Islam is Fundamentally Incoherent

[Scholastic17]

I was chatting with an associate of mine about how an empirical error in the doctrine of a religion correlates to an error of the religion itself. In any case, it has occurred to me (even before this chat…it’s just that this chat spurred me to write this thread) that there is such an error in Islam. Herein lies the error (I am pulling this from St. Bonaventure’s “Journey of the Mind into God)”:

1. Muslims believe that God is one both in substance and in hypostasis (person).
2. Muslims believe that God is perfect. This is to say, no greater God can be conceived.
3. It is apparent both to the Muslim and to me from the creation of this, the best possible world, that God desires to express His Goodness.* Further, even if it were not empirically obvious, it should nonetheless be obvious to the Reason (see Plato’s Timaeus).

• By express, I mean it in this way: red food dye makes cake icing red. The redness of the food dye is reflected in the redness of the cake icing. Likewise, God is Good. God desires to see that Goodness reflected by some communication of that Goodness.

These 3 things a given, it is evident that the Muslim faith is incoherent. This is to say, their beliefs result in a contradiction. Since their beliefs result in a contradiction, it is evident that either the Muslim faith as a whole is right (but this one belief or those several beliefs are wrong), or the entire faith is wrong. In this case, the former cannot be the case, since the beliefs in question which result in the contradiction are either obvious (as is the case in 2 and 3) or central to the Muslim faith (as is the case with 1). Therefore, if I can demonstrate that the beliefs result in a contradiction, it must be admitted that the Muslim faith as a whole is an error.

If God performs an action, then God must perform the action in the best possible way (from 2). If He does not perform the action in this fashion, then a better God can be conceived, namely a God Who has performed the action in the best possible way. For this reason, no man who believes in the second proposition (as the Muslims believe and I believe) may believe that this world is not the best possible world. God has created the world, and therefore His act of creating the world must have been the best possible. IE, this is the best possible world.

Yet, the Muslims (and I suppose the Jew) say that God expresses His Goodness only in the creation of the world (from 1 and 3). Either, therefore, no greater expression of God’s Goodness is conceivable, or Islam becomes incoherent.

But look! A greater expression of God’s Goodness is conceivable. The most perfect conceivable expression of God’s Goodness is an entire communication of the Divine Substance in a new hypostasis. Quoting St. Bonaventure:
Itinerarium Mentis in Deum 6:2:

However a most high diffusion cannot be, unless it be actual and intrinsic, substantial and hypostatic, natural and voluntary, liberal and necessary, unfailing and perfect. Therefore unless there be eternally in the Most High Good an actual and consubstantial production, and a hypostasis equally noble,8 as is one producing through the manner [per modum] of generation and spiration — so that there be an eternal (production) of an eternally co-beginning principle — so that there would be a beloved [dilectus], a co-beloved [condilectus], a begotten and a spirated, that is, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit; it would never be the Most High Good, because it would not diffuse itself most highly. For diffusion in time [ex tempore] into creatures is not but as a center and/or point in respect of the immensity of the eternal Goodness;9 whence any diffusion can also be thought greater than that, namely that, in which diffusing itself it communicates to the other its whole substance and nature. Therefore it would not be the Most High Good, if it were able in reality [in re], and/or in understanding [intellectu] to be lacking.

Look! The Muslim beliefs necessarily result in a contradiction. 2 and 3 demand that in God there be a plurality of hypostases (persons…ideally 3) in a single substance. Yet, they flatly deny this in 1.

Islam is fundamentally incoherent.

On that note, this may also demonstrate the error of Mormonism.

 

[neploho]

1. Muslims believe that God is one both in substance and in hypostasis (person).
2. Muslims believe that God is perfect. This is to say, no greater God can be conceived.
3. It is apparent both to the Muslim and to me from the creation of this, the best possible world, that God desires to express His Goodness.* Further, even if it were not empirically obvious, it should nonetheless be obvious to the Reason (see Plato’s Timaeus).

• By express, I mean it in this way: red food dye makes cake icing red. The redness of the food dye is reflected in the redness of the cake icing. Likewise, God is Good. God desires to see that Goodness reflected by some communication of that Goodness.

What is the distinction between “substance” and “hypostasis” and what Muslims authority makes this assertion?

What do you mean by “greater” and what is it’s relation to “perfection”?

I just honestly don’t understand what you mean by #3

 

[Badaliyyah]

i am not Muslim, but this seems pretty easy to answer. Islam and Judaism both reject the doctrine of the Trinity as incoherent. The multiplication of hypostases is nonsense. No division or multiplication is real in God.

