Kalam?

[Perplexity]

The objection I’ll raise to Kalam here has to do with the philosophy of time, not with theism or atheism. So, I hope this thread doesn’t turn into a discussion on either, pretty much anyone could lodge this objection against Kalam (Jews, Muslims, Pagans, Christians etc.)

On the A-theory of time, when something comes into being at time t, things are, at t, otherwise than they were before. That is, once something begins to exist, something changes: a new object comes into existence. This seems beyond reasonable dispute. How can x come into being at t if nothing changes when it does, as if it had always existed?

But, this odd claim is exactly how we’d have to understand the universe’s beginning to exist on A-theory.

I mean, if we agree with the mutakallim’s understanding of the universe’s beginning to exist anyways. That is, if there really was an absolute singularity: time itself along with matter and energy ‘begin’ at the universe’s earliest state, and we assume A-theory, we get an absurdity.

We’d be saying on the one hand that the universe literally came into being at some time t, but on the other saying the universe has never failed to exist at any time.

I think it’s clear why we’d be saying the former, and we’d be saying the latter because if time itself, along with matter and energy, are exactly the same age as the universe, then at every single point in time, the universe has existed: the universe is eternal (in the relevant sense).

It strikes me as incoherent to say an eternal thing came into being at a certain time.

But, we can easily make sense of the universe beginning to exist on B-theory: the earliest or first state of the universe is the beginning of the universe in the same way the first segment on a line is the beginning of that line. So, it seems to me that in order to make sense of the beginning of the universe, we need to adopt B-theory.

But, as Bill Craig says:

“From start to finish, the kalam cosmological argument is predicated upon the A-Theory of time. On a B-Theory of time, the universe does not in fact come into being or become actual at the Big Bang; it just exists tenselessly as a four-dimensional space-time block that is finitely extended in the earlier than direction. If time is tenseless, then the universe never really comes into being, and, therefore, the quest for a cause of its coming into being is misconceived. Although G.W.F. Leibniz’s question, Why is there (tenselessly) something rather than nothing?, should still rightly be asked, there would be no reason to look for a cause of the universe’s beginning to exist, since on tenseless theories of time the universe did not begin to exist in virtue of its having a first event anymore than a meter stick begins to exist in virtue of having a first centimeter.” - Craig, William Lane., and James Porter Moreland. The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology. Chichester, U.K.: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009. pp. 183-84.

Nobody really objects to Kalam on the grounds that B-theory is true 'cause the philosophy of time is just so speculative, what’s the point? That’s why this objection strikes me as pretty avant garde: not only is it using the philosophy of time against the Kalam, it’s using Kalam’s strength (its scientific appeals to the Big Bang) to do it!

 

[johnnyjones]

Nothing comes from nothing. That has been demonstrated over and over. Numerous speculative arguments constantly arise with the hope that everything can finally be explained.
A non-theist embraces infinite matter because that’s all he/she has. A theist sees the complexity and realizes the odds of a fully functional universe “popping up” demanding something greater. The intricacies of life are too great. To think that even a simple cell could could just “be” with no cause is incredibly far reaching. A design demands a designer.

 

[Perplexity]

Nothing comes from nothing. That has been demonstrated over and over. Numerous speculative arguments constantly arise with the hope that everything can finally be explained.
A non-theist embraces infinite matter because that’s all he/she has. A theist sees the complexity and realizes the odds of a fully functional universe “popping up” demanding something greater. The intricacies of life are too great. To think that even a simple cell could could just “be” with no cause is incredibly far reaching. A design demands a designer.

How is ‘from nothing comes nothing’ relevant to kalam though? Well, it’s only relevant if the universe came. If you can show that the universe literally came into being at some time, then you could say it couldn’t have come from nothing. But, as I argued in the OP, it’s simply incoherent (to me at least) to say something that’s never failed to exist came into a being at some point.

