Kant and Aquinas

[CHRISTINE77]

There is a problem I have found with German philosophers. It’s either they’re against what I believe in (Marx, Feuerbach, Nietzsche) or are incredibly confusing (Hegel, Schopenhauer, Heidegger, Wittgenstein). Kant falls in the latter category, of course. It takes some time to get what he is trying to say, especially about the experience-concept relationship. Laymen would not be able to grasp a thing if they take him by face value. And to be honest, I have never read anything from him because of that reason.

Take Aquinas instead I guess…

I remember reading “Sophie’s World” a while ago, that explained the major philosophers rather well. Unfortunately I don’t remember too much about it, I should re-read it.

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sophie%27s_World

But I agree, German philosophers are really difficult to understand, unlike Plato, Aquinas or even Voltaire.

 

[Charlemagne_III]

But I agree, German philosophers are really difficult to understand, unlike Plato, Aquinas or even Voltaire.

Of those three, Voltaire was always the easiest to understand.

 

[utunumsint]

There is a problem I have found with German philosophers. It’s either they’re against what I believe in (Marx, Feuerbach, Nietzsche) or are incredibly confusing (Hegel, Schopenhauer, Heidegger, Wittgenstein). Kant falls in the latter category, of course. It takes some time to get what he is trying to say, especially about the experience-concept relationship. Laymen would not be able to grasp a thing if they take him by face value. And to be honest, I have never read anything from him because of that reason.

Take Aquinas instead I guess…

Wouldn’t it be amazing if all philosophers were forced to use a consistent vocabulary, or at least provide some kind of translation matrix to Aquinas, Aristotle, Augustine, and Plotinus?

God bless,
Ut

 

[zippy2006]

Having never read any Kant, I find it hard to tell whether he really has succeeded or not…

I was going to ask you what you meant by “The Kantian critique,” but I’m doubtful you yourself know if you have not read Kant, no?

Theophorus’ post here is quite good. Kant follows Hume into an untenable rejection of metaphysics. Granted, the metaphysics they rejected was more Modern than Thomistic. But my question is: why are you worrying about Kant if you have never read him? The Kantian project, like its Humean foundation, is not something that should bother the non-philosopher. Common sense is based on the same Aristotelian metaphysics that Thomism is built on. If you don’t have any reason to believe Kant poses a problem, then don’t believe it. You are essentially asking why you should believe common sense instead of Kant. The onus of proof is backwards. The common person doesn’t even recognize the problem that Kant tried to address as a problem. They are probably quite justified in that.

 

[zippy2006]

Having never read any Kant, I find it hard to tell whether he really has succeeded or not…

Succeeded at what? And what do you mean by “The Kantian critique?” In my opinion, if you haven’t read Kant, you shouldn’t worry about Kant.

There are plenty of Thomists who reject the Humean/Kantian attack on traditional metaphysics.

 

[utunumsint]

Succeeded at what? And what do you mean by “The Kantian critique?” In my opinion, if you haven’t read Kant, you shouldn’t worry about Kant.

There are plenty of Thomists who reject the Humean/Kantian attack on traditional metaphysics.

Did you read the first part of my post?

I am aware of Thomists who reject Hume and Kant. Father Benedict Ashley is one. Ed Feser has a few blog posts that discuss Hume. One of his points, which others seem to have voiced as well is that if you follow Hume’s logic, you need to also reject science itself as a discipline, not just metaphysics.

God bless,
Ut

 

[utunumsint]

I recently bought Ed Feser’s Locke. He briefly mentions that division between the enlightenment thinkers Descartes and his emphasis on innate ideas and Locke’s focus on experience and primarily on sense data as the only source of our knowledge (the mind being tabula rosa). With regard to these two, he mentions this about Kant:

Indeed, Immanuel Kant is famous for his attempt to synthesize the empiricist emphasis on experience and the rationalist emphasis on innate cognitive faculties into a unified theory of knowledge.

Yet empiricists and rationalists needn’t have waited for Kant to see how these elements of their views might be combined. Aquinas and other Aristotelian medieval philosophers were certainly familiar with the idea that “there is nothing in the intellect which is not first in the senses,” as Aristotle put it. But they did not conclude from this that the origin of our concepts can be entirely explained in terms of processes like abstraction.

I find it interesting how the attempt to break off into purely rationalistic or empiricist directions created problems for how to unify these two streams of thinking that could have been avoided had we stayed with the traditional Aristotelian/Thomistic ways of thinking.

God bless,
Ut

 

[Patty23]

Because I am not familiar with Kant and much of modern philosophy, could you confirm, if you know whether these ideas can be mapped to the problem of universals?

Anselm was a realist about words. He believed, I think, that to have the concept implies, somehow, the reality of that concept as well. Thus his ontological argument.

Aristotle was a moderate realist, who believed that forms exists in matter, but they also exist in another mode in our mind. But that form, in the abstraction of our minds, corresponds to the real form in the physical universe.

Peter Abelard was interesting because his conceptualism, based only on Porphyry, actually was very close to Aristotle’s moderate realism and Aquinas perferred him to Aristotle on this topic.

