H
hatsoff
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reggieM,
I should note that, on second thought, the argument might be more subjectively compelling than I had initially supposed. So I apologize for my perhaps too-harsh criticism earlier. Let’s see what can be done with it…
The response to this can take two forms: First, suppose the materialist is correct that some things, though reducible to matter in principle, are not reducible in practice. Then we are still left with the problem that science is always in principle in the position to trump everything else, and this in turn is a kind of scientism. Second, what does it mean to say that something is possible in principle but will never actually happen? Isn’t it true that if we know something will never happen, then it is not possible even in principle? How else are we to make sense of the concept of possibility?
The materialist can also try to reject (3*) on the grounds that a system cannot model itself, because in order to model a system Y, the system, say X, doing the modeling must be more complex than Y. So if X models Y, then X is more complex than Y, which means X and Y are different systems, i.e., no system can model itself. So the material universe cannot model itself, which means science will never have all the answers.
This objection is more difficult to overcome, but we can still point out that whether or not science can have all the answers, certainly it still follows that science is in the best position to have each answer. So, just as before, science will trump other explanations every time, which is sufficient I think to reach the problems of scientism.
Of course, the materialist has plenty of counter-arguments at his disposal. The object of this game is to keep pressing him to deal with unintuitive consequences of his confusing system. At some point—hopefully—he will begin to recognize that his assumptions may not have been entirely appropriate. However, that sort of self-reflection is often extremely difficult to elicit.
I should note that, on second thought, the argument might be more subjectively compelling than I had initially supposed. So I apologize for my perhaps too-harsh criticism earlier. Let’s see what can be done with it…
A materialist might say the following: Even though everything is reducible to matter in principle, that doesn’t mean that it’s reducible in practice. So, for all those things which are not reducible in practice, we may never have a scientific explanation for them.Why do you think (3*) will be resisted?
If all of reality is reducible to matter, then science alone can render the true understanding of all of reality.
What are the best arguments against that?
The response to this can take two forms: First, suppose the materialist is correct that some things, though reducible to matter in principle, are not reducible in practice. Then we are still left with the problem that science is always in principle in the position to trump everything else, and this in turn is a kind of scientism. Second, what does it mean to say that something is possible in principle but will never actually happen? Isn’t it true that if we know something will never happen, then it is not possible even in principle? How else are we to make sense of the concept of possibility?
The materialist can also try to reject (3*) on the grounds that a system cannot model itself, because in order to model a system Y, the system, say X, doing the modeling must be more complex than Y. So if X models Y, then X is more complex than Y, which means X and Y are different systems, i.e., no system can model itself. So the material universe cannot model itself, which means science will never have all the answers.
This objection is more difficult to overcome, but we can still point out that whether or not science can have all the answers, certainly it still follows that science is in the best position to have each answer. So, just as before, science will trump other explanations every time, which is sufficient I think to reach the problems of scientism.
Of course, the materialist has plenty of counter-arguments at his disposal. The object of this game is to keep pressing him to deal with unintuitive consequences of his confusing system. At some point—hopefully—he will begin to recognize that his assumptions may not have been entirely appropriate. However, that sort of self-reflection is often extremely difficult to elicit.