Lying - Is it Ever Acceptable?

[Robertanthony]

So are you saying that it would have been sinful if Pope Pius lied to the Gestapo when asked if there are Jews hiding in the Vatican when in fact there were?

Truly, why would any Jew accept the help of a Pope if they know that the Pope can’t lie to save their lives. Surely, they put their lives in his hands with the expectation that he would lie if presented with the opportunity.

Killing too is an intrinsic evil and the Natural Law prohibits this action. There are exceptions to the no killing commandment such as killing in just wars and capital punishment. Why is there no exception to lying given extraordinary circumstances? Why is no lying more iron clad than no killing?

Another scenario - undercover police officers. Are they sinning when they “lie” to drug manufacturers and dealers? If man with a cleaver is chasing your daughter, she runs in the house. He pounds on the door and asked where she is. Are you seriously just going to “withhold information” or are you going to say anything to get him to leave?

I think common sense must be employed when speaking about what is and is not a sinful lie.

You put it better than I could have done it myself, and I’m glad you brought up the example of killing, which in certain circumstances, is not morally reprehensible (a sin). I’d tend to think higher principles (ex. saving a life) would override principles deemed lesser (not lying). Trying to understand the principle at work. “Thou shall not kill” is not per se an absolute, universal command, as there are provisions that dispense from it, perhaps the same goes for lying.

 

[mosher]

So are you saying that it would have been sinful if Pope Pius lied to the Gestapo when asked if there are Jews hiding in the Vatican when in fact there were?

Truly, why would any Jew accept the help of a Pope if they know that the Pope can’t lie to save their lives. Surely, they put their lives in his hands with the expectation that he would lie if presented with the opportunity.

Killing too is an intrinsic evil and the Natural Law prohibits this action. There are exceptions to the no killing commandment such as killing in just wars and capital punishment. Why is there no exception to lying given extraordinary circumstances? Why is no lying more iron clad than no killing?

Another scenario - undercover police officers. Are they sinning when they “lie” to drug manufacturers and dealers? If man with a cleaver is chasing your daughter, she runs in the house. He pounds on the door and asked where she is. Are you seriously just going to “withhold information” or are you going to say anything to get him to leave?

I think common sense must be employed when speaking about what is and is not a sinful lie.

It is not that the Pope can’t lie, rather, it is that nobody can lie. The fact that a lie is an intrinsic evil has nothing to do with being Catholic.

Killing is not an intrinsic evil. This is why there are exceptions. Be careful to not confuse killing with murder.

In your alternate scenario there is still no reason to lie. There are many other solutions to the situation. Also, while cops can legally lie in the US this does not mean that it is morally licit.

It is common sense that one can’t lie. It is one of the first and most fundamental lessons we tell our children. Don’t confuse common sense with inventing a need to lie through artificial scenarios.

I think the principles outlined are truth but it would be too rigid to state that they must apply without exception in every situation. We can say it’s always wrong to procure or perform an abortion. We cannot say it’s always wrong to kill. The specifics of a circumstance have to be taken into account. If it were a choice between lying and saving a life or preventing a great harm I would lie and let Jesus weigh it in the balance.

You have the right idea but are applying your analysis poorly. Exceptionless norms are only derivative of intrinsically evil acts. We determine what is an intrinsically evil act is from its object and its end. Circumstance provides a modification to culpability (praise or blame). The difference between an intrinsically good or intrinsically neutral act and an intrinsically evil act is that for the former culpability can be good or bad based on circumstances whereas in the latter no modification of culpability can make the act good or neutral. My explanation is deliberately rigorous. We can only judge acts if we are very precise. How this works out in the concrete moment is another thing all together. However, by clearly understanding the basic ethical principles allows us to know what kind of act is possibly good, possibly evil, and always evil. This helps us guide our actions rightly. The moral life is not easy and the Christian life is even more demanding.

 

[mosher]

I agree, but remember that our Holy Church is run by professional philosophers, who see human life in such rigid, abstract terms that IMNAAHO they can forget they are in fact human beings.

ICXC NIKA

Wrong. It is run by people that hear confessions and as a result it is essential to understand with high acuity what the nature of the human act is and the moral life so that Christ’s mercy can be made manifest.

