Lets dicuss the nature of "existence" (lets all try to be charitable)

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MindOverMatter2

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This is not necessarily an Aquinas thread based on his concepts. Thus if you disagree with an idea I have, please don’t say “well Aquinas didn’t mean this by that word.” What Aquinas thought is not relevant.

This discussion is about finding a meaningful and objective definition of existence and what it consists of.

Let me start off by asking a question.

1. Would you agree that when we perceive the nature of some thing, we are perceiving “something” which is distinct in nature or different from what we understand to be a negation of “something”. This is to say that the absence of something is not in anyway shape or form identical to the existence and power of any kind of nature.

To put it more simply, “nothing” is not an act of reality.
 
This is not necessarily an Aquinas thread based on his concepts. Thus if you disagree with an idea I have, please don’t say “well Aquinas didn’t mean this by that word.” What Aquinas thought is not relevant.

This discussion is about finding a meaningful and objective definition of existence and what it consists of.

Let me start off by asking a question.

1. Would you agree that when we perceive the nature of some thing, we are perceiving “something” which is distinct in nature or different from what we understand to be a negation of “something”. This is to say that the absence of something is not in anyway shape or form identical to the existence and power of any kind of nature.

To put it more simply, “nothing” is not an act of reality.
Correct. ‘Nothing’ does not exist.
 
Correct. ‘Nothing’ does not exist.
So, you would agree that nature and its power is not identical with the absence of nature and power.

Assuming that this is your position, would you also agree that out nothing comes only nothing.
 
So, you would agree that nature and its power is not identical with the absence of nature and power.

Assuming that this is your position, would you also agree that out nothing comes only nothing.
If nothing does not exist then ‘out of nothing’ is contradictory to that premise.
 
You would agree then that to say that something began to exist by itself is meaningless.
No, not meaningless. It may lack reference, but it has a sense or meaning.

Similarly the phrase “out of nothing” is not meaningless, although its meaning is also not determined simply (unambiguously) by the formula (“out of nothing”), and depending on the particular meaning which the formula is used to express it may also lack reference.
 
No, not meaningless. It may lack reference, but it has a sense or meaning.

Similarly the phrase “out of nothing” is not meaningless, although its meaning is also not determined simply (unambiguously) by the formula (“out of nothing”), and depending on the particular meaning which the formula is used to express it may also lack reference.
I agree; nicely put.

But remember the introductory statement:-

“To put it more simply, “nothing” is not an act of reality.”

What I don’t quite understand is why charity has been referred to in the title.

Regards
 
I agree; nicely put.

But remember the introductory statement:-

“To put it more simply, “nothing” is not an act of reality.”
Yes, I remember, and I’m not sure what the point of saying this is. It’s really not clear what it means. Strictly speaking, “nothing” is a concept and concepts are not nothing, so “nothing” is, in a sense, an act of reality. And certainly “nothing” exists (although there is not anything that exists that is nothing - although certain theologians would want to say that God is nothing, because God is no thing, at least not in the way in which they choose to use the term ‘thing’).
What I don’t quite understand is why charity has been referred to in the title.

Regards
MOM2 and I (and others) exchanged some rather frank, and sometimes uncharitable, comments in another recent thread. The moderator eventually stepped in and cleaned things up for us. 🙂
 
Yes, I remember, and I’m not sure what the point of saying this is.
The purpose was to differentiate between an act of reality and the absence of reality.
It’s really not clear what it means.
It means that nothing, in so far as the word describes a negation of something, is not a being.
Strictly speaking, “nothing” is a concept and concepts are not nothing, so “nothing” is, in a sense, an act of reality.
I did not intend to give the impression that I was speaking about the ontology of concepts. Of course, all concepts have an abstract act of reality regardless of whether or not the objects of those concepts described exist in the actual world. Like you say, It is possible to have a concept of nothing, but it is impossible to have a concept that is nothing. You cannot imagine nothing. You will automatically imagine something analogous to it, and the problem with that is, any analogy we think of will have some kind of existential act because there is not a thing in reality that can compare to that which does not exist. Nothing is not an object of actual or experiential knowledge because it is the antithesis of that kind of knowledge. Obviously there are different levels of description and reality.

