Logical/Metaphysical Proof of the Existence of God?

[James_S_Saint]

I guess I should throw in that Accurate Logic is simple (per step).

 

[punkforchrist]

OK then let’s see if can be justified. Just what is meant by an explanation? If contingent fact A being explained by fact B means that B → A then premise (1) is false, because the union of all contingent facts cannot be explained by a necessary fact because then there would be no contingent facts, they would all be necessary; thus, U must be unexplained. If B explaining A doesn’t mean B → A then what does it mean?

In a theistic context this would mean, how can the existence of God be said to explain His actions?

Notice the first premise does not state that U is possibly explained by an external fact, but merely an external agent, or cause, if you prefer. God’s choice to create is itself a contingent fact, but that doesn’t at all imply that God Himself is contingent.

 

[James_S_Saint]

Also Accurate Logic “dictates” but can be ignored or disobeyed willfully and thus cause error, “missing the mark” == “sin”.

 

[NowAgnostic]

Notice the first premise does not state that U is possibly explained by an external fact, but merely an external agent, or cause, if you prefer. God’s choice to create is itself a contingent fact, but that doesn’t at all imply that God Himself is contingent.

Fine, what explains God’s choice to create?

 

[punkforchrist]

Fine, what explains God’s choice to create?

I’m not sure how that’s an objection to the argument. If we say that God’s choice to create is a brute contingent fact, we are not left with any dilemma. For, (1) states only that U possibly has an explanation, and that explanation is not stated even as a sufficient explanation.

Regarding the MTW:

An if… then can’t be a premise. The consequent must logically follow from the antecedent. And this does not follow. The fact that there is a time or range of times t1 when being A possibly fails to exist and a time t2 when being B possibly fails to exist doesn’t entail there is a time when both A and B possibly fail to exist - t1 and t2 may not overlap.

Yet I can grant for the sake of argument a null-world is possible - you don’t need temporal contingency just logical contingency. But this argument is equivocating on the meaning of “possible”. The fact that a null-world is possible does not mean that there is a possible world in which at one time nothing existed, but at a later time they did.

I won’t be pedantic in defending (2)'s status as a premise, since I see that you grant (2) on the grounds of logical possibility. To state it again (for anyone following along), it is logically possible that all temporally contingent beings collectively fail to exist at some past time.

With respect to a possible equivocation, I’m noting a thing’s modality with the term “possible”. Whenever I’m referring to temporal contingency/necessity I will make sure to include the entire phrase (“temporal” to indicate the non-modal usage). With these distinctions in mind, I don’t see any equivocation. After all, it’s possible (pardon the pun) to soundly use modal terms and non-modal terms in the same argument.

OK, again I’d like a better definition of “explicable”.

Certainly. A thing is explicable if it has an explanation in some possible world.

This doesn’t follow either. The fact that something exists at times t1 and t2 doesn’t imply the same thing must exist at t1 and t2.

Consider the possibility that all beings fail to exist at some past time. In such a case, then nothing would presently exist, since being cannot arise from non-being. This implies that nothing would be explicable, since nothing would presently exist that would be capable of explanation to begin with. Rather, something had to have always existed; but it’s not necessary that there always be at least one temporally contingent being. This leaves us with only a temporally necessary being.

Unsupported. There could be more than one logically possible temporally necessary being.

Prima facie, there could be more than one temporally necessary being. However, if whatever is temporally necessary is unlimited, it must be one. You may wish to look back at the quotation you were responding to, since I’m not sure how your reply was pertinent to (7): Whatever is temporally necessary might be unlimited.

No, not true. There is the logical possibility of a limited though eternal entity.

I grant that this is probably the biggest hurdle of the argument, and it is the one I grappled with myself the most before I accepted the MTW. Let’s imagine that a limited star has always existed - that is, this star has existed eternally. From this, we don’t have any reason to doubt that there is some possible world in which the star is actualized. Even if it is not actualized in one possible world, it may be actualized in another. Moreover, the fact that a star (or any eternal, albeit finite, being) has always existed does not imply any temporal necessity. For, a star that has always existed in the past may cease to exist.

