James Ross's Immaterial Aspects of Thought

[inocente]

I have read Ross’s paper, and find it incredibly interesting, even if I am not full behind it as of yet (due primarily to my lack of complete understanding of it all).

I think I have a general idea of what he is getting at though. Say that one employs modus ponens in an act of reasoning. Going with the assumption that such reasoning is an entirely physical process (whether the reasoning itself is reducible to or emergent from said process), this process or function is going to be executed by various neuronal firings in the brain. For example:
(1) If Socrates is a man, then Socrates is mortal.
(2) Socrates is a man.
(3) Therefore, Socrates is mortal.

Here, the neural firings (or whatever physical process) corresponding to premises 1, 2, and the conclusion 3 will be of such-and-such an organization. The problem, however, it that one can use an invalid form as well. One can use a logical function like “modus phonenz”: p -**> q; p, ∴ q = p → q; p, ∴ q when p has a major premise whose subject starts with the letter “S,” ∴ r otherwise. Now, “modus phonenz” is obviously an invalid argument form, despite the fact that the premises and conclusions are still true, as well as the fact that the physical process corresponding to the reasoning process will be exactly the same. This is because the physical process is simply connecting the two premises and the conclusion, both in the case of modus ponens and in the case of “modus phonenz.” And one can think of any invalid form to correspond to an argument, depending upon the criterion necessary for validity. Thus, physical processes are indeterminate between incompatible forms.

The problem then, and one materialists seem to often deny for some reason, is that we do in fact have determinately formal thought when reasoning. If not, any argument we would ever make would be invalid, including any materialist position.

Does this seem to get it right?

I’d say no.

Google Scholar lists only 16 citations of Ross’s paper, which implies it never managed to break outside the small hylomorphic philosopher community. Part of the reason, as you say, is the level of difficulty imposed by his terminology.

But mainly, I think it’s clearly implausible. In his example of NN, there’s no evidence that we can set up such programs in our minds, and that when I ask myself what is 1010 or 1616, it somehow goes to a CPU in my head. Actually, for 1010 I probably already remember the answer, but if not I may think “put a zero to the right of the first ten”. For 16*16, I happen to know the same trick works in any number base, so 16 in hexadecimal is 10, put a zero to the right of it, = hex 100, which I remember is 256 base ten. We all use such tricks, and the tricks depend on our past learning, we never calculate the way a computer would.

Same goes for logic and your example. The reason we’re so slow and error prone compared to a computer is that we don’t have a CPU’s programmable logic unit and arithmetic unit. So imho his premise of determinately formal thought is, at the very least, implausible.

 

[utunumsint]

I have read Ross’s paper, and find it incredibly interesting, even if I am not full behind it as of yet (due primarily to my lack of complete understanding of it all).

I think I have a general idea of what he is getting at though. Say that one employs modus ponens in an act of reasoning. Going with the assumption that such reasoning is an entirely physical process (whether the reasoning itself is reducible to or emergent from said process), this process or function is going to be executed by various neuronal firings in the brain. For example:
(1) If Socrates is a man, then Socrates is mortal.
(2) Socrates is a man.
(3) Therefore, Socrates is mortal.

Here, the neural firings (or whatever physical process) corresponding to premises 1, 2, and the conclusion 3 will be of such-and-such an organization. The problem, however, it that one can use an invalid form as well. One can use a logical function like “modus phonenz”: p -**> q; p, ∴ q = p → q; p, ∴ q when p has a major premise whose subject starts with the letter “S,” ∴ r otherwise. Now, “modus phonenz” is obviously an invalid argument form, despite the fact that the premises and conclusions are still true, as well as the fact that the physical process corresponding to the reasoning process will be exactly the same. This is because the physical process is simply connecting the two premises and the conclusion, both in the case of modus ponens and in the case of “modus phonenz.” And one can think of any invalid form to correspond to an argument, depending upon the criterion necessary for validity. Thus, physical processes are indeterminate between incompatible forms.

The problem then, and one materialists seem to often deny for some reason, is that we do in fact have determinately formal thought when reasoning. If not, any argument we would ever make would be invalid, including any materialist position.

Does this seem to get it right?

It sounds right to me! But I still need to study the text to make sure. I’m determined to do as much groundwork as I can before passing a judgement on the text.

Thanks for insight.

God bless,
Ut

 

[utunumsint]

I’d say no.

Google Scholar lists only 16 citations of Ross’s paper, which implies it never managed to break outside the small hylomorphic philosopher community. Part of the reason, as you say, is the level of difficulty imposed by his terminology.

But mainly, I think it’s clearly implausible. In his example of NN, there’s no evidence that we can set up such programs in our minds, and that when I ask myself what is 1010 or 1616, it somehow goes to a CPU in my head. Actually, for 1010 I probably already remember the answer, but if not I may think “put a zero to the right of the first ten”. For 16*16, I happen to know the same trick works in any number base, so 16 in hexadecimal is 10, put a zero to the right of it, = hex 100, which I remember is 256 base ten. We all use such tricks, and the tricks depend on our past learning, we never calculate the way a computer would.

