Is the intellect necessarily immaterial?

[fisherman_carl]

First, Feser defines what a soul is according to Aristotle:

"THE SOUL

Aristotle, it will be remembered, held that the objects of our everyday experience are composites of form and matter, of a nature or essence on the one hand and a parcel of material stuff that takes on that form, nature, or essence on the other. This is as true of living things as of anything else. And for Aristotle, a soul is just the form or essence of a living thing. It is important not to misunderstand this. Someone with some crude misconception about what Aristotle or Aquinas must think a soul is supposed to be – like Dennett, no doubt, or Dawkins – might say “What grounds does Aristotle have for saying that a soul is what gives a living thing’s body its essence or form? What superstition!” But the form or essence of a living thing is just what Aristotle (and Aquinas) mean by the word “soul.” They aren’t saying, “We hypothesize that the soul, as popularly understood, is what gives a thing its nature”; they’re saying “By ‘soul’ we simply mean to refer to the nature of a living thing, whatever that turns out to be.” So the reader should not think of some ghostly object of the sort that floats away from a body after death, as in the movies, because that’s simply not what they have in mind. The soul is just a kind of form.

It should for that reason also not be seen as odd that Aristotle and Aquinas think of living things in general, including plants and non-human animals, as having souls. All they mean by this is that a plant or an animal has the form or essence characteristic of a living thing. They do not mean that when your favorite fern or dog dies, its soul goes to heaven. It doesn’t go anywhere but out of existence, since like the forms of rocks and tables, the forms of plants and non-human animals are mere abstractions considered by themselves, and have no reality apart from the particular material things they are the forms of. The soul of a plant is what Aristotelians call a “nutritive soul”; and that is just a form or essence that gives a thing that has it the powers of taking in nutrients, growing, and reproducing itself. The soul of a non-human animal is called a “sensory soul,” and it is just a form or essence that gives a thing that has it both the powers of a nutritive soul, and also an animal’s distinctive powers of being able to sense the world around it (by seeing, hearing, etc.) and to move itself (by walking, flying, etc.). When we come to human beings we have what is called a “rational soul,” which includes both the powers of the nutritive and sensory souls and also the distinctively human powers of intellect and will: that is, the power to grasp abstract concepts – namely, the forms or essences of things – and to reason on the basis of them, and freely to choose between different possible courses of action on the basis of what the intellect knows. As all of this indicates, the relationship between kinds of souls illustrates the Aristotelian idea that there is a hierarchy of forms: the sensory soul incorporates and adds to the powers of the nutritive soul, and the rational soul in turn incorporates and adds to the powers of both the nutritive and sensory souls, so that there is a natural hierarchical relationship between them.

The superiority of the rational soul goes beyond its place at the top of this hierarchy, however. As we have seen, a thing’s having a certain form goes hand in hand with its having a certain final cause or natural end, or a hierarchically ordered set of final causes or natural ends. A plant is ordered toward taking in nutrients, growing, and reproducing itself; those are the ends nature has given it. An animal has these ends too, along with the ends entailed by its distinctive powers of sensation and locomotion. Notice, though, that some of these ends are subordinated to the others. The point of nutrition, for example, is just to enable a plant or animal to carry out its other ends, such as growing and reproducing. Now a human being has all of these ends too, but on top of them he has the ends or final causes entailed by being rational and having free will. Rationality – the ability to grasp forms or essences and to reason on the basis of them – has as its natural end or final cause the attainment of truth, of understanding the world around us. And free will has as its natural end or final cause the choice of those actions that best accord with the truth as it is discovered by reason, and in particular in accord with the truth about a human being’s own nature or essence. That is, as we shall see, exactly what morality is from the point of view of Aristotle and Aquinas: the habitual choice of actions that further the hierarchically ordered natural ends entailed by human nature. But the intellect’s capacity to know the truth is more fully realized the deeper one’s understanding of the nature of the world and the causes underlying it. And the deepest truth about the world, as we have seen, is that it is caused and sustained in being by God. The highest fulfillment of the distinctively human power of intellect, then, is, for Aristotle and Aquinas, to know God. And since the will’s natural end or purpose is to choose in accordance with the furtherance of those ends entailed by human nature, the highest fulfillment of free choice is to live in a way that facilitates the knowing of God. All the other powers of the soul, including the nutritive and sensory powers, also have their own ends or final causes, but they are all subordinate in human nature to this distinctive and overarching end."

