Is there a rational basis for morality in a purposeless universe?

[Portofino]

If you’re trying to say that people who don’t believe in supernatural woo should not care about such things, I suspect you’re fighting a losing battle. The objective fact is that emotions are physical experiences as much as they might be anything else. When people deliberately act in ways that make others unhappy, the reality is that they will reap some sort of negative consequence - it might not be criminal charges and punishment, but it will certainly be the stress that comes from knowing that you have given others all the excuse they need to deal with you as badly as you’ve dealt with them.

I’ve thought the same – while metaphysical truth may ultimately trump experiential truth, experiential truth is rock solid and cannot be brushed aside through a sheer act of will (mind over matter).

For example, I almost turned my stomach today, with a concrete example – it is a mere prejudice that I prefer a freshly-made plate of spaghetti and meatballs, to one that is a year old and was kept at room temperature. From the ultimate metaphysical standpoint, that is my subjective preference for one over the other — nothing more.

From an experiential standpoint, however, I couldn’t care less whether it was a subjective preference, or not. I don’t even want to look at it

Just so, a child can kill the mother that raised him–that nursed him–with his own hand, perhaps because of some intellectual theory that he entertains regarding morality (namely, that there isn’t any). Perhaps he has no idea that his conscious mind is only the tip of the iceberg, and that there are large landmasses of memory and emotion that he is stirring up, by killing his mother with his own hands. For example, long-buried memories of young childhood – of a time in his life when even mama’s leaving the room was practically cause for a nervous breakdown. Those memories are still inside of him, somewhere.

 

[mangy_dog]

Why would the Universe have to be purposeless…??

Why not purposeful…?

Morality and right conscience are nurtured by the sacracments from Baptism, Confession, Communion…all the way to Extreme unction.

It would be irrational to reject morality on the basis of a wrong premise.

 

[tonyrey]

I’ve thought the same – while metaphysical truth may ultimately trump experiential truth, experiential truth is rock solid and cannot be brushed aside through a sheer act of will (mind over matter).

For example, I almost turned my stomach today, with a concrete example – it is a mere prejudice that I prefer a freshly-made plate of spaghetti and meatballs, to one that is a year old and was kept at room temperature. From the ultimate metaphysical standpoint, that is my subjective preference for one over the other — nothing more.

From an experiential standpoint, however, I couldn’t care less whether it was a subjective preference, or not. I don’t even want to look at it

Just so, a child can kill the mother that raised him–that nursed him–with his own hand, perhaps because of serive pleasureberg, and that there are large landmasses of memory and emotion that he is stirring up, by killing his mother with his own hands. For example, long-buried memories of young childhood – of a time in his life when even mama’s leaving the room was practically cause for a nervous breakdown. Those memories are still inside of him, somewhere.

To compare moral values to a taste for a plate of spaghetti and meatballs is to reveal the absurdity of moral subjectivism. Some derive pleasure from raping and killing children…

 

[Portofino]

It is because you attach a delusional moral significance to the plight of homosexuals and the value of human life in general that you feel repulsed by the events. Like I said, some people prefer Marmite and some people don’t. There is no true difference in value between the actions of the Nazis and a man sacrificing his life to save a child from certain death. Using moral buzz words, is not going to fool me in to thinking that your emotional attitude is rational.

There is a thought process behind it, just one that you don’t agree with and think is wrong. I admit that I myself have marveled that would-be atheists – such as John Lennon – had such a strong sense of humanistic ethics. In my mind, such an individual was not truly an “atheist” because – as you are maintaining – it seemed that atheism necessarily implied nihilism.