Same goes for logic and your example. The reason we’re so slow and error prone compared to a computer is that we don’t have a CPU’s programmable logic unit and arithmetic unit. So imho his premise of determinately formal thought is, at the very least, implausible.

Thanks for the feedback inocente. I’ll keep your arguments in mind as I grapple with the text. Maybe I will end up agreeing with your point of view.

God bless,
Ut

 

[utunumsint]

Last time I had checked in, I was researching what Analytical philosophers mean by underdetermination. The link I posted went in detail on philosophers like Quine. Particularly regarding the indeterminacy of science itself and how no matter now many tests you provide for a hypothesis, there is still the possibility that science is just not getting the full picture, so to speak. As the Stanford article states:

At the heart of the underdetermination of scientific theory by evidence is the simple idea that the evidence available to us at a given time may be insufficient to determine what beliefs we should hold in response to it.

Ross is contrasting this characteristic of the physical sciences with determinate thinking:

and, secondly, to deny that our judgments are of definite logical forms and pure functions conflicts with our own certainty and with what we tell our logic, mathematics, and linguistics students about validity, proof, and formal syntax, and leaves us unable to explain what we do when we do mathematics, logic, or any other formal thinking.

So this sets up the argument, so to speak.

1. 
   *]Some thinking (judgment) is determinate in a way no physical process can be.
   *]Consequently, such thinking cannot be (wholly) a physical process.
   *]If all thinking, all judgment, is determinate in that way, no physical process can be (the whole of) any judgment at all.
   *]Furthermore, “functions” among physical states cannot be determinate enough to be such judgments, either.
   *]Hence some judgments can be neither wholly physical processes nor wholly functions among physical processes.
   
   So the evidence for 1 is basically this jewel of Analytic Philosophy, this idea of underdetermination. Which leads to 2. Because if 2 is really determinate, then it can’t be physical.
   
   I need to spend some more time thinking about the argument.
   
   God bless,
   Ut

 

[utunumsint]

More on underdeterminiation from wikipedia:

To show that a conclusion is underdetermined, one must show that there is a rival conclusion that is equally well supported by the standards of evidence. A trivial example of underdetermination is the addition of the statement “whenever we look for evidence” (or more generally, any statement which cannot be falsified). For example, the conclusion “objects near earth fall toward it when dropped” might be opposed by “objects near earth fall toward it when dropped but only when we check to see that they do.” Since one may append this to any conclusion, all conclusions are at least trivially underdetermined. If one considers such statements to be illegitimate, e.g. by applying Occam’s Razor, then such “tricks” are not considered demonstrations of underdetermination.

This concept also applies to scientific theories: for example, it is similarly trivial to find situations that a theory does not address. For example, classical mechanics did not distinguish between non-accelerating reference frames. As a result, any conclusion about such a reference frame was underdetermined; it was equally consistent with the theory to say that the solar system is at rest, as it is to say that it moves at any constant velocity in any particular direction. Newton himself stated that these possibilities were indistinguishable. More generally, evidence may not always be sufficient to distinguish between competing theories (or to determine a different theory that will unify both), as is the case with general relativity and quantum mechanics.

God bless,
Ut

 

[utunumsint]

Hi,

So I’m finally ready to move on to the next paragraph:

Certain thinking, in a single case, is of a definite abstract form (e.g., N X N = N2),

Now, this is a little bit of algebra. I found this wikipedia definition of Algebra:

In its most general form, algebra is the study of mathematical symbols and the rules for manipulating these symbols; it is a unifying thread of almost all of mathematics. As such, it includes everything from elementary equation solving to the study of abstractions such as groups, rings, and fields.

So clearly, this little example is a very rudimentary example of what is the tip of the iceberg when it comes to this type of math. I found this link on field mathematics mentioned in the wikipedia quote above.

This is clearly formal and abstract. I always had trouble with math when I was a kid. My son is now learning some basic algebra in grade five. And its basically a bunch of formulas that he has to memories. If you have an equilateral triangle, and you know how long one side is, then you can know the entire perimeter. So you can generate an equation with variables that you can plug in to get the perimeter. Its basically memory work. But if you use the abstract rule, you always get the right answer. Maybe that is what is meant by determinate.

Anyway, I know Innocent had some doubts about whether our minds really run N*N=N2, but I’m not sure how it applies to this point.

God bless,
Ut

 

[fisherman_carl]

You might want to check out Feser’s blog post on James Ross’s article.

edwardfeser.blogspot.ca/2013/10/oerter-and-indeterminacy-of-physical.html?m=1

 

[fisherman_carl]

Reading Feser’s description of the indeterminancy of material things reminds me of this funny clip from the “IT Crowd” tv show.

youtu.be/0iMuBo-1eDo

 

[ccmnxc]

I’d say no.

Google Scholar lists only 16 citations of Ross’s paper, which implies it never managed to break outside the small hylomorphic philosopher community. Part of the reason, as you say, is the level of difficulty imposed by his terminology.