 

[fisherman_carl]

Feser continues. I’ve underlined some parts to highlight them:

"The human soul, then, though it is, at the first level of analysis, just the form or essence of the living human body, turns out on deeper analysis to have a divine end or purpose which raises it above plant and animal souls in dignity. But the truth about the human soul goes beyond even this. Note that the powers of nutritive and sensory souls are completely tied to the material stuff that makes up the living things they are the souls of. Nutrition and growth require the taking in and alteration of bits of matter, and reproduction involves transforming bits of matter into something that is like the thing doing the transforming. An animal’s sensing the world around itself requires the use of bodily organs (eyes, ears, tongues, etc.), as does its moving about (legs, fins, wings, etc.). If there is no matter to make up the various physical organs that carry out these functions, the functions simply cannot be carried out. Hence if the matter that makes up a plant or animal goes away, the soul goes with it, for there is nothing left to underlie the operation of its powers. That is why I said earlier that the soul of a plant or non-human animal does not “go to heaven,” or anywhere else, when it dies. If there is a sense in which plants and non-human animals have souls, then, they do not have immortal souls.

Now the rational soul, since it includes the powers of the nutritive and sensory souls, cannot fail to be to a very great extent dependent on matter for its operations. Like plants and animals, we need bodily organs if we are to fulfill our abilities to take in nutrients, grow, reproduce, and move about and sense the world around us. But things are very different with the power of intellect. This power cannot possibly require a material or bodily organ for its operation. … Central to the intellect’s operation is its grasp of forms, essences, or universals, and other abstractions like propositions … however, these things cannot be in any way material: this or that triangle is a material thing, but the form or essence triangularity is not; snow is material, but the proposition that snow is white cannot be; and so forth. But the immaterial nature of these things entails that the intellect which grasps them must itself be immaterial as well. How so?

Consider first that when we grasp the nature, essence, or form of a thing, it is necessarily one and the same form, nature, or essence that exists both in the thing and in the intellect. The form of triangularity that exists in our minds when we think about triangles is the same form that exists in actual triangles themselves; the form of “dogness” that exists in our minds when we think about dogs is the same form that exists in actual dogs; and so forth. If this weren’t the case, then we just wouldn’t really be thinking about triangles, dogs, and the like, since to think about these things requires grasping what they are, and what they are is determined by their essence or form. But now suppose that the intellect is a material thing – some part of the brain, or whatever. Then for the form to exist in the intellect is for the form to exist in a certain material thing. But for a form to exist in a material thing is just for that material thing to be the kind of thing the form is a form of; for example, for the form of “dogness” to exist in a certain parcel of matter is just for that parcel of matter to be a dog. And in that case, if your intellect was just the same thing as some part of your brain, it follows that that part of your brain would become a dog whenever you thought about dogs. “But that’s absurd!” you say. Of course it is; that’s the point. Assuming that the intellect is material leads to such absurdity; hence the intellect is not material."

 

[fisherman_carl]

Continued:

"Consider also that when you think about triangularity, for example, as you do when proving a geometrical theorem, it is necessarily perfect triangularity that you are contemplating, not some approximation of it. Triangularity as your intellect grasps it is entirely determinate or exact. (Of course your mental image of some triangle might not be determinate, but indeterminate and fuzzy. But to form a mental image of something, you’ll remember, is not the same thing as to grasp it with your intellect.) Now the thought you are having must be as determinate as triangularity itself, otherwise it just wouldn’t be a thought about triangularity per se, but only a thought about some approximation of triangularity. But material things are never determinate in this way; any material triangle, for example, is always only ever an approximation of triangularity. It follows, then, that any thought you might have about triangularity is not something material; in particular, it is not some process occurring in the brain. And what goes for triangularity goes for any thought, since any thought is going to involve universals, propositions, numbers or the like, which we have seen are all abstract and determinate in a way material objects and processes never can be.

Related to this is the fact that universals are, well, universal, and every material thing is particular. Triangularity is not identical to this or that particular material triangle. But suppose a thought about the universal triangularity was something material. Then, presumably, the “triangularity” part of this material thought would consist of some physical representation of triangularity in the brain somewhere (in the form of a neuronal firing pattern or some such thing). But no such physical representation could possibly count as the universal triangularity, because like any other physical representation of a triangle, this one too would be just one particular material thing among others, and not universal at all. Hence, again, there is just no sense to be made of the idea that thought is a purely material operation of the brain.

