Judith Jarvis Thomson and "A Defense of Abortion"

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I found out about this misguided professor today. I’m sure many of you are familiar with her and her defense of abortion “in some cases” using the “violinist” thought experiment. I am no moral philosopher or ethicist. I’m an economist and a accountant - we could use more ethics in accounting.

But her argument seems flawed in the sense that she neglects the disparity between the innocence of the child within the mother’s womb versus the assumed innocence of the sick violinist. I think she tries to cover this up by presupposing there is a “right to life”. I’m really just looking for some logical clarification in terms of her argument, and the refutations therefrom. I know most, if not all, of the population around here is pro-life, as am I, so we don’t need to talk about the Church’s position. It just bugs me that such an educated person as Professor Thomson would try to highfaluttenly defend such an awful crime. Thank you and God bless.

Matthew Wade
 
So you are saying that the women attached to the violinist has no moral requirement to keep the violinist alive, because the violinist is not as innocent as an unborn child.

What if a fertility clinic were burning down, and you had the choice to either save a Petri dish with a fertilized embryo in one room, or a group of five adults in another room. Which would you save? By your innocence argument, the answer would seem to be that the Petri dish has priority over the five live human beings.
 
This particular argument seems to be the one that abortion supporters resort to after all others have failed to justify the decision. It in effect states that even though the baby is fully human and thus fully deserving of life, s/he does not have rights to the mother’s bodily resources. The baby is essentially a parasite.
JJT attempts to relate this to an absurd story about a violinist magically becoming attached to you. You are not making a moral failure by killing the violinist.
This particular argument would be more effective if the proponent simply ditched the entire analogy, which is absurd because it assumes the baby magically appeared in the womb, like parthenogenesis, maybe?
But the crux of the argument seems to suggest that the mother is not obliged to care for the baby. But it also mentions nothing of the responsibility to care for that which you create. It is a rather sinister argument.
Francis Beckwith is quite familiar with these sorts of more fine-tune assertions:

web.me.com/francis.beckwith/FrancisBeckwith.com/Welcome.html

And here’s a talk he gives in which he does respond to the “violinist argument,” as well as some other similar views: focusonline.org/multimedia/mp3/Dr.%20Francis%20Beckwith-Defending%20Life.mp3

He is one of the leading philosophers defending the pro-life view and should be able to help you.
 
I found out about this misguided professor today…
A fetus could only even possibly be considered an intruder in the case of rape. Otherwise, pregnancy is the natural consequence of sexual intercourse.
Knowing this, and taking the prof’s assertion that a fetus is a person, both our countries should limit abortion to cases of rape. This would be an immense victory for us. Of course, a total prohibition would be the ultimate goal.
 
So you are saying that the women attached to the violinist has no moral requirement to keep the violinist alive, because the violinist is not as innocent as an unborn child.

What if a fertility clinic were burning down, and you had the choice to either save a Petri dish with a fertilized embryo in one room, or a group of five adults in another room. Which would you save? By your innocence argument, the answer would seem to be that the Petri dish has priority over the five live human beings.
Hi Just Lurking, you seem to have missed the crux of my argument by not asking for a clarification. Instead, you just changed the subject. I’ll try to respond in full:

Firstly, by “disparity of innocence” I meant for one to look at the total inequality between the two situations. A) the unborn child does in fact represent a more pure state of innocence than the violinist. No reasonable person would deny that. But like your example tries to prove, superficially at least, this would imply I should save a fetus versus the five grown people by making a moral judgement. This is not the case, more on this in a second. B) The disparity is increased when you consider that a pregnant woman is not bedridden like the woman attached to the ailing and dying violinist. A pregnant woman can work, clean the house, socialize, go to Church, and overall be a functioning member of society like anyone else (“functioning member of society” is such a base term that I hesitate to use to describe the beauty of pregnancy, so please forgive me if you’re a woman reading this). Thompson’s argument seems to posit that every pregnant woman is incapable of even getting out of bed, due to the “inconvenience” of a child developing inside of her.

Back to your proposal. There is not a connection, now that my view has been elucidated, between your example and my original point. I won’t go into a long-winded use of the principle of double-effect but it is appropriate to use in this situation to show you that I would in fact save the five people versus embryo.