You put it better than I could have done it myself, and I’m glad you brought up the example of killing, which in certain circumstances, is not morally reprehensible (a sin). I’d tend to think higher principles (ex. saving a life) would override principles deemed lesser (not lying). Trying to understand the principle at work. “Thou shall not kill” is not per se an absolute, universal command, as there are provisions that dispense from it, perhaps the same goes for lying.

As I noted above, killing is not an intrinsically evil act. To compare the type of act that killing is and the type of act that lying is is to to make a comparison between apples and oranges.

 

[otjm]

Christopher Tollefsen has recently written an article that I think addresses the question very well. He essentially agrees with the poster who said (tongue-in-cheek) that you could tell the Nazi at the door “None of your ---- business,” and he argues that this might in fact be the most effective as well as the most courageous and honest response.

In response to the question about whether one should lie to “save a relationship,” I’ll only say that a relationship based on a lie isn’t a real relationship.

And while questions like “do these clothes make me look fat” are certainly land mines, I do not address them (in my own married life) through lies. It’s better to make someone a bit upset than to establish a pattern in which your spouse can’t trust what you say. So, for instance, if I ask my wife whether food I cook tastes good (I do most of the cooking), I want her to answer honestly, because then I not only know how to improve but I also know that when she enthuses about my cooking she really means it. Otherwise words come to mean nothing.

Watering down the truth, expressing it diplomatically, keeping silent on certain things–these are OK. Lies aren’t.

Edwin

Part of the problem is in the communication between a man and a woman. Women communicate differently than men; when she asks “does this (article of clothing) make me look fat”, she is not asking for information, she is asking for support. When we as men give an answer that supplies information (which she did not ask for - although it appears to us she did) we get into hot water as we have not given what she asked for (support), but rather gave what we perceived to be what she asked for - information.

So when we answer the question, we need to understand what is actually being asked - or rather, asked for.

Further, when we ask a question, we need to understand that the answer we receive may not be what we asked for. She may say the dinner was delicious, or that it was wonderful that we cook for her - and later she may say to her girlfriend that we had a horrible (dish), but that she didn’t want to hurt our feelings; in other words, we were more than willing to never cook that again, but she didn’t say that is was not to her liking - then we wonder why she is so unenthusiastic about it when we propose making it for friends… and she sees no conflict in her answer to us and her comment to her girlfriend, because she did not understand we were asking for information - and so she gave what she perceived we were asking for - support, because that is what she would have asked for.

Bottom line - neither one is lying, but the communication goes into the tank quickly.

So: for those who think that certain responses are a lie - it ain’t necessarily so.

 

[VonDerTann]

I’m sorry, Mosher, I respectfully disagree with what you write.

You say:

“Principle 1: A lie is an intrinsic evil.”
–You cannot say this categorically. If you are really seriously positing that it’s an “intrinsic evil” to say, in answer FNDRB58’s “cleaver wielding nut chasing your daughter” “I don’t know where she is,” with all due respect, you are not going to convince anyone. Why not? Because of that little thing called a moral compass we all have, i.e., the Holy Spirit speaking thru natural law. I commit an “intrinsically evil act” by protecting my daughter? Please point me to where the Catholic Church says this. It doesn’t, because no one does.

–It is illogical to state that lying is always an intrinsic evil – despite never being categorically condemned by the Church – yet you are willing to allow killing in violation of the 10 Commandments. If killing - which is contrary to the 10 commandments - is allowable, there is no reason to not also allow for lying, which is not prohibited by the 10 Commandments.

–Life is not a logic textbook. Very few people accept this premise.

As to the “alternate scenario,” which I believe is the Pope sheltering Jews, you state, “there is still no reason to lie…there are many other solutions.”
–The “Nazis at the door” is an excellent scenario because a) it really happened that way in WWII; and b) there really is no viable other alternative beyond some response likely to get you shot and your house searched too.
–As to these “other solutions,” I note that you did not in fact name any. What are they?
–Even if you can come up with some viable solutions at your computer terminal in 2011…can an unarmed Frenchman in 1942 do so, with a squad of SS men with guns at his doorstep? We need to look at morality in the lens of what people know when they are in the situation where the lie is an option.

“While cops can legally lie in the US this does not mean that it is morally licit.”
Once again – you have given us no reason to think it is not.