Now I can almost hear a Dennett or Dawkins reading this and responding: “But how is postulating ‘ectoplasm’ or some such thing any better as an explanatory hypothesis? What about Ockham’s razor? What about neuroscience?” But Aquinas and other Scholastic writers who defend arguments like the foregoing are not “postulating” anything, they are not offering an “explanatory hypothesis,” and they certainly don’t believe in “ectoplasm.” (For the uninitiated, “ectoplasm” is a ghostly kind of stuff that writers like Dennett are constantly accusing critics of materialism of believing in. It plays the same sort of straw-man role in his writings on the mind that Paley does in Dawkins’s writings on religion.) Here, as elsewhere, the arguments we are considering are attempts at what I have been calling metaphysical demonstration, not probabilistic empirical theorizing. In each case, the premises are obviously true, the conclusion follows necessarily, and thus the conclusion is obviously true as well. That, at any rate, is what the arguments claim. If you’re going to refute them, then you need to show either that the premises are false or that the conclusion doesn’t really follow. Otherwise you have no rational basis for not accepting them. Appealing to further neuroscientific research, Ockham’s razor, etc., is just beside the point; if the arguments work, then the immateriality of the intellect is itself a datum that any respectable neuroscientific theory will have to be consistent with, and any theory that seemed to deny it would itself be violating Ockham’s razor. The “findings of neuroscience” couldn’t refute these arguments any more than they could refute “2 + 2 = 4.” For Aquinas’s claim isn’t a “soul of the gaps” analogue to “God of the gaps” arguments. He is not saying: “Gee, the mind is mysterious, and there’s still a lot we don’t know about the brain. So I speculate that there might be some ghostly object floating around in there.” Rather, he is saying that given the facts about universals, etc., and our thoughts about them, it is conceptually impossible (not merely improbable) for the intellect to be material, whatever else might be true of it. So whatever neuroscience might discover – and there is of course a lot that it has discovered, and will continue to discover – one thing we know it won’t “discover” is that thought is a material operation of the brain, any more than it will “discover” that 2 + 2 = 5."

 

[fisherman_carl]

Continued:

"If Aquinas doesn’t think of the intellect as a piece of “ectoplasm,” then, how does he conceive of it? We’ve already seen how: as a power of the soul, which is itself a kind of form, nature, or essence, and where a form, nature, or essence is but a component of a substance or thing, not a complete substance or thing in its own right. The form of a rock isn’t a complete substance; only the form of the rock and the matter of the rock together constitute a thing or substance, that is, a rock. Similarly, the soul of a man isn’t a complete substance; only the soul and body (i.e. the form and matter) together constitute a thing or substance, that is, a man. It isn’t the soul that thinks when a man uses his intellect; it is the man himself who thinks, just as it is the man himself, and not the soul, who grows taller, digests his food, and walks around. For this reason, it is not at all surprising that human thought should be very closely correlated with certain brain events even if it is not identical to any of them. Since the soul is the form of the body, including the brain, the connection between them is in many ways like the connection between the form of some particular table – its round shape, its having four legs, its being brown, etc. – and the matter that makes up the table; that is, it is bound to be very close indeed. When the intellect determines that a certain course of action is the best one to take and the will follows it, the body proceeds to move in a way that constitutes the action. The operation of intellect and will constitute in this case is the formal-cum-final cause of the action, of which the firing of the neurons, flexing of the muscles, etc. are the material cause. Then there is the fact that even though the intellect itself operates without any bodily organ, it does depend indirectly on the senses for the raw material from which it abstracts universals or essences (e.g. it abstracts the universal “triangularity” from particular triangles it has perceived). And the sense organs, along with the brain events associated with perceptual experiences, are material.