Add to this group, another group of skeptics who believed that our words and mental concepts were mere flatulence from our mouths and did not necessarily correspond to reality at all. I forget what this group were called.

Going back to Kant, then, what he did was to introduce a skeptical gap between the our words and what we know (the neumena), and the external world (phenomena). Our a priori innate ideas actually prevent us from knowing (or cannot help us in knowing) phenomena as they really are.

Furthermore, if I understand you correctly, Heidegger sort of flips that around on Kant. We are phenomena, for Heidegger, or part of the phenomenal world. There is no neumena for him. This position sort of gels well with Aristotle’s moderate realism or Abelard’s conceptualism.

Does that make sense?

God bless,
Ut

Well, actually the “Noumea” is not the what we know, it is what the thing-is-in itself as opposed to “Phenomena” which is the thing-as-it-appears to be.

 

[Nihilist]

Part of the problem is that there is no single agreement as to the understanding of Kant- both Hegel and Schopenhauer believed they understood him, but with very different views. Most of the ‘understanding’ of Kant is simply knowledge of definition of Kantian terminology.

What was Kant actually saying- most of the idea thrown around in connection with him (a idealistic nature of sapce and time, the inaccessibility of noumena, the possibility of sythentic a priori knowledge), are actually contained in the introduction and first chapter of the COPR.

 

[Charlemagne_III]

It is good to be sure of one’s faith, but unless you are a top of the line physicist, astronomer, cosmologist, etc., you aren’t qualified to make pronouncements on such complex processes as if they were fact. What the final scientific word will be on this universe is impossible to know right now, but technology is getting us closer.

You haven’t figured out yet that there will be no final scientific word?

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Thank you all for responding.

To give you some context, I have been reading a lot from Aristotelian Thomists like Father Benedict Ashley’s The Way Toward Wisdom. morec.com/nature/ashley.htm He believes his brand of Thomism is immune from Kantian critique because he proposes that the fundamental metaphysical truths about the existence of God can be found a posteriori from empirical causes to immaterial effects. He criticizes Thomists like Gilson and Maritain on this score (not on others) for the stance they take in trying to make Metaphysics completely independent of science. His argument is that Aristotle proved the need for an immaterial prime mover in his physics (based on faulty science, but that did not invalidate his conclusion). Aristotles metaphysics, and by extension, Aquinas' metaphysics rested on this notion arrived at a posteriori. He believes that by rejecting any link with science, Gilson and to a lesser extent, Maritain, opened themselves up to Kantian critique such as would be leveled against Anselms ontological argument.

Having never read any Kant, I find it hard to tell whether he really has succeeded or not. I am hoping that reading Kant is not a complete waste of time though. I get the impression from the folks who have posted so far that there isn’t much to write home about with regard to his writings.

Thank you.

God bless,
Ut

I think Kant has pretty well been discredited. At your time of life, why not just stick with Thomas? I find he is challenging enough and true enough that I have no time for any one else.

Linus2nd

 

[thinkandmull]

Einstein liked Hume and Kant. Didn’t Aquinas also believe there is a difference between the appearance of things and their substance? Very Kantian?

 

[Skeptic92]

I am wondering if there is anyone out there who has read and understood Kant, but who still believes that Thomistic metaphysics is valid?

How did you come to this conclusion?

God bless,
Ut

Etienne Gilson in the Unity of the Philosophical Experience (I believe that’s the title) addresses Kant. It should be noted, however, that Kant doesn’t address Scholastic Metaphysics, and his criticisms in the Critique of Pure Reason do not touch Thomistic Metaphysics. Kants critique only takes aim at Wolfian metaphysics, which was essentially rationalism.

 

[thinkandmull]

In the Critique of Pure Reason he attacks the belief that you can have ANY knowledge of spiritual realities.

I want to read his Metaphysical Foundation for Natural Science!

 

[Charlemagne_III]

We know pretty much for a fact that Kant was close to Aquinas on moral philosophy. Kant was certainly no moral relativist, and his espousal of the Categorical Imperative set him squarely against the Utilitiarians, making him again closer to Aquinas than to the moderns.

Kant’s argument for why we should believe in the existence of God bears no resemblance to any proof of Aquinas.

At some points in his writing he is about as difficult to grasp as Aquinas, and you really need a talented interpreter to get the message.

The great Catholic philosopher Jacques Maritain once came down from his study to join his wife for a meal, mostly complaining of the headache he had just gotten from reading Kant.

 

[CatholicWhovian]

I just had an insight about Kant and Aquinas after reading a assigned reading about the nature of international relations.

The language Kant uses to explain his points sounds legalistic - “categorical imperative, definitive article, critique, groundwork, etc.” whereas Aquinas explains in the form of objections to his ideas and countering them.

 

[Nihilist]

May I give some advice-
Don’t read commentaries. A lot of commentaries say things like “Kant mtaphysics is compatible with Thomistic realism”, etc., without any actual substantiation.

The only way to understand Kant is to read the original. But this is hard. You need to read and consider carefully each sentence, and make sure you understand it before you go to the next. You cannot leave out any section of his works. If you pick a page at random, it won’t make sense (or will be misleading) except in the context of the definitions and demonstrations that have gone before it.

