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DaveBj
Guest
On the contrary, it is a new series. It was 10 years in the making, but the premier was last month.
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Dwyer
Guest
Catholic Chaplin Major Charles J. Watters 173d Support Battalion, 173d Airborne was also posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor at Hill 875.
https://www.fold3.com/page/638045691-charles-joseph-watters/photos
http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/chaplain-charles-watters-receives-medal-of-honor
PFC John Andrew Barnes III, C Co, 1st Battalion, 503d Infantry, 173d Airborne was also posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor at Hill 875
http://corregidor.org/heritage_battalion/moh/barnes.html
(Burns and Novick highlighted Pfc. Carlos Lozada being posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor at Hill 875 but did not mentioned Chaplin Major Watters or Private First Class Barnes being posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor at Hill 875).
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carlos_Lozada
https://www.fold3.com/page/638045691-charles-joseph-watters/photos
http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/chaplain-charles-watters-receives-medal-of-honor
PFC John Andrew Barnes III, C Co, 1st Battalion, 503d Infantry, 173d Airborne was also posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor at Hill 875
http://corregidor.org/heritage_battalion/moh/barnes.html
(Burns and Novick highlighted Pfc. Carlos Lozada being posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor at Hill 875 but did not mentioned Chaplin Major Watters or Private First Class Barnes being posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor at Hill 875).
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carlos_Lozada
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7_Sorrows
Guest
Thank you. I thought this was a new one, but I was thinking PBS had shown another series on the war in Viet Nam.7_Sorrows:
On the contrary, it is a new series. It was 10 years in the making, but the premier was last month.
The Vietnam War (TV series) - Wikipedia
I finally got to watch the first two episodes last night. It seems like it was a trade off between leaving South Korea and getting involved in Viet Nam instead. These wars in foreign cultures like Asia and the Middle East are not like wars fought in Europe. We always seem at a disadvantage no matter how noble our reasons are for trying to help.
We should have learned from the French in Indochina like we should have learned from
the Russians in Afghanistan.
It doesn’t portray the Catholic leader in a good way.
I kind of fell asleep at the end of episode 2.
Did they show the assassination of the leader of Viet Nam and President Kennedy or will that be episode 3?
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DaveBj
Guest
They didn’t show the assassination of President Kennedy, but they did refer to it. They did show the aftermath of the assassinations of South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother.
Edit to add: The LBJ era is covered thru Ep 6, which I watched last night. There are a lot of taped conversations played between LBJ and some of his top advisors, and I was continually amazed at the banality of these men.
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MonteRCMS
Guest
Is “banality” really the most appropriate word???
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DaveBj
Guest
It’s the word that occurred to me. From the Google dictionary: synonyms: triteness, vapidity, staleness, unimaginativeness, lack of originality, prosaicness, dullness.
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7_Sorrows
Guest
I guess I fell asleep during those parts then.7_Sorrows:
They didn’t show the assassination of President Kennedy, but they did refer to it. They did show the aftermath of the assassinations of South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother.
Edit to add: The LBJ era is covered thru Ep 6, which I watched last night. There are a lot of taped conversations played between LBJ and some of his top advisors, and I was continually amazed at the banality of these men.
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tawny
Guest
Just like the US had Diem assassinated with a CIA-backed coup-d’etat.
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MonteRCMS
Guest
Actually, under Ho Chi Minh, assassination was routine government policy.
He killed everyone until there was no one left.
He killed everyone until there was no one left.
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tawny
Guest
It actually started out as a war between the Catholics & the Buddhists going back to the 50’s. The US forgot to heed Charles De Gaulle’s words not to get involved in Indo China.