 

[johnnyjones]

How is ‘from nothing comes nothing’ relevant to kalam though? Well, it’s only relevant if the universe came. If you can show that the universe literally came into being at some time, then you could say it couldn’t have come from nothing. But, as I argued in the OP, it’s simply incoherent (to me at least) to say something that’s never failed to exist came into a being at some point.

I see your point but “coming” or “came” outside of eternal are everyday words. To me, and those are the key words, from what is revealed around us, starting points must be. There had to be a beginning of the material universe. Why?, because as I said, everything on this Earth needs to start somewhere. Why don’t we use that as a reasonable reference.

It is clearer to me that physical things need an origin and that seems to be regularly demonstrated. Something (God) outside of that would not require origin because there is nothing to reference.

 

[Nimzovik]

Well considering the above - we may just as well use the word God in place of Uni(Multi) verse/time. Shall we start there gentlemen?

Good luck to you all.

 

[johnnyjones]

Well considering the above - we may just as well use the word God in place of Uni(Multi) verse/time. Shall we start there gentlemen?

Good luck to you all.

If your referencing me your reading it wrong. God has no origin, where as I believe the universe does have a beginning. It has a beginning because there is a God that made it. God and the universe are not one.

 

[Alberti_Devoveo]

On the A-theory of time, when something comes into being at time t, things are, at t, otherwise than they were before. That is, once something begins to exist, something changes: a new object comes into existence. This seems beyond reasonable dispute. How can x come into being at t if nothing changes when it does, as if it had always existed?

Why would nothing change at time t when something is created? That makes no sense.

I mean, if we agree with the mutakallim’s understanding of the universe’s beginning to exist anyways. That is, if there really was an absolute singularity: time itself along with matter and energy ‘begin’ at the universe’s earliest state, and we assume A-theory, we get an absurdity.

If you accept A-theory as you have defined it, one might get an absurdity. But who says that A-theory is even physical? Or intelligent?

But, as Bill Craig says:

“From start to finish, the kalam cosmological argument is predicated upon the A-Theory of time. On a B-Theory of time, the universe does not in fact come into being or become actual at the Big Bang; it just exists tenselessly as a four-dimensional space-time block that is finitely extended in the earlier than direction. If time is tenseless, then the universe never really comes into being, and, therefore, the quest for a cause of its coming into being is misconceived. Although G.W.F. Leibniz’s question, Why is there (tenselessly) something rather than nothing?, should still rightly be asked, there would be no reason to look for a cause of the universe’s beginning to exist, since on tenseless theories of time the universe did not begin to exist in virtue of its having a first event anymore than a meter stick begins to exist in virtue of having a first centimeter.” - Craig, William Lane., and James Porter Moreland. The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology. Chichester, U.K.: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009. pp. 183-84.

Bill Craig does not seem to understand the theory of general relativity. Space & time are one 4-manifold. Suggesting that time existed before space existed is absurd and wrong.

Nobody really objects to Kalam on the grounds that B-theory is true 'cause the philosophy of time is just so speculative, what’s the point? That’s why this objection strikes me as pretty avant garde: not only is it using the philosophy of time against the Kalam, it’s using Kalam’s strength (its scientific appeals to the Big Bang) to do it!

What objection?

 

[danserr]

But, this odd claim is exactly how we’d have to understand the universe’s beginning to exist on A-theory.

I mean, if we agree with the mutakallim’s understanding of the universe’s beginning to exist anyways. That is, if there really was an absolute singularity: time itself along with matter and energy ‘begin’ at the universe’s earliest state, and we assume A-theory, we get an absurdity.

We’d be saying on the one hand that the universe literally came into being at some time t, but on the other saying the universe has never failed to exist at any time.

I think it’s clear why we’d be saying the former, and we’d be saying the latter because if time itself, along with matter and energy, are exactly the same age as the universe, then at every single point in time, the universe has existed: the universe is eternal (in the relevant sense).

It strikes me as incoherent to say an eternal thing came into being at a certain time.

I think you may be equivocating on the meaning of the word “eternal.” When you say:

if time itself, along with matter and energy, are exactly the same age as the universe, then at every single point in time, the universe has existed: the universe is eternal (in the relevant sense).

