Is the Ontological Argument too good to be true?

[Dranu]

I. Diddi
Hey Diddi, I thought since I’ll have a free Monday I’ll spend a bit of time in the forum and see what I can come up with as St. Anselm is my patron saint after all (poor Anselm ). Anyhow that does not mean I blindly will assume his argument is valid and sound, but I do think so as it is.

1. But if that than which nothing greater can be thought exists in the understanding, it must also exist in reality. For it is greater to exist in reality than to exist merely in the understanding. Therefore, if that than which nothing greater can be thought existed only in the understanding, it would be possible to think of something greater than it (namely, that same being existing in reality as well).

First I would like to respond to this, kind of to a side. Using the words “namely, that same being existing in reality as well” will get the argument into the logical error that occurs when a premise is contradicted by another premise that was identified by C.I. Lewis I believe. Namely that such a contradiction will entail just anything.

One must instead say “one can conceive of a being with all of 'that than which none greater can be conceived’s ’ qualities, plus existence in reality” (given TTWNGCBC does not exist in reality), otherwise the argument would claim you could conceive of a contradiction (thus entailing anything).

The contradiction being:
1.) ‘That than which none greater can be conceived’ does not exist in reality- assumed for Reductio
2.) ‘That than which none greater can be conceived’ does exist in reality -used as a proposition in the mind given the contradiction of this is true, thus the contradiction in this thought.

-This (I think) was Plantinga’s rejection of it in God and Other Minds, which seems easily avoidable to me. Perhaps I am missing something though, as Plantinga is rather intelligent.

Now, onto my major point of contention:

doesn’t prove that “it truly exists in reality” because it changes the definition of “that than which nothing can be thought” during the course of the argument. (It could be that the person who thought it only thought it existed and was wrong.) In the first part of the supposed contradiction (see #4 above), “that than which nothing greater can be thought” must be defined as “the greatest possible mental image that one could come up with if one assumed it to be true.” In the second part of the same statement, “that than which nothing greater can be thought” must be defined as “the reality (if it were true) that no mental image could be greater than.” These are not the same. To change the definition during the course of an argument is equivocation.

I am not quite sure why you think this must be defined this way once we hit the fourth part, if you could elaborate a bit on the reason for this I can perhaps understand this better. Though, I’ll give it a shot anyhow.

I think the mental image is the thing you might be confusing. I am reasonably certain that Anselm means something more detached from the individual as rather an object of understanding versus a ‘mental image’ when he says that God exists ‘in intellectu’; just like ‘2’ or ‘5’ might only exist ‘in intellectu’ but are quite detached from needing the individual to ‘imagine’ it, or perhaps more importantly the thing that is signified by the word ‘unicorn’. What is typically referred to by ‘unicorn’ is an actual concept that exists ‘in intellectu’ (as it is non-contradictory) but more than likely not in reality. Furthermore, such a being does not need a human imagining it to continue to exist in such a manner (the same with numbers). We can only signify it (them). If looked at in this manner it does not seem that equivocation occurs.

On a side note, I think this argument is very tempting to be viewed as circular just because of the utter uniqueness of dealing with something that is completely logically self-sufficient. The term God (because of his self-sufficiency) should have our minds pointing to circles after all. God is justified by Himself alone, while all else is justified through first principles all the way up to THE First Principle (God).
I think the crux of debating about this argument lies on the premise that (given all things remain the same) "To exist in reality and the intellect is greater than to exist in the intellect alone.”

 

[Dranu]

II. Dameedna

Dameedna:

Use “flying spaghetti monster” in place of “god” in that argument and you will still find it is logcially accurate.

Hello there Dameedna. If by the utterance ‘flying spaghetti monster’ you mean ‘that than which none greater can be conceived’, then I shall agree with you that the flying spaghetti monster exists in reality. Heck, if you mean that when you use the term ‘unicorn’, I shall agree as well. Remember logic and reason is not based on the sound of words that come out of ones mouth, but rather on what is signified by them (which is other than the sounds). If I say ‘monkey’ plus ‘donkey’ equals ‘dinero’, and by money I meant what many call ‘5’ and by donkey I meant by what many call ‘2’ and by dinero I meant what many call ‘7’, then (if you knew what I was really saying) you would wholeheartedly agree that ‘monkey plus donkey equals dinero’. So you can call this being referred to by Anselm as ‘Flying Spaghetti Monster’, but remember that being couldn’t be composed of what many might call ‘flying spaghetti’ because spaghetti is limited, something (that is limit) ‘that than which none greater can be conceived’ does not logically admit of (otherwise a greater could be conceived).

