J
JP2Admirer
Guest
Thanks Alec…do not feel obligated to respond if you do not have the time, although I would like to hear what you have to say.
- Status
P
patricius79
Guest
does materialism conflict with modern quantum mechanics?
Robert C. Koons writes:
Modern quantum mechanics displays the marks of both aspects of the Platonic
heritage: the primacy of exact mathematical formalism and the rejection of the necessity
for mechanistic explanation. This latter aspect of quantum theory is most evident in its
embrace of causal non-locality, instantaneous action at a distanceÑa consequence of
BellÕs theorem. The distance between the atomism of Democritus and Epicurus and the
mathematically rigorous, holistically intertwined world of modern quantum theory could
not be greater. The four essential features of ancient materialism, viz., the absence of
mathematical realism, the insistence upon explanation in terms of paradigmatic physical
interactions, like collisions, pushings, pullings and other localizable events, the
rejectionof teleological explanation, and a commitment to ontological pluralism (the
priority of the Many over the One), are all excluded by quantum theory. The latter can
represent the triumph of ÒmaterialismÓ, rather than its utter annihilation, only if the term
ÒmaterialismÓ is evacuated of all meaning. Materialists have succeeded in the
misrepresentation that science has vindicated ÒmaterialismÓ only by repeatedly redefining
the essence of materialism to fit whatever the latest scientific theories say
lastseminary.com/display/Search?searchQuery=+koons+science&moduleId=4798594
Robert C. Koons writes:
Modern quantum mechanics displays the marks of both aspects of the Platonic
heritage: the primacy of exact mathematical formalism and the rejection of the necessity
for mechanistic explanation. This latter aspect of quantum theory is most evident in its
embrace of causal non-locality, instantaneous action at a distanceÑa consequence of
BellÕs theorem. The distance between the atomism of Democritus and Epicurus and the
mathematically rigorous, holistically intertwined world of modern quantum theory could
not be greater. The four essential features of ancient materialism, viz., the absence of
mathematical realism, the insistence upon explanation in terms of paradigmatic physical
interactions, like collisions, pushings, pullings and other localizable events, the
rejectionof teleological explanation, and a commitment to ontological pluralism (the
priority of the Many over the One), are all excluded by quantum theory. The latter can
represent the triumph of ÒmaterialismÓ, rather than its utter annihilation, only if the term
ÒmaterialismÓ is evacuated of all meaning. Materialists have succeeded in the
misrepresentation that science has vindicated ÒmaterialismÓ only by repeatedly redefining
the essence of materialism to fit whatever the latest scientific theories say
lastseminary.com/display/Search?searchQuery=+koons+science&moduleId=4798594
L
LogisticsBranch
Guest
I support the following:
I don’t support the Intelligent Design Movement that includes Stephen Meyer, Robert C. Koons, etc.
- The National Science Foundation
NSF is the only federal agency whose mission includes support for all fields of fundamental science and engineering, except for medical sciences. We are tasked with keeping the United States at the leading edge of discovery in areas from astronomy to geology to zoology. So, in addition to funding research in the traditional academic areas, the agency also supports “high-risk, high pay-off” ideas, novel collaborations and numerous projects that may seem like science fiction today, but which the public will take for granted tomorrow. And in every case, we ensure that research is fully integrated with education so that today’s revolutionary work will also be training tomorrow’s top scientists and engineers.nsf.gov/about/ - **The European Science Foundation **(ESF) *is an association of 78 Member Organisations devoted to scientific research in 30 European countries. Since we were established in 1974, we have coordinated a wide range of pan-European scientific initiatives, and our flexible organisation structure means we can respond quickly to new developments.
ESF’s core purpose is to promote high quality science at a European level.
The ESF is committed to facilitating cooperation and collaboration in European science on behalf of its principal stakeholders (Member Organisations and Europe’s scientific community). This cross-border activity combines both ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ approaches in the long-term development of science.
I don’t support the Intelligent Design Movement that includes Stephen Meyer, Robert C. Koons, etc.
P
patricius79
Guest
John F. McCarthy, commenting on the work of Denton, and in a brilliant summary of the evidence for teleology, writes:
The theory of evolution is, therefore, wrongly called a “scientific theory,” in the sense of a theory based upon statistical laws. There are no such laws supporting the theory
rtforum.org/lt/lt122.html
The theory of evolution is, therefore, wrongly called a “scientific theory,” in the sense of a theory based upon statistical laws. There are no such laws supporting the theory
rtforum.org/lt/lt122.html
L
LogisticsBranch
Guest
I support the National Academy of Sciences and Institute of Medicine.
From it’s website it plainly states, “The formal scientific definition of theory is quite different from the everyday meaning of the word. It refers to a comprehensive explanation of some aspect of nature that is supported by a vast body of evidence.” It plainly states that evolution is a theory and a fact. //http://nationalacademies.org/evolution/TheoryOrFact.html//
J
JP2Admirer
Guest
Not to get all logical on you, but aren’t theory and fact somewhat contradictory?I support the National Academy of Sciences and Institute of Medicine.
