S
Sair
Guest
I suspect someone must already have responded to this, but I’m slowly making my way through the thread and catching up after not having been on the forums for a while.You have mistakenly presumed that my evidence is “scientific”, or else, you would prefer it to be strictly scientific. On the contrary, my evidence is primarily philosophic. Like scientific evidence, the philosophical postion begins with sense experience, but does not come to rest in the emperiological realm of natural science, but proceeds deeper, into the very nature of the human organism. This position cannot be explained in a single post.
However, the error in reduction of consciousness to brain states can be seen from the following example. As you are typing at your keyboard the related neuro-physiological activity in your brain can be recorded, and the scientific ability to do that is continuously improving. Concomitantly, you can provide a verbal description of what you are consciously experiencing as you type, such as the visual perception of the monitor and keyboard, your fingers responding to the mind’s instruction to hit certain keys, and so on.
The iterations of your conscious experience can be recorded by a secretary. When one compares what the secretary has recorded to the recordings of concurrent brain activity, one sees that the two accounts are starkley different in nature. What two things, though related, could be more different?
Your conscious experience is nothing at all like the registration of the related neuro-physiological activity of your brain.
One may try to reduce human conscious experience to physiology and possibly invoke the principle of parsimony. However, that lacks something of the scientific spirit since it fails to provide any sort of explanation for the radical difference between conscious experiences and brain activity. These stark differences make invocation of the principle of parsimony totally without warrant or logical justification.
The burden of proof, then, falls upon the reductionists, who so far, have nothing to offer.
I think there is some equivocation going on here. You say that the recording of brain activity, I presume in terms of data from instruments that do said recording, bears little resemblance to our subjective experience of what goes on in our own neurochemical pathways. That’s a bit like saying that a painting bears little actual resemblance to the subject being painted, or that a shadow bears little resemblance to the body that casts it, or indeed - and perhaps a better analogy - that the sensation of warmth bears little resemblance to the fire that affords it.
The position of the observer, I am supposing, is key - let’s say I witness an accident. My report of the accident will bear little real resemblance to the experience of the person involved in the accident, but ultimately we were witnessing the same occurrence. I think the same may be said of measuring brainwaves - the observational data from the external observer are always going to be qualitatively different to the internal experience of the subject.
What does it feel like to have molecules passing across synapses, or electrical impulses passing along neurones, and how does this feel different to the influence of one’s soul?