Man (Spirit and Matter)

[thinkandmull]

I kinda use a Descartian doubt thing with Aquinas. I doubt everything until something forces itself out at me. Its very impressive as a torrent of argument. Maybe I should keep it more to myself, sorry

If you read the ON THE CONTRARY for Q 75 Art 5 he speaks of spiritual matter. Aristotle in his Physics says that air, for example, is more incorporeal than earth. So I think for Aquinas, the animals would have an ether like soul, but not purely simple (ie spiritual). Does that make sense? I think Descartes position is the same on animals, although people interpret him in a different way as well

 

[thinkandmull]

I think Aquinas was color actually:

[W]hat is receptive of color must be without color [sine colore], as what is receptive of sound must be without sound: for nothing receives what it already has: and so it is clear that the transparent must be without color. * In De Anima II L.15, n.1. Cf.*

Now the organ of any sense should not have in act the contraries of which the sense is perceptive, but should be in potency to them, so that it can receive them, since the recipient should be deprived of the thing received. . . . For the organ of vision, obviously the pupil, entirely lacks white and black and generally every kind of color; and it is the same in hearing and in smell.

Questiones De Anima Q8c.

But even if the pupil was clear, how could it see water? How can man see man? I think this just came from physics he learned at an early age. Its very fascinating to learn about this thinkers, walking in their gardens, all those years ago…

 

[balto]

“Thomists deny that matter is inert” Where do you get that from?

What you said about Descartes is incorrect. He said the soul is simple like Aquinas did. Whether he is more dualistic than Aquinas just depends on how you interpret him

That matter is inert is typically an assumption that is made by modern thinkers. It underlies the whole notion of “laws of nature.” Laws that exist over and above matter cause matter to behave in certain ways, but the matter considered by itself without any laws does not do anything.

Yes, I know Descartes believed that the soul was simple, but he thought that the soul was that which is able to say to itself “I think, therefore I am” and he defined this as a res cognitans, a “thinking thing”, as opposed to a res extensa or “extended thing.” So the human became two things, a thinking thing and an extended thing. That’s surely dualistic but not the same kind of dualism that pre-moderns used.

 

[balto]

Descartes believed that body had certain functions (imagination, movement), and the simple soul others. It not contrary to Thomas Aquinas, regardless of what Prof. Feser thinks. I read Descartes often. Augustine used an argument that was used by Descartes and Feser tried his best to say they were different but they were exactly the same thing!

I wouldn’t be surprised if St. Augustine’s thinking was similar to Descartes’ thinking. Augustine was a Christian Platonist and so probably shared Plato’s views on forms being separate entities from material things. The view of soul and body being separate things is quite amenable to this viewpoint. Descartes’ views were probably a reversion of thinking from Aristotle to Plato, and then eventually the Platonism was undone leading to the materialist vs. idealist confusion that we live in nowadays.

 

[balto]

Let me try to put this into my own words. I am sure Aquinas would agree that the eye can see colors, the body can feel sensations, the tongue can taste, the ears can hear, and the nose can smell. They have a determined nature and are attuned to receiving the kinds of (name removed by moderator)uts they receive. They can’t be the source of intellect, obviously, because they don’t perform that function. I think Aquinas would allow that we can make mental images within our minds, or recall smells, or physical sensations, and he would agree that these constitute further instances of these sensations. But they are still determined by the nature of the sense. They cannot know all things, like the intellect can. The intellect can abstract from particular instances of things and know them in their universality. It can also understand how different things are related to one another. It can also know the difference between what is true and what is false. The sense cannot perform such actions.

The key here is that determinate natures can only know determinate things. Therefore only an immaterial, indeterminate thing, could possible know indeterminate universal things. Therefore the soul must be such a substance.

I think your summary here is correct. And I think it is important to understand his reply to objection 2.

Because only that which subsists can have an operation.

Well, Aquinas seems to dispute this opinion below, but it seems to rest on a technical definition of “subsists.” The eye sees but I think he would deny that the eye is subsistent, since the eye always inheres in a complete animal. So the eye sees, it operates, but does not subsist. The whole animal is said to see by means of the eye, but only the eye is actually seeing.