In other words, if the word ‘God’ carries too many emotional attachments or you want the word ‘God’ to signify ‘a cloud dwelling lightning thrower with a large grey beard’, then perhaps don’t use that term in this argument, but know that when many theist say the word ‘God’ they mean exactly what Anselm meant when he said ‘that than which none greater can be conceived’, when Descartes said ‘infinity’, or when Plato said ‘Unhypothetical First Principle’.

Simply put, Anselm’s argument debatably proves ‘that than which none greater can be conceived’ exists in reality. Whether you want to call that ‘God’, ‘Table’, ‘Universe’, ‘Apple Pie’, etc does not matter, however, most people will call this being ‘God’.

 

[Dranu]

LeroyCRHP:

Maybe I’m too simple, but what bible verse are you connecting to these “phrases”? I cannot understand what you are trying to say? I think you are saying the GCB is God, but maybe it is Jesus.

Hey Leroy. Well as a Catholic I believe Jesus is a person of God and thus is God, so in a way yes.

The Ontological argument does not rely on scripture (though I am sure the saint was inspired by it and the Church on a whole), but rather pure reasoning. In fact, the Ontological argument relies on no empirical/historical evidence for a premise at all. It is far more simple than that. So there is no biblical verse for it, but the closest I can come to a direct saying connecting God to GCB is:

Exodus 3:14: *God replied, “I am who am.” Then he added, “This is what you shall tell the Israelites: I AM sent me to you.” *

Basically sounds like God is calling himself ‘unqualified being’ which is the same thing as saying being without limit as all qualification is limit. Being without limit is also ‘that than which none greater can be conceived’ or perhaps ‘perfect being’ or perhaps ‘infinity’. This idea of God penetrates all the scripture and doctrine of Christianity in my opinion.

What religion does not have God existing now? I’m lost on your logic?

The argument assumes God does not exist to prove that that is an absurd statement. it is called a reductio ad absurdum. here is an example:

1.) All cats are not warm-blooded. (assumed for reductio)
2.) All mammals are warm-blooded. (Premise)
3.) All cats are mammals. (premise)
4.) Therefore, all cats are warm-blooded (from 2+3)
5.) Therefore all cats are warm-blooded and not warm-blooded (conjunction of 4 +1)

-6 is of course absurd, therefore we reject #1 (if we assume 2 and 3 are true). The Ontological argument does something just like that.

 

[cpayne]

Maybe I’m too simple, but what bible verse are you connecting to these “phrases”? I cannot understand what you are trying to say? I think you are saying the GCB is God, but maybe it is Jesus.

What religion does not have God existing now? I’m lost on your logic?

Thanks
Leroy

Hi, LeroyCRHP. The Bible verse Anselm used is in a psalm, “The fool hath said in his heart, There is no God.” Anselm questioned, Why is this statement “foolish”? He decided it was logically “absurd,” for reasons stated above by Dranu. He begins by assuming God does not exist now, then goes on to argue that this assumption is absurd, given the definition of God as possessing necessary existence as a Greatest Conceivable Being.

What I was saying is that even if this argument does not work to prove God’s existence, it does show that if God exists, God exists necessarily. From that premise, we can put together a different argument, which is what I was trying to do. Best, cp

 

[Diddi]

I. Diddi
Hey Diddi, I thought since I’ll have a free Monday I’ll spend a bit of time in the forum and see what I can come up with as St. Anselm is my patron saint after all (poor Anselm ). Anyhow that does not mean I blindly will assume his argument is valid and sound, but I do think so as it is.