What is a fact? Is it an actual explanation for sense datum?
What is a theory? Is it a possible explanation for sense datum?
I love the term ‘fact’ because it seems to be a chimerical notion. People use it as a synonym for truth, but there are no “simple” facts that do not have some antecedent worldview attached to them. At least that is how I see it. (I think I might be derailing the thread here, sorry.)
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hecd2
Guest
As promised I’m getting back to the couple of open points in our conversation. I’ll make separate posts for each point. The first point of discussion was the different perspectives we have on the Five Ways - I find them unconvincing, whereas you find critiques of them unconvincing - you are looking for more of an explanation for my position which I’ll attempt here, while repeating the disclaimers that a) I am not a philosopher b) these can be at best skeletons of arguments on a forum like this and c) I don’t expect that they will change your mind as they are commonplace arguments that you must have seen before.
There are a few generic reasons for my views on the Aquinas proofs, and then arguments against each of the Ways. First of all, Aquinas’s arguments are all a posteriori - that is, they are based on intuitions about the world that Aquinas has acquired by the interpretation of sense data. They are therefore subject to revision or refutation as a consequence of new data or different interpretations of old data. In particular, Aquinas’s knowledge of physics is hardly more sophisticated or less flawed than Aristotle’s, and several of the assertions he makes as premises to the arguments are questionable in the light of more recent physical understanding. Of course, one would have to show how a modern understanding of the world’s workings actually invalidated each argument. Second, it’s my view that the first three Ways suffer from the fallacy of composition - in other words even where observations about the way things are in the world appear to be absolutes, it does not necessarily follow that the observation can be applied to the world itself as a whole. So, for example in the First Way, the first mover argument, Aquinas argues that a thing can only be moved from potentiality to act by a thing already in act, which is an argument that is defensible (but also questionable in my opinion: see below), but it does not follow that if this is true of things within the world then it is necessarily true of the world itself, since the observation is limited to the working of the world within the world and cannot reasonably be extended to the working of things outside the world (where for example the concept of time might be different or inapplicable).
Comments then on the individual arguments: The Prime Mover: this has been discussed ad nauseam by many philosophers, so I will just say that I find the following steps of the argument questionable or fallacious: first the claim that something cannot be moved from potentiality to actuality except by something that is itself in act can be questioned by the observation of the behaviour of things at a quantum level; second, the claim that something cannot be simultaneously in act and potentiality in the same respect seems to deny the possibility of gradations (his example of hotness seems to imply that being hot is a single absolute state); third the claim that something cannot move itself is, to my mind, clearly refuted by the known existence of spontaneous events; fourth, the claim that the sequence cannot go on to infinity is a bare assertion (see for example Quentin Smith and Wes Morriston arguments against this step); fifth the conclusion is a clear violation of the principle - the Prime Mover itself violates the observation - in order to arrive at the conclusion we must admit at least one exception to the argument and if we admit one, why not more than one; and if we admit one, why is that necessarily a sentient being rather than the world itself.
to be continued…
H
hecd2
Guest
Continuation.
The Efficient Cause argument: this is very similar to the Prime Mover argument and suffers from the same problems. In particular, Aquinas asserts without supporting argument or proof that if efficient causes go on to infinity there cannot be a first cause or intermediate causes and so there cannot be an ultimate effect, and, quite apart from the fact this is a circular argument, the conclusion that there cannot be an ultimate effect if there is no first cause in an infinite train of causes does not follow.
The argument from Possibility and Necessity suffers from the fallacy of composition, from the fact that we don’t know whether the world itself is necessary or contingent. We simply don’t know whether the world as a whole can be other than it is or whether it might not be at all. For all we know, the existence of the world (and possibly the way it works) is necessary. Aquinas also uses the concept of time to refer to a state when nothing existed - but if nothing existed the concept of time has no meaning. There cannot be a “time” when nothing existed. Furthermore, the propositions that something which is not necessary cannot exist unless caused by a necessary thing and that something that begins to exist must necessarily be caused by something else also fail for the same reason. The argument against an infinity of causes suffers as in the previous ways, and the assertion that what is possible not to be at some time, must not be at some time, is unsupported (and unsupportable in my view, for something which has always existed does not mean that it might not have existed).
The argument from the Maximum is predicated on an imperfect understanding of the physical world and suffers from a number of other fallacies. First, there is no such state as hottest; nor is fire the maximum heat (nor is it the cause of all hot things) - coherent statements about gradations do not require an absolute standard. Second, it does not follow that we can apply the same principles to values as we can to physical things - the fact that we have concepts of cowardice and bravery, and that we can make coherent statements about relative cowardice and bravery does entail that the concept of the absolute bravest or most cowardly are meaningful - in fact, I would argue that they are not. Third, the argument that truest, noblest etc can be identified with greatest in being doesn’t follow - neither does the claim that the maximum in a genus is the cause of all in the genus. I’m afraid I find the whole of the Fourth Way quite incoherent and fallacious.