But mainly, I think it’s clearly implausible. In his example of NN, there’s no evidence that we can set up such programs in our minds, and that when I ask myself what is 1010 or 1616, it somehow goes to a CPU in my head. Actually, for 1010 I probably already remember the answer, but if not I may think “put a zero to the right of the first ten”. For 16*16, I happen to know the same trick works in any number base, so 16 in hexadecimal is 10, put a zero to the right of it, = hex 100, which I remember is 256 base ten. We all use such tricks, and the tricks depend on our past learning, we never calculate the way a computer would.

Same goes for logic and your example. The reason we’re so slow and error prone compared to a computer is that we don’t have a CPU’s programmable logic unit and arithmetic unit. So imho his premise of determinately formal thought is, at the very least, implausible.

Well, Ross agrees with you that our reasoning is not the same thing as a computer processing an algorithm. But insofar as assuming it is all a material process, I don’t see how the physical facts of the matter would much differ from that of a computer. But even should we reject this and concede that you are right here, how would that escape from the charge that committing oneself to indeterminate formal thought means that at best, we are only approximating valid reasoning, and at worst, consistently presenting invalid argument for anything. Put briefly, I do not think that Ross needs to build a positive case for the premise given that its denial leads very quickly to contradiction.

 

[inocente]

Well, Ross agrees with you that our reasoning is not the same thing as a computer processing an algorithm. But insofar as assuming it is all a material process, I don’t see how the physical facts of the matter would much differ from that of a computer. But even should we reject this and concede that you are right here, how would that escape from the charge that committing oneself to indeterminate formal thought means that at best, we are only approximating valid reasoning, and at worst, consistently presenting invalid argument for anything. Put briefly, I do not think that Ross needs to build a positive case for the premise given that its denial leads very quickly to contradiction.

But we do only approximate valid reasoning, that’s why we make so many mistakes.

Whether the mind is material or immaterial, the brain is capable of hugely parallel processing, so if we had determinately formal thought as Ross claims, we could use our brains to calculate multiple things at prodigious rates, and would make no mistakes along the way. We can’t, instead we are very slow and inaccurate.

But whatever our opinions, Ross is not making an a priori claim which can be settled by debate, he makes an a posteriori claim, which can only be settled by evidence.

 

[ccmnxc]

But we do only approximate valid reasoning, that’s why we make so many mistakes.

Whether the mind is material or immaterial, the brain is capable of hugely parallel processing, so if we had determinately formal thought as Ross claims, we could use our brains to calculate multiple things at prodigious rates, and would make no mistakes along the way. We can’t, instead we are very slow and inaccurate.

But whatever our opinions, Ross is not making an a priori claim which can be settled by debate, he makes an a posteriori claim, which can only be settled by evidence.

I’m not seeing this. When we reason, so far as I can tell, the reasoning is either valid or invalid. Sometimes, we reason validly. Other times, we reason invalidly, hence the error. I guess I just don’t see how determinate formal reasoning cashes out to always and everywhere valid reasoning. It can be determinately invalid too.
Further, you make the claim that if our thought was determinate, our brains would be able to calculate, as you say, multiple things at prodigious rates. This strikes me as question-begging, though. Ross’s argument is that our formal thinking is not a material process, and to object by saying “Our brain can act in such-and-such a way when formally reasoning” is to assume as a premise the exact thing his argument is denying.
Finally, I would have to disagree about your claim that Ross is making an a posteriori statement. Allow me to quote him at length here:

We cannot really add, conjoin, or do modus ponens? Now that is
expensive. In fact, the cost of saying we only simulate the pure
functions is astronomical. For in order to maintain that the processes
are basically material, the philosopher has to deny outright
that we do the very things we had claimed all along that we do. Yet
our doing these things is essential to the reliability of our reasoning.
Moreover, we certainly can, Platonistically, define the ideal functions,
otherwise we cannot say definitely what we cannot do. That
exposes a contradiction in the denial that we can think in pure
functions, however; for to define such a function is to think in a
form that is not indeterminate among incompossible forms. To become
convinced that I can only simulate the recognition that two
Euclidean right triangles with equal sides are congruent, I have to
judge negatively with all the determinateness that has just been denied.
Each Platonistic definition of one of the processes, and each
description of the content of logical or arithmetical judgment, is as
definite a form of thought as any of the processes being denied; and
each judgment that we do not do such and such a function is as
definite in form as is conjunction, addition, or any of the judgments
that are challenged; otherwise, what is denied would be indeterminate.
It is implausible enough to say we do not really add or conjoin.
It is beyond credibility to say we cannot definitely deny that we add,
conjoin, assert the congruence of triangles, or define particular
functions, like conjunction.
The final and greatest cost of insisting that our judgments are not
more determinate as to pure functions than physical processes can
be, is that we can do nothing logical at all, and no pure mathematics
either. Now, who believes that?