Thanks to all of you who responded with articles. That’s exactly what I needed. God bless all of you.
 
I agree with much of what that first link to an article suggests, but I think he only indirectly hits at the arguments main flaws. Sorry if my rant is along the same reasoning the same as the second link Whowantsumadebo, I couldn’t load it up, but I thought this post might be of at least a slight bit of interest (and fun 😃 ).

Personally (like the first link’s author), its the best pro-abortion argument I have ever heard (one that almost appeals to reason and then ethics), but just think of these few things.

The problem with the argument is the difference between a perfect and imperfect obligation. That is the argument wants you to look at a perfect obligation as an imperfect one and thus deceive you. By perfect obligation I mean something one is morally obligated to do in any given situation. Such as one should never murder, etc. By imperfect I mean something that is indirectly related or a positive obligation. For example, I should help out my fellow man in need, the beggar at my door, etc, but it ought not be enforced by law. The argument wants you to think that what is at stake here is an imperfect obligation, that you ought to aid the violinist in need, but don’t necessarily have too (that is, it is supposed to sound gracious, like giving alms). However, this is not at what is at stake here, for you are in a condition in which you have already given the aid by some outside force. What is at stake is you taking it back what is already happened, and thus by taking it back you need to kill the violinist (violate a perfect obligation). (The first article linked seems to hit near this, but not directly enough to my liking) So let me draw this out in story. First lets set some things up:

She has no obligation to add anything to the violinist, but she would be obviously wrong to murder him (actively removing him, surgery etc.). Once he is connected, the removal (given it results in his death) is clearly immoral.

I. Counter-Example by Stories

1.)
Consider an indirect parallel crazy story. You live in the middle of no-where completely detached from civilization. One day a 1 year old is dropped off at your house. Now that kid could be ignored and thus will die, but the kid is going to make your life more difficult, but is ignoring the kid morally legitimate?

Now that was connected indirectly, as you would need to be actively making a choice to go beyond given circumstances to preserve the kids life, yet I am sure, even there, most people would say it would be immoral to toss the kid or let him die (though I might agree that no law need to be passed forcing a person to save them, but I would despise the one who would not nourish the kid). So what about a direct parallel? (these things are always absurd stories, but necessary 😉 )

2.) Consider you are resting at an edge of a cliff with your arms hanging over the edge. Now lets say there is a small boy walking by and a man pushes him and he falls right next to you, but right before he falls he grabs hold of one of your arms, but you are heavy enough that it doesn’t pull you off the cliff too. Now the kid is light enough that **you aren’t in any danger **of falling. But it sure is painful and stressful to have that kid holding on to you, and now you have to wait until he at least climbs up using your arm as leverage. You could pull the kid up, but that would be even more painful (maybe no obligation there, though some may argue otherwise as with the first story), but thankfully for the kid he can climb up so long as you don’t choose to shake him off, but boy is the boy annoying! Would actively trying to shake the kid off, which will result in his death, be wrong? Who would deny it? Seems a clear enough counter-example to me (kid is not at fault, you are burdened with him, all you need to do is do nothing and the kid will live,).

Just because you find yourself in a set of unfortunate circumstances doesn’t mean that you need to use murder (or any other intrinsically wrong means) to get yourself out of it. ** Allowing the violinist example as moral seems to open the door to absurdities like people murdering people who annoy them.** A tall person is born with this genetic disposition (tallness) but it might violently annoy some given man. So the burden is placed, but it is not the tall mans fault. Now does he (the horribly painfully annoyed man) have a right to remove his burden (the tall man from living)? Given we allow the violinist it seems so. Using the rhetoric of the violinist argument, he could heroically bear his burden of being annoyed (not denying that there is some heroism in doing so) but would we blame him for removing the tall man from reality? (Of course we would 😃 )

The same thing seems to apply to the violinist. I think the reason people balk at it is that they confuse actively adding him with passively bearing him as a mother passively bears her child. A mother must take an active measure to kill the child, just as the ‘host’ must take an active measure to destroy the violinist. The violinist story does not parallel to the first story, but rather the second (First is indirect, second is direct. First is passively causing the kids death, second is actively. First is an imperfect obligation, second is perfect)

Like always, abortion appears to contradict reason and morality.