Finally, the Governance argument is based on the anthropomorphic fallacy - that inanimate things in nature act towards an end in order to obtain a “best result”. Or rather, Aquinas attempts to avoid the fallacy by proposing that the inanimate things are directed to their end by an intelligent being to obtain the “best result”. There is, of course, no knowing what the best result is, but apart from that an a posteriori view of the way the world works based on what we know today, simply does not support the premise.The premise is fatally flawed and so must the conclusion be.
Alec
evolutionpages.com
The Efficient Cause argument: this is very similar to the Prime Mover argument and suffers from the same problems. In particular, Aquinas asserts without supporting argument or proof that if efficient causes go on to infinity there cannot be a first cause or intermediate causes and so there cannot be an ultimate effect, and, quite apart from the fact this is a circular argument, the conclusion that there cannot be an ultimate effect if there is no first cause in an infinite train of causes does not follow.
The argument from Possibility and Necessity suffers from the fallacy of composition, from the fact that we don’t know whether the world itself is necessary or contingent. We simply don’t know whether the world as a whole can be other than it is or whether it might not be at all. For all we know, the existence of the world (and possibly the way it works) is necessary. Aquinas also uses the concept of time to refer to a state when nothing existed - but if nothing existed the concept of time has no meaning. There cannot be a “time” when nothing existed. Furthermore, the propositions that something which is not necessary cannot exist unless caused by a necessary thing and that something that begins to exist must necessarily be caused by something else also fail for the same reason. The argument against an infinity of causes suffers as in the previous ways, and the assertion that what is possible not to be at some time, must not be at some time, is unsupported (and unsupportable in my view, for something which has always existed does not mean that it might not have existed).
The argument from the Maximum is predicated on an imperfect understanding of the physical world and suffers from a number of other fallacies. First, there is no such state as hottest; nor is fire the maximum heat (nor is it the cause of all hot things) - coherent statements about gradations do not require an absolute standard. Second, it does not follow that we can apply the same principles to values as we can to physical things - the fact that we have concepts of cowardice and bravery, and that we can make coherent statements about relative cowardice and bravery does entail that the concept of the absolute bravest or most cowardly are meaningful - in fact, I would argue that they are not. Third, the argument that truest, noblest etc can be identified with greatest in being doesn’t follow - neither does the claim that the maximum in a genus is the cause of all in the genus. I’m afraid I find the whole of the Fourth Way quite incoherent and fallacious.
Finally, the Governance argument is based on the anthropomorphic fallacy - that inanimate things in nature act towards an end in order to obtain a “best result”. Or rather, Aquinas attempts to avoid the fallacy by proposing that the inanimate things are directed to their end by an intelligent being to obtain the “best result”. There is, of course, no knowing what the best result is, but apart from that an a posteriori view of the way the world works based on what we know today, simply does not support the premise.The premise is fatally flawed and so must the conclusion be.
Alec
evolutionpages.com
H
hecd2
Guest
OK moving on to this. Remember that my view is that the argument from the intelligibility of nature is the most telling argument for the design of the world by an intelligence, so I am laying out schemes for arguments against it that could be developed. The arguments are currently arguments in principle because they generally rely on observations that we have not yet made. Previous disclaimers in the earlier posts apply.
- The argument from intelligibility fails if things are as they from necessity or high probability. If there are possible worlds that are conceivably different to ours with regard to their physical laws and if the overwhelming majority of such worlds do not behave well and do not have intelligible laws, then the argument from intelligibility is persuasive. If, however, we find that things are in this world the way they are from necessity - ie they are this way because they cannot be another way; or that of the ways the world can be, intelligibility is reasonably probable, then in these cases the argument fails because an intelligence would not then be required to arrange the world intelligibly. At the moment of course, neither of these conditions is close to being met.
- The anthropic explanation is well known - that there might be a large number or an infinite number of other universes or domains within this universe where things are ill behaved, but so long as there is one which is both intelligible and has the properties that lead to intelligent life then we will necessarily find ourselves in such a case. This argument suffers from the impossibility of ever testing the proposition - or at least that is what its critics say. It might come down to an individual using their predisposition to believe one way or the other to decide which untestable proposition, God or the multiverse, is more probable and reasonable.