I actually skipped a deductive step in the argument for the sake of brevity. We might state: Whatever is possible is either unlimited or limited. Then we can state that whatever is limited can be actualized. From this, we can deduce that whatever is possible is either unlimited or actualizable.

Premise (2) was flawed and (5) doesn’t follow from it anyway.

That was my fault. I should have said that (6) follows from (1)-(5).

That’s OK, but this modalized version of the Third Way suffers from the same logical flaw that the original one does.

What’s interesting is that the MTW was actually formulated in order to avoid the conceptual problems that the original Third Way seemingly had.

 

[surritter]

Talk about a circular argument. I’ll prove the existence of some entity, and BY DEFINITION that entity is God, therefore God exists!

Oh please – now you are playing games with the word God. If you agree that we’ve proved the existence of some uncreated entity who existed before time began, then that’s the end of the debate.

By your logic, we can prove that 70% of the world’s surface is covered by a liquid with a chemical makeup of H2O, but that doesn’t mean it’s “water.” Come on.

 

[Belloc_Fan]

Doesn’t show the creator or causer is God.

I agree to an extent with what some of the other commenters have said. If you’re willing to acknowledge that there is a Creator or Causer of the Universe, you’re a theist. The question then becomes, “What attributes does God possess?” and not “Is there a God?” So to the extent that the argument demonstrates a Creator or Causer, which you don’t refute, it proves a god.

But you’re looking more for the god we call God. Fair enough. Obviously, I’ll conceed at the outset that the Kalaam argument alone isn’t designed as a three-step proof that there is a Trinity, Jesus Christ is the eternally-begotten Son, and so forth. I mean, the basis for the argument comes from Muslims using pagan Greek theology. But I think that it does establish the traits of God you were wondering about:

God will be defined as an infinite being (without limitations), purely actual (without any potency), and a being who, if He exists, exists necessarily, from which the traditional attributes (omnipotence, omniscience, simplicity, etc.) follow.

**Infinite Being: **the argument establishes that there is a non-created Creator and an uncaused Cause. The only alternative is an endless series of cause-and-effect and creating, which the argument disproves can exist. A non-created Being is infinite, since that Being created time and (presumably) cause-and-effect.
Purely Actual & Simple: Potency implies that God could be acted upon by some force not under His control. If such a force existed, we wouldn’t be talking about the First Cause. We’d have to examine who controlled that force, who would in turn be either purely actual, or subject to a yet higher force. Whoever the highest force is, the First Cause and the First Mover, would have no external agents creating any change or causing any potency. Additionally, since the kalaam argument establishes that God (in solely divine form, leaving aside the question of the Incarnation) exists outside of time, He isn’t subject to cause-and-effect, which exists within the field of temporal actions and events. This same argument, I think establishes God’s simplicity.
Exists Necessarily: See the bit on “Infinite Being.”
Omnipotence: The Creator *created *power, and there’s no alternate source of power. Every being’s existence, etc., is dependant upon Him. So far as I can tell, there’s no way that God can create something ex nihilo, and not be equally able to uncreate or destroy it. If He’s the highest power, the Force which set the Rules (and we have already seen that they require an Author), He can seemingly abrogate them, etc. - things like miracles. He may still be bound by other factors, such as His own nature, but nothing higher than Himself, or we aren’t talking about the First.
**Omniscience: **The Creator created knowledge, as well as all capacity for knowledge. He created the brain and all its neurons, etc. He can’t, by definition, not know of something in His universe, since He designed it ex nihilo.

 

[MindOverMatter]

I’m willing to listen to anyone who can provide a proof of the existence of God, in his or her own words, not merely referring to Aquinas or Craig or Plantinga or anyone else, but of course you’re free to copy-and-paste from their arguments as much as you’d like. The proof should start with clearly stated metaphysical assumptions, epistemologically basic beliefs. They are necessary and it’s OK - nothing can be done without them. Then, a logically deductive, valid argument needs to be shown which concludes the existence of God. God will be defined as an infinite being (without limitations), purely actual (without any potency), and a being who, if He exists, exists necessarily, from which the traditional attributes (omnipotence, omniscience, simplicity, etc.) follow.