Hope that seals the deal 😉
 
She has no obligation to add anything to the violinist, but she would be obviously wrong to murder him (actively removing him, surgery etc.). Once he is connected, the removal (given it results in his death) is clearly immoral.

I. Counter-Example by Stories

Just because you find yourself in a set of unfortunate circumstances doesn’t mean that you need to use murder (or any other intrinsically wrong means) to get yourself out of it. ** Allowing the violinist example as moral seems to open the door to absurdities like people murdering people who annoy them.**

The same thing seems to apply to the violinist. I think the reason people balk at it is that they confuse actively adding him with passively bearing him as a mother passively bears her child. A mother must take an active measure to kill the child, just as the ‘host’ must take an active measure to destroy the violinist. The violinist story does not parallel to the first story, but rather the second (First is indirect, second is direct. First is passively causing the kids death, second is actively. First is an imperfect obligation, second is perfect)

Like always, abortion appears to contradict reason and morality.
I’ve been thinking about this for several months, and I think I agree with this poster. Except for the last sentence. It seems to me now that having a violinist attached to your side is just one of those very unfortunate “possible” consequences of being attacked. Certainly there will be some criminal charges laid, but maybe I would be obligated to not kill the violinist. Think of another possible outcome: I can’t just shake off a bodycast like it’s nothing, can I?
 
I’ve been thinking about this for several months, and I think I agree with this poster. Except for the last sentence. It seems to me now that having a violinist attached to your side is just one of those very unfortunate “possible” consequences of being attacked. Certainly there will be some criminal charges laid, but maybe I would be obligated to not kill the violinist. Think of another possible outcome: I can’t just shake off a bodycast like it’s nothing, can I?
EEPSS!!!
OK, I totally misread the poster I quoted. I’m sorry Dranu! Your last sentence is something I totally agree with! So, I’m not entirely sure now whether I agree with your full post, but I will consider it more fully when I have more time!! (off to school now). And I’m sure I will further refine my thoughts in the ensuing discussion.

Peace!!
 
EEPSS!!!
OK, I totally misread the poster I quoted. I’m sorry Dranu! Your last sentence is something I totally agree with! So, I’m not entirely sure now whether I agree with your full post, but I will consider it more fully when I have more time!! (off to school now). And I’m sure I will further refine my thoughts in the ensuing discussion.

Peace!!
Hehehe, np. Forgive me as I ramble on 😃

As for the main body, I have since further investigated Judith’s work, and I am still at the same conclusion against her that I was at there, for the same reasons. I think Judith wishes for us to think of the ‘unplugging’ as indirectly as possible and the connection you have being as active as possible (this is where her counterexample has rhetorical effect). But (as I argued) it seems clear to me that the unplugging is equivalent to murder.

It may be said that the unplugging does not kill the violinist, and that only the violinist not having the nutrients (or whatever) he needs kills him (not the unplugger). However, the unplugging is just as much killing by the person who does the unplugging as is ripping out one’s stomach is. Just because the person dies from starvation and not from the act of ‘stomach removal’ does not in anyway detract from the fact that the one who removed the stomach did the killing. If it were not the case that this would be killing, then most cases in which we say a person killed another would be faulty.

Another example I have thought of is that of Siamese twins. Ought one to be prevented by law to ‘unplug’ their twin if they have an organ that the twin needs to live (thus the unplugging kills the twin)? I think so. This, the violinist, and the cliffhanger ‘stories’ all seem morally equivalent to me in regards to the life of the one who dies, and anyone is welcome to attempt to argue otherwise (Good luck to whoever wants to attempt to refute that!) .

The violinist is equivalent to rape I think, and as such abortion under rape is still murder. So I think we should charge the person who aborts with the killing of another human being, but also, the punishment should certainly take in to account the mental state of the woman raped (even though this has no bearing on the fact that a human was indeed murdered).
-What treachery against God does the male rapist brings about! Not only does he bring about the countless evils of the act, but he may also force the burden of motherhood on one who did not ask for it. Thus by his act, he brings upon a poor child the sad condition in which he/she was not conceived in love. Yet in all this we must not forget that the child is a child. To murder the child, just because he is destined to have to bear that cross, is to spit on one’s trust in God and the sacredness of the human life.