“It is common sense that one can’t lie. It is one of the first and most fundamental lessons we tell our children. Don’t confuse common sense with inventing a need to lie through artificial scenarios.”
–There is nothing artificial about Nazis at your door in France in 1942.
–As to it being “common sense that one can’t lie,” yes, we do tell CHILDREN not to lie…but we teach people otherwise as they mature and begin to see life as it truly is, namely, a hard cold reality where we need undercover cops, spies, etc., to protect us. “Never, ever lie” works for a 5 year old, but real life is infinitely more complex.

Now, please answer this: Does every request for information entitle the reqester to an accurate response?

 

[FNDRB58]

It is not that the Pope can’t lie, rather, it is that nobody can lie. The fact that a lie is an intrinsic evil has nothing to do with being Catholic.

Killing is not an intrinsic evil. This is why there are exceptions. Be careful to not confuse killing with murder.

In your alternate scenario there is still no reason to lie. There are many other solutions to the situation. Also, while cops can legally lie in the US this does not mean that it is morally licit.

It is common sense that one can’t lie. It is one of the first and most fundamental lessons we tell our children. Don’t confuse common sense with inventing a need to lie through artificial scenarios.

You have the right idea but are applying your analysis poorly. Exceptionless norms are only derivative of intrinsically evil acts. We determine what is an intrinsically evil act is from its object and its end. Circumstance provides a modification to culpability (praise or blame). The difference between an intrinsically good or intrinsically neutral act and an intrinsically evil act is that for the former culpability can be good or bad based on circumstances whereas in the latter no modification of culpability can make the act good or neutral. My explanation is deliberately rigorous. We can only judge acts if we are very precise. How this works out in the concrete moment is another thing all together. However, by clearly understanding the basic ethical principles allows us to know what kind of act is possibly good, possibly evil, and always evil. This helps us guide our actions rightly. The moral life is not easy and the Christian life is even more demanding.

I don’t think I confused killing with murder at all, and this is why…

The commandment doesn’t say murder, it says killing. We presume it refers to murder which is a word we use to describe the specific immoral act of taking one’s life without cause. Yet, there is some killing that is not sinful because there is cause to do so. I would say the same with regards to lying. If lying is an intrinsic evil as killing unjustly (murder) is, then why can’t can’t there be a similar exception in situations that call for lying justly?

 

[otjm]

No one takes the writings of Aquinas to be infallible. On the other hand, no one should take the writings of popes to be infallible either. Since, however, popes take the writings of Aquinas with the utmost seriousness it is reasonable that we should accord them the same respect.

Ender

And as previously noted: theologians are still split over the issue, and the Church has not made a formal pronunciation on the matter.

 

[mosher]

Sorry, I’ve been ill for a few days.

I’m sorry, Mosher, I respectfully disagree with what you write …

Now, please answer this: Does every request for information entitle the reqester to an accurate response?

I’m not a rhetorician so it is not my intent to convince through telling people what they want to hear. I’m a philosopher and a Religious so I’m concerned with telling the truth. Whether people like it or not is irrelevant. Let me respond to each point.

1. Yes, a lie as defined by Augustine and Aquinas as ‘an intentional signification of a falsehood with the intent to deceive’ is always and in every case evil. That is what the tern ‘intrinsic’ before the word evil means. An intrinsic evil is something that is contrary to nature. To tell a lie, as so defined, is to commit an act that is contrary to nature and thus evil. No matter which way you slice it, something that is contrary to nature cannot be good.
2. The CCC clearly states that lying is an intrinsic evil. It is Part III, Section 2, Chapter 2, Article 8, Title III. Offenses against Truth & Title IV Respect for the Truth. Paragraph #2475 - 2492. The CCC is a proximate norm of faith.
3. Of course life is not a logic textbook. However, classical logic is based on life. If you hold that this is not the case then you destroy all rational. Holding such a position is contrary to many, many Catholic doctrines. I would suggest a read of Fides et Ratio and Aterni Patris.
4. Your use of term illogical doesn’t make any sense.
5. Killing is not a violation of the 10 commandments. Rather, murder is a violation of the 10 commandments. Just because english translations of the OT are not clear does not mean that the hebrew term used in the Law in context with the Mosaic laws is also not clear. Any commentary worth the money it was purchased with will explain that the prohibition does not extend to all killing but only murder. As I said, lying is an intrinsic evil whereas killing is not only not an intrinsic evil it is sometimes requisite.