But here is the thought process of the “moral” atheist or agnostic, whether mistaken or not:

1. for as long as we live, we are not beholden to metaphysical truth, but to life as it is experienced (nor is metaphysical truth ultimately knowable)
2. human beings have evolved in such a way that they prefer the preservation of their own lives to death, and their own pleasure to excruciating torture; that is our fundamental nature and what anchors us in our lives; it is more fundamental, even, than rationality itself
3. on a pragmatic level, I am living with fellow human beings; without a social contract – whereby human beings make peace with each other – life will be nasty, brutish, and short for all concerned; this is the basis of our laws, which seek to protect these fundamental human interests
4. sympathy and sociability are natural and fundamental to human beings (“man is a social animal”); because we are memebers of the same species, the need for love and affection is a natural human need; to be deprived of it is a source of suffering (an infant without affection, by some accounts, will not survive, and love and affection is as fundamental an emotional need as food and water are physical ones)
5. it is impossible to be truly happy while raping, killing, and torturing others; this does not mean that it cannot be momentarily pleasurable for some individuals, whether in the sense of a dull pleasure or of a momentary intoxication, But happiness as a constant and abiding snese of inner-pleasure and satisfaction is impossible to the sadist, just as anything other than starvation is not possible to those who do not eat (if this is paradox, it is only paradoxical in same sense as maintaining, “the crack addict is not truly happy, but suffering greatly”)
6. conversely, individuals who are already happy will be inclined towards generosity and kindness towards others; while the sadist or the cynic is, by definition, unhappy (“miserable”), and his sadism or cynicism is a manifestation of that unhappiness
7. Sadism and sociopathy is a kind of disease - not the natural state of the human organism. Individuals who commit sadistic acts are not “immoral”, in the ultimate metaphysical sense of the word, but they are “sick”; and they certainly are dangerous to the happiness of others; and, as stated above, they are certainly unhappy themselves, and are not to be envied ( assuming that only the happy are to be envied, and not the unhappy)
8. Response to anyone – believer or non-believer – who says, “this is garbage – I want to kill, rape, and steal; I am not going to subscribe to your puerile prejudices” – remove them from society, as one would remove those who are unfit to live in it; or, as one would remove a rabid tiger that is on the loose, and that is endangering lives and property; the rabid tiger is not immoral; and neither, perhaps, is the sociopath or psychopath. But they are unfit for human society, nonetheless.

The understanding of Hitler, according to this humanistic ethic (he who is the ultimate symbol of “evil” ) – that he was not evil in the metaphysical sense, nor did the universe bat an eyelash over all of the millions that he killed (just as the universe has not batted an eyelash over the billions of human beings who have died since the beginning of human history); but Hitler was typhoid; anthrax; plague;psychologically, an open wound; a running, festering sore. A character such as Hitler’s pointed in only direction, both as regards himself and everyone around him – death and suffering. Likewise, his ideology was a form of psychological cancer, that lead to only place – death and suffering.

 

[Portofino]

To compare moral values to a taste for a plate of spaghetti and meatballs is to reveal the absurdity of moral subjectivism. Some derive pleasure from raping and killing children…

Well, I wasn’t exactly highlighting it in the same spirit as you cited it above. Rather, I was citing it in the same spirit of “nutritious food versus poison.”

Comparing immoral actions to poison – to something toxic – is not far from the way a Christian would describe such actions (“they poison the soul”).

The metaphor for Adam’s choice for evil, after all, was that of eating a forbidden apple

 

[ReapReason]

but Hitler was typhoid; anthrax; plague;psychologically, an open wound; a running, festering sore.

And yet, there were many people loyal to his ideological cause. Marmite and peanut butter.

A character such as Hitler’s pointed in only direction, both as regards himself and everyone around him – death and suffering. Likewise, his ideology was a form of psychological cancer, that lead to only place – death and suffering.

He was not objectively a psychological cancer. There is no such thing as a way the body or mind ought to think or work, and there is no reason why a human body ought to exist either. That value distinction only exists in the minds of those who want to keep the human form in existence according to beliefs that Hitler clearly did not agree with. He was a cancer to your way of life relative to your meaningless and morally irrelevant ideologies about how life should be, which includes your attempts to survive.

We are all going to die. It doesn’t matter who lives longer; and i must say, good riddance to such a meaningless existence.

 

[tonyrey]

Well, I wasn’t exactly highlighting it in the same spirit as you cited it above. Rather, I was citing it in the same spirit of “nutritious food versus poison.”

Comparing immoral actions to poison – to something toxic – is not far from the way a Christian would describe such actions (“they poison the soul”).