This strikes me, especially his last objection, as being very much a priori. So I guess I have to ask at this point:
Is the argument you are giving to counter Ross valid or invalid. If the latter, why should I assent to it or you support it. If the former, how could it be anything but determinately so? Or if it is neither, then it would appear you are not making an argument at all, in which case, any objection to Ross’s argument is rather a non-objection.

 

[inocente]

I’m not seeing this. When we reason, so far as I can tell, the reasoning is either valid or invalid. Sometimes, we reason validly. Other times, we reason invalidly, hence the error. I guess I just don’t see how determinate formal reasoning cashes out to always and everywhere valid reasoning. It can be determinately invalid too.

And how do we know if it’s valid? Trial and error.

*Further, you make the claim that if our thought was determinate, our brains would be able to calculate, as you say, multiple things at prodigious rates. This strikes me as question-begging, though. Ross’s argument is that our formal thinking is not a material process, and to object by saying “Our brain can act in such-and-such a way when formally reasoning” is to assume as a premise the exact thing his argument is denying. *

The obvious thing for an immaterial mind to do would be to make use of the prodigious power of the brain, the most complicated thing in the known universe. No need to laboriously type things into a computer when the brain is instantly available 24 7. Yet we can’t. He must explain why his immaterial formal mind misses such an obvious advantage.

Finally, I would have to disagree about your claim that Ross is making an a posteriori statement. Allow me to quote him at length here:

This strikes me, especially his last objection, as being very much a priori. So I guess I have to ask at this point:
Is the argument you are giving to counter Ross valid or invalid. If the latter, why should I assent to it or you support it. If the former, how could it be anything but determinately so? Or if it is neither, then it would appear you are not making an argument at all, in which case, any objection to Ross’s argument is rather a non-objection.

Take a statement from that quotation: “That exposes a contradiction in the denial that we can think in pure functions, however; for to define such a function is to think in a form that is not indeterminate among incompossible forms. To become convinced that I can only simulate the recognition that two Euclidean right triangles with equal sides are congruent, I have to judge negatively with all the determinateness that has just been denied.”.

He argues that we must do the recognition rather than simulate. What do those two words mean, what’s the difference between determinate recognition and simulating recognition? He says it doesn’t matter, since definition of either must also be definite.

But this is to make it a priori by fiat. He is implicitly asserting that the mind is a black box, that the working of the mind cannot be determined by observation. But it can. We can observe the mind’s responses to draw out what is happening. We can also look at brain activity, and the more activity, the less there is for his immaterial mind to do. We can improve the resolution, and perhaps one day observe all the steps the brain takes in the recognition process. And if at that point we observe the entire process, with no loose ends, his immaterial mind is left with nothing to do.

His claim is a posteriori, it depends on empirical evidence. We’re not in a bubble here: Ross published in 1992, and if his peers thought his argument irrefutable then by now we would all know his name, as the man who finally proved the existence of the immaterial mind (which I guess most would take as proving Descartes’ substance dualism). Seems his peers thought otherwise.

 

[ccmnxc]

And how do we know if it’s valid? Trial and error.

Trial and error presupposes a proper reasoning process which itself presupposes validity. That is, validity is logically prior to any attempts at trial and error. I suppose if one wants to proceed exclusively by induction they could do so, though at that point, they need a determinate account of strong or weak induction, and they are back at square one anyways.

The obvious thing for an immaterial mind to do would be to make use of the prodigious power of the brain, the most complicated thing in the known universe. No need to laboriously type things into a computer when the brain is instantly available 24 7. Yet we can’t. He must explain why his immaterial formal mind misses such an obvious advantage.

Well, we believe that the brain is used in some means of cognition and consciousness (as broadly defined) with things like imagination and the like. The soul does indeed use the brain for various processes associated with thought. Thomistic and Scholastic philosophical psychology at large claims that the brain is an integral component, so to say that it is not utilized is false. Now if you are talking about the immaterial aspects of our mind using the brain for formal reasoning in particular, Ross’s claim itself is that the brain is not capable of doing things like modus ponens, mathematical formulae and the like, so to say we need to account for the reason why the immaterial intellect does not use the brain is exactly what Ross is doing in his argument.

He argues that we must do the recognition rather than simulate. What do those two words mean, what’s the difference between determinate recognition and simulating recognition? He says it doesn’t matter, since definition of either must also be definite.

But this is to make it a priori by fiat. He is implicitly asserting that the mind is a black box, that the working of the mind cannot be determined by observation. But it can. We can observe the mind’s responses to draw out what is happening. We can also look at brain activity, and the more activity, the less there is for his immaterial mind to do. We can improve the resolution, and perhaps one day observe all the steps the brain takes in the recognition process. And if at that point we observe the entire process, with no loose ends, his immaterial mind is left with nothing to do.

Not sure I get what you are saying here. Ross is arguing that to affirm or deny one is doing some logical or mathematical form, one has to have a determinate idea of what one is affirming or denying, otherwise the affirmation or denial has no particular referent, as would be the case with simulated recognition. I don’t see how this is making any assumptions about the mind or brain; perhaps you could expound upon that?

