M.O.M Vs Betterave: On the nature of existence

[MindOverMatter2]

• Originally Posted by Betterave View Post*

For Aquinas, again, existence is the final perfection of an essence or nature; it is not itself a nature.

In order to receive reality, reality must first exist. But since you say that reality does not have its own nature, then it follows that there is no such thing as existence because it has no nature or reality. Therefore existence is objectively meaningless; and thus there is no substantial objective difference between the act of something and non-existence. This is obviously impossible.

1. Out of nothing comes nothing
2. Absolutely nothing cannot exist.
3. Therefore there is a being who has a nature that is intrinsically the act of existence.
4. It follows thus that “Existence” is a nature, and the nature of existence is to be real as opposed to nothing.

Aquinas’s philosophy, as you present it, is meaningless and flawed. And i am happy to reject it as outdated and heretical in nature in so far as how it treats existence.

 

[Betterave]

Let’s just start with your first sentence (again):

In order to receive reality, reality must first exist.

I have no idea what that’s supposed to mean. It sounds like nonsense to me. Can you explain?

(For your argument, (3) and (4) look like non sequiturs.)

(On the meaning of ‘nature’ for Aquinas, he is quite clear in Chapter One of his De ente et essentia that he uses the term ‘nature’ to mean the same as essence (essentia), not existence (esse).

 

[Betterave]

Here is the beginning of Chapter One of Thomas’s De ente et essentia. In particular, please note the last sentence I quote here (bolded for your convenience ):

Sciendum est igitur quod, sicut in V metaphysicae philosophus dicit, ens per se dicitur dupliciter, uno modo quod dividitur per decem genera, alio modo quod significat propositionum veritatem. Horum autem differentia est quia secundo modo potest dici ens omne illud, de quo affirmativa propositio formari potest, etiam si illud in re nihil ponat. Per quem modum privationes et negationes entia dicuntur; dicimus enim quod affirmatio est opposita negationi et quod caecitas est in oculo. Sed primo modo non potest dici ens nisi quod aliquid in re ponit. Unde primo modo caecitas et huiusmodi non sunt entia. Nomen igitur essentiae non sumitur ab ente secundo modo dicto, aliqua enim hoc modo dicuntur entia, quae essentiam non habent, ut patet in privationibus; sed sumitur essentia ab ente primo modo dicto. Unde Commentator in eodem loco dicit quod ens primo modo dictum est quod significat essentiam rei. Et quia, ut dictum est, ens hoc modo dictum dividitur per decem genera, oportet quod essentia significet aliquid commune omnibus naturis, per quas diversa entia in diversis generibus et speciebus collocantur, sicut humanitas est essentia hominis, et sic de aliis. Et quia illud, per quod res constituitur in proprio genere vel specie, est hoc quod significatur per diffinitionem indicantem quid est res, inde est quod nomen essentiae a philosophis in nomen quiditatis mutatur. Et hoc est quod philosophus frequenter nominat quod quid erat esse, id est hoc per quod aliquid habet esse quid. Dicitur etiam forma secundum quod per formam significatur certitudo uniuscuiusque rei, ut dicit Avicenna in II metaphysicae suae. Hoc etiam alio nomine natura dicitur accipiendo naturam secundum primum modum illorum quattuor, quos Boethius in libro de duabus naturis assignat, secundum scilicet quod natura dicitur omne illud quod intellectu quoquo modo capi potest. Non enim res est intelligibilis nisi per diffinitionem et essentiam suam. Et sic etiam philosophus dicit in V metaphysicae quod omnis substantia est natura. Tamen nomen naturae hoc modo sumptae videtur significare essentiam rei, secundum quod habet ordinem ad propriam operationem rei, cum nulla res propria operatione destituatur. Quiditatis vero nomen sumitur ex hoc, quod per diffinitionem significatur. Sed essentia dicitur secundum quod per eam et in ea ens habet esse.

 

[MindOverMatter2]

I have no idea what that’s supposed to mean. It sounds like nonsense to me. Can you explain?

To say that existence is created is nonsensical. Out of nothing comes nothing, so you work it out.

Potential beings receive their reality. This is to say that they are not the source or the act of reality, but rather, God alone is the act of reality that potential essences receive.

(For your argument, (3) and (4) look like non sequiturs.)

I do not accept assertions of non-sequiturs. Explain why they are.

(On the meaning of ‘nature’ for Aquinas, he is quite clear in Chapter One of his De ente et essentia that he uses the term ‘nature’ to mean the same as essence (essentia), not existence (esse).

Its funny that you should say that because I really don’t care about how Aquinas uses the word nature. I am only interested in how i use the word. It is also quite funny and interesting to find out how quickly you have forgotten what you said earlier about Gods essence. You said that Gods esse is his essence, as in identical. Tut Tut. It would seem that speaking of esse as a “nature” is thus not out of bounds on Aquinas’s view.

I will let you work out where you have gone wrong with that one.

 

[MindOverMatter2]

Here is the beginning of Chapter One of Thomas’s De ente et essentia. In particular, please note the last sentence I quote here (bolded for your convenience ):

You know a different language, good for you.

