Is Transubstantiation incoherrent? (Last paragraph for tl/dr)

[BillikenBill]

First, I understand transubstantiation as the doctrine that the substance of bread and wine is replaced with the substance of the body and blood of Jesus Christ such that only the appearance of bread and wine remains.

Here is the difficulty: It seems that the Aristotelian idea that there are multiple types of being is incoherent, and with it the idea of substance vs accident. To see this, consider the sentence:

Socrates is not the same as whiteness.

Now it would seem that this sentence is obviously true, but a difficulty quickly arises if one looks closer. Specifically, given that Socrates and whiteness are in different categories of being, there can be no definition of same to accommodate the contrast. For example, ‘same’ cannot mean that Socrates and whiteness are not the same substance, for whiteness is not a substance, nor can it mean that Socrates and whiteness are not the same quantity, for neither are quantities, nor can it mean that Socrates and whiteness are not the same qualities, for Socrates is not a quality, and so on for all the categories. Thus, the above statement is rendered meaningless.

Of course, we intuitively think that there is a sense in which Socrates and whiteness are not the same thing, namely that they are different in virtue of existing in different categories of being. But note what this intuition presupposes: that Socrates and whiteness both share the property of existence, and indeed this is true of all the categories; all modes of being share the property of existence.

But this conclusion, that the members of all categories share a common sense of existence, is precisely opposite of the theory that being (i.e. existence) is subject to categorical distinctions. Thus, Aristotle’s metaphysics are self-referentially incoherent, implicitly denying what is explicitly affirmed.

Here is the difficulty for transubstantiation. If the underlying metaphysics is incoherent, then there is no distinction between substance and accident. Thus, rather than say that the substance of Christ replaces the substance of the bread, one would say that the region of space-time in question instantiates the bread at one moment, and then at the time of consecration also instantiates Christ. It wouldn’t be essentially bread or essentially Christ since nothing is essentially anything if my above argument is correct, and being can only be understood in a single sense. The problem with this view, however, is that it results in consubstantiation, which has been condemned as heretical. Are there any other options here? Any thoughts?

 

[Wesrock]

Whiteness is not a thing that exists on its own. It’s something that can only exist as part of something else that exists.

It’s quite simple to state instead that Socrates and whiteness are not identical.

You also don’t account for the existence/essence distinction. All the are similar in that they exist. Things differ in their essence. At all levels of distinction, there are two co-principles at work, one by which they are the same, another by which they are different. All things have existence. Not all things have the same essence. They do not differ in having existence, they differ in their essence. (Redundancies over). Then there’s form and matter, and potential and act, substance and accident.

 

[BillikenBill]

Whiteness is not a thing that exists on its own. It’s something that can only exist as part of something else that exists.

This seems to be true of white particulars, but not of whiteness itself, which is what is here being compared. Were this otherwise, then one would have to believe that, were all white things to be destroyed, that whiteness itself would cease to exist. Viewed this way, your suggestion of “Socrates is not identical with whiteness” seems to raise the original difficulties.

Could you say more about essence? In virtue of what is a thing essentially a thing? For example, how is it that a chair is essentially a chair-thing (as opposed to a wooden thing, a cushiony-thing, etc.)?

 

[tonyrey]

Whiteness is not a thing that exists on its own. It’s something that can only exist as part of something else that exists.

It’s quite simple to state instead that Socrates and whiteness are not identical.

You also don’t account for the existence/essence distinction. All the are similar in that they exist. Things differ in their essence. At all levels of distinction, there are two co-principles at work, one by which they are the same, another by which they are different. All things have existence. Not all things have the same essence. Then there’s form and matter, and potential and act, substance and accident.

It seems obvious that Socrates and whiteness don’t share the property of existence because whiteness is an attribute whereas Socrates is a person. Whiteness presupposes the existence of some one or something whereas Socrates doesn’t. At the very most they are completely distinct modes of existence which have nothing to do with transubstantiation. Whiteness doesn’t even have a substance!

 

[Vico]

First, I understand transubstantiation as the doctrine that the substance of bread and wine is replaced with the substance of the body and blood of Jesus Christ such that only the appearance of bread and wine remains.