Moreover the comparison between creation and generation is generally illegitimate, even on Christian grounds. God is, quite simply, Trinitarian. It is not that God chose to be Trinity. That the generation of the second hypostasis or the spiration of the third is somehow voluntary. It is simply what God is: Trinitarian (one nature in three persons).

Creation, on the other hand, is something that might or might not be.

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on another note, your claim that God must do what is best is often viewed with suspicion by Christian philosophy because it seems to indicate that God had to create…a proposition which is usually rejected (e.g., by Thomas and Bonaventure). Thomas for instance says that it was “fitting” that God act in a certain way, there is no reason God had to act in such and such a manner.

---

and on a completely unrelated note, you might get an audience that is more interested in this topic in the philosophy forum. just a thought.

salaam.

 

[Scholastic17]

What is the distinction between “substance” and “hypostasis” and what Muslims authority makes this assertion?

By this I mean a distinction between substance and person. For example, my substance is “rational animal,” and in that substance there is a single person (the person who is currently posting as Scholastic17).

Muslims believe in a single Divine Substance, and in this Divine Substance there is a single person whom they call “Allah.”

What do you mean by “greater” and what is it’s relation to “perfection”?

By “perfection” I understand “completeness,” and by “greater,” I understand “more perfect.” An imperfect being is lacking in some way. For example, the perfect eye is perfect in its capacity to see, whereas a very imperfect eye is blind.

I just honestly don’t understand what you mean by #3

Timaeus by Plato:

Let me tell you then why the creator made this world of generation. He was good, and the good can never have any jealousy of anything. And being free from jealousy, he desired that all things should be as like himself as they could be. This is in the truest sense the origin of creation and of the world, as we shall do well in believing on the testimony of wise men: God desired that all things should be good and nothing bad, so far as this was attainable.

 

[neploho]

By this I mean a distinction between substance and person. For example, my substance is “rational animal,” and in that substance there is a single person (the person who is currently posting as Scholastic17).

Muslims believe in a single Divine Substance, and in this Divine Substance there is a single person whom they call “Allah.”

You have not defined what you mean by substance, hypostasis what makes them distinct or what Muslim authority makes the claim you assign to them.

By “perfection” I understand “completeness,” and by “greater,” I understand “more perfect.”

Then your second premiss is circular. You satate God is perfect, and then say that by this assertion you mean no greater can be conceived, which given this explanation means you were saying that by God being perfect you mean no more perfect being can be conceived. Now you have added that perfection is “completness”. Where such an assertion warrented it would still have numerous problems but you have not given any reason for us to think this is an adequate definition of perfection.

Honestly I still can’t make sense of what you mean by your third premiss

 

[Scholastic17]

You have not defined what you mean by substance, hypostasis what makes them distinct or what Muslim authority makes the claim you assign to them.

An underlying “stuff,” so to speak, to which properties are assigned. I’m not familiar with any Muslim preacher dude who specifically says this, but I doubt any Muslim would disagree with it.

Then your second premiss is circular. You satate God is perfect, and then say that by this assertion you mean no greater can be conceived, which given this explanation means you were saying that by God being perfect you mean no more perfect being can be conceived.

It’s certainly tautologous. I wouldn’t call it “circular,” though. I think we all know what “perfect” and “greater than” mean. If I have a fire which burns at 500 degrees, then clearly a fire which burns at 530 degrees is a greater fire.

Now you have added that perfection is “completness”. Where such an assertion warrented it would still have numerous problems but you have not given any reason for us to think this is an adequate definition of perfection.

I don’t think that most people use the term in a different manner.

Honestly I still can’t make sense of what you mean by your third premiss

God is Good. In creating the world, He wanted to reflect that Goodness. IE, because God is Good, He wanted to make a good world.

 

[Badaliyyah]

Muslims believe in a single Divine Substance, and in this Divine Substance there is a single person whom they call “Allah.”

neploho is correct. I cannot think of a single Muslim philosopher who would allow that distinction, which may be appropriate to creatures, to be applied to God. God’s essence and existence are one (which Thomas would also say). The person is not in the divine substance…God is God’s being

Even Christians would avoid saying the persons are “in” the substance…the persons are not three separate instances of one substance, as if “divine substance” were a genus.

salaam.

 

[Scholastic17]

i am not Muslim, but this seems pretty easy to answer. Islam and Judaism both reject the doctrine of the Trinity as incoherent. The multiplication of hypostases is nonsense. No division or multiplication is real in God.

I fail to see why it is contradictory to say that there is a multiplicity of hypostases in a single substance.