Because only reality has objective meaning, when we speak of nothing with the intention to give a distinction, for the sake retaining its meaning we give it an object in order to make sense of it in relation to something else, but this is not intended to imply that nothing actually has an object in reality. Nothing is not an act of reality.
And certainly “nothing” exists
The concept of nothing exists, but we are not talking about the ontology of concepts in general, but rather we are talking about the described object of some particular concept. But again, the word object is being used here as a retainer, not as an act of reality.
(although there is not anything that exists that is nothing - although certain theologians would want to say that God is nothing, because God is no thing, at least not in the way in which they choose to use the term ‘thing’).
Agreed. God is not nothing, if by that we mean, God is the absence of reality in general. God is real, but God does not express existence in the same sense that his creation does. In fact creation does not express its own existence at all.
 
The purpose was to differentiate between an act of reality and the absence of reality.
Okay; but what was the purpose of that?
It means that nothing, in so far as the word -]describes/-] signifies
a negation of something, is not a being.
But that doesn’t seem quite right. Blindness, like nothing, indicates a negation of something (of sight), but blindness is a kind of being. It is truly predicated of real beings.
I did not intend to give the impression that I was speaking about the ontology of concepts. Of course, all concepts have an abstract act of reality regardless of whether or not the objects of those concepts described exist in the actual world.
Not just an abstract act of reality, but concrete ones too, I should think. And concrete first - what would an abstract act of reality be without concrete instances from which it was drawn?
Like you say, It is possible to have a concept of nothing, but it is impossible to have a concept that is nothing. You cannot imagine nothing. You will automatically imagine something analogous to it, and the problem with that is, any analogy we think of will have some kind of existential act because there is not a thing in reality that can compare to that which does not exist. Nothing is not an object of actual or experiential knowledge because it is the antithesis of that kind of knowledge. Obviously there are different levels of description and reality.
What is the point of pointing out that we cannot imagine nothing? (Of course we cannot imagine God either, except by analogy - but so what?)
Because only reality has objective meaning, when we speak of nothing with the intention to give a distinction, for the sake retaining its meaning we give it an object in order to make sense of it in relation to something else, but this is not intended to imply that nothing actually has an object in reality. Nothing is not an act of reality.
Do you perhaps just mean to say that nothing is by definition not identical to any really existing thing? If so, yes, that’s just what the term means (objectively!).
The concept of nothing exists, but we are not talking about the ontology of concepts in general, but rather we are talking about the -]described /-]**signified **
object of some particular concept. But again, the word object is being used here as a retainer, not as an act of reality.

In other words, as Aquinas claims, words signify firstly (immediately) concepts/meanings, and secondly (ultimately) things (extra-mental reality)?
“…names, verbs, and speech signify these conceptions of the intellect immediately according to the teaching of Aristotle. They cannot immediately signify things, as is clear from the mode of signifying, for the name ‘man’ signifies human nature in abstraction from singulars; hence it is impossible that it immediately signify a singular man. The Platonists for this reason held that it signified the separated idea of man. But because in Aristotle’s teaching man in the abstract does not really subsist, but is only in the mind, it was necessary for Aristotle to say that vocal sounds signify the conceptions of the intellect immediately and things by means of them.” [St. Thomas, *In Peri 1c.2.n.5]
Agreed. God is not nothing, if by that we mean, God is the absence of reality in general. God is real, but God does not express existence in the same sense that his creation does. In fact creation does not express its own existence at all.
I don’t understand what you mean by your last sentence, or why you think it’s true.
 
