Metaphysical Realism and Nominalism, and the Eucharist

[IndigoLove]

So I’m taking an Aristotelian Metaphysics class this semester and I’ve been applying some of the concepts to the Eucharist.

1. The Eucharist is a wafer of bread that is also the flesh of Jesus

A fairly simple statement but it seems to assume certain metaphysical principles, namely an adherence to universals of some sort. this is because this wafer of bread is obviously not physically a lump of human flesh. So then what meaning would the statement “the Eucharist instantiates the flesh of Jesus” have beyond that?

I would have to come to the conclusion that it would have no meaning unless you look at the statement through a realist ontology. Metaphysical Realists believe that what makes a “red ball” red is that in instantiates the universal property of “redness”. That is, an abstract entity is what defines a thing.

A is b, if and only if, a instantiates b-ness

Opposed to this ontology is that of the Nominalist who adheres to the opposite view that there are no such things as abstract entities. Many would posit that adding a new realm of abstract universals doubles amount of explaining that must be done to answer the question of being qua being, because now we have two realms of entities that must be explained instead of one. Thus, abstract universals are explanatorily useless. (This idea was first posited by Aristotle in response to Plato’s ontology of forms.)

Through a Nominalist perspective, the statement “the Eucharist is the body of Christ” would be absurd as the wafer is obviously not flesh.

That being said, when it comes to the Eucharist, do you have an issue with having to adhere to a realist ontology of universals?

What is the churches official stance on such metaphysical questions?

What is your own?

 

[ronnie_bonigli]

Short answer, the bread truly becomes the body of Christ but retains the “accidents” of bread i.e. the look, feel, taste, etc. that it had before the transformation. Thus is the doctrine of Transubstantiation.

 

[IndigoLove]

Short answer, the bread truly becomes the body of Christ but retains the “accidents” of bread i.e. the look, feel, taste, etc. that it had before the transformation. Thus is the doctrine of Transubstantiation.

care to expand? i am by no means looking for a short answer.

 

[ronnie_bonigli]

care to expand? i am by no means looking for a short answer.

what can I tell you, you’re looking to explain supernatural realities with philosophy based on the natural world only.

Btw, that first statement “the Eucharist is a wafer of bread that is also the flesh of Jesus” is wrong. It isn’t “also” a wafer of bread, it merely retains what are called the “accidents” of the bread.

 

[IndigoLove]

the two responses i got seem to deviate from the main topic of the discussion:
-Is transubstantiation compatible with a nominalist ontology?

I’m not really looking to explain so much as reasonably expand on metaphysical and theological concepts.

I think the question “does the catholic have to adhere to realist ontologies in order to keep from creating contradictions or participating in meaningless suppositions?” is rather interesting.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

Wait a minute – Aristotle was a nominalist?

To address your larger question, realism simply involves the idea that certain things – not all things – have an essence. They are not simply brute facts, but somehow intelligible and discrete. The problem with realism is that some of our words are so very vague that it is hard to make out how they “match up” with an essence. Thus, it would seem that there might be an essence to “two” or “tree”, but it quite unlikely that there is an essence to “mountain” or “highway”.

What about the Eucharist? Well, the idea would be that the host *is *Christ; that is, it has the essence of a human organism (actually, the dual essence of a human and divine person). One way of understanding how human beings have an essence is by considering DNA. Scientists, it would seem, are answering Plato’s question of whether there is a Form for each human being; in a way, there is.

I don’t see how being a nominalist about persons would be motivated. Clearly, the boundaries of individual people are not created by arbitrary conventions of our language.

So far as I can tell, “Aristotelian nominalism” really isn’t nominalism, by the way. Aristotle thought that we could *naturalize *essences, in some way, without having to rely on an actual realm of transcendent Forms. His problem wasn’t with abstract universals, but with abstract particulars. But Aristotle believed in universals; he believed that there was some property that all red things had in common.

Happy Ash Day!

 

[Betterave]

Through a Nominalist perspective, the statement “the Eucharist is the body of Christ” would be absurd [WHY?] as the wafer is obviously not flesh. [SO WHAT?]

That being said, when it comes to the Eucharist, do you have an issue with having to adhere to a realist ontology of universals?

What is the churches official stance on such metaphysical questions?

Thanks for asking your question. Let’s just say that the Church’s stance on such matters is rather better historically and philosophically informed than yours.

Your statements appear to be arbitrary and unjustified. That being said, it’s hard to know how to respond to them.