- The facade argument is that the world so far has given the appearance of being intelligible, well behaved and describable. However it might be that this is true only up to a point and that beyond that point the world is not intelligible, well-behaved or describable. We already have a situation where no interpretation of quantum physics seems intelligible (OK - we can shut up and do the maths, but what does it mean?) ; we know that our best descriptions of physical reality are incompatible at certain scales and our best attempts to reconcile them are seemingly stalled; we have several fundamental constants in nature that seem to be entirely arbitrary and we have made little or no progress in determining why they are as they are - they just seem to be plucked out of thin air. If our ability to understand the world is superficial, and after just 300 or 400 years of the project, we have reached the limits of intelligibility, we cannot be sure whether the limits arise from our cognitive limitations or because the world at a deeper level is unintelligible in principle; and if the latter does it not undermine the argument from intelligibility? Or would the veneer of intelligibility that we have explored be enough to maintain the argument?
evolutionpages.com
J
JP2Admirer
Guest
Humility is the mark of all great philosophers. And wow! You’ve been busy. I thank you for taking the time to reply, this should be a fun discussion. We do not need to prove or disprove each other, but if we are in common pursuit of the same goal – truth – then we should dialectically approach that gem and be happy for the opportunity to do so together. The best way to do that is by first disagreeing with each other.
Is this not the way science proceeds? Gathering data, refuting old claims based on new scientific (cenoscopic) intstrumentation? How are the arguments weakened by being open to new interpretations? If anything, I would think that would strengthen the arguments.
We probably need scientists to do this, right? Although, since you bring it up, I have to ask. Do you know what those recent studies are that invalidate in particular the 5 ways? I realize that Aristotle and Aquinas’ physics are outmoded, but I would be interested in learning what new physics would do to the arguments in the five ways.
I would here throw the onus back to you. This argument essentially puts both worldviews in a pickle. It claims that we cannot reasonably conclude that there is a set of all finite beings, i.e. it is a false step to sum all things into one. The universe is too big for that. Are the arguments for the conclusion that we cannot sum all things into one sound? Do not different schools, that agree on the unsoundness of the five ways, disagree about the soundness of these arguments? Does that not at least suggest that the demonstrations for them are far from perfect?
It is my understanding that the probabilities, or the disassociation of cause and effect at the quantum level is so immense that chance happening in the sensible world becomes nearly impossible. Things happen always or for the most part. Second, it is also my understanding that our instrumentation for studying things at this level is far from perfected and that it could be the weakness of that instrumentation that is causing the appearence of there to be a lack of essential causality at the level. I am not a physicist, so things may not be this way. Perhaps you could fill me in, or someone reading these boards.
Again, I think Aquinas’ metaphysics may prove impervious to this critique, even if it is found that all is chance happening. More below…
J
JP2Admirer
Guest
second, the claim that something cannot be simultaneously in act and potentiality in the same respect seems to deny the possibility of gradations (his example of hotness seems to imply that being hot is a single absolute state); …
I think you may be confusing what non-contradiction – the basis of the claim that things cannot be simultaneously in act and potentiality – states. Non-contradiction basically says that something cannot both be and not be in the in the same way and at the same time. So gradation is entirely possible (indeed it is one of the proofs Aquinas offers for the existence of God), because something can be in act so as not to be in potency, but not completely in act. So a child is in act, but not in potency, but not is completely in act as being an adult. Second, the hotness example simply serves – and it probably was Aquinas’ scientific understanding – as a philosophical example to aid in understanding the demonstration. We can certainly conceptualize an absolute heat as being perfectly hot, even if it doesn’t exist in reality.
third the claim that something cannot move itself is, to my mind, clearly refuted by the known existence of spontaneous events;.
What is a spontaneous event? A beginning to be of something that is “uncaused”? What are such an events and how do we know they are uncaused? Or is it that we do not know the cause?
fourth, the claim that the sequence cannot go on to infinity is a bare assertion (see for example Quentin Smith and Wes Morriston arguments against this step);
I am not familiar with these philosohpers. How do they make the claim that it is bare assertion?
fifth the conclusion is a clear violation of the principle - the Prime Mover itself violates the observation - in order to arrive at the conclusion we must admit at least one exception to the argument and if we admit one, why not more than one; and if we admit one, why is that necessarily a sentient being rather than the world itself.
to be continued…
Is the Prime Mover really an exception to the argument or the conclusion thereof? If indeed it becomes impossible that we exist here and now if we proceed to infinity in causes, then does not it warrant the conclusion that if we are here now, there must be an Unmoved Mover? Does the argument warrant the existence of more than one unmoved mover? (I need to revisit the 12th book of the metaphysics as my memory is hazy right now as to whether Aristotle argues for a multitude of necessary beings of of unmoved movers). In my mind, it does not, because as you climb the ladder to the Unmoved Mover, notions of perfection start to come into play, i.e.the unmoved mover needs to have total actuality and perfection to avoid having its cause from another. You start to get into the metaphysical scheme of God in whom being and essence are the same.
I will try to get to your other posts in the coming days. Thanks again for continuing this discussion. While you have yet to convince me, you have at the least made me think.