The metaphor for Adam’s choice for evil, after all, was that of eating a forbidden apple

I agree but morality based solely on emotion remains amoral.

 

[ThinkingSapien]

That value distinction only exists in the minds

This is related to what I was talking about earlier. “Value distinction” and value judgement are dependent on minds and expresses a relationship between a mind and an thing (object, concept, so on…). This is a relationship that can’t exists without minds/perceivers.

your way of life relative to your meaningless and morally irrelevant ideologies about how life should be, which includes your attempts to survive.

Here a mind is being explicitly identified…

We are all going to die. It doesn’t matter who lives longer; and i must say, good riddance to such a meaningless existence.

And here the minds are unidentified. If something matters then it is at the least implicitly being expressed that there is some mind/perceiver that finds it significant. If something had meaning then there is a mind/perceiver that has applied a meaning to that something.

Referring back to an earlier response:

There is no objective values given metaphysical naturalism.

If “objective values” are the subjective values of a specific entity then the assertion that “There [are] no objective values…” will be consistent with any standpoint in which that mind is thought not to exists (not limited to metaphysical naturalism).

 

[Portofino]

There is no such thing as a way the body or mind ought to think or work,.

That’s saying a lot. Is there no such thing as “health” versus “sickness” of the body? No objective difference between clear lungs, and those riddled with cancer and filled with fluid?

No distinction between a paranoid schizophrenic, walking down the street and screaming --because she feels there are bugs crawling all over her body–and the calm smile of the Buddha?

Of course, you’re ultimately saying, “why are healthy lungs preferable to lung cancer?” or “why is the smile of the Buddha preferable to paranoid schizophrenia?”

But frankly, the same dilemma exists for the religious person. What’s so bad about suffering? It is a gift from God. Why is the suffering of this life evil? “Whatever is, is right.” Why, even, is the suffering of hell not preferable to the pleasure of heaven?

Why should we prefer pleasure to pain?

We are all going to die. It doesn’t matter who lives longer; and i must say, good riddance to such a meaningless existence.

How does belief in God make a believer’s own “fear of death and addiction to comfort” any less irrational? If anything, it makes it more irrational. If Christianity is true, then it is irrational to want to live (i.e., avoid death) as long as possible. An early death is a blessing, so long as one is right with God. There would be no misfortune in an early death, as nothing is really lost. But, if one is right with God, everything is gained.

So why does one desire to live a long life? Why does one heal the sick? Or mourn for lost loved ones, who are now in paradise? That would be the ultimate in irrationality – or in lack of faith.

Fortunate it is if I reach the Christian in distress, to give him comfort. But more fortunate still is if he dies before I reach him – assuming he right with God. For then he is in paradise for eternity. When I pray for the “healing” of the sick, I am allowing my attachment to this world to contaminate my priorities.

But to want to live to be 100–and to eat healthy, exercise, and go for annual check-ups–is just hypocritical, yes?

And “planning for the future?” The real planning for the future is planning for an eternity in heaven. All the other things – career, marriage, children, a prosperous retirement – are just dust in the wind.

 

[ReapReason]

That’s saying a lot. Is there no such thing as “health” versus “sickness” of the body? No objective difference between clear lungs, and those riddled with cancer and filled with fluid?

No distinction between a paranoid schizophrenic, walking down the street and screaming --because she feels there are bugs crawling all over her body–and the calm smile of the Buddha?

It depends on how you interpret it. If you think that the human body is not supposed to have cancer, is supposed to work a certain way, then that is a meaningless distinction given metaphysical naturalism, since such concepts necessitate teleology. To speak of illness is to presuppose that the body is not working the way it should or ought to work. In other-words the body functions for a purpose; it has a teleological goal and it is being prevented from achieving that goal. That is a value distinction that has no objectivity, since objectively speaking there is no such thing as bad physics and good physics, or mentally ill physics and healthy physics, if you accept metaphysical naturalism. There is no such thing as the way physics is ought to work; there is simply the way physics works. Rationally speaking there is only physics. Physics is relatively bad to you only because it is not fulfilling your subjective emotional desires such as the desire to maintain the human form according to the chemically induced delusion that you should stay alive.