But precisely because the operations of the intellect are not directly dependent on the matter of the brain, the parallel with the form of a table is not exact. If the soul can, unlike the form of a table, function apart from the matter it informs (as it does in thought), then it can also, and again unlike the form of a table, exist apart from the matter it informs, as a kind of incomplete substance. Remember that from an Aristotelian point of view, there is an asymmetry between actuality and potentiality, and between form and matter (the latter distinction being a special case of the former, which is more general). Usually actuality and potentiality are combined, and potentiality can never exist without actuality; but actuality can and does exist without potentiality, namely in God, who is Pure Actuality. Similarly, form and matter are usually combined, and matter can never exist without form; but form can exist without matter, and does in this case, at least after death when the matter of the body is no longer informed by the soul, its form. Unlike the souls of plants and animals, then, the rational soul is immortal, on Aquinas’s view. Whereas the body dies precisely when and because the soul or form of the body is no longer giving structure and function to the matter of the body – just as a table goes out of existence when the matter composing it no longer has the form of a table – the soul itself, partially operating and thus existing as it does apart from the body even when informing it, does not thereby die. For a thing to perish is just for it to lose its form. But the soul doesn’t lose its form, because it is a form. That doesn’t mean that a human being continues to exist after death, for a human being is a composite of form and matter, and it is only a part of him – the form or soul – that carries on. Still, it is the highest and most distinctive part of him."

Source: Feser, Edward (2012-08-15). The Last Superstition: A Refutation of the New Atheism

Now, of course Feser goes on, but that should be enough to cover all of the points in our discussion.

 

[inocente]

On previous threads about the mind or soul, Fesser has sometimes been quoted as if he’s an official spokesman for the Church, but of course he’s not, he’s a Thomist.

It turns out there’s various kinds of Thomists (see here), each with their own interpretation, and that issue of interpretation gets every bigger with Aristotle.

I skimmed through your quotes as they’re long. In the first quote Fesser writes ““By ‘soul’ we [Aristotle and Thomas] simply mean to refer to the nature of a living thing, whatever that turns out to be.” So the reader should not think of some ghostly object of the sort that floats away from a body after death, as in the movies, because that’s simply not what they have in mind. The soul is just a kind of form.”

Fair enough, but Thomas needs to explain how the soul gets from its earthly body to its heavenly body, so he does need it to temporarily be that floating ghost, and this is one of the places where it all falls apart for me. Maybe that’s why Fesser argues that the intellect “cannot possibly require a material or bodily organ for its operation”. Well isn’t that handy, now the intellect can be the ghost after all. Only trouble is that means it’s no longer simply “the nature of a living thing”, and in any event it’s very unclear why the intellect supposedly “cannot possibly require a material or bodily organ for its operation”.

It all looks contrived, as if they started by deciding what answer they should get and then back-filled some arguments to get them there. I think that’s why their theories are so complicated, they have to keep adding band aids and pieces of string to hold in all together. But when I point out that the emperor’s got no clothes, Thomists tend to claim that Fesser is speaking for the Church, but of course he’s not. Personally, Thomas and Aristotle play no part of my faith and their views on the soul are only of passing historical interest.

(btw I’ve been told Aristotle did not believe in an afterlife, so he didn’t have to worry about how the soul gets to heaven, but you’d have to check, I’m no expert).

 

[GEddie]

The soul has no time, because time is physical; so doesn’t “go” anywhere “when” the human body has died, but is preserved unto the spiritual body. The soul is the life, but life is impossible without a body.

ICXC NIKA

 

[fisherman_carl]

On previous threads about the mind or soul, Fesser has sometimes been quoted as if he’s an official spokesman for the Church, but of course he’s not, he’s a Thomist.

It turns out there’s various kinds of Thomists (see here), each with their own interpretation, and that issue of interpretation gets every bigger with Aristotle.

I skimmed through your quotes as they’re long. In the first quote Fesser writes ““By ‘soul’ we [Aristotle and Thomas] simply mean to refer to the nature of a living thing, whatever that turns out to be.” So the reader should not think of some ghostly object of the sort that floats away from a body after death, as in the movies, because that’s simply not what they have in mind. The soul is just a kind of form.”

Fair enough, but Thomas needs to explain how the soul gets from its earthly body to its heavenly body, so he does need it to temporarily be that floating ghost, and this is one of the places where it all falls apart for me. Maybe that’s why Fesser argues that the intellect “cannot possibly require a material or bodily organ for its operation”. Well isn’t that handy, now the intellect can be the ghost after all. Only trouble is that means it’s no longer simply “the nature of a living thing”, and in any event it’s very unclear why the intellect supposedly “cannot possibly require a material or bodily organ for its operation”.

It all looks contrived, as if they started by deciding what answer they should get and then back-filled some arguments to get them there. I think that’s why their theories are so complicated, they have to keep adding band aids and pieces of string to hold in all together. But when I point out that the emperor’s got no clothes, Thomists tend to claim that Fesser is speaking for the Church, but of course he’s not. Personally, Thomas and Aristotle play no part of my faith and their views on the soul are only of passing historical interest.