FYI, none of the important figures in the elaboration of the doctrine of transubstantiation was a realist in the stereotypical ‘Platonic’ sense which you refer to (“redness” is an entity which red things instantiate). Also Ockham, the famous nominalist, had no problem with transubstantiation - he certainly didn’t think it was absurd, as your comments would seem to imply that he would.

 

[IndigoLove]

Wait a minute – Aristotle was a nominalist?

To address your larger question, realism simply involves the idea that certain things – not all things – have an essence. They are not simply brute facts, but somehow intelligible and discrete. The problem with realism is that some of our words are so very vague that it is hard to make out how they “match up” with an essence. Thus, it would seem that there might be an essence to “two” or “tree”, but it quite unlikely that there is an essence to “mountain” or “highway”.

What about the Eucharist? Well, the idea would be that the host *is *Christ; that is, it has the essence of a human organism (actually, the dual essence of a human and divine person). One way of understanding how human beings have an essence is by considering DNA. Scientists, it would seem, are answering Plato’s question of whether there is a Form for each human being; in a way, there is.

I don’t see how being a nominalist about persons would be motivated. Clearly, the boundaries of individual people are not created by arbitrary conventions of our language.

So far as I can tell, “Aristotelian nominalism” really isn’t nominalism, by the way. Aristotle thought that we could *naturalize *essences, in some way, without having to rely on an actual realm of transcendent Forms. His problem wasn’t with abstract universals, but with abstract particulars. But Aristotle believed in universals; he believed that there was some property that all red things had in common.

Happy Ash Day!

Hen no. he wasnt a nominalist. The argument that aristotle postulates against platos ontology is an argument championed and expanded upon by nominalists. i thought it reflected nominalist views rather well.

Aristotelian nominalism is an oxymoron >.<

You made many references to “essence” in your explanation of the eucharist. I am asking if a nominalist ontology (one that rejects any form of essence or abstract object) is compatible with the idea of the eucharist. if so, why? if not, what sort of ontology does the catholic church propose? What sort of ontology do you propose?

I don’t see how being a nominalist about persons would be motivated. Clearly, the boundaries of individual people are not created by arbitrary conventions of our language.

Heh i dont think that its very clear at all. In fact i believe that, as you put it, the “arbitrary conventions of language” are to blame for most philosophical problems, especially in the metaphysical realm.

 

[IndigoLove]

Through a Nominalist perspective, the statement "the Eucharist is the body of Christ"would be absurd (WHY) as the wafer is obviously not flesh.(SO WHAT)

The statement would be absurd because without the use of some form of abstract object (which nominalists do not believe exist) to define it as “flesh”, the statement would be like calling an apple a banana. Thus it would have no meaning through a nominalist perspective. Austere nominalists anyways. perhaps i should have made that distinction earlier >.<

FYI, none of the important figures in the elaboration of the doctrine of transubstantiation was a realist in the stereotypical ‘Platonic’ sense which you refer to (“redness” is an entity which red things instantiate). Also Ockham, the famous nominalist, had no problem with transubstantiation - he certainly didn’t think it was absurd, as your comments would seem to imply that he would.

As far as Ockham goes, a nominalist perspective of transubstantiation is really what this thread is about. Would you care to post a few of his arguments on the subject?

 

[Betterave]

The statement would be absurd because without the use of some form of abstract object (which nominalists do not believe exist) to define it as “flesh”, the statement would be like calling an apple a banana. Thus it would have no meaning through a nominalist perspective. Austere nominalists anyways. perhaps i should have made that distinction earlier >.<

Nominalists simply claim that nothing can properly be said to exist apart from particulars/individuals. They do not deny the reality of natures/essences; they only deny that natures/essences can properly be said to exist. Thus they do not deny that flesh is flesh; they only deny that flesh is anything apart from particular instances of flesh. I don’t see how these claims have any bearing on transubstantiation.

As far as Ockham goes, a nominalist perspective of transubstantiation is really what this thread is about. Would you care to post a few of his arguments on the subject?

There’s no real argument, so far as I know, because there doesn’t need to be. Nominalism is simply irrelevant to the issue of transubstantiation.

 

[JDaniel]

So I’m taking an Aristotelian Metaphysics class this semester and I’ve been applying some of the concepts to the Eucharist.

1. The Eucharist is a wafer of bread that is also the flesh of Jesus

A fairly simple statement but it seems to assume certain metaphysical principles, namely an adherence to universals of some sort. this is because this wafer of bread is obviously not physically a lump of human flesh. So then what meaning would the statement “the Eucharist instantiates the flesh of Jesus” have beyond that?

