PART II
quote=jgb88 Furthermore, I believe in mentioning “perfect” and “imperfect” obligations you are referring to Kantian Deontology. Longgg story short, which I can explain if you really want me to, Kantian Deontology is good intentioned but extremely faulty and vague. What exactly are our perfect/imperfect duties and obligations are intentionally vague, although admittedly murdering is one. Yet even in keeping with Kant’s idea of the negative duty not to murder, we can find times when this would be broken, i.e. the famous "fat man in the cave’ utilitarian argument. We should instead refer to (if we want a deontological stance) something such as Ross’ prima facie duties. In this case, the respect of rights, which is not just prima facie, but absolute in accordance with Ross’ ideas, overrules the conflicting prima facie duty not to murder.
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Don’t get too caught up in my language and assuming premises due to a historical connection. I may or may not favor Kantian philosophy, but just because I use similar language does not mean I embrace his system. You are right in assuming it is deontological (or absolutist) though. By perfect duty I simply mean a duty you may never legitimately violate. Are you simply rejecting that the idea that murder (which is different from killing) is always wrong? I think so with your speaking of prima facie duties and your subsequent ‘fat man’ citation, so let us turn to that.
Fat Man in Cave
If I am following the same thing, in short it goes like (correct?):
Water is rising in a cave and a fat man went through the exit first but is not solidly stuck in the hole. There are some twenty people behind him. Unless you blow a hole in the wall, which will inevitably kill the fat man, all twenty people will die. So the question is, ‘to blow or not to blow’.
Although you mention it as a utilitarian argument, it is more an argument to demonstrate the principle of double effect (which of course gives sight to something LIKE utility). The Church APPEARS to embrace something like this principle which is apparent in her doctrines on self-defense, palliative care, and just war. So I would reckon we could blow the hole as it does not require his death as a means to their safety (PERHAPS unlike the famous ‘surgeon and unwilling organ donator’ hypo where their death seems more like a means).
How it applies to my post, you will have to be a bit more clear. Perhaps you mean to say the real contention is not between perfect and imperfect duties since it appears
killing (
not murder mind you, as you put it) is tolerable (
Note: this is actually a bit unclear to me as far as holy doctrine goes looking at the CCC’s current pronouncements on the 5th commandment). Perhaps you mean to say that the killing’s permissibility rests on whether the evil in not doing it outweighs the evil in doing so. I would agree insofar as it was also the case that the killing was not the means, but an unintended consequence. You must also take into consideration that the Catholic places near infinite (i.e. Kantian value
) on human life. Therefore, you would probably need something as large as human lives being at stake to even CONSIDER the legitimacy of unplugging the violinist or fetus.
So in such a case, I would say even if we are able to claim that the killing of the violinist is unintended and really not the means (that in itself might be difficult for you to argue), the outcome of the removal must be better than the tolerance of it. As the hypothetical goes that we are referring to (the violinist argument that is), it seems clearly that it does not.
1.) To say we allow the death of the violinist under the greater value of Ross’s ‘rights’ (I assume you mean autonomy of body etc?) would results in the violation of the ‘rights’ of the violinist. It also would lead to the absurd hypothetical I suggested of allowing people to clean the streets of red heads etc. Furthermore, I believe rights of autonomy end where they violate other rights of autonomy, such as the fetus’s or the violinist’s.
2.) The woman the violinist is attached to is not at risk of dying. As far as I am concerned all matters often referred to as self-gain or removal of suffering are not legitimate reasons, in themselves, to kill, ever.
-----For both these two answers please refer to my ‘cliff-hanger’ and ‘Siamese twin’ hypothetical for more intuitive arguments by analogy that holds these principles underneath them, which I think closely parallel the violinist hypo. Still, under the ‘violinist hypo’s’ parameters isn’t Judith assuming a deontological/perfect right to life, she is just indicating (by trick) because it is passive, there is no violation of it and it falls under an imperfect duty (my hypos I think expose this trick)?
Side Note:
As far as whether the Church allows the ‘unplugging of a fetus’ in the case of a mother’s life which would subsequently threaten the fetus’s life as well, is something I am uncertain of. I would imagine the Church would tolerate it so long as the good outweighed the evil (more human life than not) and the death of the fetus was arguably not the means of this. It seems to me the way the Church uses the term ‘to abort’ is the same way we use ‘to murder’, rather than ‘to kill’. However, I am no authoritative source on this.
Anyhow, you will have to more precisely point out to me how your response is a refutation of what I said.
(Some arguments you just walk on by.)