Hi Dranu,

I only have some free time at all because I needed something mentally to do while convalescing from the stomach flu. Tomorrow, back to work. St. Anselm, pray for me. No need to feel sorry for your patron saint, I think his argument is great. I only happen to believe that all valid arguments attempting to prove that God exists or doesn’t exist beg the question (the famous five ‘proofs’ of Aquiana did), this being a subset of a rule I call the Law of the First Premise. The Law of the First Premise is that, for any question for which the answer cannot be or has not (yet) been proven correctly empirically, all attempted proofs that are valid beg the question. The most convincing invalid arguments usually equivocate. Since the Law of the First Premise can never be proven empirically, it applies to itself. Therefore, whenever I see an argument that: 1. cannot be proven empirically (such as whether the supernatural exist, or whether God exists, or whether it is murder to kill a human fetus) or 2. can conceivably be resolved empirically but hasn’t been yet (such as whether the Big Bang is the best description of the beginning of the Universe or is just an artifact of perspective), I first assume the Law of the First Premise and then try to identify the formulations of the argument that are invalid and hopefully find the valid formulation which begs the question. Mary Ann Warren did this for the pro life argument "that it is murder to kill a fetus."csus.edu/indiv/g/gaskilld/ethics/Abortion.htm

First I would like to respond to this, kind of to a side. Using the words “namely, that same being existing in reality as well” will get the argument into the logical error that occurs when a premise is contradicted by another premise that was identified by C.I. Lewis I believe. Namely that such a contradiction will entail just anything.

One must instead say "one can conceive of a being with all of 'that than which none greater can be conceived’s ’ qualities, plus existence in reality" (given TTWNGCBC does not exist in reality), otherwise the argument would claim you could conceive of a contradiction (thus entailing anything).

The contradiction being:
1.) ‘That than which none greater can be conceived’ does not exist in reality- assumed for Reductio
2.) ‘That than which none greater can be conceived’ does exist in reality -used as a proposition in the mind given the contradiction of this is true, thus the contradiction in this thought.

-This (I think) was Plantinga’s rejection of it in God and Other Minds, which seems easily avoidable to me. Perhaps I am missing something though, as Plantinga is rather intelligent.

This is what I mean. There are several formulations (takes/possible meanings) of the argument that would make it invalid. I missed this one. We must therefore look for a formulation (the one that easily avoids the objections) that is valid and see it it “begs the question.”

I will post this much first and continue in a later post.

God bless.

 

[Diddi]

I. Diddi
Hey Diddi, I thought since I’ll have a free Monday I’ll spend a bit of time in the forum and see what I can come up with as St. Anselm is my patron saint after all (poor Anselm ). Anyhow that does not mean I blindly will assume his argument is valid and sound, but I do think so as it is.

Hi Dranu,
This is a continuation of my last post.

Now, onto my major point of contention:
I am not quite sure why you think this must be defined this way once we hit the fourth part, if you could elaborate a bit on the reason for this I can perhaps understand this better. Though, I’ll give it a shot anyhow.

Remember, your patron saint is trying to convince “the fool who denies God” by this argument. When this “fool” hears the argument, it is this “fool’s” concept of what St. Anselm means, by each statement, that counts. The “fool” denies God. He also doesn’t consider himself a fool. He is the one judging the validity of the argument. Otherwise, it’s merely “preaching to the choir.” This “fool” is a hostile jury and will come up with exactly the two definitions I gave you and will say the argument is invalid. You will then have to clarify the argument to meet his objections which I believe you have done.

I think the mental image is the thing you might be confusing. I am reasonably certain that Anselm means something more detached from the individual as rather an object of understanding versus a ‘mental image’ when he says that God exists ‘in intellectu’; just like ‘2’ or ‘5’ might only exist ‘in intellectu’ but are quite detached from needing the individual to ‘imagine’ it, or perhaps more importantly the thing that is signified by the word ‘unicorn’. What is typically referred to by ‘unicorn’ is an actual concept that exists ‘in intellectu’ (as it is non-contradictory) but more than likely not in reality. Furthermore, such a being does not need a human imagining it to continue to exist in such a manner (the same with numbers). We can only signify it (them). If looked at in this manner it does not seem that equivocation occurs.