His claim is a posteriori, it depends on empirical evidence. We’re not in a bubble here: Ross published in 1992, and if his peers thought his argument irrefutable then by now we would all know his name, as the man who finally proved the existence of the immaterial mind (which I guess most would take as proving Descartes’ substance dualism). Seems his peers thought otherwise.

I’m not really inclined to spend the time responding to this, though I am guessing you can figure out pretty well exactly what I would say in reply.

 

[inocente]

Trial and error presupposes a proper reasoning process which itself presupposes validity. That is, validity is logically prior to any attempts at trial and error. I suppose if one wants to proceed exclusively by induction they could do so, though at that point, they need a determinate account of strong or weak induction, and they are back at square one anyways.

Nope. Infants don’t have knowledge of calculus or even the law of the excluded middle, they do not know how to reason validly. We learn from previous generations, who progressively discovered the rules of reasoning by trial and error. Learning is not a reasoning process which itself presupposes validity.

Well, we believe that the brain is used in some means of cognition and consciousness (as broadly defined) with things like imagination and the like. The soul does indeed use the brain for various processes associated with thought. Thomistic and Scholastic philosophical psychology at large claims that the brain is an integral component, so to say that it is not utilized is false. Now if you are talking about the immaterial aspects of our mind using the brain for formal reasoning in particular, Ross’s claim itself is that the brain is not capable of doing things like modus ponens, mathematical formulae and the like, so to say we need to account for the reason why the immaterial intellect does not use the brain is exactly what Ross is doing in his argument.

If Ross’ immaterial mind can use a material computer to calculate N*N (to use one of his examples), there’s no reason why he couldn’t use his material brain instead, which is far more powerful than his laptop. But he can’t, because we don’t reason as he claims.

*Not sure I get what you are saying here. Ross is arguing that to affirm or deny one is doing some logical or mathematical form, one has to have a determinate idea of what one is affirming or denying, otherwise the affirmation or denial has no particular referent, as would be the case with simulated recognition. I don’t see how this is making any assumptions about the mind or brain; perhaps you could expound upon that? *

His claim is based on a belief that the mind is immaterial, and since the immaterial is hidden, he concludes unsurprisingly that the mind must be hidden. He discards the possibility that the mind is material (or emerges from the material) and so can be observed (in principle if not currently in practice).

I’m not really inclined to spend the time responding to this, though I am guessing you can figure out pretty well exactly what I would say in reply.

Sure, since if we go by the stony silence of his peers, the only question is how many flaws did they see in his argument.

 

[ccmnxc]

Sorry for resurrecting an old(ish) thread. Got sidetracked with Thanksgiving and then impending finals, so hopefully we can come back around a little bit.

Nope. Infants don’t have knowledge of calculus or even the law of the excluded middle, they do not know how to reason validly. We learn from previous generations, who progressively discovered the rules of reasoning by trial and error. Learning is not a reasoning process which itself presupposes validity.

So in this case, what would the process of trial and error in coming to know validity look like, because I have a feeling that there is either going to be reasoning smuggled in somewhere, or this trial and error isn’t going to be able to get you to validity.

If Ross’ immaterial mind can use a material computer to calculate N*N (to use one of his examples), there’s no reason why he couldn’t use his material brain instead, which is far more powerful than his laptop. But he can’t, because we don’t reason as he claims.

1 AM probably isn’t the best time for me to be hashing out philosophy, but I don’t get what you are saying here. A computer cannot calculate (properly speaking, even if we use the term as shorthand) any more than a brain can insofar as it cannot instantiate a function determinately.

His claim is based on a belief that the mind is immaterial, and since the immaterial is hidden, he concludes unsurprisingly that the mind must be hidden. He discards the possibility that the mind is material (or emerges from the material) and so can be observed (in principle if not currently in practice).

I might be tired and muddleheaded, but this doesn’t seem to be anywhere near the mark. That the mind is immaterial is a conclusion here, not an assumption. I have not idea why saying that one must have a determinate idea of modus ponens, for example, is necessary to evaluate whether or not in, in fact, uses it in reasoning presumes an immaterial mind any more than it does a material one.

Sure, since if we go by the stony silence of his peers, the only question is how many flaws did they see in his argument.

Zero, apparently, since they must have realized that bringing this to light and grappling with it would jeopardize their precious materialism.

Finally, this is one question I would really like answered, as it is pretty much central to Ross’s critique:
Is the argument you are giving to counter Ross valid or invalid. If the latter, why should I assent to it or you support it. If the former, how could it be anything but determinately so? Or if it is neither, then it would appear you are not making an argument at all, in which case, any objection to Ross’s argument is rather a non-objection.

 

[inocente]

Sorry for resurrecting an old(ish) thread. Got sidetracked with Thanksgiving and then impending finals, so hopefully we can come back around a little bit.

Not sure my brain can cope with time travel back to the past .