Moreover the comparison between creation and generation is generally illegitimate, even on Christian grounds. God is, quite simply, Trinitarian. It is not that God chose to be Trinity. That the generation of the second hypostasis or the spiration of the third is somehow voluntary. It is simply what God is: Trinitarian (one nature in three persons).

I am not saying otherwise. I am running on the idea that the Good is self-diffusive. I suppose the idea comes most clearly from pseudo-Dionysus, but I don’t think that the Muslim nor the Jew will disagree. It’s obvious from the creation of the world and from the Reason.

Creation, on the other hand, is something that might or might not be.

I agree.

on another note, your claim that God must do what is best is often viewed with suspicion by Christian philosophy because it seems to indicate that God had to create…a proposition which is usually rejected (e.g., by Thomas and Bonaventure). Thomas for instance says that it was “fitting” that God act in a certain way, there is no reason God had to act in such and such a manner.

I am saying that if God acts, then God must act in the best possible fashion. Both St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas Aquinas agree with me here (for this reason, St. Thomas Aquinas treats only of the best compossible worlds, not of all the possible worlds in general), as does Leibniz.

and on a completely unrelated note, you might get an audience that is more interested in this topic in the philosophy forum. just a thought.

salaam.

I wanted a specifically Muslim/Jewish answer, though.

 

[Scholastic17]

neploho is correct. I cannot think of a single Muslim philosopher who would allow that distinction, which may be appropriate to creatures, to be applied to God. God’s essence and existence are one (which Thomas would also say). The person is not in the divine substance…God is God’s being

Even Christians would avoid saying the persons are “in” the substance…the persons are not three separate instances of one substance, as if “divine substance” were a genus.

salaam.

The Divine Substance is certain a genus. That said, that genus is entirely unique and possesses only one “thing,” so to speak. This is to say, God is sui generis. But sui generis or not, the point remains that God is “of a sort.”

In any case, I’m not saying anything controversial. When I say that in the Divine Substance there is a single hypostasis, I mean only that God is Allah and only Allah (in the Muslim worldview).

 

[neploho]

An underlying “stuff,” so to speak, to which properties are assigned.

What is that, hypostasis? How is this distinct from substance?

And what does it mean to say that a being is one in both substance

I’m not familiar with any Muslim preacher dude who specifically says this, but I doubt any Muslim would disagree with it.

Why?

It’s certainly tautologous

I have never had much time or respect for scholastic philosophy (no offense) but if you are useing the term “tautology” as it is used in modern analytic philoosphy your claim is not “certainly” tautologous

I wouldn’t call it “circular,”

Your definition of perfection is based on your use of the predicate “greater” which you define as “more perfect” I beleive.

I think we all know what “perfect” and “greater than” mean.

Not in your definition.

The number five is not “more perfect than” the number one.

If I have a fire which burns at 500 degrees, then clearly a fire which burns at 530 degrees is a greater fire.

no.

I don’t think that most people use the term in a different manner.

God is Good. In creating the world, He wanted to reflect that Goodness. IE, because God is Good, He wanted to make a good world.

I am not sure that is clear in Islamic thought.

 

[Badaliyyah]

In any case, I’m not saying anything controversial. When I say that in the Divine Substance there is a single hypostasis, I mean only that God is Allah and only Allah (in the Muslim worldview).

In neither Christian nor in Muslim philosophy is the divine substance a genus. In fact it is pretty much a running and fundamental thesis of everyone who read Aristotle that God does not belong to any of the categories (which would include substance and genus; you can find it in Albert, Thomas, etc., etc.; it also belongs very deeply to the Neoplatonic tradition within Christianity as well as mediated through Pseudo-Dionysius). If we use the language of substance for God, according to someone like Thomas, we do so analogously because God is the cause of substance, not because God falls into one of the categories.

And of course God is God and only God (as you say). The point here is that Islamic philosophy denies that one can make any sort of real distinction with regard to God (e.g., between God’s substance and God’s person). Aquinas, as a contrasting Christian example, says that while other distinctions that might be made with respect to God are not real, but merely ideal and are made because we are finite and need them to talk about God, the Trinitarian persons represent real relations in the Godhead. That sort of division would strike any Islamic or Jewish philosophy as undermining divine simplicity/unity. God cannot be divided up into parts; the plurality of hypostases is nonsense in that it either pretends to multiply or divide God.

salaam.

 

[Scholastic17]

What is that, hypostasis? How is this distinct from substance?