I would have to come to the conclusion that it would have no meaning unless you look at the statement through a realist ontology. Metaphysical Realists believe that what makes a “red ball” red is that in instantiates the universal property of “redness”. That is, an abstract entity is what defines a thing.

A is b, if and only if, a instantiates b-ness

Indigo:

This is a very interesting question, to say the least! However, there are some things that are wrong with that explanation. First, you say, “The Eucharist is a wafer of bread that is also the flesh of Jesus.” This dualism is not a part of the definition of the Eucharist. The Eucharist is actually changed into the body and blood of Christ. Otherwise, Christ’s declarations, at the table of the last supper, make no sense. God/Christ is not limited. Obviously: or else, Jesus would not have appeared in the flesh. The bread is changed transubstantially, i.e., beyond what we can know from merely physical substance. The bread and wine are said to have the appearances of bread and wine, after their consecration.

Second, when men apprehend an object, it is the work of our immaterial (or, spiritual) intellect that does so. How else can we do such a thing except by dematerializing the object? Not only must we dematerialize the object, we must immobilize it as well (except when we are actually studying motion). Immobilization and dematerialization are the first step our minds make in order to apprehend a thing. The process whereby the mobile and material world is made immobile and immaterial is called abstraction. Now, the immobilizing and dematerializing of objects is not the same as the thing’s apprehension. Instead it is simply the first step we must make in order to apprehend, or understand, a thing. Furthermore, to say that the work of understanding things, i.e., the basic sciences, for example, is (a) a kind of immobility; (b) a kind of immateriality; (c) an order of abstraction; or (d) a mode of definition is to say the same thing. Thus, an abstraction and a definition are the same thing.

An object, however, does not ‘instantiate’ (by which I think you mean, create) a property except in an accidental way. While redness itself has a definition, an essence, in another way of saying it, it is the result not of the object (such as an apple), rather, of the potentiality within the material (matter) of the apple. This potentiality is always brought into motion/change by an agent (what we call an “efficient cause”). The Priest, who is Christ, at the consecration table, is the agent that causes the transubstantiation of the bread and wine.

Opposed to this ontology is that of the Nominalist who adheres to the opposite view that there are no such things as abstract entities. Many would posit that adding a new realm of abstract universals doubles amount of explaining that must be done to answer the question of being qua being, because now we have two realms of entities that must be explained instead of one. Thus, abstract universals are explanatorily useless. (This idea was first posited by Aristotle in response to Plato’s ontology of forms.)

Through a Nominalist perspective, the statement “the Eucharist is the body of Christ” would be absurd as the wafer is obviously not flesh.

That being said, when it comes to the Eucharist, do you have an issue with having to adhere to a realist ontology of universals?

What is the churches official stance on such metaphysical questions?

What is your own?

Perhaps modern Nominalists carry their nominalism too far. Aristotle was not that that kind of nominalist, for he recognized (elsewhere, in his writings) that a physical object could not be apprehended by a mind except as it is dematerialized and immobilized. Here is a quote from St. Thomas’ Commentary on the Physics of Aristotle :

”Because the book of the Physics whose exposition we intend is the first book of Natural Science, it is necessary at the outset to designate what is the subject matter of Natural Science. It should be understood that since all science is in the intellect, anything becomes actually intelligible to the extent that there is a measure of abstraction from matter; according as any objects are diversely related to matter they pertain to diverse sciences. As another way of putting it, since all science is the product of demonstration and since the middle term of demonstration is definition, sciences are necessarily diversified according to their diverse modes of definition.” - Bk. I, les 1, nn. 1-4.

I am a little rusty on my Aristotle, but, I’ll see if I can find something to secure that thought.

God bless,
jd

 

[IndigoLove]

Nominalists simply claim that nothing can properly be said to exist apart from particulars/individuals. They do not deny the reality of natures/essences; they only deny that natures/essences can properly be said to exist. Thus they do not deny that flesh is flesh; they only deny that flesh is anything apart from particular instances of flesh. I don’t see how these claims have any bearing on transubstantiation.

There’s no real argument, so far as I know, because there doesn’t need to be. Nominalism is simply irrelevant to the issue of transubstantiation.

as far as i am aware, nominalists do deny the reality of natures/essences (in the sense that they are not real). What you are thinking of is the Trope nominalist who denies universals, however support the idea of the trope (a property held within a thing and only that thing. Example being two pieces of paper both having completely different instances of white, even if the measurements for wavelength are exactly the same in every way).

There are also set nominalists who apply the mathematical concepts of sets to metaphysics. ie: A is B if an only if A is a member of the set B

Then, finally, there is the Quine-ian nominalist or Austere nominalist who rejects universals, tropes as well as sets. Austere nominalism is what i wish to focus on.