On a side note, it is interesting to note that the violinist is not Judith’s main argument (her main argument is weak). It is just what she is famous for since it is a supposed counter-example to most people who are anti-abortion because of ‘right to life’.
 
Thomson argues that rape is not necessary for her argument to work; she says it works for the case of all abortions, even women who just want an abortion because pregnancy will interfere with their vacation plans. (I wish I were making this up.) :nope:

Beckwith argues (I’m paraphrasing from memory, so I hope this is close) that just because someone has neediness does not automatically create my personal moral obligation toward them. The fact that the violinist either gets help or will die does not mean I am the one who has to remain hooked up to him, since I am not involved in the creation of his neediness.

However, intercourse is precisely an action in which the natural, intrinsic end goal is the creation of a being with neediness. This may happen, given intercourse, even with people who contracept themselves into total insensitivity.

Therefore, the end result of an embryo (a being with neediness) is not at all parallel to the violinist example, and Thomson’s argument does not work.
 
Thomson argues that rape is not necessary for her argument to work; she says it works for the case of all abortions, even women who just want an abortion because pregnancy will interfere with their vacation plans. (I wish I were making this up.) :nope:
Not that I recall. She argues for depraved morals, but not that depraved. She thinks a minimally good samaritan law ought to prevent it (If I remember right) .
The fact that the violinist either gets help or will die does not mean I am the one who has to remain hooked up to him, since I am not involved in the creation of his neediness.
The question of that has already passed, jsut like the question of being connected to the siamese twin. The moral question is not whether or not you will provide (you have been forced to), the question is now whether you will kill them or not. That is why unplugging the violinist would be murder.
Therefore, the end result of an embryo (a being with neediness) is not at all parallel to the violinist example, and Thomson’s argument does not work.
I think the example fails (for the reasons I gave in post #7), but I also think it is very analogous (to rape specifically) and fits well to replace ‘fetus’ with ‘violinist’.
 
Not that I recall. She argues for depraved morals, but not that depraved. She thinks a minimally good samaritan law ought to prevent it (If I remember right) .
You are right on this point; I was wrong. The vacation example is from Mary Anne Warren’s essay “On the Legal and Moral Status of Abortion.” I got them mixed up in memory.
 
Sorry to bump this, but I came across this posting and was disturbed enough that I found it necessary to write a lengthy response. We cannot be absolutist in our stances, but must re-evaluate them from time to time. Ignorance of debate and refusal to engage in discussion as to the cause and effect, origins and errors of our own beliefs is a failure to be truthful to ourselves and furthermore a failure to assess our own intuitions on ethical, intellectual, and honest scales. So let me play, pun intended, the devil’s advocate and see whether you truly believe your claims (and are being honest with yourself) or whether “being right” is a matter of personal pride in this issue.

Here we go:
This particular argument seems to be the one that abortion supporters resort to after all others have failed to justify the decision. It in effect states that even though the baby is fully human and thus fully deserving of life, s/he does not have rights to the mother’s bodily resources. The baby is essentially a parasite.
JJT attempts to relate this to an absurd story about a violinist magically becoming attached to you. You are not making a moral failure by killing the violinist.
This particular argument would be more effective if the proponent simply ditched the entire analogy, which is absurd because it assumes the baby magically appeared in the womb, like parthenogenesis, maybe?
But the crux of the argument seems to suggest that the mother is not obliged to care for the baby. But it also mentions nothing of the responsibility to care for that which you create.
(1) This argument in fact, is not the “last resort” argument, but rather the least demanding of the pro-life (PL) position, so it is perhaps the strongest. Many PL people declare that if the fetus is a person (in the moral sense) from conception, it thus leads one to embrace PL position. This is clearly not true, as evidenced in Thomson’s argument.

(2) At the very least, Thomson gives an effective reason for why rape victims should be allowed abortions. I’m not sure where you think it comes to be that the baby magically appears in the womb, but the analogy clearly is one for rape.

(3) The Church does not claim to be against killing a fetus in all situations. There are situations such as a cancerous womb, etc. that removal is allowed, which is effectively abortion.