I think you may be confusing what non-contradiction – the basis of the claim that things cannot be simultaneously in act and potentiality – states. Non-contradiction basically says that something cannot both be and not be in the in the same way and at the same time. So gradation is entirely possible (indeed it is one of the proofs Aquinas offers for the existence of God), because something can be in act so as not to be in potency, but not completely in act. So a child is in act, but not in potency, but not is completely in act as being an adult. Second, the hotness example simply serves – and it probably was Aquinas’ scientific understanding – as a philosophical example to aid in understanding the demonstration. We can certainly conceptualize an absolute heat as being perfectly hot, even if it doesn’t exist in reality.
third the claim that something cannot move itself is, to my mind, clearly refuted by the known existence of spontaneous events;.
What is a spontaneous event? A beginning to be of something that is “uncaused”? What are such an events and how do we know they are uncaused? Or is it that we do not know the cause?
fourth, the claim that the sequence cannot go on to infinity is a bare assertion (see for example Quentin Smith and Wes Morriston arguments against this step);
I am not familiar with these philosohpers. How do they make the claim that it is bare assertion?
fifth the conclusion is a clear violation of the principle - the Prime Mover itself violates the observation - in order to arrive at the conclusion we must admit at least one exception to the argument and if we admit one, why not more than one; and if we admit one, why is that necessarily a sentient being rather than the world itself.
to be continued…
Is the Prime Mover really an exception to the argument or the conclusion thereof? If indeed it becomes impossible that we exist here and now if we proceed to infinity in causes, then does not it warrant the conclusion that if we are here now, there must be an Unmoved Mover? Does the argument warrant the existence of more than one unmoved mover? (I need to revisit the 12th book of the metaphysics as my memory is hazy right now as to whether Aristotle argues for a multitude of necessary beings of of unmoved movers). In my mind, it does not, because as you climb the ladder to the Unmoved Mover, notions of perfection start to come into play, i.e.the unmoved mover needs to have total actuality and perfection to avoid having its cause from another. You start to get into the metaphysical scheme of God in whom being and essence are the same.
I will try to get to your other posts in the coming days. Thanks again for continuing this discussion. While you have yet to convince me, you have at the least made me think.
H
hecd2
Guest
And thank you. The problem with subjects like this is that they are huge and go off in all directions. You’ve already taken two posts to reply to my one and there’s two more of mine to go. We could spin up about 20 different threads on stuff in here, but I haven’t the time, energy or knowledge to do that, science being the thing that floats my boat. I’ll make brief, even cryptic remarks on some of your points in your recent replies, but I fear an in-depth discussion is beyond me.
My point was not an argument against the validity of the Ways per se, but was meant to establish the principle that the conclusions of a posteriori arguments are subject to revision in the light of new knowledge and understanding (as are scientific conclusions). In other words a posteriori arguments cannot necessarily settle the matter for all time. Just because Aquinas’s arguments were cogent when he made them in the light of what he and others knew about the world then, doesn’t *necessarily *mean that they are cogent now in the light of what we know now.
Sure.
I touch on them as I go through, but in my view QM and GR call some elements of the first three into question, the understanding of things like heat and temperature affect arguments about actuality and potentiality, the whole of the argument from the Maximum is affected by a proper understanding of physical variables, and the argument from Governance is simply untenable, in my view, in the light of science since Galileo. I could expand a lot on these, but wonder whether I have the time especially if we are going to develop other thoughts below.
I can’t speak for others only for myself. It is fundamental to my worldview that we cannot reason our way to true beliefs about external reality unless we have access to sense data about that reality (and I think that Aquinas would agree?). Now modern science suggests that we cannot access sense data about any reality that does not influence things within our past light cone or before the Planck time (at least as things stand). We have no reason to believe that all of reality lies within our past light cone or that all of reality is like this region that we can perceive. And even if there is a single set of all finite things which all behave the same way, it is still a fallacy to conclude that what is true for the behaviour of elements of the set is necessarily true for the set as a whole.
Yes - at the macro level the summation of probabilities is such that behaviour appears deterministic rather than random. However, quantum effects do affect the macroscopic world (even transistors depend on quantum effects and quantum computing relies fundamentally on odd things like particles being in two states at once). However my point is that quantum behaviour demonstrates the principle that at some levels the world acts counter-intuitively, so we must be careful about reaching intuitive conclusions about the way things work - particularly it seems at very small and very large scales.
This is not the case - quantum behaviour is not an artifact of imperfect instrumentation but is fundamentally different and non-intuitive behaviour in the building blocks of reality. You could look up the quantised Young’s slit experiment, something that can be done in any undergraduate physics lab which results in deeply non-intuitive results and challenges our ability to describe reality coherently.