But that doesn’t seem quite right. Blindness, like nothing, indicates a negation of something (of sight), but blindness is a kind of being. It is truly predicated of real beings.
Blindness, is not a being, its a negation of functionality, or rather a “privation” of sight. Just like evil is a privation of some good, we would not say that evil is a “being”. Neither should we say that blindness is a being. To say that something is blind, is not the same as saying that the being we call blindness is present in reality. In this context the absence of one being is not replaced by another being. We say that something is blind only because a being no-longer has sight. Blindness is the absence of sight, not the “being” of absence. Nothing is the absence of reality, not the existence of nothing.

Negations and privations, in and of themselves, are not beings, regardless of the fact that we can predicate them to being. There are obviously different kinds of predications, I kind which doesn’t require a being in-order to be true about some thing. Its just requires the existence of potential beings in general, so that negations and privation can be applied meaningfully.
 
What is the point of pointing out that we cannot imagine nothing? (Of course we cannot imagine God either, except by analogy - but so what?)
The point was to show you that an analogy of nothing is not the same as nothing. A concept of nothing is not the same as nothing. Its impossible to conceive the “being” of nothing. You were saying that because we have a concept of something, that therefore this equals the existence of that thing for which we have a concept, simply because the concept exists. This is obviously impossible when speaking about the word nothing since nothing is not a thing.
 
If nothing does not exist then ‘out of nothing’ is contradictory to that premise.
So you agree that there is such a thing as proportionate causality? That you cannot get essentially more from that which is essentially or existentially less.
 
So you agree that there is such a thing as proportionate causality? That you cannot get essentially more from that which is essentially or existentially less.
I should state immediately that I am not a student of Ontology; but nevertheless must say that I find the dialogue above between yourself & Betterave as fascinating.

However, although I would be inclined to agree, I would rather attempt to confirm that (if you would kindly apply some patience regarding myself) – after you provide an example of what you mean. If not particularly for me but at least for any others so reading this particular topic here.

Your reply concerning ‘charity’ – much appreciated – and for me perhaps a most fortunate insertion. I mean as it might encourage other readers here to take part in this topic in general terms when they might otherwise be inclined not to do so. For although Ontology can be, and is, a difficult subject to enter into, it should as far as possible be directed in my opinion to seek to expand (as in any subject) so as to be as inclusive as possible - as distinct from appearing to many as seemingly exclusive. [You will understand my remarks in this regard later; as soon as I see it as appropriate (& get the time) to introduce and elaborate on an essential concept in this discussion i.e. that of ‘the imagination’].

In the meantime I look forward to reading the current dialogue as it continues.

Best Wishes
 
Blindness, is not a being, its a negation of functionality, or rather a “privation” of sight. Just like evil is a privation of some good, we would not say that evil is a “being”. Neither should we say that blindness is a being. To say that something is blind, is not the same as saying that the being we call blindness is present in reality. In this context the absence of one being is not replaced by another being. We say that something is blind only because a being no-longer has sight. Blindness is the absence of sight, not the “being” of absence. Nothing is the absence of reality, not the existence of nothing.
I agree that nothing does not exist in itself and blindness does not exist in itself. But I don’t see how it is possible to deny that blindness does exist as a real modification of reality. Think of the contrast with blurgness (an arbitrarily invented nonsense word), which does not exist, and blindness, which does. Real privations are privations which are … real! (Isn’t that obvious?)
Negations and privations, in and of themselves, are not beings, regardless of the fact that we can predicate them to being. There are obviously different kinds of predications, I kind which doesn’t require a being in-order to be true about some thing. Its just requires the existence of potential beings in general, so that negations and privation can be applied meaningfully.
But a blind man is really blind, and his existence is obviously not just that of “potential beings in general”… so I don’t understand what you’re trying to say here.
 
The point was to show you that an analogy of nothing is not the same as nothing. A concept of nothing is not the same as nothing.
I think that’s obvious: a concept is never simply *the same as *that which it signifies.
Its impossible to conceive the “being” of nothing.
I’m not sure what that means.
You were saying that because we have a concept of something, that therefore this equals the existence of that thing for which we have a concept, simply because the concept exists.
I certainly didn’t say that. I clearly distinguished sense from reference, concept from thing referred to by that concept, and I never said that the former implies the latter.
This is obviously impossible when speaking about the word nothing since nothing is not a thing
.
I have been trying to point out that it does not follow from the fact that X is not a thing, that X cannot be real (unless you want to simply declare that, according to your way of using these words, this claim is true by definition, i.e., trivially true).
 