 

[IndigoLove]

For the first part of your statement (i had to cut back on characters)

Transubstantiation seems to me to be a claim about abstract universals. Would you say this is true?

Second, when men apprehend an object, it is the work of our immaterial (or, spiritual) intellect that does so. How else can we do such a thing except by dematerializing the object? Not only must we dematerialize the object, we must immobilize it as well (except when we are actually studying motion). Immobilization and dematerialization are the first step our minds make in order to apprehend a thing. The process whereby the mobile and material world is made immobile and immaterial is called abstraction. Now, the immobilizing and dematerializing of objects is not the same as the thing’s apprehension. Instead it is simply the first step we must make in order to apprehend, or understand, a thing. Furthermore, to say that the work of understanding things, i.e., the basic sciences, for example, is (a) a kind of immobility; (b) a kind of immateriality; (c) an order of abstraction; or (d) a mode of definition is to say the same thing. Thus, an abstraction and a definition are the same thing.

nods yes. realists define “things” through abstract entities.
Nominalists would disagree with you. They would posit that abstraction does not exist and thus can not be an objective definition of a thing.

I would say that the organizational patterns of the brain are not reflective of reality and thus can not be used to objectively define “things” (which is what appears to be what you have done here. though i’ve been wrong before lol) therefor abstractions are separate from objective definitions.

An object, however, does not ‘instantiate’ (by which I think you mean, create) a property except in an accidental way. While redness itself has a definition, an essence, in another way of saying it, it is the result not of the object (such as an apple), rather, of the potentiality within the material (matter) of the apple. This potentiality is always brought into motion/change by an agent (what we call an “efficient cause”). The Priest, who is Christ, at the consecration table, is the agent that causes the transubstantiation of the bread and wine.

Instantiate means: to be an instance of. Red things are an instance of the property of redness. ie, red things instantiate redness.

so what you did here, it appears, is you have given a cause to properties in a sense i am not familiar with, then you claim that this cause is the thing changed, which results in transubstantiation. This appears to widely differ from the realist ontology, which usually claims that the properties themselves are causal and fundamental. Furthermore, the Aristotelian would posit that “redness” is indeed a result of the apple. That is, particulars are what create universals. If red things did not exist, the property of redness would also not exist.
Plato on the other hand would posit that things work the other way around. Redness exists whether or not red things exist. This redness would exist in “platonic heaven” in which the perfect essence of “things” are located, where as Aristotle would posit that properties are located within particulars themselves.

Your response appears to be rather platonic in the sense that properties have a cause outside of their particulars. This position seems to have been widely abandoned by the philosophical community because the property of “non self instantiation” is a bi-product of the ontology. This is a problem when we ask if non self instantiation instantiates itself. If it does instantiate itself, then it does not instantiate itself. If it does not instantiate itself, then it does instantiate itself. So basically, non self instantiation leads us to:

A
.’. ~A

or

~A
.’.A

This is obviously a logical paradox and thus many realists take on an Aristotelian ontology and deny that non self instantiation is a property.

Though if you do not see this as reasonable feel free to expand on this ontology.

”Because the book of the Physics whose exposition we intend is the first book of Natural Science, it is necessary at the outset to designate what is the subject matter of Natural Science. It should be understood that since all science is in the intellect, anything becomes actually intelligible to the extent that there is a measure of abstraction from matter; according as any objects are diversely related to matter they pertain to diverse sciences. As another way of putting it, since all science is the product of demonstration and since the middle term of demonstration is definition, sciences are necessarily diversified according to their diverse modes of definition.” - Bk. I, les 1, nn. 1-4.

I am a little rusty on my Aristotle, but, I’ll see if I can find something to secure that thought.

God bless,
jd

again i had to cut down on characters >.<

again i disagree. The organizational patterns of the mind do not reflect objective reality. This is where things get fascinating though (at least to me), because obviously mathematical thought obviously has some use. This is absurd as is pointed out in a famous paper by Wigner called “the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics” in which he posits that the philosophical and metaphysical reasons for the effectiveness of mathematics is widely unexplored. Kant had some interesting writings which start with the idea that mathematics is, in essence (lol), two objects whos relations are measured, then the objects are removed, leaving only their relations which we can attach numerical values to. From there, Kants writing got so dense i gave up rofl.