(4) Perhaps we are in fact too concerned with a responsibility to care for a child. Are you to care for a miscarriage? Are you to care for a removed tumor? Not everything that comes from our body is worthy of care. Yes, perhaps the moral status of a child is worthy of respect, yet it does not have to be the mother’s own. Adoption of a child as one’s own negates this “biology of care” scenario. You assume that a woman who does not have an abortion will love and care for her child. This is at odds with stark reality: millions of children living awful lives and abandonded by their mothers.
A fetus could only even possibly be considered an intruder in the case of rape. Otherwise, pregnancy is the natural consequence of sexual intercourse.
Knowing this, and taking the prof’s assertion that a fetus is a person, both our countries should limit abortion to cases of rape. This would be an immense victory for us. Of course, a total prohibition would be the ultimate goal.
(5) Why would a total prohibition be the ultimate goal? Is this blindly supporting the idea that abortion is evil? The Pope himself allows abortions in some cases, except usually it is known as the removal of a cancerous ovary…it is abortion nonetheless.

(6) Please refer to Thomson’s argument on People Seeds, which I believe will calm your opinions on sex having implicit reproduction causality. Religious texts contradict themselves in this regard (if you truly treat texts as equal…please read the Old Testament again.)
Firstly, by “disparity of innocence” I meant for one to look at the total inequality between the two situations. A) the unborn child does in fact represent a more pure state of innocence than the violinist. No reasonable person would deny that. But like your example tries to prove, superficially at least, this would imply I should save a fetus versus the five grown people by making a moral judgement. This is not the case, more on this in a second. B) The disparity is increased when you consider that a pregnant woman is not bedridden like the woman attached to the ailing and dying violinist. A pregnant woman can work, clean the house, socialize, go to Church, and overall be a functioning member of society like anyone else (“functioning member of society” is such a base term that I hesitate to use to describe the beauty of pregnancy, so please forgive me if you’re a woman reading this). Thompson’s argument seems to posit that every pregnant woman is incapable of even getting out of bed, due to the “inconvenience” of a child developing inside of her…
(7) In alignment with the argument of original sin, a child is as sinful as a incapacitated, innocent stranger.

(8) Even if this is not a valid argument, I will ask: Why does the violinist represent a more innocent life? Let’s suppose the violinist happens to be an Seraphim who plays the violin…in this case there is no difference. The innocence of the embryo vs. the supposed violinist is not an issue.
 
(9) I would argue that a pregnant woman cannot be a “functioning member of society”. They cannot drink, cannot smoke, cannot go on amusement park rides, etc. like others. In addition, as the pregnancy gets more advanced, women have to resist certain physical activity and experience extreme fatigue, pains, sores, and health complications in addition to reqiring more energy as a result of the fetus. A pregnant woman cannot play football, soccer, or other sports. A pregnant woman cannot even take the stairs quickly for fear of falling and killing the fetus. Thomson doesn’t even link the fact that not only is the fetus attached and limits action (like the violinist) but the fetus (unlike the violinist) in fact has a parasitic nature to it.
 
Now that was connected indirectly, as you would need to be actively making a choice to go beyond given circumstances to preserve the kids life, yet I am sure, even there, most people would say it would be immoral to toss the kid or let him die (though I might agree that no law need to be passed forcing a person to save them, but I would despise the one who would not nourish the kid). So what about a direct parallel? (these things are always absurd stories, but necessary 😉 )
Just because you find yourself in a set of unfortunate circumstances doesn’t mean that you need to use murder (or any other intrinsically wrong means) to get yourself out of it. ** Allowing the violinist example as moral seems to open the door to absurdities like people murdering people who annoy them.** A tall person is born with this genetic disposition (tallness) but it might violently annoy some given man. So the burden is placed, but it is not the tall mans fault. Now does he (the horribly painfully annoyed man) have a right to remove his burden (the tall man from living)? Given we allow the violinist it seems so. Using the rhetoric of the violinist argument, he could heroically bear his burden of being annoyed (not denying that there is some heroism in doing so) but would we blame him for removing the tall man from reality? (Of course we would 😃 )
The same thing seems to apply to the violinist. I think the reason people balk at it is that they confuse actively adding him with passively bearing him as a mother passively bears her child. A mother must take an active measure to kill the child, just as the ‘host’ must take an active measure to destroy the violinist. The violinist story does not parallel to the first story, but rather the second (First is indirect, second is direct. First is passively causing the kids death, second is actively. First is an imperfect obligation, second is perfect)😉
(10) A “passive role” in not one of the child. If a woman chooses to eat certain foods (such as a theoretical coincidental combination of herbs that results in the “death pill” for the embryo but is otherwise a delicious snack) she can kill the child. There is NOTHING passive about being pregnant.