I would love to give you my proof, but you are going to have to wait for my e-book. I would much rather you criticize something i have put a lot of thought in to rather than a post that took no time at all to write. Like you say, there are also epistemological and metaphysical considerations to take care of before we can even begin to consider what a proof for Gods existence would look like. I think that’s the best route to a possible proof.

 

[punkforchrist]

MindOverMatter, hit me up when you’re finished with the book.

 

[NowAgnostic]

I’m not sure how that’s an objection to the argument. If we say that God’s choice to create is a brute contingent fact, we are not left with any dilemma. For, (1) states only that U possibly has an explanation, and that explanation is not stated even as a sufficient explanation.

But there is no possible explanation for God’s choice to create if it is a brute contingent fact, thus U does not possibly have an explanation. It’s simply not possible for U to have an explanation in terms of a necessary fact; if a necessary fact explains U, then U is necessary.

Now this MTW has three serious flaws which I will document below.

I won’t be pedantic in defending (2)'s status as a premise, since I see that you grant (2) on the grounds of logical possibility. To state it again (for anyone following along), it is logically possible that all temporally contingent beings collectively fail to exist at some past time.

Wait a second. Admitting the logical possibility of a null world is not the same as admitting the logical possibility of a world in which at one time there is nothing, and at another something. Because even saying there is “time” implies there is something. There can’t be a “time” at which there is nothing, because “time” is something. In an null world there is no “time”.

Now there is a logically possible world in which each temporally contingent being fails to exist at some time, and yet there is never a time in that world in which at least one temporally contingent being fails to exist. This is the first point at which both this newfangled version and Aquinas’ original argument fails (philosophers have some fancy term for this fallacy I can’t remember). If you don’t see this, then we need to stop and discuss this point. If you deny this premise, then you need to provide an argument against it.

With respect to a possible equivocation, I’m noting a thing’s modality with the term “possible”. Whenever I’m referring to temporal contingency/necessity I will make sure to include the entire phrase (“temporal” to indicate the non-modal usage). With these distinctions in mind, I don’t see any equivocation. After all, it’s possible (pardon the pun) to soundly use modal terms and non-modal terms in the same argument.

Fair enough, but “temporal necessity” is also capable of a modal or a non-modal interpretation, and this is the second flaw - there’s still an equivocation. Modally, it means an entity which, in every world in which it exists, exists eternally. Non-modally, it could mean an entity which, in point of fact, exists eternally in the actual world, or in some other possible world, but need not. But this kind of object is in fact a modally temporally contingent one. So there is still a problem with equivocation here and that is the second flaw.

Certainly. A thing is explicable if it has an explanation in some possible world.

Ok.

Consider the possibility that all beings fail to exist at some past time.

It’s not possible.

In such a case, then nothing would presently exist, since being cannot arise from non-being. This implies that nothing would be explicable, since nothing would presently exist that would be capable of explanation to begin with.

You’re arguing for the logical impossibility of a null world here?

Rather, something had to have always existed; but it’s not necessary that there always be at least one temporally contingent being.

Which means that it’s **possible ** there always be at least one temporally contingent being, which means that

This leaves us with only a temporally necessary being.

doesn’t follow.

The first problem is, as I said, is the error of arguing that since there is a time when each thing fails to exist, that implies there is a time when nothing existed.

The second problem is again the equivocation on “temporally necessary”. A temporally contingent being might exist eternally in this world or in another world in point of fact, in which case something always existed.

You may wish to look back at the quotation you were responding to, since I’m not sure how your reply was pertinent to (7): Whatever is temporally necessary might be unlimited.

And there is the old modal problem of conflating epistemic with logical possibility. The third flaw.

Let’s imagine that a limited star has always existed - that is, this star has existed eternally. From this, we don’t have any reason to doubt that there is some possible world in which the star is actualized. Even if it is not actualized in one possible world, it may be actualized in another. Moreover, the fact that a star (or any eternal, albeit finite, being) has always existed does not imply any temporal necessity. For, a star that has always existed in the past may cease to exist.

So every limited thing is actualizable. OK I can grant that. But this doesn’t show why a temporally necessary being can’t be limited and actualizable. Actually your next paragraph shows the flaw:

I actually skipped a deductive step in the argument for the sake of brevity. We might state: Whatever is possible is either unlimited or limited. Then we can state that whatever is limited can be actualized. From this, we can deduce that whatever is possible is either unlimited or actualizable.