 

[ReapReason]

This is a relationship that can’t exists without minds/perceivers.

You are merely asserting that objective intrinsic moral value cannot exist based on a definition of value that you found in a dictionary. Its a circular argument.

 

[ThinkingSapien]

You are merely asserting that objective intrinsic moral value cannot exist based on a definition of value that you found in a dictionary. Its a circular argument.

As of yet despite request and searching myself I’ve neither found nor have I been presented with definitions that are not explicitly or implicitly dependent on a relationship with one or more minds.

 

[Portofino]

It depends on how you interpret it. If you think that the human body is not supposed to have cancer, is supposed to work a certain way, then that is a meaningless distinction given metaphysical naturalism, since such concepts necessitate teleology. To speak of illness is to presuppose that the body is not working the way it should or ought to work. In other-words the body functions for a purpose; it has a teleological goal and it is being prevented from achieving that goal. That is a value distinction that has no objectivity, since objectively speaking there is no such thing as bad physics and good physics, or mentally ill physics and healthy physics, if you accept metaphysical naturalism. There is no such thing as the way physics is ought to work; there is simply the way physics works. Rationally speaking there is only physics. Physics is relatively bad to you only because it is not fulfilling your subjective emotional desires such as the desire to maintain the human form according to the chemically induced delusion that you should stay alive.

I do appreciate that formulation of it; the logic is unimpeachable. So, most human beings prefer the comfort of “health” to the excruciating agony of cancer (for example) because that is the way we are wired. It is a wiring that goes very deep (all other things being equal, only a miniscule proportion of human beings would prefer to drink a glass of sulfuric acid over drinking a glass of water).

However, as far as physics is concerned, or mathematics, both are entirely neutral; even a car accident (or a battle) can be a symphony of physics and of the interplay of forces.

I grant that the most I can say is that our societies – in times of peace – are based on certain very strong subjective preferences, which – insofar as they command the assent of the majority – have a certain *de facto *objectivity (within the relative context of human life). Assent is almost universal regarding preference for what we call “self-interest” (the desire that I avoid pain, and that I live a long life). It is very easy to persuade another person, based on grounds of self-interest (muggers and blackmailers rely on the self-interest of their would-be victims, pretty reliablly; as do hostage-takers). Assent is much, much less universal regarding the statement, “I want others to avoid pain, and to live a long life.” On the other hand, kidnappers rely on it – pretty successfully – when they say something like, “if you ever want to see your kid again…”

The rules of society are thus based on “enlightened self-interest”, whereby one recognizes that, “if there is anarchy, the good news is that I get to victimize anyone I want; the bad news is that anyone that wants gets to victimize me.” Perhaps you don’t want to victimize others, either, because people have been pretty kind to you in your life (your mother, your family, your friends). Even dogs envince a more genial or sweet disposition if they’ve been well-treated. Altruism is also based on an almost “intellectual” enlargement of one’s sense of “relatedness” to those around us. An individual recognizes similarities between himself and others, just as --on a much simpler level – a father recognizes that his son has his eyes, or his face, and subconsciously loves him as he loves himself. As humans, we travel together very much like herd animals (which dogs seem quite at home with); as far as they are concerned, perhaps, strangers are part of their master’s “extended” tribe. And, indeed, this does seem to be the case, given the instinctive urge for strangers to rush to each other’s aid, in a crisis or emergency.

Thus, there is “stability” or “predictability” in the way a civil society is set up, based on predictable human wants or perceived needs. What is unclear is whether those wants or needs have any significance beyond their subjective significance to those human beings. This I don’t contest.

What I personally hope, of course, is that they do have some larger, more ultimate significance. The mere hope of this is not an irrational hope, in my mind, since (in my mind) it can be neither proven nor disproven. For me, it is more of a “Pascal’s wager” of this life, whereby I not only prefer pleasure to torture – which, personally, I cannot help but do, anymore than my eyes can prevent from tearing up, if there is sand blown into them, or anymore than I avoid crying out in pain if I step on a nail with my bare foot; but I believe it is possible that what the majority of human want (peace, happiness, life itself) is somehow what human beings are “meant” to want, in a somehow benevolent universe. I personally grant that it’s not proven, but that it’s not an unreasonable wager.