(11) Furthermore, I believe in mentioning “perfect” and “imperfect” obligations you are referring to Kantian Deontology. Longgg story short, which I can explain if you really want me to, Kantian Deontology is good intentioned but extremely faulty and vague. What exactly are our perfect/imperfect duties and obligations are intentionally vague, although admittedly murdering is one. Yet even in keeping with Kant’s idea of the negative duty not to murder, we can find times when this would be broken, i.e. the famous "fat man in the cave’ utilitarian argument. We should instead refer to (if we want a deontological stance) something such as Ross’ prima facie duties. In this case, the respect of rights, which is not just prima facie, but absolute in accordance with Ross’ ideas, overrules the conflicting prima facie duty not to murder.
 
Hehehe, np. Forgive me as I ramble on 😃

As for the main body, I have since further investigated Judith’s work, and I am still at the same conclusion against her that I was at there, for the same reasons. I think Judith wishes for us to think of the ‘unplugging’ as indirectly as possible and the connection you have being as active as possible (this is where her counterexample has rhetorical effect). But (as I argued) it seems clear to me that the unplugging is equivalent to murder.

It may be said that the unplugging does not kill the violinist, and that only the violinist not having the nutrients (or whatever) he needs kills him (not the unplugger). However, the unplugging is just as much killing by the person who does the unplugging as is ripping out one’s stomach is. Just because the person dies from starvation and not from the act of ‘stomach removal’ does not in anyway detract from the fact that the one who removed the stomach did the killing. If it were not the case that this would be killing, then most cases in which we say a person killed another would be faulty.

Another example I have thought of is that of Siamese twins. Ought one to be prevented by law to ‘unplug’ their twin if they have an organ that the twin needs to live (thus the unplugging kills the twin)? I think so. This, the violinist, and the cliffhanger ‘stories’ all seem morally equivalent to me in regards to the life of the one who dies, and anyone is welcome to attempt to argue otherwise (Good luck to whoever wants to attempt to refute that!) .

The violinist is equivalent to rape I think, and as such abortion under rape is still murder. So I think we should charge the person who aborts with the killing of another human being, but also, the punishment should certainly take in to account the mental state of the woman raped (even though this has no bearing on the fact that a human was indeed murdered).
-What treachery against God does the male rapist brings about! Not only does he bring about the countless evils of the act, but he may also force the burden of motherhood on one who did not ask for it. Thus by his act, he brings upon a poor child the sad condition in which he/she was not conceived in love. Yet in all this we must not forget that the child is a child. To murder the child, just because he is destined to have to bear that cross, is to spit on one’s trust in God and the sacredness of the human life.

On a side note, it is interesting to note that the violinist is not Judith’s main argument (her main argument is weak). It is just what she is famous for since it is a supposed counter-example to most people who are anti-abortion because of ‘right to life’.
(12) Even the Catholic Church/Pope allows murder. Killing in defense is one example. The bible mentions numerous times when both Christian and Jews have committed murder with right. Thus murder is not an absolute wrong. If murder is not an absolute wrong, then it is feasible that possiby murdering anything, in some strange way, would be appropiate. I flinch to say that, but it says it is POSSIBLE, yet not ALWAYS obviously right. Thus I refer you to the Human Seeds argument or the second Good Samaritan argument.
Thomson argues that rape is not necessary for her argument to work; she says it works for the case of all abortions, even women who just want an abortion because pregnancy will interfere with their vacation plans. (I wish I were making this up.) :nope:

Beckwith argues (I’m paraphrasing from memory, so I hope this is close) that just because someone has neediness does not automatically create my personal moral obligation toward them. The fact that the violinist either gets help or will die does not mean I am the one who has to remain hooked up to him, since I am not involved in the creation of his neediness.

However, intercourse is precisely an action in which the natural, intrinsic end goal is the creation of a being with neediness. This may happen, given intercourse, even with people who contracept themselves into total insensitivity.