I think people may not understand what an intrinsic evil is. This is evident by your statement that it cannot always be an intrinsic evil. However, such a statement implies that there are times where an intrinsic evil would not be evil. But, this doesn’t make any sense because an intrinsic evil is, by definition always evil not matter what. It cannot magically become good for any reason.

1. There is a specific reason why we do not look at morality based on specific situations. Why? I have explained this elsewhere. But to put it briefly, it is because situation only effects the act as to the level of praise or blame that can be attributed to the person who does the act. However, to determine if an action is intrinsically evil, morally neutral, or good we have to look at the very nature of the act itself. If we don’t do this then we are relativists.
2. I don’t give specific solutions because I am not in that situation. As an ethicist all I can do is tell someone what is a objectively good act and what is an objectively evil act. It is only after the fact that culpability can be determined. No good ethicist is going to try to give all the possible other solutions to this issue. As you said, life is not a logic textbook. You can’t look at human situations as if they are math equations.

However, we can analyze whether there is a necessary connection between lying and saving the jewish family. With any bit of reflection it is obvious that there is no necessary connection, only an accidental connection. Why, because, the man could lie and the Nazi agent could still have the house searched. Or, also, the man could not answer the question either in part or in full and the Nazi could still search the house or not search the house. We presume in the thought experiment the following equations:

lie + situation = lives saved
not lie + situation = lives not saved

This hidden presupposition in the thought experiment negates its efficacy to tell us anything except that given these hidden equations what would most people do. However, in real life there are no such hidden equations. From this it is clear that there is only a necessary relationship between telling a lie and saving lives if we already presume that to be the case. Rather, in real life there is no necessary connection.

1. If we tell our children not to lie but it is ok for adults to lie do we not set up a double standard of morality? To believe this is to be a moral relativist, which is unchristian at best. I would suggest a read of St. Augustine’s work On Lying. He is very clear on the issue.
2. It depends on what you mean by accurate. A statement can be accurate without being complete. Also, a statement can be accurate without being true. So, without knowing what you mena by accurate I can’t answer your question yet.

 

[mosher]

I don’t think I confused killing with murder at all, and this is why…

The commandment doesn’t say murder, it says killing. We presume it refers to murder which is a word we use to describe the specific immoral act of taking one’s life without cause. Yet, there is some killing that is not sinful because there is cause to do so. I would say the same with regards to lying. If lying is an intrinsic evil as killing unjustly (murder) is, then why can’t can’t there be a similar exception in situations that call for lying justly?

I think I see what the issue is here. First, let me clarify, the commandment does say murder the hebrew word ratzach not only has the sense of meaning that our term murder has but it also is differentiated from other hebrew terms that mean ‘to kill.’ There is not really a debate about this anymore among scholars.

But, I can see the confusion of why one would think that killing is a special case of murder. However, this is looking at the issue backwards. Rather, it is murder that is a special case of killing. Killing is the genus and murder is a specific type of killing. This is why the issue doesn’t match-up with your suggestion. False signification is the genus while lying is the specific type of false signification that is immoral. Just as you can’t say that there is a special type of murder that can be morally licit we cannot say that there is a special type of lying that is morally licit. Such a statement would be nonsensical when we understand the genus/species relationships.

 

[mosher]

And as previously noted: theologians are still split over the issue, and the Church has not made a formal pronunciation on the matter.

This is not quite the case. Please note my above reference to the Catechism of the Catholic Church. The second edition of the CCC made a specific retraction in the section on lying to come into conformity with Aquinas and Augustine on the issue. The CCC is a proximate norm of faith to which we must give our assent.

Plus that, it is not really a matter of Theology so much as it is a matter of philosophy.

 

[FNDRB58]

I think I see what the issue is here. First, let me clarify, the commandment does say murder the hebrew word ratzach not only has the sense of meaning that our term murder has but it also is differentiated from other hebrew terms that mean ‘to kill.’ There is not really a debate about this anymore among scholars.

But, I can see the confusion of why one would think that killing is a special case of murder. However, this is looking at the issue backwards. Rather, it is murder that is a special case of killing. Killing is the genus and murder is a specific type of killing. This is why the issue doesn’t match-up with your suggestion. False signification is the genus while lying is the specific type of false signification that is immoral. Just as you can’t say that there is a special type of murder that can be morally licit we cannot say that there is a special type of lying that is morally licit. Such a statement would be nonsensical when we understand the genus/species relationships.