**[In response to reply to objection 2]**Uggg. Not sure I’m getting this. I have to read it through again tomorrow.

I think understanding this is related to the preceding paragraph that I wrote. Sensible organs are part of the whole animal. The eye sees, the skin feels, the ears hear, etc. and the animal sees, feels, and hears by means of these organs. It’s not the animal qua animal that sees, feels, etc. But it is different with the intellect. It’s not a “part of” the human that understands, as it really is a “part of” the human that sees and the human sees by this part. The human as a whole is said to understand. The objector said that the soul cannot be subsistent because to understand is to be moved, and what subsists cannot be moved. I think Aquinas is probably trying to draw a distinction between soul and essence, and would say that it is okay for the soul to be moved, as long as it is a per se movement (i.e. the whole thing is moved). But what the objector was thinking about when talking about the soul was really the essence. What a human is, that is not changed by understanding, but the whole human is changed by understanding.

The confusion comes because “soul” is understood as the life principle. In animals and lower life forms, the soul and essence probably refer to the same thing, since the organism is purely corporeal. There’s no intellectual, immaterial knower in animals that transcends matter, so it’s not possible to move the soul, since the soul, or form, cannot directly interact with other forms and so cannot be moved. So soul and essence mistakenly seem to be the same thing since neither is moved (but it is only accidental that the soul is not moved, while essential that the essence is not, the objector fails to make this distinction). I guess in humans and angels, the soul is an intellectual knower that transcends matter, so that accidental property of the soul not being moved no longer holds due to the incorporeal intellect, which is directly affected by other forms, but it is still true that the essence is not moved. Aquinas seems to mean something like this since Aristotle, contra Plato, said that forms cannot subsist without having some matter. Aquinas says they can, as they can subsist apart from matter in angels, but angels still have essence and existence. So he seems to try to be synthesizing Plato and Aristotle.

 

[utunumsint]

I think your summary here is correct. And I think it is important to understand his reply to objection 2.

Thanks Balto.

Reply to Objection 2. Aristotle wrote those words as expressing not his own opinion, but the opinion of those who said that to understand is to be moved, as is clear from the context. Or we may reply that to operate “per se” belongs to what exists “per se.” But for a thing to exist “per se,” it suffices sometimes that it be not inherent, as an accident or a material form; even though it be part of something. Nevertheless, that is rightly said to subsist “per se,” which is neither inherent in the above sense, nor part of anything else. In this sense, the eye or the hand cannot be said to subsist “per se”; nor can it for that reason be said to operate “per se.” Hence the operation of the parts is through each part attributed to the whole. For we say that man sees with the eye, and feels with the hand, and not in the same sense as when we say that what is hot gives heat by its heat; for heat, strictly speaking, does not give heat. We may therefore say that the soul understands, as the eye sees; but it is more correct to say that man understands through the soul.

Well, Aquinas seems to dispute this opinion below, but it seems to rest on a technical definition of “subsists.” The eye sees but I think he would deny that the eye is subsistent, since the eye always inheres in a complete animal. So the eye sees, it operates, but does not subsist. The whole animal is said to see by means of the eye, but only the eye is actually seeing.

Right. I think this corresponds to what he says here in his reply:

In this sense, the eye or the hand cannot be said to subsist “per se”; nor can it for that reason be said to operate “per se.” Hence the operation of the parts is through each part attributed to the whole.

I think understanding this is related to the preceding paragraph that I wrote. Sensible organs are part of the whole animal. The eye sees, the skin feels, the ears hear, etc. and the animal sees, feels, and hears by means of these organs. It’s not the animal qua animal that sees, feels, etc. But it is different with the intellect. It’s not a “part of” the human that understands, as it really is a “part of” the human that sees and the human sees by this part. The human as a whole is said to understand. The objector said that the soul cannot be subsistent because to understand is to be moved, and what subsists cannot be moved. I think Aquinas is probably trying to draw a distinction between soul and essence, and would say that it is okay for the soul to be moved, as long as it is a per se movement (i.e. the whole thing is moved). But what the objector was thinking about when talking about the soul was really the essence. What a human is, that is not changed by understanding, but the whole human is changed by understanding.

