As I post topics related to my doubts, it seems many keep telling me that I just need to have faith. But I know that fideism is rejected by the Church. So, is the “just have faith” advice just bad advice? Or is there something about the Church’s teaching that encourages us to “just have faith” despite not being persuaded by evidence?
I really need some clarity on this because I’m simply trying to deal with my doubts and weigh the “evidence”… but then I’ve got people telling me I can’t use empiricism in religion, that I need to just have faith…as if I shouldn’t be weighing the evidence.
So, should one weigh the evidence for and against Christianity?
OK a few things.
RE empiricism
In your second paragraph, you seem to equate “weighing the evidence” with “empiricism.” I’m not sure that that equation has been justified. Weighing the evidence may take many forms–empirical testing being one among them.
Yet since God is by definition pure spirit, utterly immaterial, He is inaccessible to the senses. To use an empirical method to test for God is essentially to predetermine not to find evidence of Him. It is as if a person were to say I’ll believe in atoms if I can see them with my own two unaided eyes, because I only believe in the existence of what I can see with my own eyes. Even though the reality does exist you won’t find evidence of it. No scientist would design and conduct research in this manner.
RE "just have faith"
I’m not sure what the others posters mean, but as I understand it there is a grain of truth to the statement. Here’s what I mean.
One method among others to explore a religious tradition (here Catholicism) in view of adjudication is intrinsically as a
participant observer. Extrinsic methods as a
detached observer yield valuable information, but alone are not ultimately suitable to the subject matter.
Here are some reasons.
(1) The domain of religion is not primarily one of a physical or metaphysical explanation of objects out in the physical world, but rather one of an encounter and relationship between subjects (divine and human). Consequently, approaching religious experience and traditions (in view of some adjudication)
a priori, detached, and extrinsic like naturalists speaking in hushed voices observing the mating habits of adult lions from the safety of a Jeep is not methodologically consistent with the subject matter.
(2) There are many situations in life where someone makes a statement based on experience to which at the time we have no access, say, in sports, or medicine, marriage, a trade, or living in general. We cannot always get sufficient evidence
a priori to judge it. We must trust them, live it out in faith, take it on their word; and then the reasons reveal themselves
a posteriori . . . or not. Some things in life cannot be understood until they are lived through from within, intrinsically. It is not less reasonable to expect that one can approach religious experience and traditions for purposes of evaluation in this way.
(3) Also, there are some domains of truth and reality that will be hidden from us unless we go half way to meet them. For example, in a relationship, the question “Do you like me?” If I insist on maintaining an extrinsic posture of maximum detachment and suspicion, it’s very likely I will forfeit the chance of a positive answer/outcome.
(4) One does not deduce their way
a priori to the experience of empathy, romance, sexual attraction, artistic inspiration, or grief. Yet these are rightly accepted as legitimate domains of human experience, entered into intrinsically, and reflected upon by reason. On the other hand, the encounter with God in religious experience which enters consciousness in the same way–i.e., one does not deduce their way to it, but experiences it as a datum in life–is rejected
a priori and not tested in a manner consistent with its subject matter, intrinsically and phenomenologically as a participant observer, and then adjudicated by reason. This seems to be a double standard.
(5) It seems that inherent in the extrinsicist method when used alone is the position that “it is better to risk the loss of truth than to make an error.” I don’t see that this is more reasonable than “better to risk making some errors than to lose whole domains of truth and reality.”
So testing as a participant observer would be the true empiricism in the subject matter of religion.