Limbo, logical or illogical belief?

[Trevor_Stamm]

It would seem Limbo is an illogical belief based on the assumption that it’s a place of “natural happiness” for the unbaptized infants that died. What is “natural happiness”? The argument of desire by Peter Kreeft seems to apply in refuting this belief that the human will desires the greatest joy to fulfill all desires. What is the greatest joy? The beatific vision in seeing God as He is, face to face. Anything less would be Hell, especially living eternally always desiring the beatific vision but never obtaining it.

Any counter-arguments or additions to this argument?

 

[Perplexity]

If you can see past the rhetoric, I found the following to be one of the best arguments for limbo:

traditionalmass.org/articles/article.php?id=73&catname=15

I devoted dozens of hours to studying this issue when I was Catholic, I’ll see if I can dig up a formalization for it…

 

[paduard]

I think that belief in Limbo is optional; but stand to be corrected on that.

 

[tonyrey]

A loving Father would not allow a father and a mother in heaven to be parted from their child(ren) **for all eternity **simply because of an event on earth…

 

[smilodon]

We don’t have a natural right to seeing God face-to-face, so it’s not really a loss. Nor do we have a natural impulse to desire it per se - I think you’re confusing Christian promises with natural law.

 

[tonyrey]

We don’t have a natural right to seeing God face-to-face, so it’s not really a loss. Nor do we have a natural impulse to desire it per se - I think you’re confusing Christian promises with natural law.

Welcome to the forum!

God is not bound by natural rights and it would be an immense loss for the parents of the unbaptised child(ren) for all eternity…

 

[Trevor_Stamm]

We don’t have a natural right to seeing God face-to-face, so it’s not really a loss. Nor do we have a natural impulse to desire it per se - I think you’re confusing Christian promises with natural law.

Welcome to the forum.

Where did rights come into the discussion?

Also, we do have a natural desire per se for the greatest joy. The onus is on limbo believers to define what “natural happiness” is when all natural desires are directed towards God.

Note, this conversation excludes all non-Catholics.

 

[Trevor_Stamm]

If you can see past the rhetoric, I found the following to be one of the best arguments for limbo:

traditionalmass.org/articles/article.php?id=73&catname=15

I devoted dozens of hours to studying this issue when I was Catholic, I’ll see if I can dig up a formalization for it…

The entire article is refuted by simply saying no salvation outside the Church dogma does not apply to those who are invincibly ignorant. Though, I have and will always argue this exception to the rule only applies to an extreme minute amount of people past the age of reason, but prior is a different story.

This question is critical for limbo supporters, explain “natural happiness.”

 

[bmonk]

The theory of Limbo was developed in past times to explain why we baptize babies, and depended on the idea that, without baptism (if it was available), God would not have mercy on the non-Christian.

We have a better appreciation of God’s mercy nowadays. As pointed out, before the age of reason, the child is unable to understand and does not have the capacity to demand baptism, if the parents don’t bring the child for baptism. Thus, an unbaptized child who dies would not be guilty of rejecting the Church; we can hope in God’s mercy on that child.

But, is it not better to bring the child in, and raise him or her in the faith? A reasonable delay–weeks or months–is not a problem. But, what of a child of 17 who dies or is in an accident?

What of a 20-something who had an accident, and was no longer able to ask for baptism? In one case I heard of, the parents suddenly wanted to baptize him, but the priest refused: they had had 20+ years to see to it. The child had several years as an adult to see to it. There was no apparent desire before the accident, and so no justification to baptize him afterwards.

I don’t think we need to invoke Limbo to say why we should baptize children–and then raise them in the faith, a responsibility that infant baptism implies.

 

[Verbum_Caro]

Trevor,

I find some light in Aquinas as summarized in the old Catholic Encyclopedia:

Hence he expressly denies that they suffer from any “interior affliction”, in other words that they experience any pain of loss (nihil omnino dolebunt de carentia visionis divinae — “In Sent.”, II, 33, q. ii, a. 2). At first (“In Sent.”, loc. cit.), St. Thomas held this absence of subjective suffering to be compatible with a consciousness of objective loss or privation, the resignation of such souls to the ways of God’s providence being so perfect that a knowledge of what they had lost through no fault of their own does not interfere with the full enjoyment of the natural goods they possess. Afterwards, however, he adopted the much simpler psychological explanation which denies that these souls have any knowledge of the supernatural destiny they have missed, this knowledge being itself supernatural, and as such not included in what is naturally due to the separated soul (De Malo loc. cit.). It should be added that in St. Thomas’ view the limbus infantium is not a mere negative state of immunity from suffering and sorrow, but a state of positive happiness in which the soul is united to God by a knowledge and love of him proportionate to nature’s capacity.