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Erikaspirit16
Guest
For me, the program brought up a host of questions:
- There is scene after scene of US troops marching up trails and being ambushed. Didn’t it dawn on someone at some point in the 10+ years of combat that maybe marching up trails was a bad idea and an invitation for an ambush? On a recent trip to Australia, where I stayed with a cousin who had been a lieutenant in the Australian army in VN in the mid-60s, I heard a lot about VN and read all the exhibits at all the war museums. The #1 message I got from the Australians was “Why did the stupid Americans march up trails? We kept telling them not to.” (note that all Australian officers receive jungle warfare training and that they fought successful jungle warfare campaigns in New Guinea in WW II and Malaya in the late 50s.)
- Is there some rule that only the Vietcong could set ambushes? Why didn’t the US set ambushes?
- The US seemed to suffer a lot of casualties from land mines. Why didn’t the US lay land mines along various roads they knew the Vietcong were using?
- The US seemed to go out on daily patrols and come back at night if they didn’t engage the enemy. Then they seemed surprised (!) that the Vietcong came at night and terrorized villages, etc. Again, going back to Australia, they seemed bemused by this returning to base at the end of the day. There attitude was that if they held territory, it was held 24 hours a day, not 12.
- the Hill 875 episode, and others like it: OK, so they finally found an enemy force on top of a hill. It seems to me that the US had two obvious advantages: control of the air and the ability to transport troops by helicopter–mobility. So why on earth would you fight–uphill!–a ground battle when you could call in bombers to blast the enemy? And then of course the other obvious question (which came up again and again): why allow them to retreat? Why wouldn’t you use your mobility to surround them and force a surrender?
- They mentioned a couple B-52s were shot down, and I was surprised. I figured they flew out of range. So I looked up “List of Aircraft Losses in the VN War” on Wikipedia. The losses were staggering: 31 (!) B-52s lost; 56 B-57s. Phantom F-4s? 678! Helicopters? I didn’t add them all up, but it looks like easily 6,000. All in all, the US lost over 10,000 aircraft; the South VN lost 2,500. Was there ever an analysis of whether it was worth it? (i.e., would it make sense for an F-4 to bomb a truck?)
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MonteRCMS
Guest
Sigh.
Are you sitting down?
Look up the F-105 Thunderchief.
[Still sitting down?]
Are you sitting down?
Look up the F-105 Thunderchief.
[Still sitting down?]
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Erikaspirit16
Guest
A mere 382 F105s lost. I confess to being astounded. I’m certainly no military expert, but on the other hand, I’ve read a few books and watched a lot of TV. If someone had come along and asked me to guess the numbers lost, I would have guessed well below 10% of the actual totals.
Maybe this is why these things go on forever–no one knows what’s really going on. For example, someone needs to explain to me why it takes 16+ years to “train” Afghan soldiers. I suspect the Taliban do a much better job in a few weeks. Same population. So what’s up?
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MonteRCMS
Guest
Tomorrow.
[Makes me sick.]
[Makes me sick.]
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MonteRCMS
Guest
Later.
But if anyone scrolls up a few posts … [around October 4th …], there are links to writing by F-105 pilots Billy Sparks [at Takhli] and Ed Rasimus [at Korat] who survived the war, but died relatively young … from the accumulated stress.
Visit Google and type in " You Tube Ed Rasimus " …
There is his funeral and “farewell luncheon”.
And a video made by a fellow who survived the war.
But if anyone scrolls up a few posts … [around October 4th …], there are links to writing by F-105 pilots Billy Sparks [at Takhli] and Ed Rasimus [at Korat] who survived the war, but died relatively young … from the accumulated stress.
Visit Google and type in " You Tube Ed Rasimus " …
There is his funeral and “farewell luncheon”.
And a video made by a fellow who survived the war.
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MonteRCMS
Guest
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MonteRCMS
Guest
http://www.talkingproud.us/Military/Military/F105.html
excerpts:
While Rolling Thunder was initially advertised as an eight-week bombing campaign that would force the North to give up, it developed into what became known as a strategy of “gradualism,” the complete antithesis of what General Curtis Lemay, the CSAF and his senior generals saw as the proper use of airpower.