You are using “eternal” to mean “the universe has existed for as long as time has existed.”

But the word “eternal” could also be used (and I think is typically used by the proponent of the Kalam) to mean “beginning-less.”

Now when you say:

It strikes me as incoherent to say an eternal thing came into being at a certain time.

I would probably agree, but you seem to be assuming a meaning of eternal in the sense of “has existed as long as time has existed.” On this sense, you can plausibly hold that the above statement is absurd.

But, I think if we assume a more appropriate understanding of eternal as “without beginning” then we see that the Kalam and A theory of time in no way entail that the universe is eternal. This means that the proponet of the Kalam is not forced in the absurd position of saying that an eternal universe came into being at a certain time.

So, I agree that there is no time at which the universe did not exist, but it does not follow that the universe is eternal in the sense relevant to the Kalam argument, ie that is is beginning-less.

 

[Nimzovik]

If your referencing me your reading it wrong. God has no origin, where as I believe the universe does have a beginning. It has a beginning because there is a God that made it. God and the universe are not one.

Hmmmmmmmm… Methinks that many of the stated dynamics referencing begining of time / universe have a degree of being parallel.

 

[Perplexity]

danserr: You say that you would

probably agree

that it’s absurd to say ‘x has existed as long as time but came into being at t’ (my paraphrase).

This seems to be what Kalam is asking you to believe though. On the one hand, it says that the universe is just as old as time is. On the other, it says the universe came into being at the first moment of time. So, if I’ve understood correctly, you seem to be agreeing with me that Kalam commits us to an absurdity.

To clarify on the equivocation issue, I think while the mutakallim and I might be using the word ‘eternal’ in different senses, my objection to the Kalam doesn’t rest on that equivocation.

It seems to me that the problem is in saying that the universe has never failed to exist at any point in time, had a beginning, and that we should understand its beginning temporally.

The first claim sounds perfectly intelligible to me. The second (that the universe had a beginning) is only intelligible to me in so far as we understand it as a spatial beginning. (i.e., like the first segment of a line). That’s what I struggle with: what it would even mean to say something that’s never failed to exist came into being.

 

[inocente]

But, as Bill Craig says:

“From start to finish, the kalam cosmological argument is predicated upon the A-Theory of time. On a B-Theory of time, the universe does not in fact come into being or become actual at the Big Bang; it just exists tenselessly as a four-dimensional space-time block that is finitely extended in the earlier than direction. If time is tenseless, then the universe never really comes into being, and, therefore, the quest for a cause of its coming into being is misconceived. Although G.W.F. Leibniz’s question, Why is there (tenselessly) something rather than nothing?, should still rightly be asked, there would be no reason to look for a cause of the universe’s beginning to exist, since on tenseless theories of time the universe did not begin to exist in virtue of its having a first event anymore than a meter stick begins to exist in virtue of having a first centimeter.” - Craig, William Lane., and James Porter Moreland. The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology. Chichester, U.K.: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009. pp. 183-84.

Nobody really objects to Kalam on the grounds that B-theory is true 'cause the philosophy of time is just so speculative, what’s the point? That’s why this objection strikes me as pretty avant garde: not only is it using the philosophy of time against the Kalam, it’s using Kalam’s strength (its scientific appeals to the Big Bang) to do it!

Stephen Hawking’s “no boundary proposal” may also apply.

In quantum mechanics, time is treated as having two components, call them X-time and Y-time (the proper terms in complex numbers are real and imaginary, but those words can be very confusing).

X-time is time as we see it, with a past and a future. Y-time runs at right-angles to X-time and is more like another dimension of space. (X-time sounds a bit like A-theory, and Y-time like B-theory, although I get easily confused there).

Hawking applied this to the universe. X-time (what we think of as regular time) starts in a singularity at the big bang, and this a problem because in a singularity spacetime is infinitely curved and physics breaks down. But Hawking gets round this by adding in Y-time, in Y-time there is no beginning, and so no singularity either. An analogy is that in Y-time the big bang is like the north pole, it’s just a point on the Y-time surface.