 

[JDaniel]

as far as i am aware, nominalists do deny the reality of natures/essences (in the sense that they are not real). What you are thinking of is the Trope nominalist who denies universals, however support the idea of the trope (a property held within a thing and only that thing. Example being two pieces of paper both having completely different instances of white, even if the measurements for wavelength are exactly the same in every way).

There are also set nominalists who apply the mathematical concepts of sets to metaphysics. ie: A is B if an only if A is a member of the set B

Then, finally, there is the Quine-ian nominalist or Austere nominalist who rejects universals, tropes as well as sets. Austere nominalism is what i wish to focus on.

IL:

So, what exists in our minds is no more than a representation of a property and is in no way anywhere near a good representation? Or, is there anything which we can rely on held in our minds? Or, is the ‘mind’ the ultimate criterion?

I can understand there not being any extant universals “out there,” but, “in here,” in my head, I am aware of comparative similarities, of natures which I glean the moment my mind dematerializes two, or more, identical, or virtually identical, objects, of the same category.

Now, in mathematics, A is A by being a member of the set of A’s, as well as and/or by other means. As, a 2 is a 2 because it is that grammar that we use to describe two instances (1+1)+(1+1). But, A is not B except only by being a member of the set of B’s. So, A becomes merely that which someone is currently calling B, but, which, in reality, is really an A.

But, to say that there does not exist any similarities, equivalences, or identicalities seems absurd, even if such similarities, equivalences, or identicalities are not absolutely similar, equivalent, or identical. A cat is a cat. Even the cats know this.

Am I getting this wrong? In any event, I agree with Betterave: I’m not sure how this ties back to the Eucharist.

God bless,
jd

 

[IndigoLove]

IL:

So, what exists in our minds is no more than a representation of a property and is in no way anywhere near a good representation?

I would agree with this sentiment.

Or, is there anything which we can rely on held in our minds?

I am unsure. i must admit this is something i havent thought about yet. On a kneejerk reflex i would say no, except maybe personal experience of the divine (i must stress personal because i dont believe that there can be objective knowledge of the divine, but i do believe that each individual will have differing, true experiences of Divinity. This is because Divinity, if it chooses to show itself, will show itself perfectly. This is only achievable [at least while individuals use a mind to conceptualize], by the Divine working within an individuals paradigm to create an understanding of it through our own views of what “perfect” or “good” or “love” is. Otherwise, there would be instances of the Divine showing itself in which a person does not see the divine as being “perfect”, “good” or “loving” or possibly even “the divine”. This is not a perfect representation, and i do not believe that divinity would show itself imperfectly.)

Wow that was a mouthful. sorry if it isnt clear. if you need clarification ask and i’ll try a bit harder.

Or, is the ‘mind’ the ultimate criterion?

I diddnt know what you meant by criterion here:
a standard of judgment or criticism; a rule or principle for evaluating or testing something.
-dictionary.com
using this definition i would say the exact opposite is true. While the mind has some uses when it comes to survival, i doubt its capabilities to reflect objective reality.

I can understand there not being any extant universals “out there,” but, “in here,” in my head, I am aware of comparative similarities, of natures which I glean the moment my mind dematerializes two, or more, identical, or virtually identical, objects, of the same category.

This is an example of why i dont believe the mind is reflective of reality. i dont see any reason why two plates must both be “plates” other than some sort of intuition or common sense… that is, organizational patterns of the mind. And as the principia discordia says “common sense is what tells you the earth is flat”. i guess you could classify my own ontology in a Permendidean sense as he states, “There is only one “thing” and that is the universe”.

Now, in mathematics, A is A by being a member of the set of A’s, as well as and/or by other means. As, a 2 is a 2 because it is that grammar that we use to describe two instances (1+1)+(1+1). But, A is not B except only by being a member of the set of B’s. So, A becomes merely that which someone is currently calling B, but, which, in reality, is really an A.

honestly i dont quite understand what you are getting at here. could you perhaps reiterate?

But, to say that there does not exist any similarities, equivalences, or identicalities seems absurd, even if such similarities, equivalences, or identicalities are not absolutely similar, equivalent, or identical. A cat is a cat. Even the cats know this.

i wouldn’t say that there arent similarities (except in the sense that it is an abstract entity) but i would say that these similarities exist merely as mathematical entities, and in objective reality the concept of “similarities” does not exist.

Am I getting this wrong? In any event, I agree with Betterave: I’m not sure how this ties back to the Eucharist.

God bless,
jd

Well, when one speaks of transubstantiation, it seems that it changes the “essence” of the wafer. I want to know if transubstantiation is compatible with nominalist ontologies, be they sets, tropes or Austere. I believe that Austere nominalism would be the most interesting conversation since it rejects universals and properties, and we are left with the question “what changes in the wafer to make it the body of Christ?”