More…
H
hecd2
Guest
Ok understood. Here’s a question for you - do you think that the demonstration that a thing can simultaneously have two different and incompatible natures weigh at all against the principle of non-contradiction? Or that a thing can simultaneously be in one place and two places at the same time
I certainly can’t conceptualise anything such as an absolute heat or something being perfectly hot. What could that possibly mean?
Well it is always possible that we have an imperfect understanding of reality (in fact it is certain) but as far as we can see quantum events such as radioactive decay or spontaneous particle generation lack a proximate cause in a rather profound way.
Smith and Morriston don’t say it (ie the impossibility of a sequence going on to infinity) is a bare assertion - I said that in the context of Aquinas’s statement (whilst acknowledging that the five ways are merely a summary). They develop arguments against the proposition (see for example Smith’s debate with William Lane Craig - it’s on-line somewhere) and Morriston’s paper on this published in Philo is available on-line here.
It’s obviously the conclusion, but a conclusion that also violates the ‘universal’ principle on which the argument is based. To that extent, it seems to me that the whole argument is incoherent.
Well, first of all I don’t concede the premise, and secondly I don’t concede the conclusion to the extent that that conclusion is necessarily an entity other than the world, even if I accept the premise for the sake of argument.
That seems to me to be a very different level of argument - I think the first step is to agree or agree to disagree on the point of whether one or more than one unmoved movers is proven by the argument - and at that level if we acknowledge one, then I see no reason to limit it to one. The onus would then be on you to demonstrate why it must be one and one only. But we are far from the first step there I think.
Ditto
Alec
evolutionpages.com
H
hecd2
Guest
JP2A I hope you see this. I just notice I wrote:
Alec
What I meant of course was: the fact that we have concepts of cowardice and bravery, and that we can make coherent statements about relative cowardice and bravery does NOT entail that the concept of the absolute bravest or most cowardly are meaningful.
Alec
J
JP2Admirer
Guest
I wholeheartedly agree that it doesn’t de facto mean that the arguments are cogent now in light of new understanding, but that is why we, and others, are having this discussion. I believe the arguments may still be relevant, you do not.
I realize you do not have time to pursue these one by one so I will just say I will be reading what these philosophers have to say in the very near future. Any good recommendations? I personally am not a scientist, I have some training in philosophy, but I have never studied the philosophy of science. So the arguments of these philosophers would be fascinating to read. I am curious as to what about Galileo’s science deflates the argument from Governance?
I am unfamiliar with “past light cone” and “Planck time”? Could you enlighten me? Outside of that, I am perceiving a bit of a contradiction in your statement here. You begin by stating that we have to have access to sense data to determine the truth of external reality, but then you go on to state that “we have no reason to believe that all of reality lies in our past light cone.” Do we have reason to believe that it does not? Or is this speculation outside of the sense datum, which is contrary to your original statement? I only ask because this scientific terminology is new to me…perhaps there is evidence that there are 'different light cones."
I agree that it may be that there is a fallacy in jumping to the conclusion that what is true of some elements is true of the whole. But I also perceive in nature – without the aid of instrumentation – a hierarchical order where the individuals of one species (I am using these terms logically and not scientifically to designate intelligible "groups) all behave in similar fashion. Those in that species behave in a certain way that puts them in a genus…and so on. I guess I can say that it seems that we may not be jumping to a conclusion that is ill advised by the evidence, but on the contrary, that we are jumping to a conlusion* based on the evidence. *Again, I say this as a non-scientist so the micro world may prove that this evidence is merely a figment of an organizing imagination…time will tell. This again gets us into the “Nietzsche vs. Aquinas” debate.
I wil look into Young’s slit experiment, but I ask, what do we mean when we say the world acts “counter intuitively?” Counter intuitively to known “laws” of science?
J
JP2Admirer
Guest
I’m starting to feel like Socrates…we are answering each other with questions lol. I guess we have to get our terminology straight – what is meant by having different natures simultaneously? Logically, I cannot see how one thing can simultaneously be in two places unless it is ubiquitous? Because two, is two one’s, so if it is in two places then it is in two places and not one. If it is in one then it is not in two, and so on.
If you can conceptualize “absolute heat” then you already know what it means. It’s an analogy that aids in the understanding of a philosophical concept because we are such beings that intelligible truths are made understandable to us with the aid of phantasms (images). Aristotle’s famous example is we can understand curvature by looking at the snub-nose – we simply “hollow out” the snub nose and arrive at the concept of curve.
Again, I think we are running up against, ultimately, the question of teleology in nature…is there such a thing or not?
Again, I think part of the problem with the critique of the 5 ways is that they are surface level to Aquinas’ metaphysics. Indeed, if science goes on to prove in a profound way that nature is unintelligible, I still think Aquinas has an answer based on how Esse Subsistens and habens esse differ.