This also seems to speak to your objection re: Kreeft’s argument from desire. I’m not sure Kreeft would, for instance, claim that infants desire a supernatural end. . . though he may claim (I think correctly) that all, even infants, are so ordered.

Any thoughts?
VC

 

[Trevor_Stamm]

Trevor,

I find some light in Aquinas as summarized in the old Catholic Encyclopedia:

This also seems to speak to your objection re: Kreeft’s argument from desire. I’m not sure Kreeft would, for instance, claim that infants desire a supernatural end. . . though he may claim (I think correctly) that all, even infants, are so ordered.

Any thoughts?
VC

St. Aquinas (ST II.1.7-8)

Article 7. Whether all men have the same last end?

Objection 1. It would seem that all men have not the same last end. For before all else the unchangeable good seems to be the last end of man. But some turn away from the unchangeable good, by sinning. Therefore all men have not the same last end.

Objection 2. Further, man’s entire life is ruled according to his last end. If, therefore, all men had the same last end, they would not have various pursuits in life. Which is evidently false.

Objection 3. Further, the end is the term of action. But actions are of individuals. Now although men agree in their specific nature, yet they differ in things pertaining to individuals. Therefore all men have not the same last end.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 3) that all men agree in desiring the last end, which is happiness.

I answer that, We can speak of the last end in two ways: first, considering only the aspect of last end; secondly, considering the thing in which the aspect of last end is realized. So, then, as to the aspect of last end, all agree in desiring the last end: since all desire the fulfilment of their perfection, and it is precisely this fulfilment in which the last end consists, as stated above (Article 5). But as to the thing in which this aspect is realized, all men are not agreed as to their last end: since some desire riches as their consummate good; some, pleasure; others, something else. Thus to every taste the sweet is pleasant but to some, the sweetness of wine is most pleasant, to others, the sweetness of honey, or of something similar. Yet that sweet is absolutely the best of all pleasant things, in which he who has the best taste takes most pleasure. In like manner that good is most complete which the man with well disposed affections desires for his last end.

Reply to Objection 1. Those who sin turn from that in which their last end really consists: but they do not turn away from the intention of the last end, which intention they mistakenly seek in other things.

Reply to Objection 2. Various pursuits in life are found among men by reason of the various things in which men seek to find their last end.

Reply to Objection 3. Although actions are of individuals, yet their first principle of action is nature, which tends to one thing, as stated above (Article 5).

Article 8. Whether other creatures concur in that last end?

Objection 1. It would seem that all other creatures concur in man’s last end. For the end corresponds to the beginning. But man’s beginning–i.e. God–is also the beginning of all else. Therefore all other things concur in man’s last end.

Objection 2. Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that “God turns all things to Himself as to their last end.” But He is also man’s last end; because He alone is to be enjoyed by man, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5,22). Therefore other things, too, concur in man’s last end.

Objection 3. Further, man’s last end is the object of the will. But the object of the will is the universal good, which is the end of all. Therefore other things, too, concur in man’s last end.

On the contrary, man’s last end is happiness; which all men desire, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 3,4). But “happiness is not possible for animals bereft of reason,” as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 5). Therefore other things do not concur in man’s last end.

I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 2), the end is twofold–the end “for which” and the end “by which”; viz. the thing itself in which is found the aspect of good, and the use or acquisition of that thing. Thus we say that the end of the movement of a weighty body is either a lower place as “thing,” or to be in a lower place, as “use”; and the end of the miser is money as “thing,” or possession of money as “use.”

If, therefore, we speak of man’s last end as of the thing which is the end, thus all other things concur in man’s last end, since God is the last end of man and of all other things. If, however, we speak of man’s last end, as of the acquisition of the end, then irrational creatures do not concur with man in this end. For man and other rational creatures attain to their last end by knowing and loving God: this is not possible to other creatures, which acquire their last end, in so far as they share in the Divine likeness, inasmuch as they are, or live, or even know.

Hence it is evident how the objections are solved: since happiness means the acquisition of the last end.