*So in this case, what would the process of trial and error in coming to know validity look like, because I have a feeling that there is either going to be reasoning smuggled in somewhere, or this trial and error isn’t going to be able to get you to validity. *

The evidence is that we’re born helpless and learn what we need.

1 AM probably isn’t the best time for me to be hashing out philosophy, but I don’t get what you are saying here. A computer cannot calculate (properly speaking, even if we use the term as shorthand) any more than a brain can insofar as it cannot instantiate a function determinately.

OED: *Calculate - 1. Determine (the amount or number of something) mathematically: e.g. the program can calculate the number of words that will fit in the space available *

*I might be tired and muddleheaded, but this doesn’t seem to be anywhere near the mark. That the mind is immaterial is a conclusion here, not an assumption. I have not idea why saying that one must have a determinate idea of modus ponens, for example, is necessary to evaluate whether or not in, in fact, uses it in reasoning presumes an immaterial mind any more than it does a material one. *

It’s not a conclusion. He argues that a material mind can’t do it. But then he provides no argument for why an immaterial mind can do it, or even for what an immaterial mind is supposed to be. Look, he says, I can’t explain this so it must be inexplicable.

Zero, apparently, since they must have realized that bringing this to light and grappling with it would jeopardize their precious materialism.

Your claim that every living philosopher must be dishonest except for the one or two who liked his paper is noted.

Finally, this is one question I would really like answered, as it is pretty much central to Ross’s critique:
Is the argument you are giving to counter Ross valid or invalid. If the latter, why should I assent to it or you support it. If the former, how could it be anything but determinately so? Or if it is neither, then it would appear you are not making an argument at all, in which case, any objection to Ross’s argument is rather a non-objection.

He feels that he is perfectly determinate (“truth preserving for all relevant cases”), but does he objectively prove it’s any more than a subjective feeling? Seems to me he ignores the obvious fact that as we gain more experience in something, the more lines of thought we have to cross-check ourselves. Not sure there’s anything else I can add, coming back to it now his paper determinately has even less merit.

 

[thinkandmull]

There are two options here:

1. Either mental conceptions are something in themselves, have objective reality
2. Or they are just modes of the mind

I believe that everyone comes to the realization in their life that they have a spiritual soul. People might reject that when the thought comes to them.

There are two other options here:

1. Either God sustains the bodies and pain and emotions of the raper and the rapist during the act
2. Or the devil does this

Number one cannot be maintained with number 3 because then God is a monster. Number (2) cannot be maintained in order to avoid (4) with Ross’s and Fesser’s argument floundering. I believe (1) and (4)

 

[ccmnxc]

The evidence is that we’re born helpless and learn what we need.

But this doesn’t answer my question. I was not asking whether infants and children learn validity from trial and error but, given your view, how. An account that neither smuggles in validity yet can make it such that one in fact learns validity from trial and error would go a long way in your claim here. Why, for example, can one not claim that as a child grows, they simply come to the ability to reason (sans cognitive handicaps) simply in virtue of their cognitive faculties developing? This strand of thought, after all, stands in contradiction to your position, yet I don’t see how one can argue against it without providing a mode for how this trial and error learning might come to bring about the grasping of validity.

OED: Calculate - 1. Determine (the amount or number of something) mathematically: e.g. the program can calculate the number of words that will fit in the space available

Right, but it isn’t the OED that we need to be consulting here, but rather Ross. I see no reason why computers and brains cannot run algorithmically, where we can (name removed by moderator)ut a number and get a numbered output. So if this was all you meant, then sure, a brain can in principle do that too. But Ross is saying that neither computers nor brains can determinately instantiate a function when running said algorithm precisely because they are both material. He is not claiming there is a magical something that a computer can do that a brain cannot. However, he is saying that there is something a mind (immaterial) can do that a computer (and also an exclusively material mind identified with the brain) cannot do.
I’m not really sure what you mean when speaking of Ross’ immaterial mind using a computer to calculate N*N, and I think that is the source of confusion. If my above didn’t set things straight, perhaps you could clarify on what that phrase means (or point out the text you are referring to).

It’s not a conclusion. He argues that a material mind can’t do it. But then he provides no argument for why an immaterial mind can do it, or even for what an immaterial mind is supposed to be. Look, he says, I can’t explain this so it must be inexplicable.

At this point, I’m not even sure we are talking about the same thing anymore. But against my better judgment, I will proceed here, anyways (though if you could point to where in the text you are talking about, it might make more sense as to what exactly we are disputing over).
First you say “It is not a conclusion,” and then proceed to saying “He argues that…”. Do you mean to say “He assumes that…” instead as otherwise to say both that it is not a conclusion and that he argues for it seems, well, contradictory.
Second, yes he does argue that a material mind cannot formally instantiate a function, mathematical, logical, or otherwise. You object that he does not say why an immaterial mind can do it, which makes little sense to me. “Material” and “Immaterial” seem to me to be a pretty straight disjunction here (the prefix of “im” being equivalent to a “non (~)”). To prove that the material cannot do X is to conclude that the immaterial can do X. And for this specific purpose, who cares what an immaterial mind is? He was simply arguing that the mind was at least in part immaterial; he does not need to work out an entire metaphysics of mind here to prove that point.
And finally, Ross isn’t making an argument from ignorance here. If you think he is, I’d like you to point out where, because I ain’t seeing it. All I see is “No material/physical process can do X” rather than “We don’t know how material/physical processes can do X.”