 

[Peter_Plato]

What I personally hope, of course, is that they do have some larger, more ultimate significance. The mere hope of this is not an irrational hope, in my mind, since (in my mind) it can be neither proven nor disproven. For me, it is more of a “Pascal’s wager” of this life, whereby I not only prefer pleasure to torture – which, personally, I cannot help but do, anymore than my eyes can prevent from tearing up, if there is sand blown into them, or anymore than I avoid crying out in pain if I step on a nail with my bare foot; but I believe it is possible that what the majority of human want (peace, happiness, life itself) is somehow what human beings are “meant” to want, in a somehow benevolent universe. I personally grant that it’s not proven, but that it’s not an unreasonable wager.

In this sense, there is the level of “natural moral good” that is restricted to the current existence we enjoy. Human beings naturally desire this good because it defines the good as well-being or flourishing in this life. The fact that conflicts can occur between the good of one or some and other individuals or groups means that well-being can be jeopardized by these kinds of conflicts. Even so a concept of the “good” remains fairly universal. What is good (peace, happiness, life, etc.,) for one individual or group is the same, or basically the same as the good for another individual or group. The presumption, and at the same time, the cause of conflict because of limited availability, is that the good is only available in this natural realm.

What Christianity has brought into the discussion is the fact that this life is “not all there is.” That has resulted in an altered view of the good because what is needed to fulfill the requirements for a strictly natural definition of a “good life” is not necessarily correlated to those of an eternal or supernatural life.

Another consideration is that there may be major differences between 1) what it means to be a naturally good person fulfilling the requirements of a strictly natural moral being who promotes the natural good of others altruistically or in a rationally self-interested way and 2) what it means to be a spiritually good being promoting the supernatural good of others according to the divine will. The teleological view that is taken will make all the difference in the world.

To see moral goodness in strictly natural or rationally self-interested terms is quite different from viewing the good as the fulfillment of supernatural ends where human beings have a destiny, purpose and nature that far exceeds the mere achievement of natural goods for a bodily constrained lifetime limited to around 85 years. If achieving, in CS Lewis’ terms, a “Zoe” form of existence rather than a merely “Bios” form is our destiny, then that alters dramatically the nature of the moral good.

Lewis uses the argument from desire in support of this. If we innately desire something that cannot be attained in this life, then that is strong evidence that we were created for something more than just this natural existence. In negative terms, if nothing in this life can truly fulfill us, then we were designed for some other form of existence.

If Lewis is correct then merely natural moral goods that make possible a naturally good life are superseded by the goods required to attain a supernatural life. This does not mean these goods (value sets) are necessarily in conflict, but it does mean the natural goods are hierarchically subordinate in value to supernatural goods.

This also goes a long way to explaining differences in the conceptions of morality and in practical application, since there would be competition for limited natural goods between individuals, but an awareness of a supernatural layer to goodness on the part of some but not others could exacerbate this competition/conflict because of differing value sets.

 

[Portofino]

Another consideration is that there may be major differences between 1) what it means to be a naturally good person fulfilling the requirements of a strictly natural moral being who promotes the natural good of others altruistically or in a rationally self-interested way and 2) what it means to be a spiritually good being promoting the supernatural good of others according to the divine will. The teleological view that is taken will make all the difference in the world.

Lewis uses the argument from desire in support of this. If we innately desire something that cannot be attained in this life, then that is strong evidence that we were created for something more than just this natural existence. In negative terms, if nothing in this life can truly fulfill us, then we were designed for some other form of existence.

I appreciate those thoughts; thanks for offering them

What interests me are those few non-religious thinkers who almost go beyond a naturalistic ethics of pleasure and self-interest, all the while remaining within its circle.

Epicurus, ironically, came very close to articulating a Christian vision of altruism, as did – as is well known – the Buddha.