I have been trying to point out that it does not follow from the fact that X is not a thing, that X cannot be real (unless you want to simply declare that, according to your way of using these words, this claim is true by definition, i.e., trivially true).
It seems to me that you have confused the context. What do you mean by real if you are not talking about “being”. You should be clear that when you speak of real you are not talking about it in the context of “actuality”. Blindness is the absence of an actuality or the reality of sight. Blindness in and of its self is not an object, it is not a thing and is thus not real in a purely existential sense, because it is by definition an absence from existence. However it is a real privation in a teleological sense. It is not the blindness that is real, but rather It is the “person” that is real minus the reality of sight. The person lacks some kind of reality. Therefore if I say that blindness is real, I can only mean to say that it is “true” that something is absent from the act of some reality, the reality of a person. When I say a person is blind, I mean that the eye is no longer serving its teleological purpose. But the thing that is absent is not real if by that I mean it has “being”.

A fail to see why it is difficult to understand what I mean by “nothing is not an act of reality”.
 
It seems to me that you have confused the context. What do you mean by real if you are not talking about “being”. You should be clear that when you speak of real you are not talking about it in the context of “actuality”.
I should be clear that what?? (I don’t know what you’re trying to say that I’m saying here - and I doubt that I’m actually trying to say what you’re trying to say that I’m saying.) Please note that the term ‘being’ is systematically ambiguous between a gerund (a verbal form) and a substantive (a noun form). You seem to be ignoring this ambiguity.
Blindness is the absence of an actuality or the reality of sight
. Blindness in and of its self is not an object, it is not a thing and is thus not real in a purely existential sense, because it is by definition an absence from existence. However it is a real privation in a teleological sense. It is not the blindness that is real, but rather It is the “person” that is real minus the reality of sight. The person lacks some kind of reality. Therefore if I say that blindness is real, I can only mean to say that it is “true” that something is absent from the act of some reality, the reality of a person. When I say a person is blind, I mean that the eye is no longer serving its teleological purpose. But the thing that is absent is not real if by that I mean it has “being”.

How is that last sentence supposed to resolve anything? When you write “being,” with quotation marks, what are you referring to? What are the quotation marks for? Do they somehow make your sentence true? Would you say that privations have being, but not “being”?
A fail to see why it is difficult to understand what I mean by “nothing is not an act of reality”.
I think I understand what you mean by that, but I still don’t understand why you are saying it (what your point is). For the record, I think you just mean that when you use the concept “nothing,” your intention is to not refer to any real thing.
 
Blindness in and of its self is not an object, it is not a thing and is thus not real in a purely existential sense, because it is by definition an absence from existence.
Here’s a question: could absence from existence be absent from existence?
Here’s another: Could blindness be absent from existence?
 
Here’s a question: could absence from existence be absent from existence?
You are changing absence into an object. If something real ceases to exist, it is true that it has become absent from existence, but it does not follow from this fact that “absence” exists in its place, this is to say absence does not have an act of reality, because “absence from existence” signifies non-existence. " We can say the words, but we are not talking about something that exists.

SO, does non-existence exist? Is non-existence real? Of course not. However something which has lost a part of its essence or actuality can certainly exist.
Here’s another: Could blindness be absent from existence?
Again that depends on what you mean by “blindness” and the context in which you have chosen to express the word.

Is there something in existence which has lost the actuality of sight? Yes

Is there something in existence that has gained in addition to its being or essence the actuality of absence? No, it is clear that such is not possible, because act and absence, reality and non-reality, are absolutely distinct.

Does the blind man have an act of reality? Yes, in so far as there is a man who has lost the actuality of sight.

Does blindness have an act of reality? No, in so far as blindness is by definition the absence of the actuality of sight.
 
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