In Y-time the universe has no beginning and so doesn’t need a cause, which kind of blows kalam out of the water. Hawking may be right or wrong (in any case we don’t yet know whether X- and Y-time is just a mathematical trick or is how time actually works), but it indicates that the kalam argument may rely on us just not having a very good understanding of time.

 

[danserr]

danserr: You say that you would agree that it’s absurd to say ‘x has existed as long as time but came into being at t’ (my paraphrase).

This seems to be what Kalam is asking you to believe though. On the one hand, it says that the universe is just as old as time is. On the other, it says the universe came into being at the first moment of time. So, if I’ve understood correctly, you seem to be agreeing with me that Kalam commits us to an absurdity.

.

The problem, though, is your paraphrase, since it changes the meaning of what I said.
For instance, I did not say that I agreed with the statement you just made. I do not think that is necessarily absurd.

I said that I would agree that:

It strikes me as incoherent to say an eternal thing came into being at a certain time

So, here are the two statements that you are interpreting as functionally equivelant:

1. An eternal thing came into being at a certain time. (your direct words)
2. x has existed as long as time but came into being at t’ (your paraphrase of my words).

I find it plausible that 1 is absurd. I thought (and still think) that we are using the word eternal in two different senses.

1. eternal- has existed as long as time as existed.
2. eternal- without beginning

• The second sense is that in which the proponet of the Kalam uses it, but your initial post used it in the first sense. Because of this, you were able to label the universe “eternal” and point to the absurdity of an eternal universe beginning to exist.
• If we understand eternal to mean “beginningless” though, then we are not asked to believe that the universe is eternal at all. We are only asked to believe that it has existed as long as time has, which is perfectly fine.

That’s what I struggle with: what it would even mean to say something that’s never failed to exist came into being.

But time had a beginning too. The universe existed as long as time, but time itself has not existed without beginning. So it is not as if time has always existed, and the universe existed as long as time, but began to exist at a certain time. All you have to believe is that the universe had a beginning, along with time, space, and matter.

 

[Perplexity]

• If we understand eternal to mean “beginningless” though, then we are not asked to believe that the universe is eternal at all. We are only asked to believe that it has existed as long as time has, which is perfectly fine.

That’s what I’m saying is incoherent to me though. I don’t know what it means to say that the universe has existed as long as time has, but that it came into being.

I can understand the universe (and time’s) beginning on B-theory, but it’s beyond me what it’d amount to on A-theory.

 

[Cristiano]

Stephen Hawking’s “no boundary proposal” may also apply.

In quantum mechanics, time is treated as having two components, call them X-time and Y-time (the proper terms in complex numbers are real and imaginary, but those words can be very confusing).

X-time is time as we see it, with a past and a future. Y-time runs at right-angles to X-time and is more like another dimension of space. (X-time sounds a bit like A-theory, and Y-time like B-theory, although I get easily confused there).

Hawking applied this to the universe. X-time (what we think of as regular time) starts in a singularity at the big bang, and this a problem because in a singularity spacetime is infinitely curved and physics breaks down. But Hawking gets round this by adding in Y-time, in Y-time there is no beginning, and so no singularity either. An analogy is that in Y-time the big bang is like the north pole, it’s just a point on the Y-time surface.

In Y-time the universe has no beginning and so doesn’t need a cause, which kind of blows kalam out of the water. Hawking may be right or wrong (in any case we don’t yet know whether X- and Y-time is just a mathematical trick or is how time actually works), but it indicates that the kalam argument may rely on us just not having a very good understanding of time.

 

[Cristiano]

Stephen Hawking’s “no boundary proposal” may also apply.

In quantum mechanics, time is treated as having two components, call them X-time and Y-time (the proper terms in complex numbers are real and imaginary, but those words can be very confusing).

X-time is time as we see it, with a past and a future. Y-time runs at right-angles to X-time and is more like another dimension of space. (X-time sounds a bit like A-theory, and Y-time like B-theory, although I get easily confused there).

