Meaning of the Real Presence

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Just as an interesting aside, no one (not Roman Catholics, not the Orthodox, & not Anglicans) “believe” in transubstantiation… we believe in the Real Presence of Christ in the Eucharist. Transubstantiation is only the Aristotelian way the RCC has tried to explain how it all happens.
Ave Verum Corpus,
First time “speaking” with you I believe. Looking forward to your contributions and insights.
Just as an interesting aside, no one (not Roman Catholics, not the Orthodox, & not Anglicans) “believe” in transubstantiation… we believe in the Real Presence of Christ in the Eucharist. Transubstantiation is only the Aristotelian way the RCC has tried to explain how it all happens.
I’m not certain this is an entirely accurate representation of the the matter. I, for one, believe in transubstantiation. It doesn’t strike me as a description of “how” the Real Presence becomes present but rather a description of “what” actually happens.

While the term transubstantiation may be “new” (although certainly not very new) the concept it denotes is not new, and the concept is less a description of how something happens than a description of what happens. What the term transubstantiation (accurately) denotes is a total change of substance.

So when you say
AveVeruCorpus:
that transubstantiation is the best way to describe how that real presence has come about.
I would rather say that transubstantiation is the best term to denote what has happened. But I would say that Catholics, even if they wished to use a different term (over against its strong recommendation by the Church), must hold the concept which the term denotes.
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AveVerumCorpus:
I think we sometimes get wrapped up in the nuts and bolts of things, rather than looking past explanations to the larger reality of the situation.
I can agree with this insofar as the nuts and bolts obscure the larger reality. But sometimes, and I think in this case, the nuts and bolts protect and preserve the larger reality and help communicate it to us.
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AveVerumCorpus:
In this case, the reality is that (as we Anglicans believe) when we receive the Eucharist, we are receiving the Resurrected Christ- the Whole Christ, not just a piece of bread, not just a piece of flesh, but the entire resurrected Body of Christ.
I think the above might be a good illustration of this principal at work. For Catholics, we would avoid the phrase “not just a piece of bread*” *especially in conjunction with the phrase “not just. . .flesh”. Transubstantiation, i.e the concept that Catholics give their assent of faith too, means that there is no bread anymore. This is part of what transubstantiation denotes and it is part of the faith of Catholics.

God bless you!
VC
 
I am a chemist by training and in modern science substance has an entirely different meaning so it is easy to be confused.
Actually, modern science does not recognize any meaning of the term “substance”. That is considered to be a Aristotelian metaphysical term, not a scientific one. It is extremely difficult to give any actual scientific meaning to the term “substance”. Does it include the molecules of something? Aristotle and Aquinas couldn’t say one way or the other, because they didn’t know about molecules. Joe
 
This is not the teaching of the Roman Catholic Church. Separating itself from the See of Rome, whether over political or theological reasons (or both), does not mean that the group no longer has valid sacraments. If that were the case, the Orthodox, Old Catholic, various other groups would not be recognized by the Holy See as having valid sacraments. If the group maintains a validly ordained clergy and uses an acceptable formula for the Eucharistic liturgy, they do indeed have the Real Presence of Christ in their consecrated elements.
The Orthodox have valid Apostolic Succession; however, the Anglicans do not. Apostolic Succession was broken because the Anglican ordinations were invalid.
 
Actually, modern science does not recognize any meaning of the term “substance”. That is considered to be a Aristotelian metaphysical term, not a scientific one. It is extremely difficult to give any actual scientific meaning to the term “substance”. Does it include the molecules of something? Aristotle and Aquinas couldn’t say one way or the other, because they didn’t know about molecules. Joe
Yes both Aquinas and Thomas can answer that question, since substances are are immaterial forms, and not the matter (this is somewhat debated in Aristotle – some people think that the substance refers to the composite of form and matter, but I don’t find that a very compelling read --, whatever the case in A., the form has to be the individual subtance in Thomas because Thomas thinks it is possible to imagine the self independently of the body in death, prior to the resurrection, etc.). Thus the question of molecules is irrelevant.

salaam.
 