Nonetheless, I also am perceiving in our discussion the problem with modern science and philosophy. Scientists, without philosophical training, make bold claims without asking the requisite questions of meaning in the language they use. At the same time, philosophers develop arguments without the aid of science. It’s too bad we aren’t still in the dark ages in terms of the goal of the sciences, i.e. the unification of knowledge.
I am going to try to read this today. (Home with two young children, so we’ll see how that goes.
)I guess we should begin at the beginning. Show me what about the premise you object to? Things being reduced to actuality from potency? That all things have a beginning of movement? Above you seemed to question the validity of actuality and potentiality, I’d be interested to understand where this comes from?
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hecd2
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I was puzzled by this reference to philosophers here, but on reflection think you mean QM and GR, which isn’t a reference to philosophers but to Quantum Mechanics and General Relativity.
OK - so the argument from governance is about things that lack intelligence acting ‘for the best’ and therefore requiring an intelligence to move them towards an end. Everything that we have learned about the way the world works, starting with Galileo and proceeding up to today, by way of Newton, Darwin, Bohr and Einstein belies the idea that inanimate things have an end or a purpose and that any intelligence is required to govern their action - instead what we see from the galaxies to bacteria can be explained by the consequence of applying unintelligent blind processes to the matter-energy of the universe. Every scientist that I mentioned, and many more, added another brick in that wall, and Galileo played his part by insisting that where our observations about the world conflict with interpretations of revelation, then the former should take precedence. He also introduced the idea of inertia and constant motion in the absence of external forces - see below. The universe, as we observe it, does not require an intelligence to govern or control its unfolding or manage it on a moment by moment basis. Don’t forget that Aquinas was part of a tradition that thought that the end of all earthy objects and their proper place was the centre of the earth, and the end and proper place of fire was the edge of the universe. (There is a sense in which things we have learned about the world are evidence against a guiding intelligence or at least a benevolent one - Darwin was particularly disturbed by the facts of the life cycle of parasitoid wasps; there are many other ways in which the world works that present a terrible challenge to theodicy, particularly if one assents to the governance argument)
The past light cone is that extent of space beyond which we cannot see because of the finite speed of light. The radius of the cone expands into the past. We cannot know anything about events that lie outside the cone (so we cannot, for example, see or know anything about events that occurred a thousand years ago at a point two thousand light years from us.) Because of the finite time since the Big Bang (or rather since an event called decoupling where the universe became transparent to light for the first time), light has been travelling for 13.7 billion years and no more, so we cannot see any event that occurred more than about 45 billion light years from us (it’s 45 rather than 13.7 because of the expansion of the universe since decoupling). We cannot know anything about the universe beyond that radius or before Planck time when physics as we understand it breaks down.
Not really different light cones. We have no reason to believe that the universe doesn’t continue outside our light cone, because the limitations that our light cone imposes are functions of our position in time and space in the universe rather than indications of a boundary to the universe. (If the universe is the same size as or smaller than what we can see within our light cone, we should be able to detect that - we don’t) Therefore it seems very likely that there are regions of the universe, possibly vast or infinite regions, that exist that we cannot know anything about. …]
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hecd2
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Alec
evolutionpages.com
I think that your example here is a tautology - what you are saying is that all members of a set which is defined by its similar behaviour, behave similarly (I am using the term behaviour rather loosely to paraphrase me, but I am sure you take my point). That does not represent the fallacy. The fallacy is not claiming that what is true of some, is true of all. The fallacy is claiming that given a set where *all *members have a certain property then the set as whole has that property. Here’s an example from biology. “All cells in the human body replicate by division. The human body is composed entirely of cells. Therefore humans replicate by division.” This is the fallacy which Aquinas potentially falls into when he claims that what is true about entities within the world is necessarily true of the world itself.
No - counter-intuitively to the way things appear to be if we look at them using mere appearance and the way things appear to us at our scale. An example from Galileo: until Galileo did his wonderful work on mechanics (after his house arrest, interestingly), people intuitively thought that heavier objects would fall more quickly than lighter ones, and they also thought that in the absence of applied forces all objects in the universe would come to rest. Galileo showed that both of these notions are wrong which was deeply counter-intuitive. The truth also contradicts Aristotle’s and Aquinas’s ideas on these subjects, and Galileo’s demonstration of inertia and constant motion in the absence of external force stands against the governance argument. The celestial bodies do not need movers - as Newton showed, the fact of inertia and the universal law of gravitation explain their motion well.
Alec
evolutionpages.com
C
Charlemagne_II
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hecd2
Everything that we have learned about the way the world works, starting with Galileo and proceeding up to today, by way of* Newton, Darwin, Bohr and Einstein **belies the idea that inanimate things have an end or a purpose and that any intelligence is required to govern their action - *
Everything?