Hawking applied this to the universe. X-time (what we think of as regular time) starts in a singularity at the big bang, and this a problem because in a singularity spacetime is infinitely curved and physics breaks down. But Hawking gets round this by adding in Y-time, in Y-time there is no beginning, and so no singularity either. An analogy is that in Y-time the big bang is like the north pole, it’s just a point on the Y-time surface.

In Y-time the universe has no beginning and so doesn’t need a cause, which kind of blows kalam out of the water. Hawking may be right or wrong (in any case we don’t yet know whether X- and Y-time is just a mathematical trick or is how time actually works), but it indicates that the kalam argument may rely on us just not having a very good understanding of time.

I just looking at the statement that I put in bold.
First I think that as you say it can be and it is just a “mathematical trick”. If I understand correctly the idea of using time as a complex number came to be in order to be able to relate the time dependent Schrodinger equation to the Wheeler-DeWitt equation.
Second I think that the second comment in regard to our poor understanding of time could be a logical fallacy, because it simply says that the present definition is wrong and the analysis based on such a definition is wrong. I think that the burden of using a new definition based on reality is quite difficult, it could go well with other assumptions and models but that does not mean that it is real. It is a risky business mixing physics with the general realm of philosophy because physics is subject to much bigger constraints ad if it goes beyond those then it is not physics anymore and it could loose the intellectual support/foundation of the methodology associated with it.

 

[inocente]

I just looking at the statement that I put in bold.
First I think that as you say it can be and it is just a “mathematical trick”. If I understand correctly the idea of using time as a complex number came to be in order to be able to relate the time dependent Schrodinger equation to the Wheeler-DeWitt equation.

Euler’s Identity (e[sup]i π[/sup] + 1 = 0) indicates that i is part of reality, and complex numbers appear to be fundamental in the quantum world. Hawking thinks his idea is more than a trick, but whether he’s right I wouldn’t know.

Second I think that the second comment in regard to our poor understanding of time could be a logical fallacy, because it simply says that the present definition is wrong and the analysis based on such a definition is wrong. I think that the burden of using a new definition based on reality is quite difficult, it could go well with other assumptions and models but that does not mean that it is real. It is a risky business mixing physics with the general realm of philosophy because physics is subject to much bigger constraints ad if it goes beyond those then it is not physics anymore and it could loose the intellectual support/foundation of the methodology associated with it.

The kalam argument brings science into philosophy, or at least in the only form I’ve seen it expressed, e.g. by William Lane Craig:

1. Everything that begins to exist has a cause of its existence.
2. The universe began to exist.
3. Therefore, the universe has a cause of its existence.
4. Since no scientific explanation (in terms of physical laws) can provide a causal account of the origin of the universe, the cause must be personal (explanation is given in terms of a personal agent)

To paraphrase, it’s God unless science knows better.

 

[Serious]

1. Everything that begins to exist has a cause of its existence.
2. The universe began to exist.
3. Therefore, the universe has a cause of its existence.
4. Since no scientific explanation (in terms of physical laws) can provide a causal account of the origin of the universe, the cause must be personal (explanation is given in terms of a personal agent)

1. is based on an inductive observation. Of course that does not make it incorrect, per se, but it does not make it correct either. It is just an unsubstantiated hypothesis. It cannot be elevated to an unquestioned status.
2. is another unsupported hypothesis. No one says that the BB is the “beginning” of the universe, at best it can be said that the current form of the universe started with a singularity.
3. therefore there is no “therefore”.
4. is just a re-iteration of the god-of-the-gaps, which is not an “explanation” at all. It simply says: “an unknowable being using unknowable means made it magically happen”. That is not an “explanation”, it is the admission that explanation is forever impossible.

The Kalam is just as fallacious as all the other arguments for God.

 

[danserr]

That’s what I’m saying is incoherent to me though. I don’t know what it means to say that the universe has existed as long as time has, but that it came into being.