No, that’s a substance. The underlying thing (substance is literally “substans,” meaning “standing beneath”) is the substance. The hypostasis is presumably to be defined as an “ego (in the Cartesian sense),” or perhaps an agent (in the Aristotelian sense).

So here, I am a rational animal (this is my substance), and this rational animal is a single hypostasis, namely Scholastic17. The substance has the hypostasis, but the hypostasis is that whereby these words are currently being typed.

And what does it mean to say that a being is one in both substance

By “one in substance and hypostasis” I mean that this thing is one person, and only one person.

Why?

Muslims believe that God is Allah, and only Allah.

I have never had much time or respect for scholastic philosophy (no offense) but if you are useing the term “tautology” as it is used in modern analytic philoosphy your claim is not “certainly” tautologous

I did mean it in the modern analytic sense. I suppose I’ll be a bit less vague. When I say “greater than,” I mean it in the sense that St. Anselm does, and when I say “perfection,” I mean it in the sense that Descartes and the other rationalists do.

The number five is not “more perfect than” the number one.

“Greater than” has a different meaning in that context. It means “numerically more” here.

no.

Ok. A fire which burns at 530 degrees and is burning up 2 square miles is greater than a fire which burns at 500 degrees and is only burning up 2 square feet. Surely you’ll admit that?

I am not sure that is clear in Islamic thought.

It’s evident both empirically (from the creation of the world) and from the Reason (see the Timaeus).

 

[neploho]

In neither Christian nor in Muslim philosophy is the divine substance a genus. In fact it is pretty much a running and fundamental thesis of everyone who read Aristotle that God does not belong to any of the categories (which would include substance and genus; you can find it in Albert, Thomas, etc., etc.; it also belongs very deeply to the Neoplatonic tradition within Christianity as well as mediated through Pseudo-Dionysius). If we use the language of substance for God, according to someone like Thomas, we do so analogously because God is the cause of substance, not because God falls into one of the categories.

And of course God is God and only God (as you say). The point here is that Islamic philosophy denies that one can make any sort of real distinction with regard to God (e.g., between God’s substance and God’s person). Aquinas, as a contrasting Christian example, says that while other distinctions that might be made with respect to God are not real, but merely ideal and are made because we are finite and need them to talk about God, the Trinitarian persons represent real relations in the Godhead. That sort of division would strike any Islamic or Jewish philosophy as undermining divine simplicity/unity. God cannot be divided up into parts; the plurality of hypostases is nonsense in that it either pretends to multiply or divide God.

salaam.

Yes. I am also not sure a Muslim philosopher would insist that God must creat “the best possible world”. Obviously we are painting with broad brushes but would Ash’ari claim that God must creat ‘x’ as ‘y’?

 

[Badaliyyah]

Yes. I am also not sure a Muslim philosopher would insist that God must creat “the best possible world”. Obviously we are painting with broad brushes but would Ash’ari claim that God must creat ‘x’ as ‘y’?

You are absolutely right; the Ash’ari theologians would fundamentally reject that kind of claim (God must do x). There are some among the falasifa though who would be more comfortable with the claim (ibn’Sina; ibn’Rushd).

Christian nominalists would have more in common with the Ash’ari theologians on this point, I believe.

salaam.

 

[Scholastic17]

In neither Christian nor in Muslim philosophy is the divine substance a genus. In fact it is pretty much a running and fundamental thesis of everyone who read Aristotle that God does not belong to any of the categories (which would include substance and genus; you can find it in Albert, Thomas, etc., etc.; it also belongs very deeply to the Neoplatonic tradition within Christianity as well as mediated through Pseudo-Dionysius). If we use the language of substance for God, according to someone like Thomas, we do so analogously because God is the cause of substance, not because God falls into one of the categories.

And of course God is God and only God (as you say). The point here is that Islamic philosophy denies that one can make any sort of real distinction with regard to God (e.g., between God’s substance and God’s person). Aquinas, as a contrasting Christian example, says that while other distinctions that might be made with respect to God are not real, but merely ideal and are made because we are finite and need them to talk about God, the Trinitarian persons represent real relations in the Godhead. That sort of division would strike any Islamic or Jewish philosophy as undermining divine simplicity/unity. God cannot be divided up into parts; the plurality of hypostases is nonsense in that it either pretends to multiply or divide God.

salaam.

I suppose this is where the “substance” thing is particularly important to me. When you say that the doctrine “divides” God, I have to ask “in what sense?” I ultimately have to disagree with you that God is not a substance in the Christian worldview. It’s certainly not the case in the Cartesian system. It’s certainly not contrary to the language of the various Catholic creeds. Consider the Athanasian Creed:

1. God of the substance of the Father, begotten before the worlds; and man of substance of His mother, born in the world.