I am afraid you have misunderstood me. Your explanation of the genus/specific I agree with. I will state it again for clarity…

Murder is a type of killing. There is also killing that is justified. *
Lying is a type of telling of an untruth. There is also the telling of an untruth that is justified. [My assertion of which I think you disagree]

If you do disagree, then please explain why you can’t do with “telling and untruth → lying” what you can do with “killing → murder.”

Now that I think about it, whichever word was used in the bible is irrelevant. I did make the point that it was understood to all who received the teaching that it meant unjust killing or murder. Yet, there is the killing of a human being that is just in certain circumstances. Likewise, lying is also immoral but it is a type of telling of an untruth and there is the telling of an untruth that I maintain is justified in certain circumstances.

Thanks*

 

[mosher]

I am afraid you have misunderstood me. Your explanation of the genus/specific I agree with. I will state it again for clarity…

Murder is a type of killing. There is also killing that is justified. *
Lying is a type of telling of an untruth. There is also the telling of an untruth that is justified. [My assertion of which I think you disagree]

If you do disagree, then please explain why you can’t do with “telling and untruth → lying” *what you can do with “killing → murder.”

Now that I think about it, whichever word was used in the bible is irrelevant. I did make the point that it was understood to all who received the teaching that it meant unjust killing or murder. Yet, there is the killing of a human being that is just in certain circumstances. Likewise, lying is also immoral but it is a type of telling of an untruth and there is the telling of an untruth that I maintain is justified in certain circumstances.

Thanks

You are correct. I would agree that there are types of un-truths that are not intrinsically evil. If if were the case that all un-truths were intrinsically evil then there would be no acting, fiction literature, etc. However, such a claim would be silly. The specific difference for lying is found in the definition. St. Thomas has, as is normally the case, a very perceptive analysis of this issue. See his article on lying in the Summa Theologiae. It is worth reading the whole question instead of just the first article.

The problem is with the specific difference: “with the intention to deceive.” As long as this desire is part of the willed act then it retains its character as a lie and thus retains its character as an intrinsically evil act. What we would need to find is an act of false signification that does not have the intention to deceive in order to provide a morally licit act for the cases under consideration.

 

[FNDRB58]

Just as you can’t say that there is a special type of murder that can be morally licit we cannot say that there is a special type of lying that is morally licit. Such a statement would be nonsensical when we understand the genus/species relationships.

Quick point…I did not say that there is a special type of lying, I said that there is a special type of “telling an untruth” which is lying. Perhaps you ascertained this from my previous post but I wanted to be clear.

 

[FNDRB58]

The problem is with the specific difference: “with the intention to deceive.” As long as this desire is part of the willed act then it retains its character as a lie and thus retains its character as an intrinsically evil act. What we would need to find is an act of false signification that does not have the intention to deceive in order to provide a morally licit act for the cases under consideration.

The problem you run into though is that the Catechism states that the intent to deceive ***for those who have the right to know the truth. *** So the telling of an untruth is not a lie (sinful) if the murderer is asking you where his next victim is hiding because he does not have a right to know this truth. Would you agree or disagree with this?

So though lying (by its definition) may be an intrinsic evil if done with the intent to deceive one who has the right to know the truth, there is the situation where a person does not have the right to know the truth, therefore it is not a lie…or should be called something else, but it is still the just telling of an untruth.

 

[momor]

And can we justifiably tell a lie (no Jews here) to prevent a greater evil (murder)?
I don’t think God would see that as a sin. In fact, I think God would see our hiding of the Jews (in which we would technically be decieving the state) as a heroic act.

I just watched The Pianist last night and I have no moral qualms about lying to the Nazi’s and see nothing evil in that kind of lie. Think about it. Mosher seems to be saying that lying to a Nazi to protect a Jew is an intrinsic evil but killing a Nazi who is about to murder a Jew is not. If you could lie to prevent the Nazi from murdering the Jew and to avoid killing the Nazi yourself who is about to murder the Jew, is lying that saves 2 lives so bad?

 

[mosher]

The problem you run into though is that the Catechism states that the intent to deceive ***for those who have the right to know the truth. *** So the telling of an untruth is not a lie (sinful) if the murderer is asking you where his next victim is hiding because he does not have a right to know this truth. Would you agree or disagree with this?