Here is the difficulty: It seems that the Aristotelian idea that there are multiple types of being is incoherent, and with it the idea of substance vs accident. To see this, consider the sentence:

Socrates is not the same as whiteness.

Now it would seem that this sentence is obviously true, but a difficulty quickly arises if one looks closer. Specifically, given that Socrates and whiteness are in different categories of being, there can be no definition of same to accommodate the contrast. For example, ‘same’ cannot mean that Socrates and whiteness are not the same substance, for whiteness is not a substance, nor can it mean that Socrates and whiteness are not the same quantity, for neither are quantities, nor can it mean that Socrates and whiteness are not the same qualities, for Socrates is not a quality, and so on for all the categories. Thus, the above statement is rendered meaningless.

Of course, we intuitively think that there is a sense in which Socrates and whiteness are not the same thing, namely that they are different in virtue of existing in different categories of being. But note what this intuition presupposes: that Socrates and whiteness both share the property of existence, and indeed this is true of all the categories; all modes of being share the property of existence.

But this conclusion, that the members of all categories share a common sense of existence, is precisely opposite of the theory that being (i.e. existence) is subject to categorical distinctions. Thus, Aristotle’s metaphysics are self-referentially incoherent, implicitly denying what is explicitly affirmed.

Here is the difficulty for transubstantiation. If the underlying metaphysics is incoherent, then there is no distinction between substance and accident. Thus, rather than say that the substance of Christ replaces the substance of the bread, one would say that the region of space-time in question instantiates the bread at one moment, and then at the time of consecration also instantiates Christ. It wouldn’t be essentially bread or essentially Christ since nothing is essentially anything if my above argument is correct, and being can only be understood in a single sense. The problem with this view, however, is that it results in consubstantiation, which has been condemned as heretical. Are there any other options here? Any thoughts?

St. Thomas Aquinas did not accept all things taught by the Philosopher (Aristotle). The soul and body together form a complete substance and the soul is immortal. Aquinas gives us two different types of substantial form: subsisting incorporeal form vs inhering material form.

Council of Lateran IV, 1215 A.D. (Denzinger, Sources of Catholic Dogma)

430 One indeed is the universal Church of the faithful, outside which no one at all is saved, * in which the priest himself is the sacrifice, Jesus Christ, whose body and blood are truly contained in the sacrament of the altar under the species of bread and wine; the bread (changed) into His body by the divine power of transubstantiation, and the wine into the blood, so that to accomplish the mystery of unity we ourselves receive from His (nature) what He Himself received from ours. And surely no one can accomplish this sacrament except a priest who has been rightly ordained according to the keys of the Church which Jesus Christ Himself conceded to the Apostles and to their successors. But the sacrament of baptism (which at the invocation of God and the indivisible Trinity, namely, of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, is solemnized in water) rightly conferred by anyone in the form of the Church is useful unto salvation for little ones and for adults. And if, after the reception of baptism, anyone shall have lapsed into sin, through true penance he can always be restored. Moreover, not only virgins and the continent but also married persons pleasing to God through right faith and good work merit to arrive at a blessed eternity.

Those philosophies which take a phenomenalistic stand and deny the existence of noumenalistic matter, and also of the existence of essential forms, are antagonistic to the Real Presence doctrine.

 

[Wesrock]

Another angle to approach this: the use of the Latin word transubstantiation to describe the change in the Eucharist predated any embrace of Aristotlean-ish metaphysics. In fact, it was at a time when Aristotle was viewed with much skepticism. While Saint Thomas’ form of Aristotleanism later gained very high praise in the Church, Aristotlean metaphysics is not itself part of the Church’s dogma of transubstantiation, which only states that the species become the body and blood of Christ under the appearance of bread and wine. Even speaking of substance and accident to describe these features does not mean it’s reliant on Aristotle.

That’s not to disregard the other points that have been mentioned, but it is a common misconception that the Church dogmatized Aristotlean metaphysics.

 

[hazcompat]

Time and “No Time” embrace. Vico summed it up well

“Those philosophies which take a phenomenalistic stand and deny the existence of noumenalistic matter, and also of the existence of essential forms, are antagonistic to the Real Presence doctrine.”

Peace