That’s again confusing epistemic with logical possibility, or just assuming it. If there is a logically possible unlimited (infinite) being then you can skip all the MTW stuff, the being exists via S5.

What’s interesting is that the MTW was actually formulated in order to avoid the conceptual problems that the original Third Way seemingly had.

Well they’re still here.

 

[DPMartin]

I’m willing to listen to anyone who can provide a proof of the existence of God, in his or her own words, not merely referring to Aquinas or Craig or Plantinga or anyone else, but of course you’re free to copy-and-paste from their arguments as much as you’d like. The proof should start with clearly stated metaphysical assumptions, epistemologically basic beliefs. They are necessary and it’s OK - nothing can be done without them. Then, a logically deductive, valid argument needs to be shown which concludes the existence of God. God will be defined as an infinite being (without limitations), purely actual (without any potency), and a being who, if He exists, exists necessarily, from which the traditional attributes (omnipotence, omniscience, simplicity, etc.) follow.

Let me ask you this then, where does knowledge come from? Does it have a beginning? And is there anything that proves that Life is not? And doesn’t it require knowledge to live?

Remember, knowledge does not come from man, for man must learn or acquire knowledge.

 

[MindOverMatter]

Now there is a logically possible world in which each temporally contingent being fails to exist at some time, and yet there is never a time in that world in which at least one temporally contingent being fails to exist. This is the first point at which both this newfangled version and Aquinas’ original argument fails (philosophers have some fancy term for this fallacy I can’t remember).

Can you please explain this a bit more?

The second problem is again the equivocation on “temporally necessary”. A temporally contingent being might exist eternally in this world or in another world in point of fact, in which case something always existed.

What does it mean to say that a contingent being has existed for all eternity?

 

[punkforchrist]

MCA

But there is no possible explanation for God’s choice to create if it is a brute contingent fact, thus U does not possibly have an explanation. It’s simply not possible for U to have an explanation in terms of a necessary fact; if a necessary fact explains U, then U is necessary.

We need to be careful not to confuse a partial explanation with a complete (or sufficient) explanation. We might simply change the wording of (1): It is possible that the union of all contingent facts U is dependent on an external agent.

“Dependency” in this case need not require any strong version of the PSR any more than the dependency of spontaneous fluctuations in a quantum vacuum.

MTW

Wait a second. Admitting the logical possibility of a null world is not the same as admitting the logical possibility of a world in which at one time there is nothing, and at another something. Because even saying there is “time” implies there is something. There can’t be a “time” at which there is nothing, because “time” is something. In an null world there is no “time”.

I don’t see how that bodes well for one who rejects the existence of a temporally necessary being. I’m quite happy to say there is no possible world in which nothing existed in the past but something exists in the present. The central claim under consideration is that it is possible for all temporally contingent beings to collectively fail to exist at some past time.

Now there is a logically possible world in which each temporally contingent being fails to exist at some time, and yet there is never a time in that world in which at least one temporally contingent being fails to exist. This is the first point at which both this newfangled version and Aquinas’ original argument fails (philosophers have some fancy term for this fallacy I can’t remember). If you don’t see this, then we need to stop and discuss this point. If you deny this premise, then you need to provide an argument against it.

The argument doesn’t rest on the claim that there had to have been a time in which no temporally contingent being existed, so the above I think is rather moot. It may very well be the case that for every time T some temporally contingent being has existed at T1, T2, T3, … and so forth. But of course, such a proposition is not mutually exclusive with the claim that there exists a temporally necessary being.

Fair enough, but “temporal necessity” is also capable of a modal or a non-modal interpretation, and this is the second flaw - there’s still an equivocation. Modally, it means an entity which, in every world in which it exists, exists eternally. Non-modally, it could mean an entity which, in point of fact, exists eternally in the actual world, or in some other possible world, but need not. But this kind of object is in fact a modally temporally contingent one. So there is still a problem with equivocation here and that is the second flaw.