The confusion comes because “soul” is understood as the life principle. In animals and lower life forms, the soul and essence probably refer to the same thing, since the organism is purely corporeal. There’s no intellectual, immaterial knower in animals that transcends matter, so it’s not possible to move the soul, since the soul, or form, cannot directly interact with other forms and so cannot be moved. So soul and essence mistakenly seem to be the same thing since neither is moved (but it is only accidental that the soul is not moved, while essential that the essence is not, the objector fails to make this distinction). I guess in humans and angels, the soul is an intellectual knower that transcends matter, so that accidental property of the soul not being moved no longer holds due to the incorporeal intellect, which is directly affected by other forms, but it is still true that the essence is not moved. Aquinas seems to mean something like this since Aristotle, contra Plato, said that forms cannot subsist without having some matter. Aquinas says they can, as they can subsist apart from matter in angels, but angels still have essence and existence. So he seems to try to be synthesizing Plato and Aristotle.

You are probably on the right track. But it is astounding how much knowledge Aquinas is assuming here in his response. I wonder if there might be some parallel section in the SCG that explains this in more detail? I’ll see what I can find later on today.

Thanks again for your responses.

God bless,
Ut

 

[utunumsint]

From the SCG THAT THE INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCE IS NOT A BODY

[2] For it is only by quantitative commensuration that a body contains anything at all; so, too, if a thing contains a whole thing in the whole of itself, it contains also a part in a part of itself, a greater part in a greater part, a lesser part in a lesser part. But an intellect does not, in terms of any quantitative commensuration, comprehend a thing understood, since by its whole self it understands and encompasses both whole and part, things great in quantity and things small. Therefore, no intelligent substance is a body.

You can’t quantify intellect, although we try to grade it in test and exams at school, that measurement does not constitute a physical division, just a correspondence with truth. Still, the concept of a hard drive containing information might apply here. And that is a physical thing. I can cut out segments of my disk space and corrupt data.

[3] Then, too, no body can receive the substantial form of another body, unless by corruption it lose its own form. But the intellect is not corrupted; rather, it is perfected by receiving the forms of all bodies; for it is perfected by understanding, and it understands by having in itself the forms of the things understood. Hence, no intellectual substance is a body.

Right. A ball only becomes a puddle of goo through the heat by loosing the form of ball. But the intellect does not work like that. It has a potential for truth, and as knowledge is added, it typically grows in perfection. It has the ability to understand forms and take them in in their immaterial universality.

[4] Again, the principle of diversity among individuals of the same species is the division of matter according to quantity; the form of this fire does not differ from the form of that fire, except by the fact of its presence in different parts into which the matter is divided; nor is this brought about in any other way than by the division of quantity—without which substance is indivisible. Now, that which is received into a body is received into it according to the division of quantity. Therefore, it is only as individuated that a form is received into a body. If, then, the intellect were a body, the intelligible forms of things would not be received into it except as individuated. But the intellect understands things by those forms of theirs which it has in its possession. So, if it were a body, it would not be cognizant of universals but only of particulars. But this is patently false. Therefore, no intellect is a body.

Makes perfect sense to me.

[5] Likewise, nothing acts except in keeping with its species, because in each and every thing the form is the principle of action; so that, if the intellect is a body, its action will not go beyond the order of bodies. It would then have no knowledge of anything except bodies. But this is clearly false, because we know many things that are not bodies. Therefore, the intellect is not a body.

Clear as day. But is it true? For those who reduce intellect to brain, this is a very difficult thing to disprove. Truly a huge problem for reductionists.

Continued…

God bless,
Ut

 

[utunumsint]

[6] Moreover, if an intelligent substance is a body, it is either finite or infinite. Now, it is impossible for a body to be actually infinite, as is proved in the Physics [III, 5]. Therefore, if we suppose that such a substance is a body at all, it is a finite one. But this also is impossible, since, as was shown in Book I of this work, infinite power can exist in no finite body. And yet the cognitive power of the intellect is in a certain way infinite; for by adding number to number its knowledge of the species of numbers is infinitely extended; and the same applies to its knowledge of the species of figures and proportions. Moreover, the intellect grasps the universal, which is virtually infinite in its scope, because it contains individuals which are potentially infinite. Therefore, the intellect is not a body.

