The Ontological Argument does not work. I think that some of Thomas Aquinas’s proofs work (perhaps not all), but Anselm didn’t get it.
Yes I can imagine a being greater than which nothing can be conceived, and yes, I would have to assume this being has actual existence, but there is simply no logical connection that necessitates this “idea of actual existence” actually being actual existence. “Actual existence” can remain an imaginary property of this being in my mind and does not imply that this being exists outside my imagination.
What you are saying it that the Ontological Argument
equivocates by changing the meaning of the term “actual existence” from an “idea (or possibility) of actual existence” to “the fact (reality of) actually existing.” If this is true, then yes, the argument would be invalid (because it equivocates). Logical proofs that equivocate are worthless for any purpose. They could even be thought deceptive.
However, the argument could be interpreted as a case of “begging the question”, in which case the argument would be valid, have pedagogical value, but be worthless as a proof because arguments that beg the question never prove anything. To make the argument beg the question, we could make the first premise leading into the argument state an
assumption that God (as Christians define God) exists. Then, assuming God (as Christians define God) exists; “
God is that than which nothing greater can be conceived” would be true because it begs the question.With the first premise in place, the argument is valid (begging the question is always valid/it merely proves nothing), not deceptive and can be of pedagogical value (useful for instruction of novices, preaching to the choir, helping someone else understand your position, etc.).
Now let’s look at the case of St. Anselm of Canterbury. In his argument, we note that St. Anselm assumed the truth of the statement: “It is greater to exist than not to exist.” He then described two kinds of existence: existence in the mind and existence in reality. Next, he shows that it is possible for something to exist in the mind and also in reality by describing a painter who visualizes his painting before he paints it and then sees the painting of his vision. Finally, St. Anselm also assumes the truth of the statement “To exist in reality is greater than to exist in the mind.” Now, here’s a summary of St. Anselm’s argument.
- God is “that than which nothing greater can be conceived.” The Psalmist, however, tells us that “The fool has said in his heart, ‘There is no God’ ” (Psalm 14:1; 53:1). Is it possible to convince the fool that he is wrong? It is. All we need is the characterization of God as “that than which nothing greater can be conceived.” The fool does at least understand that definition.
- But whatever is understood exists in the understanding, just as the plan of a painting he has yet to execute already exists in the understanding of the painter. So that than which nothing greater can be thought exists in the understanding.
- But if that than which nothing greater can be thought exists in the understanding, it must also exist in reality. For it is greater to exist in reality than to exist merely in the understanding. Therefore, if that than which nothing greater can be thought existed only in the understanding, it would be possible to think of something greater than it (namely, that same being existing in reality as well).
- It follows, then, that if that than which nothing greater can be thought existed only in the understanding, it would not be that than which nothing greater can be thought; and that, obviously, is a contradiction.
- So that than which nothing greater can be thought must exist in reality, not merely in the understanding.
- Therefore God exists.
My analysis: St. Anselm’s argument equivocates because the argument that “that than which nothing greater can be thought existing in the understanding” can only truly be “that than which nothing greater can be thought”
if it also existed in reality doesn’t prove that “it truly exists in reality” because it changes the definition of “that than which nothing can be thought” during the course of the argument. (It could be that the person who thought it only thought it existed and was wrong.) In the first part of the supposed contradiction (see #4 above), “that than which nothing greater can be thought” must be defined as “the greatest possible mental image that one could come up with if one assumed it to be true.” In the second part of the same statement, “that than which nothing greater can be thought” must be defined as “the reality (if it were true) that no mental image could be greater than.” These are not the same. To change the definition during the course of an argument is equivocation. The argument is invalid as stated.
Therefore, if my analysis is correct, you are right! Nice job.
Merry Christmas, and God bless.