criteria for a just war and the morality of war altogether, as well as most of the other issues I referred to in the previous posts. Does one need to come to a moral decision on these issues? I suppose so, particularly if the issue affects one personally. If it does not, however, one has the privilege of philosophizing and presenting intricate hypothetical situations, such as we do a lot here in the Philosophy Forum.

However, the one option a moral agent does not have regarding moral questions is to conclude that it does not matter which side is taken - that is entirely what makes it a moral question after all, i.e., that we are obliged to accept the decided answer to every moral question.

We cannot choose to simply sidestep the question completely and pretend both sides of a moral question CAN be correct, because THAT is making a determination that the question is NOT a moral one after all because whatever choice is made is inconsequential.

The point of moral questions is that the answer DOES matter and the choices ARE monumentally consequential. In fact, there is an obligation to find the “right” answer that is implicit in moral questions.

 

[Roscoe_Turner]

I think that May bring us back to navigating the sea of morality with the ship called “the golden rule”

 

[Peter_Plato]

I can choose not to steal because I fear retribution, legal or eternal or I can choose to not steal because I can see that I wouldn’t want others to steal from me so I will not steal from others. (golden rule ) I find the latter to be the moral position, the former reactive and not internally driven, so lacking as a moral position.

Ultimately, I don’t see that these two positions are even distinguishable. If you refrain from stealing from a motive that you “wouldn’t want others to steal from me” then it boils down to fear of retribution in the sense of you fearing the loss of something you value. The motive is essentially the same in both cases because in both cases it is essentially your welfare that is at stake and serves as the motive behind whichever course of action you take.

What you are proposing is that the question of theft is not a moral one after all, but merely a pragmatic one. IF you don’t want others to steal from you, then you won’t steal from others. Ultimately, there can be no obligation that derives from this moral position because IF a person doesn’t mind others taking from him/her, then the conclusion (from your position) is that it would be quite permissible for them to steal from others, provided they don’t mind others stealing from them.

Nothing can be obligatory, based on your ethical beliefs precisely because the ultimate ground is the moral self that makes the decision. Ultimately, you are denying that morality has any absolute sense in which things might be right or wrong independent of the motives a moral agent might have.

My point is that the reason or motive an agent has for doing what is right is quite a different matter from whether the action is right or not.

You are claiming agents must have a motive or reason for doing what is right, I am claiming that is precisely the problem.

Agents do not need a motive or reason because the obligation is the motive. No other “justification” is necessary. It is not necessary to justify a moral decision by appeal to self-preservation, fear of punishment or any other emotional impetus. Moral beings recognize rightness and wrongness in the same way sentient beings perceive light or sound vibrations.

It doesn’t make moral sense to say: "The reason I refrain from killing others is because I don’t want them killing me.” That simply seems an inferior position to: “It’s morally wrong to kill others without some justifiable reason.”

 

[Aloysium]

. . . Because I choose to indulge in certain behaviors that other find immoral, drinking alcohol, dancing, eating pork, etc doesn’t mean I am amoral. . . .They have chosen a more restrictive morality. . . .

You might be, but perhaps just don’t see it.
A morality that is chosen is no more than a life-style, with no moral truth to compel, describing only an inclination or preference to act in certain ways.

 

[Roscoe_Turner]

Ultimately, I don’t see that these two positions are even distinguishable. If you refrain from stealing from a motive that you “wouldn’t want others to steal from me” then it boils down to fear of retribution in the sense of you fearing the loss of something you value. The motive is essentially the same in both cases because in both cases it is essentially your welfare that is at stake and serves as the motive behind whichever course of action you take.

What you are proposing is that the question of theft is not a moral one after all, but merely a pragmatic one. IF you don’t want others to steal from you, then you won’t steal from others. Ultimately, there can be no obligation that derives from this moral position because IF a person doesn’t mind others taking from him/her, then the conclusion (from your position) is that it would be quite permissible for them to steal from others, provided they don’t mind others stealing from them.

Nothing can be obligatory, based on your ethical beliefs precisely because the ultimate ground is the moral self that makes the decision. Ultimately, you are denying that morality has any absolute sense in which things might be right or wrong independent of the motives a moral agent might have.

My point is that the reason or motive an agent has for doing what is right is quite a different matter from whether the action is right or not.

You are claiming agents must have a motive or reason for doing what is right, I am claiming that is precisely the problem.

Agents do not need a motive or reason because the obligation is the motive. No other “justification” is necessary. It is not necessary to justify a moral decision by appeal to self-preservation, fear of punishment or any other emotional impetus. Moral beings recognize rightness and wrongness in the same way sentient beings perceive light or sound vibrations.

It doesn’t make moral sense to say: "The reason I refrain from killing others is because I don’t want them killing me.” That simply seems an inferior position to: “It’s morally wrong to kill others without some justifiable reason.”

I am not stealing, not out of some magical thinking that it will prevent theft. I do not steal for empathetical reasons. I can image the distress that it would cause myself, I do not wish to inflict that harm on others. It can’t protect me from theft.

Morality can’t only be obligatory in of it’s self. Why be moral? Motivations can include the aforementioned empathy or another is eternal reward or punishment. There is always a motivating factor.

 

[Roscoe_Turner]

You might be, but perhaps just don’t see it.
A morality that is chosen is no more than a life-style, with no moral truth to compel, describing only an inclination or preference to act in certain ways.

Being Christian isn’t compulsory. It is a choice. Everyone makes a choice how they will live their lives. It can be cultural but the choice to follow or not is always available.

 

[Peter_Plato]

I am not stealing, not out of some magical thinking that it will prevent theft. I do not steal for empathetical reasons. I can image the distress that it would cause myself, I do not wish to inflict that harm on others. It can’t protect me from theft.

Morality can’t only be obligatory in of it’s self. Why be moral? Motivations can include the aforementioned empathy or another is eternal reward or punishment. There is always a motivating factor.

Motivating factors might exist for doing what is the right thing, but motivating factors do not determine what the right thing is.

As soon as motivating factors enter into determining what the right thing is, then the right thing becomes dependent upon some pragmatic condition or consideration.

The presumption then is that moral obligations do not exist and motives become the basis for moral principles.

This is the crux of the issue RE: moral relativism vs moral absolutism.