So though lying (by its definition) may be an intrinsic evil if done with the intent to deceive one who has the right to know the truth, there is the situation where a person does not have the right to know the truth, therefore it is not a lie…or should be called something else, but it is still the just telling of an untruth.

The Second Edition of the Catechism specifically removed that clause. Unfortunatelly the text on the Vatican Website still has the text of the First Edition though it has the Second Edition numbering. Let us compare:
"First Edition:

2483 Lying is the most direct offense against the truth. To lie is to speak or act against the truth in order to lead into error someone who has the right to know the truth. By injuring man’s relation to truth and to his neighbor, a lie offends against the fundamental relation of man and of his word to the Lord.

Second Edition:

2483 Lying is the most direct offense against the truth. To lie is to speak or act against the truth in order to lead someone into error. By injuring man’s relation to truth and to his neighbor, a lie offends against the fundamental relation of man and of his word to the Lord.

Notice that the subordinate clause, “who has the right to know the truth” was the only thing removed or modified in this paragraph. Also, even if the notion were included it still does not grant permission to lie. Taken in context of what has come before this paragraph and what comes after it the only viable conclusion of the clauses meaning is the withholding of true information out of the virtue of discretion. My response to your questions should be obvious. Another reason why this is important is because a priest needs to know how to act when being commanded by a civil or church authority to divulge knowledge gained in confession. The priest may not lie but he may not divulge what he has heard in confession no matter what compulsion he is faced with. The example of the martyrs makes this evident.

And can we justifiably tell a lie (no Jews here) to prevent a greater evil (murder)?
I don’t think God would see that as a sin. In fact, I think God would see our hiding of the Jews (in which we would technically be decieving the state) as a heroic act.

I just watched The Pianist last night and I have no moral qualms about lying to the Nazi’s and see nothing evil in that kind of lie. Think about it. Mosher seems to be saying that lying to a Nazi to protect a Jew is an intrinsic evil but killing a Nazi who is about to murder a Jew is not. If you could lie to prevent the Nazi from murdering the Jew and to avoid killing the Nazi yourself who is about to murder the Jew, is lying that saves 2 lives so bad?

No. One, especially a Christian, cannot do evil to bring about a good ever. Not only is this philosophically the case but Scripture is very clear about this:
3 John 1:11:

Beloved, do not imitate evil but imitate good. He who does good is of God; he who does evil has not seen God.

1 Peter 10:

For “He that would love life and see good days, let him keep his tongue from evil and his lips from speaking guile …”

The only reason why people seem to have a problem with lying is because we do it all the time. Sometimes we are so familiar with a particular sin that we forget that it is a sin and we think that it is normative. But, just because a sin is rampant doesn’t mean that it is praiseworthy or in some way good. All it means is that sin abounds. I also think that we don’t grasp just how grave sin really is with relation to societal cohesion. Human civilization, is intimately bound up with a reliance on the presumption that people speak the truth to one other. Also, all human knowledge begins to breakdown if we start excusing or normalizing lying. Human life cannot be lived in such a way. But, also, in some respect a lie is also an offense against God directly because he is the Way, the *Truth/], and the Life. Christ unites these three things in himself. To abandon one is to, in some degree, abandon all.

But there is a more subtle issue that is troubling me here that we haven’t examined closely. I’ve hinted at it but not thematized it. This is the connection between the lie and the intended end in these situations that are given. I’ll do a specific post on the issue to try to make clear what I see as a problem with the reasoning behind trying to accept lying as a licit means to achieve a good.*

 

[FNDRB58]

.,…Notice that the subordinate clause, “who has the right to know the truth” was the only thing removed or modified in this paragraph. Also, even if the notion were included it still does not grant permission to lie. Taken in context of what has come before this paragraph and what comes after it the only viable conclusion of the clauses meaning is the withholding of true information out of the virtue of discretion. My response to your questions should be obvious. Another reason why this is important is because a priest needs to know how to act when being commanded by a civil or church authority to divulge knowledge gained in confession. The priest may not lie but he may not divulge what he has heard in confession no matter what compulsion he is faced with. The example of the martyrs makes this evident.