Calvinists believe in the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist, but they hold that it is spiritual in nature. The bread and wine remain unaltered physically.

Catholics agree that Christ is spiritually present in the Eucharist, but they also believe in transubstantiation. Calvinists reject transubstantiation.
This is basically right about Calvin himself. Calvin has a very rich understanding of the real presence in the Lord’s Supper. As other posters have noted though, the bulk of the Reformed tradition (i.e., Calvinism) rejects Calvin on this point for an understanding of the Lord’s Supper as symbolic in some form or another. There have been attempts to recover Calvin from time to time, but it never seems to pick up a lot of speed within the Reformed communion.
It is my understanding that transubstantiation was not articulated until after 800 AD. Earlier church fathers always held to the real presence, but they never clarified how it actually occurred which is what transubstantiation does.
Well after, I believe. I don’t think the word is used officially until Lateran IV (1215 AD), and even there it is undefined. It is basically at Trent that the Church makes Thomas’ description of transubstantiation into the official doctrine of Roman Catholicism.
Is my assessment accurate? If this is the case, the debate is not really about whether the real presence exists in the Eucharist. The debate is about how it exists in the Eucharist.
that is the debate with Calvin himself. Calvin, as an individual theologian, is quite an interesting conversation partner for Catholics, because, apart from ecclesiology, he is actually very similar to Thomas in belief and in the order and manner of his arguments. (side note, Thomas doesn’t actually write an ecclesiology at all…).

But as I have already suggested, that is NOT the debate you are going to run into with most Calvinists, who think Calvin is himself wrong on this issue. I know you said you were not interested in that, but that is the reality on the ground, so to speak.
Please help me explore the real meaning of a change in the “substance” in the Catholic point of view. How does this really differ from saying that Christ is present spiritually? If we say that the accidents of bread and wine are unchanged, aren’t we really saying that it is unchanged physically?
Someone else has already pointed out that the doctrine of transubstantiation held by Trent and Thomas Aquinas evacuates the bread of reality, and leaves only appearance. That said, the matter or physicality is the mode of appearing of substances, so I think you could press your case. I am not sure how far a fan of Calvin would be willing to go down that road since it is technically inaccurate, on Thomas’ account, to say that the Eucharist is bread and wine.

salaam.
 
Yes both Aquinas and Thomas can answer that question, since substances are are immaterial forms, and not the matter (this is somewhat debated in Aristotle – some people think that the substance refers to the composite of form and matter, but I don’t find that a very compelling read --, whatever the case in A., the form has to be the individual subtance in Thomas because Thomas thinks it is possible to imagine the self independently of the body in death, prior to the resurrection, etc.). Thus the question of molecules is irrelevant.
salaam.
I’m aware that for Aquinas there are immaterial forms, namely the angels, that cannot be the case with Eucharist because it is the presence of Christ, who was truly Man as well as truly God. The presence of a human cannot be conveyed by an immaterial form- the idea is absurd.
 
I’m aware that for Aquinas there are immaterial forms, namely the angels, that cannot be the case with Eucharist because it is the presence of Christ, who was truly Man as well as truly God. The presence of a human cannot be conveyed by an immaterial form- the idea is absurd.
form and matter are distinct (that is just basic Aristotle)…For Thomas, the matter is in-formed, if you will. But the matter is not, and by definition cannot be, the form. So, even in material objects, like a living human being, what makes something what-it-is is the immaterial individual form of the object, not the matter. This is particularly necessary in human beings in order to explain how the soul (which is the form of the animate body in Thomas) can be disjoined from the body and you still be you: i.e., you are, strictly speaking, the form, not the composite (though the two will be, in a certain way, rejoined in the resurrection).

This is likewise clear in the Eucharist where what-it-is is obviously defined completely by the immaterial individual form of the body of Christ. Notice for instance that Thomas completely denies that the body of Christ is locally present (i.e. it is not in the place). The body of Christ is only immaterially present, as the substance of the Eucharist. What is materially present, locally present, are the accidents of bread and wine.

