Justice

[Oreoracle]

I don’t think so. When we claim that “this particular evil shouldn’t be” it is saying that “something else should be.” Like, when we say, “This man shouldn’t be blind” we are saying “This man should have sight.”

I’m not sure if that’s an accurate analogy. In the latter situation, you only have two options. As I’ve demonstrated (hopefully), we have three options in ethics, and an unsubstantiated dismissal of the “neutral” option will result in a false dichotomy.

I know that “nothingness” or negative terms do not exist in reality … but they exist in the mind are have a foundation in reality.

Fair enough.

If they didn’t have a foundation in reality, we couldn’t talk about them at all. Yet, you are making claims about them … so it must have some foundation in reality. Just as “sightlessness” doesn’t exist in reality (because it’s a negative term) it exists only in the mind but says something about reality, for it is true in circumstances that “this person does not have sight” and hence he has “sightlessness.” Does that make sense?

Yes, but notice that sightlessness is a state of lacking, and so it is the quality of lacking the quality of sight. This is certainly a mental construct based on an objective quality, but is not an objective quality itself. (Meaning that a blind man does not contract sightlessness but merely loses sight. We can say it differently, but that’s just wordplay.)

But we can say that by his inaction, he has become an evil person (or at least, less good, or something to that effect). Thus, inaction can be condemned. Otherwise, why call that man evil? It is because of his particular inaction in this circumstance.

Keep in mind that my perspective is based on consequentialism, and so I don’t think the morality of character has a place in ethics per se. But I think what you’ve said is important, and I agree that inaction is indicative of an evil character at times. But since inaction is caused by having an evil character, and not the other way around, I’m not sure how you conclude that being active improves character (if that’s what you’re saying).

This changes the argument, of course. Instead of saying, “I should not stand idle when another is in danger” we would say, “I should want to help another who is in danger.” We’re making a judgment about character and not inaction. Inaction is just an acid test for one’s personality, if you will, and isn’t what is being valuated.

Failing to produce what you are obligated to do would be bad. However, heroic or supererogatory actions are not obligatory but beyond the call of duty. So … what’s your question?

How exactly would it be bad? Would it reveal bad character? It certainly couldn’t produce bad consequences. As for the bad consequences that are allowed by inaction, they would be what is bad, and not the inaction.

I think we agree on quite a lot, we’re just looking at it differently.

Hmm … I don’t. If someone is constantly trying to do something good but the circumstances prevent him from accomplishing it, I would consider him to have a “good character.”

But aren’t you imagining what consequences would follow if the person succeeded? Let’s clarify: A good character wants to do good and attempts to do good, so how do we judge what a good action is? If the consequences play a part, then the definition of a “good character” would be at least partially dependent on consequences.

That’s what I would say … I wonder if that made any sense.

I agreed with you, minus the parts where you said “objective morality.” But that’s a whole other debate.