I actually stated in my first most on the MTW in this thread that the argument does not establish any logical necessity in a temporally necessary being. Although, I would maintain that there is no conflict, either. I don’t understand why you’re calling this an equivocation, though, since the conclusion does not rely upon one use of the word “necessary” and then a distinct meaning in the next, nor does the conclusion itself imply that a Supreme Being is logically necessary. The only claim is that in whichever world a temporally necessary being exists, it must be supreme.

It’s not possible [that all things fail to exist at some past time]

It’s not possible in any world in which something presently exists. In any case, I’m happy to concede that there was never a time in which nothing existed. In fact, that’s part of the argument!

You’re arguing for the logical impossibility of a null world here?

I’m arguing for the impossibility of a world in which nothing existed in the past, but something presently exists. Nevertheless, it is possible (I maintain) that all temporally contingent beings should fail to exist at some past time. This would imply, given the indubitable existence of something at the present, that a temporally necessary being exists.

The first problem is, as I said, is the error of arguing that since there is a time when each thing fails to exist, that implies there is a time when nothing existed.

The MTW only requires that this be possible. I think this is a reasonable and fairly uncontroversial claim.

The second problem is again the equivocation on “temporally necessary”. A temporally contingent being might exist eternally in this world or in another world in point of fact, in which case something always existed.

You may need to go through the argument step-by-step in order to point out any equivocation, since I just don’t see it. I grant that there may always be some temporally contingent being, but that implies nothing negative about a temporally necessary being.

And there is the old modal problem of conflating epistemic with logical possibility. The third flaw.

There is warrant for concluding something about logical possibility here. Consider the fact that whatever is temporally necessary is unlimited in its duration. Doesn’t this give us an incentive to consider the possibility of its unlimitedness with respect to other things? If not, why not? Is there some contradiction inherent in the idea of an unlimited being? If there isn’t, then epistemic warrant suffices to support at least one goal of natural theology: the rational acceptability of theism.

 

[punkforchrist]

So every limited thing is actualizable. OK I can grant that. But this doesn’t show why a temporally necessary being can’t be limited and actualizable.

How is it possible to actualize something temporally necessary?

That’s again confusing epistemic with logical possibility, or just assuming it. If there is a logically possible unlimited (infinite) being then you can skip all the MTW stuff, the being exists via S5.

My point is that we don’t need S5 in order for the argument to be successful.

Well they’re still here.

Well, I appreciate the rigor with which you are defending your position. I respectfully disagree, however. I’m sure that’s no surprise, though.

 

[punkforchrist]

By the way, are you willing to say that time is temporally necessary? After all, there can be no existing time in which nothing exists. But, this proposition would be an uneasy bed fellow (to say the least) with the view that everything that exists is temporally contingent.

 

[NowAgnostic]

Can you please explain this a bit more?

Sure. The fact that each being fails to exist at some time does not imply that all beings fail to exist at the same time. It is logically possible that at every time, at least one being exists.

What does it mean to say that a contingent being has existed for all eternity?

“Contingent” is here used in the modal sense of “not logically necessary”. So in this world the being exists for eternity, but there is another possible world in which the being fails to exist at some time, or does not exist at all.

 

[punkforchrist]

Allow me to summarize the MTW in a less esoteric manner:

1. Something has always existed.
2. Whatever exists is either temporally necessary or temporally contingent.
3. It is possible that all temporally contingent beings collectively fail to exist at some past time.
4. It is necessarily the case that possible truths are explicable.
5. It is necessarily the case that something is explicable only if something exists.
6. Therefore, a temporally necessary being exists.

In light of our discussion, I’m not sure which of these reformulated premises you deny. Perhaps you reject (5), but I can’t think of any way to justify the claim that something can be explicable if nothing exists. The main disagreement it seems we have (feel free to point out anything you still disagree with above) is over the step from “temporally necessary being” to God.

 

[NowAgnostic]

We need to be careful not to confuse a partial explanation with a complete (or sufficient) explanation. We might simply change the wording of (1): It is possible that the union of all contingent facts U is dependent on an external agent.

That dependency is itself another contingent fact if it is possible but not necessary. Is that dependent on the external agent as well? Well that must be possible via (1). But then that is yet another contingent fact. So off to infinity we go.