And you are right, we cannot know anything except through matter, in this life (you use the word “conveyed”). But this just means that the senses and ratio have to fill in for the real intellectual intuition of immaterial substance that knowledge longs for, and will ultimately achieve in the beatific vision.

salaam.
 
form and matter are distinct (that is just basic Aristotle)…For Thomas, the matter is in-formed, if you will. But the matter is not, and by definition cannot be, the form. So, even in material objects, like a living human being, what makes something what-it-is is the immaterial individual form of the object, not the matter. This is particularly necessary in human beings in order to explain how the soul (which is the form of the animate body in Thomas) can be disjoined from the body and you still be you: i.e., you are, strictly speaking, the form, not the composite (though the two will be, in a certain way, rejoined in the resurrection).

This is likewise clear in the Eucharist where what-it-is is obviously defined completely by the immaterial individual form of the body of Christ. Notice for instance that Thomas completely denies that the body of Christ is locally present (i.e. it is not in the place). The body of Christ is only immaterially present, as the substance of the Eucharist. What is materially present, locally present, are the accidents of bread and wine.​

And you are right, we cannot know anything except through matter, in this life (you use the word “conveyed”). But this just means that the senses and ratio have to fill in for the real intellectual intuition of immaterial substance that knowledge longs for, and will ultimately achieve in the beatific vision.
salaam.
You are right that for Aquinas form is what “makes a thing what it is”, but still, for composite substances like human beings, it isn’t what it is without also having matter “informed” by the form. Otherwise, we would be immaterial substances like angels. Joe
 
You are right that for Aquinas form is what “makes a thing what it is”, but still, for composite substances like human beings, it isn’t what it is without also having matter “informed” by the form. Otherwise, we would be immaterial substances like angels. Joe
I do not know how you could get any clearer statement from Thomas than you get in the doctrine of the Eucharist; in its treatment of substance the teaching on Eucharist is not unique, otherwise it would be a complete equivocation for Thomas to call it “substance”: the substance of material things is not in any way material. The body of Christ is not materially present. No matter pertaining to the body of Christ is present in the Eucharist; Christ’s body is not local to the Eucharist. All that is present is substance. This is possible because substances are not themselves material.

You can think it is non-sense (I don’t think it is, but I do understand criticisms of it), but it is unarguably Thomas’ position.

Btw, as we also see in death, human beings can be pure form: i.e., souls without bodies. Even in death you are a human being, even if your body will not be restored until the resurrection.

salaam.
 
That is simply wrong. Composite substances, such as individual men, must include form and matter. The matter is part of what it is to be a composite substance.
Then how is it that the body of Christ (a body is material after all) is substantially but not materially and locally present in the Eucharist for Thomas?

The way in which Thomas uses “substance” in his treatment of the Eucharist is consistent with how he uses it elsewhere…AND it is completely immaterial. As Thomas says in III.76.4.ad1, substance is at once whole in itself and whole in every part. That which is spatial and material on the other hand is whole in itself but a mere part in each part. Just above that Thomas says that matter of Christ’s body is concomitant with the substance but it is NOT the substance.
Actually, St. Thomas denied that souls after death but before the Resurrection are whole human persons, for that very reason. Which I think is a very problematic feature of his whole metaphysics, from an orthodox Christian point of view.
That is true, but that is a LOT different from saying that they are not human persons. Only the latter claim is relevant to the issue of substance properly speaking (the what-it-is…a disembodied soul is a human being in a particular mode; I don’t cease to be a human being at death. I do not become a walnut or an angel, for instance). It is proper to human beings to have bodies and when they do not have them they are not whole, but that is a different claim. Being without a body is not proper to being human, but it is certainly possible (and indeed even actual when we die), no matter how unnatural. The whole issue here, of course, is that death is an unnatural condition.

salaam.
 
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