Comparing priests’ obligations in the Sacrament of Confession and the question of whether it is permissible to tell an untruth to Nazis in order to save the lives of Jews is like comparing apples to oranges. If telling the confessions of penitents to others were permissible, even in the most dire situations, then there would be no trust of the priest nor the Sacrament, leaving the Sacrament effectively worthless. No one would confess murders, rapes, etc. This is a much different scenario than the non-sacramental one’s of which we are discussing.

In the other thread I started on this subject I said this:

Jesus healing on the Sabbath…

Working on the Sabbath was forbidden as written in the Ten Commandments. Yet, Jesus did do work on the Sabbath contrary to the law. Why, because he was doing an act of love by saving a man’s soul which is a good thing. You see, everyone interpreted the law incorrectly. Jesus showed them that there were exceptions to the law. Just as there are exceptions to “thou shalt not kill (murder)” we can still kill in self-defense. Just as there are exceptions to lying which makes it not a lie but rather a justifiable telling of an untruth. Certainly saving the lives of innocent Jews would be considered an act of love. If Jesus breaks a law to save a man’s soul, isn’t it prudent for us to break the “no lying” law to save a man’s life?

 

[mosher]

We keep speaking about the thought experiment that invokes the binary conclusion that either a) lying to a Nazi about hidden Jews in your house = ensuring that they lives are saved, or b) any other speech act to the Nazi = the death of the Jews hidden in your house. While I object to the very structure of the thought experiment this is not my concern at this point. My concern is that we take a look at the first assumed conclusion a little closer to see if it actually follows that the lives of the Jews hidden in your house are saved as a result of you telling a lie to the Nazi. This connection between the act and the hoped for intention is not often discussed because the thought experiment does not allow you to question the connection because it assumes the connection. However, this is a poor understanding of how an act and a future (proximate or remote) hoped for end, i.e., ‘intention’ is related.

An intention is what we as an acting person hope to accomplish. It is the desired end of the agent. So, in the thought experiment if I am the person answering the door and confronted with the situation described my intention is to save the hidden Jews in my house. This is not the real question in the thought experiment. The question is about means. This is what I choose to do in order to achieve my intended end of saving the Jews in my house. But it is about more than just means. It is also about the deliberation I have as a acting subject with myself about what means to choose.

The first issue is simple, it is restricted by the thought experiment. There are effectively three possible choices permitted 1) tell the truth, 2) lie, or 3) refuse to answer. For clarity sake we should remember that the question is: “are there Jews in your house?” We can represent the three possible responses as 1) Yes, 2) No, or 3) neither yes nor no. There is a possible 4th response but it too similar to #3 to matter for this analysis. Anyway, we are confronted with one of the most basic principles of moral action at this point, viz., the ends do not justify the means. So, now we have to deliberate about the means available to us. The deliberation leads us to ask: can I lie?, can I tell the truth?, or can I refuse to answer? in order to achieve my intended end of saving the lives of the Jews hiding in my house.

It is at this point where we rush to a judgment when thinking about this problem. We get to this point and think that we are caught in a unresolvable situation. We think that, if we tell the truth it is certain that the Nazi will take the Jews off to their deaths; if I refuse to answer it will most likely result in the Nazi having my house searched, the Jews being found and lead off to their deaths; or if I lie that the Nazi will go away and the Jews will be safe. Thus, given these three foreseen conclusions I need to lie in order to achieve my intended end. But now we get into the problem that lying is wrong and we can’t do a wrong in order to make a right so either we satisfy ourselves by saying that the end is so important that I am willing to lie in this instance or we try to redefine ‘to lie’ so that we can assuage our conscience by telling ourselves that lying really isn’t always evil.

 

[mosher]

(cont.)