Therefore, the end result of an embryo (a being with neediness) is not at all parallel to the violinist example, and Thomson’s argument does not work.
(13) We must remember once and for all: Thomson provides the PL position with its strongest possible claim: that a fetus is a person (not just a human being). My question to you is: if the fetus is NOT a human being, what does that mean for your stance?

(14) The creation of need, by all means, is not important. Christians of all people should know that the creation of need is arbitrary to how we treat others. That is a libertarian point of view that starkly is constradictory with anything that Christianity attempts to convey.

(15) Once again, People Seeds dictates the contraceptive issue etc.
 
(2) At the very least, Thomson gives an effective reason for why rape victims should be allowed abortions. I’m not sure where you think it comes to be that the baby magically appears in the womb, but the analogy clearly is one for rape.
Agreed. One can justify legalization of abortions in the case of rape. It is questionable, however, whether a doctor can be justified in doing such an abortion, although *perhaps *it should be legal for him/her to do so.
(8) Even if this is not a valid argument, I will ask: Why does the violinist represent a more innocent life? Let’s suppose the violinist happens to be an Seraphim who plays the violin…in this case there is no difference. The innocence of the embryo vs. the supposed violinist is not an issue.
Agreed. Our duty toward the embryo cannot ever exceed our duty toward an adult human, although the two duties may be equal.
(9) I would argue that a pregnant woman cannot be a “functioning member of society”. They cannot drink, cannot smoke, cannot go on amusement park rides, etc. like others. In addition, as the pregnancy gets more advanced, women have to resist certain physical activity and experience extreme fatigue, pains, sores, and health complications in addition to reqiring more energy as a result of the fetus. A pregnant woman cannot play football, soccer, or other sports. A pregnant woman cannot even take the stairs quickly for fear of falling and killing the fetus. Thomson doesn’t even link the fact that not only is the fetus attached and limits action (like the violinist) but the fetus (unlike the violinist) in fact has a parasitic nature to it.
Many pregnant women go jogging the day before they deliver. Your description above is inaccurate, 9 times out of 10. The fetus has no more of a parasitic nature than a one-year-old does, and is significantly less trouble than a one-year-old.
In this case, the respect of rights, which is not just prima facie, but absolute in accordance with Ross’ ideas, overrules the conflicting prima facie duty not to murder.
The respect of rights? I will agree that we have the right, all things being equal, to exert our freedom. If you’re hooked to the violinist, and you have not caused the situation, and it is against your will, then you may free yourself. But, in most cases of abortion, all things are not equal. Sexual behavior results in pregnancy; that is its nature. And if you chose to risk being hooked to that violinist – **in effect playing roulette with his life **-- you have no right to pull the plug. Thompson’s scenario does not apply to post-conceptive birth control.
(13) We must remember once and for all: Thomson provides the PL position with its strongest possible claim: that a fetus is a person (not just a human being). My question to you is: if the fetus is NOT a human being, what does that mean for your stance?
Not much. Look up Don Marquis’ argument on abortion; it demonstrates that it is the future human experiences of the fetus that are relevant, not the fetus’ present state as a person.

By the way, if you use the term “human being”, the fetus is obviously that. It’s human, and it’s a being. Better to ask if it’s a “person”.
 
(7) In alignment with the argument of original sin, a child is as sinful as a incapacitated, innocent stranger.

(8) Even if this is not a valid argument, I will ask: Why does the violinist represent a more innocent life? Let’s suppose the violinist happens to be an Seraphim who plays the violin…in this case there is no difference. The innocence of the embryo vs. the supposed violinist is not an issue.
jgb88. I’ve taken some time to reply to your arguments in direct reference to my words. Any more than that would severely compromise my other plans for tonight. I will continue to pray for you, and for all who take the time to discover the truth about this important issue. I have responded below:

(7) The soul is stained with Original Sin from the moment of its creation, I’ll grant you that. What I won’t grant to you, and this is why your argument in this case fails, is that the soul is joined at conception. This cannot be answered by science; and, indeed, it doesn’t destroy any pro-life (PL) argument to admit this.

(8) Therefore, this argument (#8) fails and the “questiono of innocence” enters back into the equation. Also, you can’t abort spiritual beings, so if the violinist is a Seraphim, then we’re talking about a miracle.

In Christ,

Matthew Wade
 
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