1. Perfect God and perfect man, of a reasonable soul and human flesh subsisting.

1. Equal to the Father as touching His Godhead, and inferior to the Father as touching His manhood.

1. Who, although He is God and man, yet He is not two, but one Christ.

1. One, not by conversion of the Godhead into flesh, but by taking of that manhood into God.

1. One altogether, not by confusion of substance, but by unity of person.

Granted, I may be using “substance” in a very broad sense, but I am ultimately using it in the sense of “what underlies,” and I don’t think that this is wrong. We say many things about God. God is Good. God is Merciful. God is Just. What’s Good? What’s Merciful? What’s Just? To what are we assigning these things? Well…to God as a substance…an incorporeal substance, to be certain, but a substance nonetheless.

In any case, I come back to my original point. What is it to say that God is divided? What is being divided? Surely, we can only mean that His substance is being divided, and this is flatly denied in the Trinitarian doctrine.

 

[neploho]

You are absolutely right; the Ash’ari theologians would fundamentally reject that kind of claim (God must do x). There are some among the falasifa though who would be more comfortable with the claim (ibn’Sina; ibn’Rushd).

Christian nominalists would have more in common with the Ash’ari theologians on this point, I believe.

salaam.

Yes, and it would be important to note that while the view that Al-Ghazali expelled philosophy from Islam is simplistic much of those philosophers views fell out of favor and Sufi anti rationalism and traditionalism haveing a larger impact on Islamic thought. At least until the nineteenth century.

Ash’ari’s thought puzzel for the Mu’tazali comes to mind (when he gave the example of the three souls asking Allah about his decisions regarding the course of their lives and destination in the afterlife)

 

[Scholastic17]

Yes, and it would be important to note that while the view that Al-Ghazali expelled philosophy from Islam is simplistic much of those philosophers views fell out of favor and Sufi anti rationalism and traditionalism haveing a larger impact on Islamic thought. At least until the nineteenth century.

If Muslims believe that it is not the case that God must do what is best, if He does anything, then so much worse for Muslims.

 

[neploho]

No, that’s a substance. The underlying thing (substance is literally “substans,” meaning “standing beneath”) is the substance. The hypostasis is presumably to be defined as an “ego (in the Cartesian sense),” or perhaps an agent (in the Aristotelian sense).

Alright

So here, I am a rational animal (this is my substance), and this rational animal is a single hypostasis, namely Scholastic17. The substance has the hypostasis, but the hypostasis is that whereby these words are currently being typed.

ok

By “one in substance and hypostasis” I mean that this thing is one person, and only one person.

I have reservations as to wheather a Muslim theologian would assign God as a “person”

Muslims believe that God is Allah, and only Allah.

If by that you mean that Allah is a being of radical oneness then yes. If you are making a distinction between the substance of being a higher power and the person of Allah with the implied properties I doubt a Muslim would make this distinction

I did mean it in the modern analytic sense. I suppose I’ll be a bit less vague. When I say “greater than,” I mean it in the sense that St. Anselm does, and when I say “perfection,” I mean it in the sense that Descartes and the other rationalists do.

And what senses are those?

“Greater than” has a different meaning in that context. It means “numerically more” here.

Then in what contexts is greater than an assertion as to the perfection of a thing?

Ok. A fire which burns at 530 degrees and is burning up 2 square miles is greater than a fire which burns at 500 degrees and is only burning up 2 square feet. Surely you’ll admit that?

No, what do you mean by greater than in this context? Heat is a physical property expressable in mathematics, you seem to be trying to inject some normative aspect into what is a reductionist property.

It’s evident both empirically (from the creation of the world) and from the Reason (see the Timaeus

).

How?

 

[neploho]

If Muslims believe that it is not the case that God must do what is best, if He does anything, then so much worse for Muslims.

aqnd yet this is the whole problem with your argument (setting the internal confusions aside) you seek to prove that the Muslim idea of God is internally incoherant but do so (highly arguable that you have) with assigning them luggage of Christian theology that they would not admit.

 

[Scholastic17]

aqnd yet this is the whole problem with your argument (setting the internal confusions aside) you seek to prove that the Muslim idea of God is internally incoherant but do so (highly arguable that you have) with assigning them luggage of Christian theology that they would not admit.

It’s really not a matter of Christian or non-Christian theology at that point. It’s theological, I suppose, but it’s purely a matter of natural theology. God is defined as “The Supreme Perfect Being.”