The Air Force at this point in its evolution was immersed in strategic bombardment, some called Lemay’s “hard-knock.” Many knew Lemay as “Bombs away with Curt Lemay.” He wanted to pulverize North Vietnam’s strategic targets and was not much interested in coaxing them to lose their will inch by inch.
Momyer … General William W. Momyer commanded the 7th Air Force (7AF) in Vietnam and became General Westmoreland’s air component commander for this theater of warfare. His idea of employment of air power was much like Lemay’s "hard-knock,’ except his plan was referred to as SLAM, a concept for seeking, locating, annihilating, and monitoring the enemy. In a book written by General Momyer, entitled Airpower in three wars, published by the Air University Press in April 2003, General Momeyer makes the following points about Operation Rolling Thunder:
Senior USAF leadership felt the operation was too restrictive and that it should target vital North Vietnamese strategic targets instead of lines of communication.
The USAF wanted an “air strategy focused upon the heart of North Vietnam. But neither the President, the Secretary of State, nor the Secretary of Defense yet conceived of Rolling Thunder as a strategic air offensive … Secretary McNamara still believed that Rolling Thunder should be a limited application of Airpower against logistics targets relatively close to the DMZ. Further, the size and frequency of these strikes, as well as the targets, should be selected in Washington.”
There was no agreed on formal command arrangement for who would control the strikes into North Vietnam. As an aside, Momyer took this on as a major task to fix while commanding 7th AF, and he finally became the air component commander for all air forces, though tensions always remained between the USAF and Navy-Marines.
Instead, a Rolling Thunder Coordinating Committee controlled air operations during the 1965–1968 bombing campaign … “The Rolling Thunder Coordinating Committee could not do the job.”
This was most surely a recipe for disaster - warfare by committee.
excerpts:
While Rolling Thunder was initially advertised as an eight-week bombing campaign that would force the North to give up, it developed into what became known as a strategy of “gradualism,” the complete antithesis of what General Curtis Lemay, the CSAF and his senior generals saw as the proper use of airpower.
The Air Force at this point in its evolution was immersed in strategic bombardment, some called Lemay’s “hard-knock.” Many knew Lemay as “Bombs away with Curt Lemay.” He wanted to pulverize North Vietnam’s strategic targets and was not much interested in coaxing them to lose their will inch by inch.
Momyer … General William W. Momyer commanded the 7th Air Force (7AF) in Vietnam and became General Westmoreland’s air component commander for this theater of warfare. His idea of employment of air power was much like Lemay’s "hard-knock,’ except his plan was referred to as SLAM, a concept for seeking, locating, annihilating, and monitoring the enemy. In a book written by General Momyer, entitled Airpower in three wars, published by the Air University Press in April 2003, General Momeyer makes the following points about Operation Rolling Thunder:
Senior USAF leadership felt the operation was too restrictive and that it should target vital North Vietnamese strategic targets instead of lines of communication.
The USAF wanted an “air strategy focused upon the heart of North Vietnam. But neither the President, the Secretary of State, nor the Secretary of Defense yet conceived of Rolling Thunder as a strategic air offensive … Secretary McNamara still believed that Rolling Thunder should be a limited application of Airpower against logistics targets relatively close to the DMZ. Further, the size and frequency of these strikes, as well as the targets, should be selected in Washington.”
There was no agreed on formal command arrangement for who would control the strikes into North Vietnam. As an aside, Momyer took this on as a major task to fix while commanding 7th AF, and he finally became the air component commander for all air forces, though tensions always remained between the USAF and Navy-Marines.
Instead, a Rolling Thunder Coordinating Committee controlled air operations during the 1965–1968 bombing campaign … “The Rolling Thunder Coordinating Committee could not do the job.”
This was most surely a recipe for disaster - warfare by committee.