(btw I’ve been told Aristotle did not believe in an afterlife, so he didn’t have to worry about how the soul gets to heaven, but you’d have to check, I’m no expert).

How the soul gets its resurrected body can only be by a supernatural event of God. The only reason we know of such an event is because of Revelation. So it can’t be known through philosophy.

Through philosophy here Feser has shown the existence of the soul and immaterial mind. In his book he also shows the existence of God. Thus, if God exists he is perfectly capable of giving us new bodies.

Philosophy has its limits though. Revelation is needed to fill in the blanks. Aristotle and Aquinas’ version of the soul may be perfectly logical. However, there may be more about the soul than philosophy can reveal.

As far as it being contrived, I don’t see it. Aristotle was not a religious man. Using reason alone he came up with the existence of God and the soul. Aquinas builds on Aristotle’s reasoning.

Since thoughts are immaterial it seems to me that so is the mind. That doesn’t tell us what the mind is necessarily, just what it is not. Revelation could tell us more things. Like the soul going to heaven or the resurrection of the body.

 

[inocente]

How the soul gets its resurrected body can only be by a supernatural event of God. The only reason we know of such an event is because of Revelation. So it can’t be known through philosophy.

Through philosophy here Feser has shown the existence of the soul and immaterial mind. In his book he also shows the existence of God. Thus, if God exists he is perfectly capable of giving us new bodies.

Philosophy has its limits though. Revelation is needed to fill in the blanks. Aristotle and Aquinas’ version of the soul may be perfectly logical. However, there may be more about the soul than philosophy can reveal.

As far as it being contrived, I don’t see it. Aristotle was not a religious man. Using reason alone he came up with the existence of God and the soul. Aquinas builds on Aristotle’s reasoning.

Since thoughts are immaterial it seems to me that so is the mind. That doesn’t tell us what the mind is necessarily, just what it is not. Revelation could tell us more things. Like the soul going to heaven or the resurrection of the body.

Philosophers don’t agree on this, and I’d tend to make revelation primary rather than philosophy. If we go by revelation alone then we might get another view - that when we’re dead, we’re dead (“dead in Christ”) until we’re resurrected on judgment day. For instance 1 Thes 4:13-18 or 1 Cor 15.

 

[fisherman_carl]

Philosophers don’t agree on this, and I’d tend to make revelation primary rather than philosophy. If we go by revelation alone then we might get another view - that when we’re dead, we’re dead (“dead in Christ”) until we’re resurrected on judgment day. For instance 1 Thes 4:13-18 or 1 Cor 15.

I agree that true revelation is more sure knowledge then philosophy. However, now you are getting into interpretation of Scripture trying to show the view that there is no life apart from the body. There are other passages that you do not address that would give a different impression. For example Phil 1:23±

“I am hard pressed between the two. My desire is to depart and be with Christ, for that is far better. 24But to remain in the flesh is more necessary on your account."

Paul reasons that if he departs the flesh, ie dies, he will go to be with Christ. Yet, it is better for them that he remains in the body.

 

[Tomdstone]

The soul has no time,

That makes no sense because before you commit a sin, right after your baptism, your soul is clean.
After you have committed a mortal sin, your soul becomes dirty. I thought that this was taught with a picture in the Baltimore catechism.

 

[GEddie]

That makes no sense because before you commit a sin, right after your baptism, your soul is clean.
After you have committed a mortal sin, your soul becomes dirty. I thought that this was taught with a picture in the Baltimore catechism.

The soul has time only insofar as tied to the processes or actions of the human body.

ICXC NIKA

 

[inocente]

I agree that true revelation is more sure knowledge then philosophy. However, now you are getting into interpretation of Scripture trying to show the view that there is no life apart from the body. There are other passages that you do not address that would give a different impression. For example Phil 1:23±

“I am hard pressed between the two. My desire is to depart and be with Christ, for that is far better. 24But to remain in the flesh is more necessary on your account."

Paul reasons that if he departs the flesh, ie dies, he will go to be with Christ. Yet, it is better for them that he remains in the body.

Sure, but if we take the fact that there is more than one interpretation,
plus the CCC stating that the soul is the form of the body,
plus Aristotle saying that form does not exist apart from the body,
plus all the evidence from science,
then we can say that belief in a disembodied soul is far from mandatory.