 

[JDaniel]

Transubstantiation seems to me to be a claim about abstract universals. Would you say this is true?

No. “Abstract universals” seems to be tautological to me.

realists define “things” through abstract entities.

How are you defining “abstract entity?”

Nominalists would disagree with you.

I suppose they would. What I would like to do is give one of them a mouse and an elephant, and nothing more. then say to him, “When I get back, I expect to see a robust, healthy and pregnant mouse!”

They would posit that abstraction does not exist and thus can not be an objective definition of a thing.

“Out there” it does not. That is true (can we say “true?”). But, “in here” it certainly does.

I would say that the organizational patterns of the brain are not reflective of reality and thus can not be used to objectively define “things” (which is what appears to be what you have done here. though i’ve been wrong before lol) therefor abstractions are separate from objective definitions.

Well, interestingly, from a scientific perspective, abstractions can be proven. They are nothing more than an orderly arrangement of pictures our minds have taken at each and every moment of our being. Under hypnosis, a person can give you precise details of what is a “cat.”

Instantiate means: to be an instance of. Red things are an instance of the property of redness. ie, red things instantiate redness.

But, as you are stating it here, it rather seems to be a causative instance of it. Thus, in the loosest sense of the word “creation,” you appear to mean create.

so what you did here, it appears, is you have given a cause to properties in a sense i am not familiar with, then you claim that this cause is the thing changed, which results in transubstantiation. This appears to widely differ from the realist ontology, which usually claims that the properties themselves are causal and fundamental.

And that’s the problem: nothing causes itself. If it could, it would have to pre-exist itself.

Furthermore, the Aristotelian would posit that “redness” is indeed a result of the apple.

I consider myself to be a Thomistic Aristotelian, and I do not. That said, there is a sense where the apple is causative of redness. Contraries in motion require a common subject, otherwise it would be more correct to say, the green that is in this apple is what causes the red.

That is, particulars are what create universals.

What is more proper to say is, “Those particulars, out there, cause these universals in here.” One cannot simply do away with the locus of a universal’s existence, its correct environment, so to speak.

If red things did not exist, the property of redness would also not exist.

That is correct. (Except perhaps in someone’s skewed mental conflation of pink and purple! Or, whatever colors might accidentally present one with ‘red’.)

Plato on the other hand would posit that things work the other way around. Redness exists whether or not red things exist. This redness would exist in “platonic heaven” in which the perfect essence of “things” are located,

But this does not contradict your above proposition. After we’re all gone, it is also the realm where the futurum exactum resides.

where as Aristotle would posit that properties are located within particulars themselves.

That may be so.

Your response appears to be rather platonic in the sense that properties have a cause outside of their particulars. This position seems to have been widely abandoned by the philosophical community because the property of “non self instantiation” is a bi-product of the ontology.

Of course some would like to abandon it. That would make perfect sense since many of them would like to abandon God as well.

This is a problem when we ask if non self instantiation instantiates itself.

That’s not a problem: nothing causes itself, as I have already posited.

If it does instantiate itself, then it does not instantiate itself. If it does not instantiate itself, then it does instantiate itself. So basically, non self instantiation leads us to:

A
.’. ~A

or

~A
.’.A

This is obviously a logical paradox and thus many realists take on an Aristotelian ontology and deny that non self instantiation is a property.

What you propose is a diametric contrary. "If it does not … → it does not. Period.

Though if you do not see this as reasonable feel free to expand on this ontology.

OK.

again i disagree. The organizational patterns of the mind do not reflect objective reality.

Then how is it that minds, deep in the sleep of a hypnotic trance, can and do recall with remarkable precision objects and events that now only exist as impressions in their brains?

cont . . .

 

[JDaniel]

continuation . . .

This is where things get fascinating though (at least to me), because obviously mathematical thought obviously has some use.

It certainly does. It helps us make things.

This is absurd as is pointed out in a famous paper by Wigner called “the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics” in which he posits that the philosophical and metaphysical reasons for the effectiveness of mathematics is widely unexplored.

Possibly. But we are certainly enjoying the fruits of man’s artifices from the proper use of mathematics, aren’t we?

Kant had some interesting writings which start with the idea that mathematics is, in essence (lol), two objects whos relations are measured, then the objects are removed, leaving only their relations which we can attach numerical values to. From there, Kants writing got so dense i gave up rofl.

I don’t remember that, but, the first man might have done just that. Although, if one believes in Adam and Eve, arithmetical concepts were more than likely given to them by God.