For example, Epicurus was celibate, in the name of intelligent hedonism. He believed that, “sexual indulgence has never done anyone lasting good, and one should count himself lucky if it has not done positive harm.” He ate extremely frugally (as did Socrates). He didn’t believe in money and riches, in the same vein as a comment from George Carlin that I recently encountered: “Trying to be happy by accumulating possessions is like trying to satisfy hunger by taping sandwiches all over your body.” In other words, it was a misguided way to pursue happiness.

What Epicurus did believe was necessary for happiness – and which he probably believed we underestimated, as most of us probably do – is the extent to which affection and companionship is a fundamental human need (although, on some level, we do recognize it, since a common human complaint is “loneliness”). He felt that loneliness was one of the most painful of human emotions, and that happiness was not an individual affair but an inter-personal one. Like the Christian, he emphasized communal eating; solitary eating, he felt, was fit for a wolf and not for a man. Epicureans had the reputation of being a very close-knit group, almost in the sense of “see how these Christians love one another.” This was based on their very strong belief that no one can be happy all alone (which they observed, perhaps, becomes more true, the older we get and especially as we approach old age). It was very much a “getting by with the help of one’s friends” philosophy.

He also recognized that there can be no friendship without trust and sincerity. Thus, he says, “when we love our friends, we love them for their own sake (as ends in themselves); even though the initial impetus for seeking friends is utility.”

From there, one can go pretty far into altruism, it seems. If others treat you well, you will tend to feel gratitude or affection towards them. When it takes root in your emotions, it is not a matter of the head, but the heart. If someone does a kind enough deed for you–especially if it is unexpected–you may remember it your whole life. If enough people have done kind deeds for you, you will have much more “excess” goodwill – enough to spare, even, for those who would be your enemies.

Another insight is that anger, hatred, fear, jealousy (so potentially damaging to others) are self-destructive emotions. Fear is the origin of much cruelty and animosity – feeling threatened or “cornered” or attacked by others. If one feels safe, one will be calmer and less belligerent. Appreciating others’ good qualities is also pleasurable – taking pleasure in the good qualities of others. With gratitude, it is the same; gratitude is a form of taking pleasure. But, when you truly appreciate others, then you will still value them for themselves, even if they are no longer in a position to benefit you. It’s as if you are putting something in motion or lighting a fire; after a certain point, it is self-propelling and no longer needs anything feeding it.

Epicurus, in any case, had two huge Christian virtues – he led a celibate life; and he expressed willingness to die for his friends (“no greater love has a man than this, to lay down his life for his friends”). The first was more purely pragmatic (he didn’t believe sex was inherently evil, anymore than excess of wine is inherently evil). The second was more sincere, though he didn’t see it as conflicting with self-interest, even where he was willing to die for a friend in need. He simply felt that, when there is a true friend, one is capable of loving that friend more than one loves oneself; that one forgets oneself.

It’s thus – as with the original Buddhist teaching – a conception of morality whereby morality begins through self-interest, but then flowers into something more genuinely altruistic. Although, even when you get into the highest realms of altruism via a Christian ethic, some modicum of self-benefit still remains. Love of God, for example, becomes a joy; or love of neighbor. The same with a deep feeling of inner satisfaction or inner peace. It is love without material expectations – without expecting anything in return (certainly not in the way of money or even recognition). But there is the pleasure of “virtue being its own reward” – of doing something with a glad heart, just out of the satisfaction of knowing you are doing it.

 

[Peter_Plato]

Another insight is that anger, hatred, fear, jealousy (so potentially damaging to others) are self-destructive emotions. Fear is the origin of much cruelty and animosity – feeling threatened or “cornered” or attacked by others. If one feels safe, one will be calmer and less belligerent.

Consider the role of faith in the above insight. If God is ultimately in control of all and has the power, knowledge and benevolent will to bring about final good, then there is safety beyond all possibility and therefore no need for the self-destructive emotions you listed.

Another point to consider is the role of all the “theological virtues.” Charity does not require much exposition, but hope and faith do.