The intellect seems to potentially be able to add numbers infinitely. Infinitely extended numbers. Also knowledge of infinites of figures and proportions. Not sure what he means here, but maybe something like pie? Also, universals are virtually infinite in scope because universals contains all individuals within its scope. But all of these are just potential infinites, not actual infinites. The mind represents them as abstractions. No one actually calculates pie. No one actually knows all members of a species. But somehow we know we are dealing with potentially infinite sets when are minds dwell on universals. Many mathematicians that inhabit this world of abstraction, who are philosophically inclined, tend to be platonic-realists about these universals. Whereas Aristotle believes they only exist in the concrete substances. Just consider a universal in itself. It is not a thing. You can point at a universal in the physical world. You can only point at a particular instantiation of a universal. Such and such is a member of species X. Species X only exists in the mind.

[7] It is impossible, furthermore, for two bodies to contain one another, since the container exceeds the contained. Yet, when one intellect has knowledge of another, the two intellects contain and encompass one another. Therefore, the intellect is not a body.

I suppose he is talking about relationality. How can I know you if knowledge is material? You would have to somehow inhabit me. (seems a little weak this one).

[8] Also, the action of no body is self-reflexive. For it is proved in the Physics that no body is moved by itself except with respect to a part, so that one part of it is the mover and the other the moved. But in acting the intellect reflects on itself, not only as to a part, but as to the whole of itself. Therefore, it is not a body.

This goes back to the idea that when a body moves itself, it is one part moving another. But the mind can somehow consider itself in its entirety. But how can the movement to reflect on itself come from a physical part if it is reflecting on itself as a whole? (Also seems weak).

[9] A body’s action, moreover, is not terminated in action, nor movement in movement—a point proved in the Physics [V, 2]. But the action of an intelligent substance is terminated in action; for just as the intellect knows a thing, so does it know that it knows; and so on indefinitely. An intelligent substance, therefore, is not a body.

What does he mean here? Is it that physical change is nothing something that is done for the sake of the action. Motion’s end is the resulting change. But intellect act of knowledge terminates in itself. Not in some other. It is actuating a potency within itself… maybe?

Continued

 

[thinkandmull]

That matter is inert is typically an assumption that is made by modern thinkers. It underlies the whole notion of “laws of nature.” Laws that exist over and above matter cause matter to behave in certain ways, but the matter considered by itself without any laws does not do anything.

Yes, I know Descartes believed that the soul was simple, but he thought that the soul was that which is able to say to itself “I think, therefore I am” and he defined this as a res cognitans, a “thinking thing”, as opposed to a res extensa or “extended thing.” So the human became two things, a thinking thing and an extended thing. That’s surely dualistic but not the same kind of dualism that pre-moderns used.

He believe in a soul and a body. How is that different that you believe

 

[thinkandmull]

I wouldn’t be surprised if St. Augustine’s thinking was similar to Descartes’ thinking. Augustine was a Christian Platonist and so probably shared Plato’s views on forms being separate entities from material things. The view of soul and body being separate things is quite amenable to this viewpoint. Descartes’ views were probably a reversion of thinking from Aristotle to Plato, and then eventually the Platonism was undone leading to the materialist vs. idealist confusion that we live in nowadays.

Feser had a quote from Augustine on his website where Augustine spoke of separating the mind from one’s surroundings and see it as purely simply

 

[thinkandmull]

Thanks Balto.

Right. I think this corresponds to what he says here in his reply:

You are probably on the right track. But it is astounding how much knowledge Aquinas is assuming here in his response. I wonder if there might be some parallel section in the SCG that explains this in more detail? I’ll see what I can find later on today.

Thanks again for your responses.

God bless,
Ut

Hmmm

“But for a thing to exist ‘per se,’ it suffices sometimes that it be not inherent, as an accident or a material form; even though it be part of something.”

What is a material form inherent in?

What’s the difference between immaterial and incorporeal?