(And remembering what Fesser said of the soul in your quote - “the reader should not think of some ghostly object of the sort that floats away from a body after death, as in the movies, because that’s simply not what they have in mind”. )

 

[Bahman]

In this thread a couple of years ago, I had an argument over whether it is possible to build machines that act more intelligently than people. This in turn depends on whether the intellect is something that works according to physical laws we can exploit, like various other bodily functions, or whether it is immaterial and impossible to physically capture.

That is possible. Consider consciousness/soul as essence of any being with the ability to experience and create. What we call body is simply a utility of consciousness to have access to reality in order to experience reality and affect it then it is feasible to understand the physical body in a machine which allows intellect to exist. Existence by definition is the fundamental mode of experience.

I think that intellect works according to physical laws, even if the experience of being transcends physics. In other words, the brain is a ‘machine’ that suffices to produce intelligent behavior, while the soul is immersed in the brain and has experiences that correspond to the brain’s physical activity.

Brain is simply the utility of consciousness allowing intellect to exist.

I also believe in supernatural grace (where the Holy Spirit alters the spiritual activity of the soul and the physical activity of the brain), but I don’t believe it is necessary for intelligence. Your thoughts?

There is nothing like supernatural grace in the sense that everything can be divided into consciousness/soul and illusion, what we experience.

 

[fisherman_carl]

Sure, but if we take the fact that there is more than one interpretation,
plus the CCC stating that the soul is the form of the body,
plus Aristotle saying that form does not exist apart from the body,
plus all the evidence from science,
then we can say that belief in a disembodied soul is far from mandatory.

(And remembering what Fesser said of the soul in your quote - “the reader should not think of some ghostly object of the sort that floats away from a body after death, as in the movies, because that’s simply not what they have in mind”. )

I think you are jumping to conclusions here.

Aristotle for instance is not a Church authority on the soul. True, Aquinas built on Aristotle. But Aquinas believed in the immortality of the soul.

Aristotle described objects in terms of form and matter. True, form doesn’t really exist on its own. A table is material in the form of a table. But, take away the material you also take away its form. But, in the table you have a one to one ratio of form to matter. Every bit of matter in the table has its form and vice versa. However, in the case of humans you do not have a one to one ratio of form to matter. There is part of our form that exists with no physical counterpart. That is the mind, which Feser tried to show in the quote I posted. The mind is immaterial precisely because it has to be. Because material can not deal with immaterial thoughts. The material brain can not adequately serve as the mind alone. The brain has its form, but the immaterial mind that deals with immaterial thought exists apart from the brain on its own and thus survives the body. This could only be because of God’s will ultimately. Because God wanted us to know him he gave us a mind that could.

 

[fisherman_carl]

Also, just because the church uses the language of Aristotle doesn’t mean that the church is limited in its view of the soul to Aristotle. Remember, the Church has revelation that takes it beyond philosophy. I guess the point of the philosophy here is to bring us to a starting point. But, it does not lead us all the way. For that we need revelation. Similarly using philosophy we can show the existence of a slice of God, but not all of the God of the Bible. For instance we can not prove that God is love or the Trinity. To go higher in our knowledge we must have revelation.

 

[inocente]

I think you are jumping to conclusions here.

Aristotle for instance is not a Church authority on the soul. True, Aquinas built on Aristotle. But Aquinas believed in the immortality of the soul.

Aristotle described objects in terms of form and matter. True, form doesn’t really exist on its own. A table is material in the form of a table. But, take away the material you also take away its form. But, in the table you have a one to one ratio of form to matter. Every bit of matter in the table has its form and vice versa. However, in the case of humans you do not have a one to one ratio of form to matter. There is part of our form that exists with no physical counterpart. That is the mind, which Feser tried to show in the quote I posted. The mind is immaterial precisely because it has to be. Because material can not deal with immaterial thoughts. The material brain can not adequately serve as the mind alone. The brain has its form, but the immaterial mind that deals with immaterial thought exists apart from the brain on its own and thus survives the body. This could only be because of God’s will ultimately. Because God wanted us to know him he gave us a mind that could.

I’d still be interested in the source of the claim that “material can not deal with immaterial thoughts”. I’d like to see it laid out formally, by its original author, because there seems no logical reason to accept it, and it goes against all the evidence.