 

[MindOverMatter2]

(On the meaning of ‘nature’ for Aquinas, he is quite clear in Chapter One of his De ente et essentia that he uses the term ‘nature’ to mean the same as essence (essentia), not existence (esse).

I would also like to point out something that is quite telling of how flawed your interpretation of Aquinas really is. You see, Aquinas seems to emphasize quite explicitly that Gods essence is his esse. In other words Gods esse is intrinsic to Gods nature. Now if that were true of all potential beings, as in to say that their essence is their own esse or act of reality, then it would not make sense that Aquinas would make this special emphasis for God. Also if esse is not intrinsic to the nature of a potential essence, then it is meaningless to say that a potential essence has its own act of reality. It receives reality from that which is the act of reality, since out of absolutely nothing comes no reality. The act of reality is not something that is independent of Gods nature or something that can be quantified in to parts.

The fact is a potential being is not its own act of reality, and Aquinas never held that view. If he did, then i don’t understand why he is seen as one of the greatest philosophers of all time, since to me it is just ridiculous to say a potential essence is its own act of reality.

It seems to me that you fall in to the ranks of Transcendental-Thomism, while me and warp are in the ranks of Existential-Thomism.

 

[Betterave]

To say that existence is created is nonsensical. Out of nothing comes nothing, so you work it out.
If what you’re saying makes sense, and what I’m saying doesn’t, maybe you could explain why that is the case instead of telling me to work it out. IOW, please afford me the same courtesy that I afford you. Repeated assertions of a view that doesn’t make sense to me and a refusal to engage with my critique of your view are not helpful argumentative strategies. You might want to pretend for a minute that you’re talking to someone who is just as educated as you, maybe more so, and to whom you shouldn’t address yourself so dismissively. Thanks in advance for your cooperation.

Potential beings receive their reality. This is to say that they are not the source or the act of reality, but rather, God alone is the act of reality that potential essences receive.

Is that supposed to explicate your previous claim: “In order to receive reality, reality must first exist”? If so, I think you’ve done a pretty poor job. Could you try again?

I do not accept assertions of non-sequiturs. Explain why they are.

Your conclusions appear not to follow from your premises. If you think they do, explain how.

Its funny that you should say that because I really don’t care about how Aquinas uses the word nature. I am only interested in how i use the word. It is also quite funny and interesting to find out how quickly you have forgotten what you said earlier about Gods essence. You said that Gods esse is his essence, as in identical. Tut Tut. It would seem that speaking of esse as a “nature” is thus not out of bounds on Aquinas’s view.

I will let you work out where you have gone wrong with that one.

You seem to be of two minds on caring what Aquinas thinks. You apparently believe you are some kind of representative of a defensible version of ‘Thomism,’ but you don’t care about how Thomas actually used terms? You only care how YOU use the term? That’s whack. If that’s going to be your attitude, I suspect attempting to have an intelligent discussion with you will be too difficult to be worth the effort.

As to me forgetting anything, that’s nonsense. If you would just bother to carefully read the quote I provided from St. Thomas’ De ente et essentia, I think you should be able to understand the violence you have done to the context of Thomas’ statements.

 

[Betterave]

I would also like to point out something that is quite telling of how flawed your interpretation of Aquinas really is. You see, Aquinas seems to emphasize quite explicitly that Gods essence is his esse. In other words Gods esse is intrinsic to Gods nature. Now if that were true of all potential beings, as in to say that their essence is their own esse or act of reality, then it would not make sense that Aquinas would make this special emphasis for God. Also if esse is not intrinsic to the nature of a potential essence, then it is meaningless to say that a potential essence has its own act of reality. It receives reality from that which is the act of reality, since out of absolutely nothing comes no reality. The act of reality is not something that is independent of Gods nature or something that can be quantified in to parts.

I think you badly misunderstand the conceptual structure of Thomas’ position as expressed in the DEE. The discussion of meanings of terms or concepts - of semantic distinctions and identities (as in the excerpt provided) - is different from and precedes the discussion of real distinctions and identities. Do you understand that?

 

[warpspeedpetey]

Since that through which a thing is constituted in its proper genus or species is what is signified by the definition indicating what the thing is, philosophers introduced the term quiddity to mean the same as the term essence; and this is the same thing that the Philosopher frequently terms what it is to be a thing, that is, that through which something has being as a particular kind of thing. Essence is also called form, for the certitude of every thing is signified through its form, as Avicenna says in his Metaphysicae I, cap. 6. The same thing is also called nature, taking nature in the first of the four senses that Boethius distinguishes in his book De Persona et Duabus Naturis cap. 1 (PL 64, 1341B), in the sense, in other words, that nature is what we call everything that can in any way be captured by the intellect, for a thing is not intelligible except through its definition and essence. And so the Philosopher says in V Metaphysicae cap. 4 (1014b36) that every substance is a nature. But the term nature used in this way seems to signify the essence of a thing as it is ordered to the proper operation of the thing, for no thing is without its proper operation. The term quiddity, surely, is taken from the fact that this is what is signified by the definition. But the same thing is called essence because the being has existence through it and in it.