Materialists think matter can think, and that when we see matter we are seeing it from its outside WITH our inside matter

 

[thinkandmull]

The intellect seems to potentially be able to add numbers infinitely. Infinitely extended numbers. Also knowledge of infinites of figures and proportions. Not sure what he means here, but maybe something like pie? Also, universals are virtually infinite in scope because universals contains all individuals within its scope. But all of these are just potential infinites, not actual infinites. The mind represents them as abstractions. No one actually calculates pie. No one actually knows all members of a species. But somehow we know we are dealing with potentially infinite sets when are minds dwell on universals. Many mathematicians that inhabit this world of abstraction, who are philosophically inclined, tend to be platonic-realists about these universals. Whereas Aristotle believes they only exist in the concrete substances. Just consider a universal in itself. It is not a thing. You can point at a universal in the physical world. You can only point at a particular instantiation of a universal. Such and such is a member of species X. Species X only exists in the mind.

I suppose he is talking about relationality. How can I know you if knowledge is material? You would have to somehow inhabit me. (seems a little weak this one).

This goes back to the idea that when a body moves itself, it is one part moving another. But the mind can somehow consider itself in its entirety. But how can the movement to reflect on itself come from a physical part if it is reflecting on itself as a whole? (Also seems weak).

What does he mean here? Is it that physical change is nothing something that is done for the sake of the action. Motion’s end is the resulting change. But intellect act of knowledge terminates in itself. Not in some other. It is actuating a potency within itself… maybe?

Continued

I think he means by [9] that a movement of a body doesn’t prevent it from moving again in another direction, but that the soul knows that its knows that it knows that it knows in an infinite series that’s complete, and a finite body cannot have an infinite power. I would like to see his earlier proof though that a finite body cannot have an infinite power. 1) a finite body is infinite in a real sense by division 2) ability to learn anything is not all **powerful ** 3) The ability to now anything among an infinite doesn’t mean you can now the infinite.
This is really interesting physics though.

I thought up myself his argument about self-reflection when I was 18. How can something physical think of itself. An eye cannot see itself. But maybe the right side of the brain knows the left, and the left the right, and they exchange information.

I find these arguments funny though, because it experience of the spiritual is so obvious what do these really matter much?

 

[utunumsint]

I think he means by [9] that a movement of a body doesn’t prevent it from moving again in another direction, but that the soul knows that its knows that it knows that it knows in an infinite series that’s complete, and a finite body cannot have an infinite power.

Aquinas called an infinite series that is complete, an actual infinity, while material infinities are only potentially so.

I would like to see his earlier proof though that a finite body cannot have an infinite power. 1) a finite body is infinite in a real sense by division

I think he would agree, but only in the sense of potential infinity. Not what you would call a complete infinity.

1. ability to learn anything is not all **powerful **

Agreed. But does he say that?

1. The ability to now anything among an infinite doesn’t mean you can now the infinite.

Yes. For sure. But is he claiming that we can true know an infinite, or is he just claiming that this just shows that intellect cannot be material?

This is really interesting physics though.

I thought up myself his argument about self-reflection when I was 18. How can something physical think of itself. An eye cannot see itself. But maybe the right side of the brain knows the left, and the left the right, and they exchange information.

I find these arguments funny though, because it experience of the spiritual is so obvious what do these really matter much?

Well it isn’t obvious to everyone, it seems.

God bless,
Ut

 

[thinkandmull]

I think he means there is an infinite back and form that goes on between knowing and knowing that you know, although we experience it as one thing. Its a neat observation. He says this contradicts, if mind is matter, his earlier argument in this work that a finite material thing cannot have an infinite power. I can’t find where that argument is though

To answer my question in other post, material form is inherent in matter.

What’s the difference between immaterial and incorporeal? I DON’T KNOW!

 

[thinkandmull]

a78 art 5
On the contrary, Augustine (Gen. ad lit. vii, 7,8,9) proves that the soul was made neither of corporeal matter, nor of spiritual matter.

Does anyone have that work?

 

[utunumsint]

a78 art 5
On the contrary, Augustine (Gen. ad lit. vii, 7,8,9) proves that the soul was made neither of corporeal matter, nor of spiritual matter.

Does anyone have that work?

I found it, but only in latin. From what I could see, he doesn’t posit a spiritual matter at all. He says the soul is none of these.