Agreed Aristotle doesn’t speak for the Church, but nor does Descartes with his substance dualism, with his separation of material and immaterial. The CCC doesn’t talk about an immaterial mind, it still says the soul is the form of the body, the section heading is still BODY AND SOUL BUT TRULY ONE, it still says that in scripture soul “often refers to human life or the entire human person … also refers to the innermost aspect of man … the spiritual principle in man”.

There’s no separation, as Fesser says “the reader should not think of some ghostly object of the sort that floats away from a body after death, as in the movies, because that’s simply not what they have in mind”.

In any case, my point is simply there’s no compelling reason to accept the claim that the intellect is necessarily immaterial.

 

[fisherman_carl]

Feser talks about it in his book “The Last Superstition”, which I have read and it is worth reading. He also has an entire book on the subject that I have not read that would be worth checking out. Interestingly enough he came to believe in an immaterial mind as an atheist through reading other atheist philosophers on the subject. If you read his book the last Superstition and spent some time thinking about it you would better understand why he makes the claim that the mind is necessarily immaterial. I did quote a portion of his book but you said you only skimmed through it. Unfortunately, this material requires careful consideration or you will not understand the argument. And that is one of the points he makes in the book against atheists like Dawkind who Feser says do not understand philosophy and argue against straw men. Having only a cursory understanding of the argument means it is unconvincing. But it is interesting how much Feser believes in the arguments of Aquinas that he compares them to the solidity of believing 2 +2 = 4. He says was an atheist for 10 years because he believed there was a lack of evidence. It was partly through studying Aquinas that made him change his mind.

 

[Tomdstone]

. But it is interesting how much Feser believes in the arguments of Aquinas that he compares them to the solidity of believing 2 +2 = 4.

2+2 does not always equal 4. For example, in base 4 arithmetic, 2+2 = 10. Also, if you add together two vectors, both of length 2, you can get a vector of length less than 4. Further in relativity theory, when adding together two quantities such as velocity, you have to take into account an additional factor because the speed of light is constant and nothing can exceed the speed of light.
Suppose an object A is moving with a velocity v relative to an object B, and B is moving with a velocity u (in the same direction) relative to an object C. What is the velocity of A relative to C?

               u  ...............                   v
                -------> A      --------> B

                   w
            ----------------->C

In non-relativistic mechanics the velocities are simply added and the answer is that A is moving with a velocity w = u+v relative to C. But in special relativity the velocities must be combined using the formula

     w =( u + v)/ (1 + u*v/c*c)

So suppose in some unit system u=2 and v=2. then 2+2 = 4/(1+ 4/c*c).
In conclusion it is not always true that 2+2=4.

 

[fisherman_carl]

2+2 does not always equal 4. For example, in base 4 arithmetic, 2+2 = 10. Also, if you add together two vectors, both of length 2, you can get a vector of length less than 4. Further in relativity theory, when adding together two quantities such as velocity, you have to take into account an additional factor because the speed of light is constant and nothing can exceed the speed of light.
Suppose an object A is moving with a velocity v relative to an object B, and B is moving with a velocity u (in the same direction) relative to an object C. What is the velocity of A relative to C?

               u  ...............                   v
                -------> A      --------> B

                   w
            ----------------->C

In non-relativistic mechanics the velocities are simply added and the answer is that A is moving with a velocity w = u+v relative to C. But in special relativity the velocities must be combined using the formula

     w =( u + v)/ (1 + u*v/c*c)

So suppose in some unit system u=2 and v=2. then 2+2 = 4/(1+ 4/c*c).
In conclusion it is not always true that 2+2=4.

Really? In common sense 2+2+4. I’m surprised anyone would argue with that. Yeah if we change our number system then our arithmetic looks different. But that doesn’t change the fact that 2+2=4 in the number system that we actually use. Doh! So let me rephrase it so even skeptical math nerds can understand. 2+2=4 is always true in a 10 base numbering system.

 

[Tomdstone]

Really? In common sense 2+2+4. I’m surprised anyone would argue with that. Yeah if we change our number system then our arithmetic looks different. But that doesn’t change the fact that 2+2=4 in the number system that we actually use. Doh! So let me rephrase it so even skeptical math nerds can understand. 2+2=4 is always true in a 10 base numbering system.

You have not addressed the question in special relativity where 2+2 = 4/(1+ 4/c*c), c being the speed of light.