God bless,
jd

 

[JDaniel]

I would agree with this sentiment.

That’s a start.

I am unsure. i must admit this is something i havent thought about yet. On a kneejerk reflex i would say no,

Nothing? Do you own a car?

except maybe personal experience of the divine (i must stress personal because i dont believe that there can be objective knowledge of the divine, but i do believe that each individual will have differing, true experiences of Divinity. This is because Divinity, if it chooses to show itself, will show itself perfectly. This is only achievable [at least while individuals use a mind to conceptualize], by the Divine working within an individuals paradigm to create an understanding of it through our own views of what “perfect” or “good” or “love” is. Otherwise, there would be instances of the Divine showing itself in which a person does not see the divine as being “perfect”, “good” or “loving” or possibly even “the divine”. This is not a perfect representation, and i do not believe that divinity would show itself imperfectly.)

How can God stop to choose? How does an Infinite being “move” in such a way so as to stop to choose? Where would it move, i.e., relative to what? The answer is: He doesn’t move. But, He is rolling out Creation. And, said Creation is occurring with God’s Providence. Now, if a man cannot see Creation rolling out before his eyes, he is blinded by something other than his optical apparatus.

Wow that was a mouthful. sorry if it isnt clear. if you need clarification ask and i’ll try a bit harder.

Not at all: it was quite clear (after my twentieth re-reading!).

I didnt know what you meant by criterion here:
a standard of judgment or criticism; a rule or principle for evaluating or testing something.
-dictionary.com
using this definition i would say the exact opposite is true. While the mind has some uses when it comes to survival, i doubt its capabilities to reflect objective reality.

Do you trust your mind enough to decode what your senses are receiving? If you were driving on the wrong side of the street with numerous oncoming cars, traveling at high rates of speed, would you trust your mind sufficiently to get the heck out of there?

This is an example of why i dont believe the mind is reflective of reality. i dont see any reason why two plates must both be “plates” other than some sort of intuition or common sense…

Precisely: our minds can actually render a sufficient – and, sufficiently rapid – demonstrative dialectical syllogism so that it can very effectively bypass the middle term.

that is, organizational patterns of the mind. And as the principia discordia says “common sense is what tells you the earth is flat”. i guess you could classify my own ontology in a Permendidean sense as he states, “There is only one “thing” and that is the universe”.

Well, there’s also you, is there not?

honestly i dont quite understand what you are getting at here. could you perhaps reiterate?

Are you quite sure you want me to “reiterate” it?

i wouldn’t say that there arent similarities (except in the sense that it is an abstract entity) but i would say that these similarities exist merely as mathematical entities, and in objective reality the concept of “similarities” does not exist.

Then . . . only the cats know they are cats?

Well, when one speaks of transubstantiation, it seems that it changes the “essence” of the wafer.

Actually it changes the “substance” of the wafer. That’s the whole point of the Church’s affirmation of Christ’s declaration, “This is my body.” He was not trying to catch his disciples in a ‘gotcha!’

I want to know if transubstantiation is compatible with nominalist ontologies, be they sets, tropes or Austere. I believe that Austere nominalism would be the most interesting conversation since it rejects universals and properties, and we are left with the question “what changes in the wafer to make it the body of Christ?”

Again, I am at a loss as to how any kind of nominalism relates to the Eucharist. But, it would be very interesting to discuss nominalism here.

God bless,
jd

 

[IndigoLove]

rubs hands together Ok! lets get to this…

No. “Abstract universals” seems to be tautological to me.

You are correct! Rofl.

How are you defining “abstract entity?”

An abstract object is an object which does not exist at any particular time or place, but rather exists as a type of thing (as an idea, or abstraction)
-wikipedia

I suppose they would. What I would like to do is give one of them a mouse and an elephant, and nothing more. then say to him, “When I get back, I expect to see a robust, healthy and pregnant mouse!”

o.o?

“Out there” it does not. That is true (can we say “true?”). But, “in here” it certainly does.

probably not

Well, interestingly, from a scientific perspective, abstractions can be proven. They are nothing more than an orderly arrangement of pictures our minds have taken at each and every moment of our being. Under hypnosis, a person can give you precise details of what is a “cat.”

v.v… Rofl!