Your claim that every living philosopher must be dishonest except for the one or two who liked his paper is noted.

Eh, it was mostly a tongue-in cheek statement illustrating that ad homs are cheap to manufacture.

He feels that he is perfectly determinate (“truth preserving for all relevant cases”), but does he objectively prove it’s any more than a subjective feeling? Seems to me he ignores the obvious fact that as we gain more experience in something, the more lines of thought we have to cross-check ourselves. Not sure there’s anything else I can add, coming back to it now his paper determinately has even less merit.

It’s comments like this that make a guy lose his patience, and for two reasons:

1. It doesn’t even attempt to answer my question, but rather sidesteps it, and
2. In my comment on November 23rd at 12:51 PM, I quoted Ross’ objection at moderate length. Nowhere does Ross come even close to saying what you ascribe to him, and you don’t seem to grapple with what he actually says there.

But I will not belabor the 2nd point, because it is a distraction. So I will ask for a third time, now:
Is the argument you are giving to counter Ross valid or invalid. If the latter, why should I assent to it or you support it. If the former, how could it be anything but determinately so? Or if it is neither, then it would appear you are not making an argument at all, in which case, any objection to Ross’s argument is rather a non-objection.

 

[inocente]

But this doesn’t answer my question. I was not asking whether infants and children learn validity from trial and error but, given your view, how. An account that neither smuggles in validity yet can make it such that one in fact learns validity from trial and error would go a long way in your claim here. Why, for example, can one not claim that as a child grows, they simply come to the ability to reason (sans cognitive handicaps) simply in virtue of their cognitive faculties developing? This strand of thought, after all, stands in contradiction to your position, yet I don’t see how one can argue against it without providing a mode for how this trial and error learning might come to bring about the grasping of validity.

Ross doesn’t claim that his immaterial mind somehow acquires cognitive abilities as he grew up. How’s that supposed to work? You claim later that immaterial is the logical complement of material. What then is the immaterial version of “as a child grows”?

Anyway there’s no contradiction, cognitive faculties are absent until we learn. We’re not computers with a separate CPU and RAM, when we learn, the brain rewires, see neuroplasticity. The wiring for driving a car is absent until we learn to drive. We learn “validity” by feedback. If an infant tries to move spoon to mouth and misses, she tries again until she is rewarded with food. Overtime, repetition improves her motor skills. Same with reasoning, with everything we learn.

Right, but it isn’t the OED that we need to be consulting here, but rather Ross.

Nope, it was you who said “A computer cannot calculate”, and I quoted the OED to say that in English, computers do calculate.

*But Ross is saying that neither computers nor brains can determinately instantiate a function when running said algorithm precisely because they are both material. He is not claiming there is a magical something that a computer can do that a brain cannot. However, he is saying that there is something a mind (immaterial) can do that a computer (and also an exclusively material mind identified with the brain) cannot do. *

I wasn’t saying that computers are magic. We don’t need Ross to tell us that computer programs may contain bugs. That’s why some spacecraft, for instance, have multiple computers programmed differently, which take a vote on each decision. Just as, on a larger scale, we automatically use different things we learned to cross-check our decisions. “Determinacy” isn’t either on or off, there or not there, it happens by degrees. No magic required.

I’m not really sure what you mean when speaking of Ross’ immaterial mind using a computer to calculate NN, and I think that is the source of confusion. If my above didn’t set things straight, perhaps you could clarify on what that phrase means (or point out the text you are referring to). *

Not sure what you’re referring to here.

*At this point, I’m not even sure we are talking about the same thing anymore. But against my better judgment, I will proceed here, anyways (though if you could point to where in the text you are talking about, it might make more sense as to what exactly we are disputing over).
First you say “It is not a conclusion,” and then proceed to saying “He argues that…”.

“Material” and “Immaterial” seem to me to be a pretty straight disjunction here (the prefix of “im” being equivalent to a “non (~)”). To prove that the material cannot do X is to conclude that the immaterial can do X. And for this specific purpose, who cares what an immaterial mind is? He was simply arguing that the mind was at least in part immaterial; he does not need to work out an entire metaphysics of mind here to prove that point. < snip to fit>*

You had said “that the mind is immaterial is a conclusion here, not an assumption” and I pointed out that he argues that a material mind can’t do something, but provides no argument that an immaterial mind can, or even that an immaterial mind is a coherent proposition. You now make a claim which he never makes, that immaterial is somehow the logical complement of material. That’s not at all what the word means, again OED: immaterial 2: Philosophy Spiritual, rather than physical. Come on, I’m wondering if you’re taking this seriously now. Before we go on, prove there is such a thing as an immaterial mind and it isn’t a fiction.