As he argued, the happiness of man is fulfilled by man’s last end which is God. I think he believed in limbo as a safety, fail-safe, to avoid promoting possible heresy, as it was understood at the time, in stating baptism is not absolute under all conditions, which is why extremist trads (sedevacantists and extreme SSPX folks) attack us for paragraph 847 in the CCC.

 

[tonyrey]

St. Aquinas (ST II.1.7-8)

As he argued, the happiness of man is fulfilled by man’s last end which is God. I think he believed in limbo as a safety, fail-safe, to avoid promoting possible heresy, as it was understood at the time, in stating baptism is not absolute under all conditions, which is why extremist trads (sedevacantists and extreme SSPX folks) attack us for paragraph 847 in the CCC.

Is there another example of St Thomas using that stratagem?

 

[Trevor_Stamm]

Is there another example of St Thomas using that stratagem?

As far as happiness? In part I-II of the Summa on Q. 2 shows that man’s happiness does not consist in wealth, honor, glory, power, any good of the body, pleasure, any good of the soul, and any created good. Moving onto Q. 3 he defines happiness and how it is fulfilled.

perfect happiness can consist in nothing else than the vision of the Divine Essence. To make this clear, two points must be observed. First, that man is not perfectly happy, so long as something remains for him to desire and seek: secondly, that the perfection of any power is determined by the nature of its object.

So I’m trying to figure out what in the world did he mean by “natural joy” or “natural happiness” in limbo since there is no happiness to be found outside of God. He taught one can be saved without Baptism but only insofar as there is desire for it. Guess this is all academic being that infants fall under the category of invincible ignorance, but just seems like a strange belief to hold by St. Aquinas or anyone today.

 

[Perplexity]

The entire article is refuted by simply saying no salvation outside the Church dogma does not apply to those who are invincibly ignorant. Though, I have and will always argue this exception to the rule only applies to an extreme minute amount of people past the age of reason, but prior is a different story.

Ah, as I understand it, extra ecclesiam nulla salus est necessarily incorporates the invincibly ignorant. I wrote a tract on Catholic ecclesiology when I was Catholic, I think it says everything I could in response to your post here. Note, the argument is logically invalid, but I’m proposing it as an ampliative argument (an invalid argument whose premises still afford considerable inductive support for the conclusion).

 

[tonyrey]

As far as happiness? In part I-II of the Summa on Q. 2 shows that man’s happiness does not consist in wealth, honor, glory, power, any good of the body, pleasure, any good of the soul, and any created good. Moving onto Q. 3 he defines happiness and how it is fulfilled.

I mean a stratagem comparable to belief in limbo as a safety, fail-safe, to avoid promoting possible heresy?

So I’m trying to figure out what in the world did he mean by “natural joy” or “natural happiness” in limbo since there is no happiness to be found outside of God. He taught one can be saved without Baptism but only insofar as there is desire for it. Guess this is all academic being that infants fall under the category of invincible ignorance, but just seems like a strange belief to hold by St. Aquinas or anyone today.

Surely after death it doesn’t matter what category infants were in because it was beyond their control anyway!

 

[Trevor_Stamm]

I mean a stratagem comparable to belief in limbo as a safety, fail-safe, to avoid promoting possible heresy?

I don’t have any sources, just a speculation. Only one I can think of though. St. Augustine stated they were damned to hell if they were not baptized, but again I think this mindset is just a safety to staying absolute to the dogmas. Since the Church has given us infallible decrees to say otherwise, we let loose that safety position of limbo or saying they go to hell.

 

[Trevor_Stamm]

Ah, as I understand it, extra ecclesiam nulla salus est necessarily incorporates the invincibly ignorant. I wrote a tract on Catholic ecclesiology when I was Catholic, I think it says everything I could in response to your post here. Note, the argument is logically invalid, but I’m proposing it as an ampliative argument (an invalid argument whose premises still afford considerable inductive support for the conclusion).

Great article. I enjoy your writing as it is clear and precise.

As I understand your definition, the invincibly ignorant desire to be a member of the body of Christ through the natural inclination the human person has towards God. This would include infants as well since, by Catholic definition, human life is preordained to Him. Since the infant is incapable of sin and to seek God but unable to intellectually desire baptism and truth, it would follow that the infant is preordained to baptism by the very act of living. The age of reason seems to end this condition.