First of all, I’m not sure how this clears up the equivocation (for a unicorn ‘in intellectu’ is still not a unicorn ‘in re’ which is Gaunilo’s argument books.google.com/books?id=UD8TAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA268&lpg=PA268&dq=%22exists+in+intellectu,+and+the+only+point+discussed+is+whether+He+exists+also+in+re%22&source=web&ots=fPJv38A4bV&sig=pqsRMPWdFWO_kLOVQItPxszRBs0&hl=en&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=1&ct=result),

Second, a ‘widget’ exist ‘in intellectu’ and and there are thousands of possible very different widgets that are quite detached from needing the individual to ‘imagine them.’ Is this the same as what you mean? Would not two beings with all the characteristics of that than which nothing greater can be conceived be greater than one? I can conceive of two such beings, then three, then thousands of them, there’s no limit. Have we thus proved there are an infinite number of equal Gods? Or maybe we have proved that God has and infinite number coequal person’s in one (sort of like the trinity but with an infinite number of persons instead of three).

I say no because either the argument would be invalid by contradiction or we would be equivocating just like before, or, if not, we would be begging the question because we assume in our premise (that more is better/greater than less) our conclusion (that more Gods/persons in one God are better than one).

I think my next step will be to rewrite the argument with your qualification so I can read it in place and then give it more thought. There must be a way to formulate it that would be valid even by the fool.

On a side note, I think this argument is very tempting to be viewed as circular just because of the utter uniqueness of dealing with something that is completely logically self-sufficient. The term God (because of his self-sufficiency) should have our minds pointing to circles after all. God is justified by Himself alone, while all else is justified through first principles all the way up to THE First Principle (God).
I think the crux of debating about this argument lies on the premise that (given all things remain the same) "To exist in reality and the intellect is greater than to exist in the intellect alone.”

I think the argument will eventually come down to: Assuming that God which Christians believe in is real, then this God is the being with all the characteristics of that than which nothing greater can be conceived. This will be circular because we are assuming the conclusion, i.e., begging the question, but He is the God I believe in.

By the way, thanks for the great reply. God bless you and goodnight.

 

[cpayne]

Hi Dranu,

all valid arguments attempting to prove that God exists or doesn’t exist beg the question (the famous five ‘proofs’ of Aquiana did), this being a subset of a rule I call the Law of the First Premise. The Law of the First Premise is that, for any question for which the answer cannot be or has not (yet) been proven correctly empirically, all attempted proofs that are valid beg the question. .

Hello, Diddi. Not to steer the thread away from the OA, but since Aquinas’s arguments very specifically appeal to empirical observations rather than to *a priori *premises, in what way do they violate your law?

(P.S. I accept enumerative induction as empirical observation.) (P.P.S. Probably not everybody does.)

 

[Diddi]

Hello, Diddi. Not to steer the thread away from the OA, but since Aquinas’s arguments very specifically appeal to empirical observations rather than to *a priori *premises, in what way do they violate your law?

(P.S. I accept enumerative induction as empirical observation.) (P.P.S. Probably not everybody does.)

Hello cpayne,

Thanks for your reply. They do not violate the Law of the First Premise. They follow it. The law states that they will either be invalid or they will beg the question. The following link to This Rock Magazine will show which are invalid and that all beg the question. catholic.com/thisrock/2006/0601uan.asp

Here is a link to the proper thread on this board.

forums.catholic-questions.org/showthread.php?t=294107

Yes they appeal to empirical observations, right up the line, but then they make the purly logical jump to “We call this being God” which is not empirically determined but is an assumption that begs the question. The first link explains this more fully.

Thanks again for replying to my post. I’m afraid I will have to discipline myself and will not be posting for awhile because I’m behind in my work so I hope this suffices.

Thanks, Merry Christmas and God bless.

 

[cpayne]

Hello cpayne,

Thanks for your reply. They do not violate the Law of the First Premise. They follow it. The law states that they will either be invalid or they will beg the question. The following link to This Rock Magazine will show which are invalid and that all beg the question. catholic.com/thisrock/2006/0601uan.asp

Here is a link to the proper thread on this board.

forums.catholic-questions.org/showthread.php?t=294107

Yes they appeal to empirical observations, right up the line, but then they make the purly logical jump to “We call this being God” which is not empirically determined but is an assumption that begs the question. The first link explains this more fully.