Experience (practical wisdom) is what is gained from the past. The methodology that formalizes experience into knowledge is the scientific method. Experience, observe, hypothesize, test, collect data and draw conclusions are all in some sense historically based, backward looking endeavors. If I do this, this will happen is constrained by past knowledge.

However, faith and hope are required to create, to move forward, to advance toward a teleological end that is not merely an attempt to remake some past event. Even then, faith is required that providence will take notice and provide missing ingredients.

This idea could be expounded upon more fully, but I think generally the relationship of reason and faith is that reason relies on the past for direction (premises are historically, experientially derived), whereas faith is essentially future looking, projecting forward towards an end. Reason without faith requires no courage, no risk and no purpose because knowing what has been or is now is not sufficient to determine what should be; but faith or hope without reason have no direction, no starting point. Faith and hope (along with charity, of course) are essentially supernatural because the future has supernatural potential, if these virtues are brought to bear.

 

[Sair]

I don’t know that it isn’t. But you should know that given metaphysical naturalism any value distinctions you make about reality beyond the utility value we give to things is nothing more than a chemically induced fantasy in your brain. In fact human existence is as insignificant as the excrement left by an elephant. Your sense of self importance is a fantasy, regardless of who shares your delusion.

Why are such notions only “fantasy” if chemically induced, yet somehow more of a “real”, or “objective” phenomenon if induced by some undetectable nonphyscial ectoplasm, like a soul? If, as a matter of fact, we have such notions, why ascribe less weight to them for being natural than if they were supernatural?

And I think you’ll find that excrement is actually accorded quite a lot of significance in elephant communities, as a form of scent-based communication.

As for my sense of self-importance, I recognise it for what it is, and what it means in a naturalistic context. I don’t believe the universe cares one way or the other for my well-being or that of any sentient being. I don’t buy into the idea that the whole edifice of the universe was somehow built for the sake of my moral development and ultimate fulfilment, which from what I have seen, is a belief held by many a monotheist.

 

[JDaniel]

Why are such notions only “fantasy” if chemically induced, yet somehow more of a “real”, or “objective” phenomenon if induced by some undetectable nonphyscial ectoplasm, like a soul? If, as a matter of fact, we have such notions, why ascribe less weight to them for being natural than if they were supernatural?

Sair:

Because, otherwise, under the materialist/naturalist assumption, everything simply “emerges”. By calling things that come to be, “emergent,” the non-theist believes in the fantasy that such a description absolves him of having to find or attribute cause. When confronted with that difficulty, the non-theist conjures up even more fantasies, such as, “the life principle emerged from inert matter.”

That starts with a “nothingness” and ends with a “nothingness.” And, by a process of non-think, something finds being, as a process, in between the two nothingnesses. After 30 years of wallowing in atheism, I found it much easier to believe in something on either side of “something.” Even if that something is that we are nothing more than ideas in the Mind of our Deity.

And I think you’ll find that excrement is actually accorded quite a lot of significance in elephant communities, as a form of scent-based communication.

Yes. I think there’s been far too much excremental talk in the last couple of posts.

As for my sense of self-importance, I recognise it for what it is

Which is what? And, more importantly, Why?

I don’t believe the universe cares one way or the other for my well-being or that of any sentient being.

Finally, something that I can agree with! Sounds as though you are crossing the Tiber.

I don’t buy into the idea that the whole edifice of the universe was somehow built for the sake of my moral development and ultimate fulfilment,

What, then, do you think it was built for?

which from what I have seen, is a belief held by many a monotheist.

Likewise, yours is a belief that I’ve seen held by many non-theists. (Boy! I’m glad we said that!)

God bless,
jd

 

[Peter_Plato]

As for my sense of self-importance, I recognise it for what it is, and what it means in a naturalistic context. I don’t believe the universe cares one way or the other for my well-being or that of any sentient being.