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MonteRCMS
Guest
excerpt (continued)
The F-105 in the early years of the war was flying about 75 percent of the Air Force’s attack missions into North Vietnam, largely because the USAF did not want to risk the B-52 strategic bomber, which had to be protected for the nuclear strike mission against the Soviet Union. While the Thuds did enormous damage to the North Vietnamese war machine, they took a severe beating. The USAF bought about 600 F-105Ds. As of early 1967, there were only about 300 left. About 350 F-105s were lost to combat. Most of these, 312, were lost to anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) and surface-to-air missiles (SAM). Most of these were lost to AAA. North Vietnamese MiGs claimed 22 F-105 kills. In 1966 alone, the year we lost Captain Leetun, 126 Thuds were lost, 103 to AAA.
One problem was that the F-105 formations flew every day at roughly the same time, using roughly the same flight routes, and the same callsigns. So the enemy was waiting for them. It was calculated that an F-105 pilot stood only a 75 percent chance of surviving 100 missions over North Vietnam.
In order to give you a sense for the job undertaken by the F-105 pilot and his machine, we want to present a few USAF photos of them in combat over North Vietnam. They were provided courtesy of “Ralph H. via Paul Jarvis,” and presented on a page entitled, “388th TFW F-105 Thunderchiefs over Vietnam:” Remember, there is an American pilot in those cockpits!
The F-105 in the early years of the war was flying about 75 percent of the Air Force’s attack missions into North Vietnam, largely because the USAF did not want to risk the B-52 strategic bomber, which had to be protected for the nuclear strike mission against the Soviet Union. While the Thuds did enormous damage to the North Vietnamese war machine, they took a severe beating. The USAF bought about 600 F-105Ds. As of early 1967, there were only about 300 left. About 350 F-105s were lost to combat. Most of these, 312, were lost to anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) and surface-to-air missiles (SAM). Most of these were lost to AAA. North Vietnamese MiGs claimed 22 F-105 kills. In 1966 alone, the year we lost Captain Leetun, 126 Thuds were lost, 103 to AAA.
One problem was that the F-105 formations flew every day at roughly the same time, using roughly the same flight routes, and the same callsigns. So the enemy was waiting for them. It was calculated that an F-105 pilot stood only a 75 percent chance of surviving 100 missions over North Vietnam.
In order to give you a sense for the job undertaken by the F-105 pilot and his machine, we want to present a few USAF photos of them in combat over North Vietnam. They were provided courtesy of “Ralph H. via Paul Jarvis,” and presented on a page entitled, “388th TFW F-105 Thunderchiefs over Vietnam:” Remember, there is an American pilot in those cockpits!
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MonteRCMS
Guest
Yeah, so they sent the QRC-160 jammer pods back to the factory … figuring they were a waste of time.
Many losses later, they asked for the QRC-160 pods back.
F-105 Wild Weasel vs SA-2 ‘Guideline’ SAM
The Vietnam war was the first conflict that saw extensive use of surface-to-air anti-aircraft missiles, and thus became a training ground for the tactics of this new type of battle. This Duel presents this story in the context of two of the main opponents: America's top fighter-bomber and the...
books.google.com
Many losses later, they asked for the QRC-160 pods back.
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MonteRCMS
Guest
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a440196.pdf
excerpt:
p. 119:
Washington’s prohibition against MiG base attacks lasted until April 1967 when the North Vietnamese Air Force began large-scale attacks on Air Force and Navy Rolling Thunder aircraft and could no longer be ignored. Until then, the services were frustrated that they were not allowed to strike more important military targets. The Washington-imposed strictures highlighted the widely divergent viewpoints of high civilian officials and military commanders, with the former clearly reluctant to permit air strikes that might be considered unduly provocative.47
excerpt:
p. 119:
Washington’s prohibition against MiG base attacks lasted until April 1967 when the North Vietnamese Air Force began large-scale attacks on Air Force and Navy Rolling Thunder aircraft and could no longer be ignored. Until then, the services were frustrated that they were not allowed to strike more important military targets. The Washington-imposed strictures highlighted the widely divergent viewpoints of high civilian officials and military commanders, with the former clearly reluctant to permit air strikes that might be considered unduly provocative.47
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