The purpose was to differentiate between an act of reality and the absence of reality.
Okay; but what was the purpose of that?
It means that nothing, in so far as the word -]describes/-] signifies
a negation of something, is not a being.
But that doesn’t seem quite right. Blindness, like nothing, indicates a negation of something (of sight), but blindness is a kind of being. It is truly predicated of real beings.
I did not intend to give the impression that I was speaking about the ontology of concepts. Of course, all concepts have an abstract act of reality regardless of whether or not the objects of those concepts described exist in the actual world.
Not just an abstract act of reality, but concrete ones too, I should think. And concrete
first - what would an abstract act of reality be without concrete instances from which it was drawn?
Like you say, It is possible to have a concept of nothing, but it is impossible to have a concept that is nothing. You cannot imagine nothing. You will automatically imagine something analogous to it, and the problem with that is, any analogy we think of will have some kind of existential act because there is not a thing in reality that can compare to that which does not exist. Nothing is not an object of actual or experiential knowledge because it is the antithesis of that kind of knowledge. Obviously there are different levels of description and reality.
What is the point of pointing out that we cannot imagine nothing? (Of course we cannot imagine God either, except by analogy - but so what?)
Because only reality has objective meaning, when we speak of nothing with the intention to give a distinction, for the sake retaining its meaning we give it an object in order to make sense of it in relation to something else, but this is not intended to imply that nothing actually has an object in reality. Nothing is not an act of reality.
Do you perhaps just mean to say that
nothing is by definition not identical to any really existing thing? If so, yes, that’s just what the term means (objectively!).
The concept of nothing exists, but we are not talking about the ontology of concepts in general, but rather we are talking about the -]described /-]**signified **
object of some particular concept. But again, the word object is being used here as a retainer, not as an act of reality.
In other words, as Aquinas claims, words signify firstly (immediately) concepts/meanings, and secondly (ultimately) things (extra-mental reality)?
“…names, verbs, and speech signify these conceptions of the intellect immediately according to the teaching of Aristotle. They cannot immediately signify things, as is clear from the mode of signifying, for the name ‘man’ signifies human nature in abstraction from singulars; hence it is impossible that it immediately signify a singular man. The Platonists for this reason held that it signified the separated idea of man. But because in Aristotle’s teaching man in the abstract does not really subsist, but is only in the mind, it was necessary for Aristotle to say that vocal sounds signify the conceptions of the intellect immediately and things by means of them.” [St. Thomas, *In Peri 1c.2.n.5]
Agreed. God is not nothing, if by that we mean, God is the absence of reality in general. God is real, but God does not express existence in the same sense that his creation does. In fact creation does not express its own existence at all.
I don’t understand what you mean by your last sentence, or why you think it’s true.