But, wait a moment, we missed something. We have jumped to conclusions and justified our actions too soon. What we should have done is taken a moment to see just how certain we are about the foreseen conclusions. So we should look at them again. They can be represented as:

1. If truth then death
2. If lie then life
3. If neither then death

But, are we so sure? Is there a necessary connection between my action (lying or not) and my intention (saving the Jews in my house) or is there only an accidental connection if and only if their lives are saved? I would suggest that the latter is the case. Why is the case? If we think about it the reason is clear. We are assuming an action of the Nazi for which we have no certain knowledge. He may already know that you are hiding a Jewish family. He may not care either way. He might be a sympathizer with your cause and you don’t know it. If we consider each ‘if, then clause’ this way then we might be surprised at how the conclusions change:

1. If truth then possibly death.
2. If lie then possibly death.
3. If lie then possibly death.

The first is changed because we don’t know how the Nazi is going to react to the truth. If he is a sympathizer, then your achieve your intention. If he is not, then you don’t. The second changes because you may lie and he believes you or he may not believe you and still search the house, find the Jews and have them killed. The third is changed because of basically the same reasons as #2. So, unless we have absolute certainty of how the Nazi at the door is going to act then we have no sure reason to believe that any of the three options will be more effective at helping us attain our intention of saving the Jews hiding in the house. This means that there is no necessary connection between the means of lying or the means of telling the truth and the intention of the agent.

Granted, it is more probable that the Jews will be killed if you choose means 1 or 3. But, we should not confuse probability with necessity. Therefore, for us to act rightly and effectively we need to discover a means that has a necessary connection between the means and the end of the agent. I don’t know what this would be, I’d have to think about it a lot. However, the point is that we ought not assume a necessary connection where one does not exist.

What the thought experiment really exposes is the willingness of an individual person to lie in order to save the lives of those under his care. This is very different than it making a rational argument for the goodness of lying. So, we should be honest and call a spade a spade instead of doing philosophical [sic] gymnastics in order to say that lying is good. Rather, we should say simply that a person put in such a circumstance is placed in an impossible situation where he believes that he must lie in order to save the lives of those he has promised to protect. Then let us have sympathy and but understanding if he does choose to lie. But, let us not go so far as to call evil good even if it accomplishes a good end.

 

[momor]

mosher;7643412:

Comparing priests’ obligations in the Sacrament of Confession and the question of whether it is permissible to tell an untruth to Nazis in order to save the lives of Jews is like comparing apples to oranges. If telling the confessions of penitents to others were permissible, even in the most dire situations, then there would be no trust of the priest nor the Sacrament, leaving the Sacrament effectively worthless. No one would confess murders, rapes, etc. This is a much different scenario than the non-sacramental one’s of which we are discussing.

In the other thread I started on this subject I said this:

Jesus healing on the Sabbath…

Working on the Sabbath was forbidden as written in the Ten Commandments. Yet, Jesus did do work on the Sabbath contrary to the law. Why, because he was doing an act of love by saving a man’s soul which is a good thing. You see, everyone interpreted the law incorrectly. Jesus showed them that there were exceptions to the law. Just as there are exceptions to “thou shalt not kill (murder)” we can still kill in self-defense. Just as there are exceptions to lying which makes it not a lie but rather a justifiable telling of an untruth. Certainly saving the lives of innocent Jews would be considered an act of love. If Jesus breaks a law to save a man’s soul, isn’t it prudent for us to break the “no lying” law to save a man’s life?

Another point regarding confession and telling a lie:

A priest cannot be forced by authorities to give information about what was said in the confessional and at the same time he is not necessarily revealing anything harmful by saying I cannot answer. The authorities can’t make a determination based on the answer.

However, a Nazi at the door asking are there any Jews hiding here is going to form a positive opinion that there are if you say I can’t answer.

I like your example of Jesus working on the Sabbath. He broke a technicality of the Law to act in the Spirit of the Law. If I was first on the scene of an injury car accident and didn’t stop to render aid (I’m an RN) because it would mean doing work on the Sabbath, I’d be keeping one commandment but breaking one of the greatest commandments which is to love my neighbor. If telling a lie saves a life, then I am breaking one commandment in order to keep the commandment about loving my neighbor. Since keeping one commandment can’t logically break another commandment, then I think telling a lie in that case isn’t breaking a commandment at all.

It seems to me that in a perfect world absolutes such as never telling any lie even to a good end would be possible. In our broken world however, I question how we can be that absolute and still be able to do the most loving thing. People have listed example after example in which telling the truth or even remaining silent would bring about harm. I think greater evil can be morally thwarted by lesser evil.

I also cannot accept the idea that telling a literal or half truth with the intent to deceive is any more moral than telling a proportionate lie with the intent to do good.

One final thought. If we can kill in self-defense or defense of another’s life why can’t we lie in the same circumstances? We all know that hiding Jews was a killing offense so if they were discovered you were going to die right along with them.