In this naturalistic context, then, there is nothing in the fact of sentience that makes it a preferable form of existence because there is no ground for preferential treatment in this naturalistic context. If then your existence or lack of it makes no difference, then why would murder be impermissible? Merely because it destroys your sense of self being important to you? You would have to admit that other selves need not harbor those same feelings about you as you do because they have no natural basis for doing so. In which case, there are no grounds for anything like a moral imperative. No “ought” could exist other than to promote a merely self-preservationist pragmatism. If we both want to survive, we should not kill each other, but what if I feel my survival is better promoted by doing away with you? There cannot be anything “morally” wrong in killing you because you have no inherent “value,” in fact, no one does. It might not be pragmatically feasible to kill others, but it also could very well be in some situations. Your strictly naturalistic context would necessarily be silent on such a question.

You must be aware that this thinking would not be compelling to a super powerful agent whose view is to not respect the other selves in his/her world (to show no gender bias) because of an aim to subdue all other forms and become the ruling lord of all sentient creatures. There is no objective moral standard by which this world view could be found to be morally objectionable because the natural order is neutral in this regard.

You must also be aware that the standard rejoinder to the moral argument for God: “Does God will things because they are good or are they good because God wills them?” completely loses its cogency following such an admission because you have conceded that the universe is morally neutral. Therefore might is just as right as any other pragmatically successful strategy because right has no definable meaning, except to subjective holders of value. God, being ultimate subject, would have the ultimate say on the definition and standard for value.

I don’t buy into the idea that the whole edifice of the universe was somehow built for the sake of my moral development and ultimate fulfilment, which from what I have seen, is a belief held by many a monotheist.

The idea that there is a moral edifice to the universe/creation/exiistence does not entail that its ultimate purpose was for human development, but that human development fits into a greater moral structure that is the foundation of existence because the ground of existence is something analogically akin to “personhood,” “agency” or “purpose.” How important human moral development is within that structure is an open question to a theist. Humans were made to be moral creatures, not that the only morally valuable creatures are humans. The idea is that value is basic to the universe, and includes but is not restricted to humans. Without value as a foundational aspect of existence, there is not a compelling ground for moral principles, except in some extended pragmatic sense of social contract.

 

[ReapReason]

In this naturalistic context, then, there is nothing in the fact of sentience that makes it a preferable form of existence because there is no ground for preferential treatment in this naturalistic context. If then your existence or lack of it makes no difference, then why would murder be impermissible? Merely because it destroys your sense of self being important to you? You would have to admit that other selves need not harbor those same feelings about you as you do because they have no natural basis for doing so. In which case, there are no grounds for anything like a moral imperative. No “ought” could exist other than to promote a merely self-preservationist pragmatism. If we both want to survive, we should not kill each other, but what if I feel my survival is better promoted by doing away with you? There cannot be anything “morally” wrong in killing you because you have no inherent “value,” in fact, no one does. It might not be pragmatically feasible to kill others, but it also could very well be in some situations. Your strictly naturalistic context would necessarily be silent on such a question.

You must be aware that this thinking would not be compelling to a super powerful agent whose view is to not respect the other selves in his/her world (to show no gender bias) because of an aim to subdue all other forms and become the ruling lord of all sentient creatures. There is no objective moral standard by which this world view could be found to be morally objectionable because the natural order is neutral in this regard.

You must also be aware that the standard rejoinder to the moral argument for God: “Does God will things because they are good or are they good because God wills them?” completely loses its cogency following such an admission because you have conceded that the universe is morally neutral. Therefore might is just as right as any other pragmatically successful strategy because right has no definable meaning, except to subjective holders of value. God, being ultimate subject, would have the ultimate say on the definition and standard for value.

The idea that there is a moral edifice to the universe/creation/exiistence does not entail that its ultimate purpose was for human development, but that human development fits into a greater moral structure that is the foundation of existence because the ground of existence is something analogically akin to “personhood,” “agency” or “purpose.” How important human moral development is within that structure is an open question to a theist. Humans were made to be moral creatures, not that the only morally valuable creatures are humans. The idea is that value is basic to the universe, and includes but is not restricted to humans. Without value as a foundational aspect of existence, there is not a compelling ground for moral principles, except in some extended pragmatic sense of social contract.

This is very well written and shows precisely what’s at stake. Well done…