This premise needs fleshing out - I don’t have the answer right now. I’m also not clear on what is meant by a “partial” explanation. Yes, you might say that because I was hungry that is a partial explanation for me going to the steak restaurant, but there is a contingent fact left completely unexplained - why I went to the steak restaurant instead of the fish place. Doesn’t a “partial” explanation of one contingent fact imply some other completely unexplained contingent fact?

I don’t see how that bodes well for one who rejects the existence of a temporally necessary being. I’m quite happy to say there is no possible world in which nothing existed in the past but something exists in the present.

OK.

The central claim under consideration is that it is possible for all temporally contingent beings to collectively fail to exist at some past time.

And I’m saying it’s not possible unless a temporally necessary being exists, from the above. This logically follows.

But now you’re trying to claim from this that a temporally necessary being exists, and it’s a non sequitur. Where’s the logic? In fact you’re committing a modal fallacy, which I’m detailing below.

The argument doesn’t rest on the claim that there had to have been a time in which no temporally contingent being existed, so the above I think is rather moot. It may very well be the case that for every time T some temporally contingent being has existed at T1, T2, T3, … and so forth. But of course, such a proposition is not mutually exclusive with the claim that there exists a temporally necessary being.

No, it isn’t, but now we have a possible universe with only temporally contingent beings, and yet one in which it was never the case in which nothing existed, right?

The only claim is that in whichever world a temporally necessary being exists, it must be supreme.

No, it just means there’s nothing capable of destroying it in any world.

I’m arguing for the impossibility of a world in which nothing existed in the past, but something presently exists. Nevertheless, it is possible (I maintain) that all temporally contingent beings should fail to exist at some past time. This would imply, given the indubitable existence of something at the present, that a temporally necessary being exists.

No, it would imply that a temporally necessary being possibly exists. You’re committing a modal fallacy, conflating modal statuses. I think every statement in a modal argument should begin with either “necessarily” or “possibly” so we know what modal status we’re in.

Your logic runs like this:

Necessarily, if something presently exists, it was not the case nothing existed in the past. (A premise I grant.)
Necessarily, each being is either temporally contingent or temporally eternal. (Law of Excluded Middle.)
Therefore, necessarily, if all temporally contingent beings failed to exist in the past, a temporally necessary being exists. (From the first two)
Possibly, all temporally contingent beings failed to exist in the past. (A premise I grant.)

from which you want to conclude

Necessarily, a temporally necessary being exists.

whereas the proper conclusion is

Possibly, a temporally necessary being exists.

There are possible worlds with temporally necessary beings. You can’t conclude from the existence of temporally contingent beings however that one exists in the actual world.

You may need to go through the argument step-by-step in order to point out any equivocation, since I just don’t see it. I grant that there may always be some temporally contingent being, but that implies nothing negative about a temporally necessary being.

OK do you see the modal fallacy now that I went through it step-by-step?

 

[punkforchrist]

Your critique above leaves out the premise about explicability, which is key in establishing the existence of a temporally necessary being. Hopefully I’ve made that a little clearer with my reformulated version.

 

[punkforchrist]

NowAgnostic:

That dependency is itself another contingent fact if it is possible but not necessary. Is that dependent on the external agent as well? Well that must be possible via (1). But then that is yet another contingent fact. So off to infinity we go.

This becomes a little unclear because I don’t see abstract objects as standing in any causal relations, which come to think about it, has a great effect on whether every contingent “fact” must have an explanation. We can easily avoid this if we postulate: It is possible that the collection of contingent things is dependent on an external cause/agent.

Now we’re no longer talking about facts, but things - that is, objects that stand in causal relations. I’m thankful for your critique of the prior version of the MCA, since that helps to present a better formulation.

This premise needs fleshing out - I don’t have the answer right now. I’m also not clear on what is meant by a “partial” explanation. Yes, you might say that because I was hungry that is a partial explanation for me going to the steak restaurant, but there is a contingent fact left completely unexplained - why I went to the steak restaurant instead of the fish place. Doesn’t a “partial” explanation of one contingent fact imply some other completely unexplained contingent fact?

I haven’t made up my mind about the necessity of explaining facts, so unfortunately, I don’t have much of an answer to this.