God bless,
Ut

 

[thinkandmull]

on inertia, Q 115 Art 2 Obj 3 “it does not pertain to matter to act (A. I, Ans. 2,4)”

 

[thinkandmull]

Descarte argued from his pure and wonderous idea of God itself to the existence of God Himself. How could a thought be in our mind of this God when we are not God? A thought is from an apparatus that takes realities from things: that is, it must get its reality from a stone, if it has the idea of the stone, or from the self, since the self is greater than an actual stone. Descartes kind of blurs the distinction between forms here though; do I really have the reality of a stone in me? Be that as it may. But his argument is that we have this idea of God even though this thought’s “thought matter” is greater than we are. So either his thought is from God, or his thought of God is actually God trying to shine into us

 

[balto]

You can’t quantify intellect, although we try to grade it in test and exams at school, that measurement does not constitute a physical division, just a correspondence with truth. Still, the concept of a hard drive containing information might apply here. And that is a physical thing. I can cut out segments of my disk space and corrupt data.

I think that what he is trying to say is that a body can never encompass a whole other thing. He’s not using the word “encompass” in a physical sense, but in a formal sense. A body could not formally encompass another thing without becoming an individual member of that class. A body can only encompass something like say, an apple, by either only receiving sensible parts of the apple, which is not appleness, or by consuming it in which case it loses the form appleness and acquires the animal’s form. If a body were to ever receive the formal encompassing of the apple, it would cease to be an animal and begin to be an apple, which is nonsense. Matter is an individuating principle. It only receives forms by becoming an individual instance of that form. Intellect is not like that since it can really receive appleness without ceasing to be an intellect. It receives the form in a non-individuating way, that is to say, in an immaterial way.

Right. A ball only becomes a puddle of goo through the heat by loosing the form of ball. But the intellect does not work like that. It has a potential for truth, and as knowledge is added, it typically grows in perfection. It has the ability to understand forms and take them in in their immaterial universality.

Makes perfect sense to me.

Clear as day. But is it true? For those who reduce intellect to brain, this is a very difficult thing to disprove. Truly a huge problem for reductionists.

Continued…

God bless,
Ut

I agree with the rest of this analysis.

 

[balto]

The intellect seems to potentially be able to add numbers infinitely. Infinitely extended numbers. Also knowledge of infinites of figures and proportions. Not sure what he means here, but maybe something like pie? Also, universals are virtually infinite in scope because universals contains all individuals within its scope. But all of these are just potential infinites, not actual infinites. The mind represents them as abstractions. No one actually calculates pie. No one actually knows all members of a species. But somehow we know we are dealing with potentially infinite sets when are minds dwell on universals. Many mathematicians that inhabit this world of abstraction, who are philosophically inclined, tend to be platonic-realists about these universals. Whereas Aristotle believes they only exist in the concrete substances. Just consider a universal in itself. It is not a thing. You can point at a universal in the physical world. You can only point at a particular instantiation of a universal. Such and such is a member of species X. Species X only exists in the mind.

His argument actually reminds me of James Ross’ argument for the immateriality of the intellect by noting that humans are able to reason according to pure functions. The article can be found here: www3.nd.edu/~afreddos/courses/43151/ross-immateriality.pdf. Briefly, the argument is that all formal thinking is determinate (there is an objective fact about “what function it is computing”), but no physical process is determinate among an infinite number of incompatible functions, hence formal thinking is not physical. He uses the example of addition. You know what it means to add two integers together, even though you have not computed the sum of all possible pairs of integers and could never do so. But having a finite physical set of pairwise integer sums is not sufficient to determine that the thinker is computing addition. Kripke defines “quaddition” as “x quus y = {x+y, if x, y < 57; else 5}”, so if you haven’t seen an x or y >= 57 then you cannot determine whether addition or quaddition is occurring, and for any set of finite physical facts you could always say that the determining output lies beyond that which you’ve already experienced. But yet if you really are intending to compute addition, then your doing so is not wholly physical, since the physical facts cannot determine that. It just seemed similar to Aquinas’ argument that the intellect can understand the infinity of continually adding sums together or continually dividing proportions without actually having added or divided infinitely.