But, as you are stating it here, it rather seems to be a causative instance of it. Thus, in the loosest sense of the word “creation,” you appear to mean create.

i would settle for "cause of "… create maybe takes it a bit too far for my tastes…

And that’s the problem: nothing causes itself. If it could, it would have to pre-exist itself.

er not causual, just fundamental. >.<

I consider myself to be a Thomistic Aristotelian, and I do not. That said, there is a sense where the apple is causative of redness. Contraries in motion require a common subject, otherwise it would be more correct to say, the green that is in this apple is what causes the red.

i have been using the term “cause” too loosely. What would make more sense is “ground”. Aristotelians would posit that particulars ground their properties.

What is more proper to say is, “Those particulars, out there, cause these universals in here.” One cannot simply do away with the locus of a universal’s existence, its correct environment, so to speak.

i rephrase “Particulars are what ground their universals”

That’s not a problem: nothing causes itself, as I have already posited.

you misunderstand:

The property of being a property is self instantiated because it, itself, is an instance of being a property. The property of being red is non self instantiated because the property of being red is not itself red

So this property of being red would be said to have the property of non-self-instantiation.

What you propose is a diametric contrary. "If it does not … → it does not. Period.

Think about it.

If Non-self instantiation is an instance of itself, then it is not an instance of itself by definition.

If Non self instantiation is NOT an instance of itself, then it fits the definition of a non self instantiated property and thus it DOES instantiate itself.

This is a natural logical consequence of the property of non self instantiation.

Then how is it that minds, deep in the sleep of a hypnotic trance, can and do recall with remarkable precision objects and events that now only exist as impressions in their brains?

again… Rofl!

cont . . .

 

[IndigoLove]

Nothing? Do you own a car?

heh this could be fun. what kinda logic trail are you gonna lead me down this time?

yes i own a car.

How can God stop to choose? How does an Infinite being “move” in such a way so as to stop to choose? Where would it move, i.e., relative to what? The answer is: He doesn’t move. But, He is rolling out Creation. And, said Creation is occurring with God’s Providence. Now, if a man cannot see Creation rolling out before his eyes, he is blinded by something other than his optical apparatus.

Divinity could be defined as “the Tao” maybe? the in between… uhh… i dunno how to describe it lol… i guess it cant be defined lol… but it is capable of bestowing “beatific vision” as you Catholics put it. or moments of clarity…satori… nirvana… whatever you want to call it. These insights happen to a wide variety of people across all cultures. Its my own personal belief that they are all glimpses of divinity seen through different paradigms. Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism… its all the same lol. I learned more about Christianity when i looked into Buddhism than i did after all my years being raised catholic lol.

Do you trust your mind enough to decode what your senses are receiving? If you were driving on the wrong side of the street with numerous oncoming cars, traveling at high rates of speed, would you trust your mind sufficiently to get the heck out of there?

i would say so, but much like words, what you perceive is purely subjective. Perception is an evolutionary adaptation meant to further survival. organizing the world into patterns such as “this is a car traveling at this speed which means if i hit it, bad things will happen” is useful, whereas such organizational patterns such as “there is no car, only the universe”, are not particularly useful for furthering survival.

For instance, when i look down, my mind sees “a computer” instead of “the universe”. This is a useful view as it allows for a depth of interaction with the object, at least in a psychological sense. Thus it furthers survival. Is it really a computer? i would say no and posit that it is simply the universe doing what the universe does.

Precisely: our minds can actually render a sufficient – and, sufficiently rapid – demonstrative dialectical syllogism so that it can very effectively bypass the middle term.

Usually i’d look up the terms you were using to try to make sense of your statement, but i’m lazy and have more writing to do, so i’ll simply ask…

“What?”

Well, there’s also you, is there not?

heh no. there is no “i”.

Are you quite sure you want me to “reiterate” it?

Thesaurus.com says “reiterate” is synonymous with “restate” and the “with different terminology” is implied… so yes!

Then . . . only the cats know they are cats?

I dont know what cats can know or cant know o.o

Actually it changes the “substance” of the wafer. That’s the whole point of the Church’s affirmation of Christ’s declaration, “This is my body.” He was not trying to catch his disciples in a ‘gotcha!’

Substance in what sense? From what i’ve been taught in class, substance is synonymous with “matter” in a hylomophic compound. So you can see my confusion as the wafer of bread is not literally a hunk of flesh…

Again, I am at a loss as to how any kind of nominalism relates to the Eucharist. But, it would be very interesting to discuss nominalism here.

God bless,
jd

well it doesnt relate in any meaningful way. i just thought it would be neat to look into theological metaphysics, and this is the first interesting topic i thought up. “what sorts of ontologies does Christianity adhere to?”. I thought Austere nominalism as applied to the eucharist would be a challenging topic for all parties involoved, so i hoped a lengthy and colorful conversation would ensue ^_^.