I can understand the universe (and time’s) beginning on B-theory, but it’s beyond me what it’d amount to on A-theory.

Because time began to exist too. I see your question, but I don’t see that there is anything incoherent in saying that time, space, and matter began to exist.

1. is based on an inductive observation. Of course that does not make it incorrect, per se, but it does not make it correct either. It is just an unsubstantiated hypothesis. It cannot be elevated to an unquestioned status.
2. is another unsupported hypothesis. No one says that the BB is the “beginning” of the universe, at best it can be said that the current form of the universe started with a singularity.
3. therefore there is no “therefore”.
4. is just a re-iteration of the god-of-the-gaps, which is not an “explanation” at all. It simply says: “an unknowable being using unknowable means made it magically happen”. That is not an “explanation”, it is the admission that explanation is forever impossible.

The Kalam is just as fallacious as all the other arguments for God.

Your reponse to 1 and 2 seem fairly weak. One is not primarily based on inductive support ,but on the metaphysical intuition that nothing comes from nothing. This is just common sense. It’s like saying that minds other than my own exist or the physical universe has existed for more than 5 minutes. It draws support from inductive observations, but if inductive observations were as weak as you claim, then science itself, which is based on inductive reasoning, would be impossible!

Your response to two shows a misunderstanding of Big Bang Cosmology,
"According to Sandage and Tammann, “Hence, we are forced to decide that . . . it seems inevitable that the Universe will expand forever”; they conclude, therefore, that “the Universe has happened only once.”
from: lan Sandage and G.A. Tammann, “Steps Toward the Hubble Constant. VII,” Astrophyscial Journal 210 (1976): 23, 7

1. is just an absurd caricature. The Kalam does not rely on God in the gaps reasoning, on the contrary, if time, space, and matter began to exist, then a scientific explanation (in terms of laws operating on initial conditions) of the universe is in principle impossible.

 

[Cristiano]

Euler’s Identity (e[sup]i π[/sup] + 1 = 0) indicates that i is part of reality, and complex numbers appear to be fundamental in the quantum world. Hawking thinks his idea is more than a trick, but whether he’s right I wouldn’t know.
…

Euler’s identity does not indicate that “i” is part of reality. I think that here you are mixing the methodology of real and imaginary numbers with the reality of the world. I would also beg to say that there is a difference between saying that imaginary numbers appear to be fundamental in the quantum world and saying that complex numbers are a necessity to handle equations that model the quantum mechanical properties. The introduction of a complex number to represent time is a clear example of the necessity of introducing time in a manner that the basic equation of canonical quantum gravity, the Wheeler-De Witt equation (WDE), is consistent with the time dependent Schrodinger equation. J. B. Barbour Pys. Rev. D 47, 5422 (1993)

 

[inocente]

Euler’s identity does not indicate that “i” is part of reality. I think that here you are mixing the methodology of real and imaginary numbers with the reality of the world. I would also beg to say that there is a difference between saying that imaginary numbers appear to be fundamental in the quantum world and saying that complex numbers are a necessity to handle equations that model the quantum mechanical properties. The introduction of a complex number to represent time is a clear example of the necessity of introducing time in a manner that the basic equation of canonical quantum gravity, the Wheeler-De Witt equation (WDE), is consistent with the time dependent Schrodinger equation. J. B. Barbour Pys. Rev. D 47, 5422 (1993)

I’ve not fallen desperately in love with i or anything, but would think it has the same claim to be real as 0, 1,* e* and π, since they are all related by Euler’s Identity.

And in a more religious vein, without complex numbers we would not have the Mandelbrot set, and without that life would lose all beauty and meaning.

With or without Hawking though, the kalam formulation is vulnerable to science. For example, it’s been argued that time is a product of the big bang, in the sense that the big bang is a recipe and one of the outcomes is time. By this account time has a beginning but the big bang does not (it just is), and so the big bang falls outside the scope of kalam.

Incidentally, that Barbour paper is online at platonia.com/complex_numbers.pdf - I’m not a physicist so my understanding is “lite”.