Thanks again for replying to my post. I’m afraid I will have to discipline myself and will not be posting for awhile because I’m behind in my work so I hope this suffices.

Thanks, Merry Christmas and God bless.

Thank you. A bit of refreshing holiday reading.

Merry Christmas to you, too.

 

[Dranu]

I think my next step will be to rewrite the argument with your qualification so I can read it in place and then give it more thought. There must be a way to formulate it that would be valid even by the fool.

Hey Diddi, hope your work goes well.

I. The Argument
I shall present one off the top of my head:
’TWNGC=That than which none greater can be conceived’

1.) (assumption) TWNGC does not exist in reality.
2.) TWNGC exists in concept (otherwise the word would be like square circle)
3.) Given all other qualities are the same, that which exists in concept and in reality is greater than that which exists in concept alone.
4.) If TWNGC does not exist in reality then we can conceive of (another) being (G) that has all TWNGC qualities plus existence in reality.
5.) For TWNGC, a greater can be conceived (namely G)

-Contradiction at 5, thus the assumption is rejected, given hold the premises 2+3.

II. In Reality and In Concept are Modes of Existence of One Being.

First of all, I’m not sure how this clears up the equivocation *(for a unicorn ‘in intellectu’ is still not a unicorn ‘in re’ * There is a problem with saying they are not the same, namely the ability to know anything. If that monitor in front of you does not exist also in intellectu then it cannot be seen within your own mind at all. If the monitor ‘in intellectu’ is not the monitor ‘in re’, then how do you connect the two? Simply put, they are one in the same (I think), but you consider the monitor (which you perceive in intellectu) to also have the quality of existing in re. So would you agree that perhaps they are the same thing; that Anselm’s talk is just a talk about different actions of the same object?

Second, a ‘widget’ exist ‘in intellectu’ and and there are thousands of possible very different widgets that are quite detached from needing the individual to 'imagine them

.’ Is this the same as what you mean? As I said in the previous post, ‘imagine’ is not what I think ‘in intellectu means at all’. Also ‘widget’ is not the same as many things we ‘call widgets’. Just like ‘number’ is not the same as 'a number’.

III. Differentia

Would not two beings with all the characteristics of that than which nothing greater can be conceived be greater than one? I can conceive of two such beings, then three, then thousands of them, there’s no limit. Have we thus proved there are an infinite number of equal Gods? Or maybe we have proved that God has and infinite number coequal person’s in one (sort of like the trinity but with an infinite number of persons instead of three).

Being and ‘person’ is something I am not prepared to talk about (at least making any knowledge claims myself) as I haven’t studied it myself in much depth. However, leaving it to ‘being’, what is it that allows us to call a second being another being from the first?

The answer, I believe, is that it has a different quality (or is limited and thus automatically differentiated as it cannot exist in the same place or at the same time as another one with seemingly identical qualities). Saying we have two TWNGC does not seem to make sense, for what is the different in that the first is not? If one notes the difference (perhaps place in existence, or simply existing as another), then that is something which the first is lacking and therefore is not TWNGC.

I think the argument will eventually come down to: Assuming that God which Christians believe in is real, then this God is the being with all the characteristics of that than which nothing greater can be conceived.

There is no such assumption in St. Anselm’s formulation (well, that is in the actual argument at least). In fact ‘God’ never needs to come into it. However, most would call TWNGC by the name of ‘God’. Furthermore, the argument assumes the opposite. That is, it assume TWNGC does not exist so as to derive the conclusion that such an utterance is contradictory and makes no sense (that is, one who said it in their hearts would be ‘a fool’).

By the way, thanks for the great reply. God bless you and goodnight.

Same to you, and thank you for your response as well! Hope you had a great Christmas.

 

[cpayne]

Can’t be more than one GCB. A GCB would have no potential for improvement. If there were two of them, each of them would have potential–namely, to be greater than the other one. Therefore neither one of them could be the GCB, since both would have unfulfilled potential.

It’s singular at the top.