*Eh, it was mostly a tongue-in cheek statement illustrating that ad homs are cheap to manufacture. *

Can’t see how the empirical evidence of the near total silence of his peers on his argument can be brushed aside as ad hominem, although I grant you that your reply, that it “would jeopardize their precious materialism”, was cheap .

*It’s comments like this that make a guy lose his patience, and for two reasons:

1. It doesn’t even attempt to answer my question, but rather sidesteps it, and
2. In my comment on November 23rd at 12:51 PM, I quoted Ross’ objection at moderate length. Nowhere does Ross come even close to saying what you ascribe to him, and you don’t seem to grapple with what he actually says there.*

Ross is nothing to me, his paper has more holes that a fishing net, you left the thread hanging for several weeks, you don’t link to that post, don’t even quote it by number, but by date and time, in, I take it, your own time zone. Ross’ paper is linked in the OP, and I quoted directly from the center of page 138 and tried to answer your question as best I’m able, only to be told I’m lying and evading. And you’re loosing patience?

 

[ccmnxc]

Ross doesn’t claim that his immaterial mind somehow acquires cognitive abilities as he grew up. How’s that supposed to work? You claim later that immaterial is the logical complement of material. What then is the immaterial version of “as a child grows”?

You are right, Ross says no such thing, as it lies outside the scope of his paper. However, I see no particularly problematic notion about an immaterial intellect growing alongside the material body, which isn’t to say that it (the immaterial) grows and develops because the material does. The intellect, as it comes to exercise itself grows in the same way as would a muscle that you exercise. Similarly, a muscle that isn’t exercised can atrophy, and an adult who does little thinking isn’t going to tend to be all that good at it. I have no mechanism for you other than habituation, but I don’t see anything prima facie wrong with it.

Anyway there’s no contradiction, cognitive faculties are absent until we learn. We’re not computers with a separate CPU and RAM, when we learn, the brain rewires, see neuroplasticity. The wiring for driving a car is absent until we learn to drive. We learn “validity” by feedback. If an infant tries to move spoon to mouth and misses, she tries again until she is rewarded with food. Overtime, repetition improves her motor skills. Same with reasoning, with everything we learn.

On the first couple sentences, I have no disagreement. I believe cognitive processes are in part material, and that even for the immaterial, there can be material reflections of it insofar as the soul is the form of the body.
However, once we get to the “We learn ‘validity,’” part, then I see issues. First of all, learning through a mechanism of rewards/punishments only gets us to conditionals, which is to say X —> Y. “If I put the spoon here, then I will eat” (or at least some inchoate form of that) seems to be what is learned. The problem is that one never learns validity from a conditional, they can only learn what yields the desired output. Likewise, you can have arguments that are invalid yet lead to the right conclusions, but if validity is learned through trial and error, we can never know whether what we are saying is valid or whether we just haven’t come across a counter-example yet. This is to completely kill reasoning.

Second, you draw on an argument from analogy here, which is fine in itself, but you use the learning of motor skills as your analogy. The problem here is that I am trying to get you to account for how reasoning might follow the same way without it being smuggled in, but to assert that it works in the same way as something as pedestrian as motor function is concerned is to assert what I am asking you to prove.

Nope, it was you who said “A computer cannot calculate”, and I quoted the OED to say that in English, computers do calculate.

And then I pointed out two ways by which one could define calculate, one which is compatible with the OED definition (running algorithms) but does no damage to Ross’s argument and one which is different from the OED definition (determinately instantiating a function) but which Ross (as I argue) shows does not occur. So if you insist upon using OED, that’s fine, but then any objection you based upon it is a non-starter because Ross and I agree with you anyways.

I wasn’t saying that computers are magic. We don’t need Ross to tell us that computer programs may contain bugs. That’s why some spacecraft, for instance, have multiple computers programmed differently, which take a vote on each decision. Just as, on a larger scale, we automatically use different things we learned to cross-check our decisions. “Determinacy” isn’t either on or off, there or not there, it happens by degrees. No magic required.

“Magic” was an unfortunate word on my part and was ultimately superfluous. You could take it out of the sentence and it would still say what I meant it to say. My entire point there was that Ross doesn’t seem to think that brain is capable of doing (by itself) anything in principle different from a computer (and vice-versa). I was making no argument but rather pointing out what Ross seems to be saying.

Also, I am beginning to wonder if you are using determinacy in the same way as Ross is, because for Ross, a function being instantiated determinately utterly precludes any other incompatible functions possibly being instantiated. That seems pretty black and white to me. If others aren’t precluded, it doesn’t matter if there is one or if there is an infinite number of compatible functions, the entire system would be indeterminate between them.

Not sure what you’re referring to here.

Referencing your comment here on Nov. 25, 3:55 AM:

If Ross’ immaterial mind can use a material computer to calculate N*N (to use one of his examples), there’s no reason why he couldn’t use his material brain instead, which is far more powerful than his laptop. But he can’t, because we don’t reason as he claims.