“The universe has been wrought for us by a supremely good and orderly Creator.” Nicolaus Copernicus
“[May] God who is most admirable in his works … deign to grant us the grace to bring to light and illuminate the profundity of his wisdom in the visible (and accordingly intelligible) creation of this world.” Johannes Kepler
“This most beautiful system [the universe] could only proceed from the dominion of an intelligent and powerful Being.” Isaac Newton
“It seems to me absurd to doubt that a man may be an ardent theist and an evolutionist.” Charles Darwin
“I want to know how God created this world. I am not interested in this or that phenomenon, in the spectrum of this or that element. I want to know His thoughts, the rest are details.” Albert Einstein
“Both religion and science need for their activities the belief in God, and moreover God stands for the former in the beginning, and for the latter at the end of the whole thinking. For the former, God represents the basis, for the latter - the crown of any reasoning concerning the world-view.” Max Planck
“Those who say that the study of science makes a man an atheist must be rather silly.” Max Born
“The first gulp from the glass of natural sciences will turn you into an atheist, but at the bottom of the glass God is waiting for you.” Werner Heisenberg
“Mind, rather than emerging as a late outgrowth in the evolution of life, has existed always as the matrix, the source and condition of physical reality - that the stuff of which physical reality is composed is mind-stuff. It is Mind that has composed a physical universe that breeds life, and so eventually evolves creatures that know and create.” George Wald
I could go on and on, but I suppose you’d rather I didn’t. 
Everything that we have learned about the way the world works, starting with Galileo and proceeding up to today, by way of* Newton, Darwin, Bohr and Einstein **belies the idea that inanimate things have an end or a purpose and that any intelligence is required to govern their action - *
Everything?
“The universe has been wrought for us by a supremely good and orderly Creator.” Nicolaus Copernicus
“[May] God who is most admirable in his works … deign to grant us the grace to bring to light and illuminate the profundity of his wisdom in the visible (and accordingly intelligible) creation of this world.” Johannes Kepler
“This most beautiful system [the universe] could only proceed from the dominion of an intelligent and powerful Being.” Isaac Newton
“It seems to me absurd to doubt that a man may be an ardent theist and an evolutionist.” Charles Darwin
“I want to know how God created this world. I am not interested in this or that phenomenon, in the spectrum of this or that element. I want to know His thoughts, the rest are details.” Albert Einstein
“Both religion and science need for their activities the belief in God, and moreover God stands for the former in the beginning, and for the latter at the end of the whole thinking. For the former, God represents the basis, for the latter - the crown of any reasoning concerning the world-view.” Max Planck
“Those who say that the study of science makes a man an atheist must be rather silly.” Max Born
“The first gulp from the glass of natural sciences will turn you into an atheist, but at the bottom of the glass God is waiting for you.” Werner Heisenberg
“Mind, rather than emerging as a late outgrowth in the evolution of life, has existed always as the matrix, the source and condition of physical reality - that the stuff of which physical reality is composed is mind-stuff. It is Mind that has composed a physical universe that breeds life, and so eventually evolves creatures that know and create.” George Wald
I could go on and on, but I suppose you’d rather I didn’t.
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hecd2
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Let’s come back to this when you have looked up the quantised Young’s experiment, but what it shows challenges ordinary views about the inviolability of non-contradiction
Sorry but this doesn’t help because I can’t conceptualise ‘absolute heat’. It means nothing to me, actually or conceptually. What does it mean to you?
Possibly - the governance argument for example, assumes telos where, in my opinion, none exists.
And I would say, with all respect, that what I know of Aquinas’s metaphysics is that it is surface level (or erroneous) to what we know now about reality.
I’d be interested in an expansion of this idea.
Your comments immediately above were in response to my statement that quantum events such as radioactive decay or spontaneous particle generation lack a proximate cause in a rather profound way. I didn’t say anything about the intelligibility of nature and I’m struggling to understand how your response is directly relevant to my observation. I’m worried that our mutual claims, that neither side understands the other’s position sufficiently profoundly, is an excuse for breaking down our discourse into mutual incomprehensibility. Let’s not give up the dialogue so easily. We might ultimately have to do so, but I think it’s worth a further struggle yet.
We should try for a while longer anyway, to make a little dark age of our own
My problem with the premise is that I don’t concede the impossibility of existing here and now if we proceed to an infinity in causes - I believe that proposition is based on a misunderstanding of the nature of infinity and particularly of past eternity. I don’t see what is incompatible (starting from a Cantorian understanding of infinity) with being here, and there being an infinity of past causes. But even if I concede that point, I don’t see that a past finite world requires a Prime Mover because, although the proposition that every thing in potency requires a thing act to move it might be true within the world, we cannot say that it is true of the world itself. And if I accept the argument as stated it is incoherent in that the conclusion violates the principle used to establish it (or we introduce a category of being - the unmoved mover - not predicated and not available in the premises - but if allowed, fatal to the premises)
Alec
evolutionpages.com
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