It is also a good idea to make your own dictionary of Kantian terminology as you go.

On top of that, he is hard to translate. We get words like ‘intuition’, ‘transcendental’, etc. used in senses completely different to the colloquial sense, but rather connect more directly with the Latin etymology of the words.

One good thing about Kant, though, is he doesn’t make much reference to the writings of others. Another thing is that what he writes is never ‘quasi-mystical’ (like Derrida), but always absolutely logical, although, quoted out of context or read lightly, it can sound as such.

Reading Kant, for me, goes about four times more slowly than reading Heidegger, and about 10 times slower than reading Locke, Hume or Berkeley. Its more like reading Euclid, and needs to be understood with the same thoroughness of a such a work.

 

[Patty23]

Einstein liked Hume and Kant. Didn’t Aquinas also believe there is a difference between the appearance of things and their substance? Very Kantian?

Yes, Aquinas made a distinction between appearance “accidents” and substance. But the main difference with Kant is Aquinas held that the intellect can know the essences of things while Kant held that we cannot know things-as-they-are in themselves. Meaning we cannot know things and leaves us still with skepticism.

As for God, Kant held that knowledge about God cannot be known since knowledge of God is beyond our senses. He’s motive for believing in God is only to preserve ethics.

 

[utunumsint]

I have noticed some action on this thread. I just wanted to give an update on my research. I picked up a book by Gilson “Methodical Realism: A Handbook for Beginning Realists”. It outlines Gilson’s case against Descarte, Kant, and Berkley (basically against Idealists) and his case for realism. A sampling of his final case in chapter 5 in defining methodical realism and his attack on idealism are as follows:

1. 
   *]Step1.1 Recognize that one has always been a realist. Step 1.2 However one tries to think differently, one can’t. Step 1.3 All those who claim differently, think as realists as soon as they forget to act the part. When one asks oneself why, one’s conversion to realism is all but complete.
   *]All idealists objections to realism are formulated on idealist terms. If you accept those terms, they always win. A realist should basically refuse to play their game.
   *]Idealists think, while realists know. For a realist, thought is not first. Thought is impossible without their first being knowledge to think about. Because the idealist goes from thought to things, they cannot know whether their thought corresponds to reality or not. When, therefore, the idealist asks the realist how starting from thought they can rejoin the object, the realist should respond that it is impossible. Realists, rather, start from knowledge, with an act of the intellect which consists essentially in grasping an object.
   *]Knowledge, for the realist, is the lived and experienced unity of an intellect with an apprehended reality. Without the thing in itself, there would be no knowledge.
   *]We do not have to go from thought to things (because that is impossible). A something beyong thought may be unthinkable, but it is certain that all knowledge implied a something beyond thought. Idealists always confuse “being which is given in thought” with being which is given by thought".
   *]The idealist says "You define true knowledge as an adequate copy of reality. But how can you know that the copy reproduces the thing as it is in itself, seeing that the thing is only given to you in thought. " The objection has no meaning except for idealism, which posits thought before being, and finding itself no longer able to compare the former with the latter, wonders how anyone else can. The realist, on the contrary, does not have to ask himself whether things do or do not conform to his knowledge of them, because for him knowledge consists in his assimilating his knowledge of things. In a system where the bringing of the intellect into accord with the thing, which the judgement formulates, presupposes the concrete and lived accord of the intellect with its objects, it would be absurd to expect knowledge to guarantee a conformity without which it would not exists.
   *]For the realist, there is no noumenon as the realist understands the term. Since knowledge presupposes the presence to the intellect of the thing itself, there is no reason to assume, behind the thing in thought, the presence of a mysterious and unknowable duplicate, which would be the thing of the thing in thought. Knowing is not apprehending a thing as it is in thought, but, in and through thought, apprehending the thing as it is.
   *]If we go deeper into the nature of the object given to us, we direct ourselves toward one of the sciences, which will be completed by a metaphysics of nature. If we go deeper into the conditions under which the object is given us, we shall be turning towards a psychology, which will reach completion in a metaphysics of knowledge. Like the idealist, he uses his power of reflection, but keeping it within the limits of a reality given from without. Therefore the starting point of his reflections has to be being, which in effect is for us the beginning of knowledge: res sunt.
   *]Etc… Basically he rejects that the cogito can be the starting point of knowledge. Rather Res sunt, ergo cognosco, ergo sum res cognoscens [Things exist, therefore I know, therefore I am a knowing subject.]
   
   God bless,
   Ut

 

[thinkandmull]

Yes, Aquinas made a distinction between appearance “accidents” and substance. But the main difference with Kant is Aquinas held that the intellect can know the essences of things while Kant held that we cannot know things-as-they-are in themselves. Meaning we cannot know things and leaves us still with skepticism.

As for God, Kant held that knowledge about God cannot be known since knowledge of God is beyond our senses. He’s motive for believing in God is only to preserve ethics.

Thomas Aquinas says that we can’t understand things as they truly are, but merely according to the “mode of the intellect”. Sounds just like Kant. As with the Eucharest, you can’t see the substance. Doesn’t sound like common sense, as Chesterton claimed it was