Metaphysical Realism and Nominalism, and the Eucharist

[Betterave]

as far as i am aware, nominalists do deny the reality of natures/essences (in the sense that they are not real). What you are thinking of is the Trope nominalist who denies universals, however support the idea of the trope (a property held within a thing and only that thing. Example being two pieces of paper both having completely different instances of white, even if the measurements for wavelength are exactly the same in every way).

No, actually I wasn’t thinking of the trope nominalist.

Nominalists do not deny that there really are red things, that there really are human beings, that there really are cats, etc. None of them do, so far as I know. If you want to claim otherwise, please refer to something specific.

There are also set nominalists who apply the mathematical concepts of sets to metaphysics. ie: A is B if an only if A is a member of the set B

Then, finally, there is the Quine-ian nominalist or Austere nominalist who rejects universals, tropes as well as sets. Austere nominalism is what i wish to focus on.

Out of curiosity: Where does Quine reject universals? Where does he reject sets??

 

[Betterave]

Substance in what sense? From what i’ve been taught in class, substance is synonymous with “matter” in a hylomophic compound. So you can see my confusion as the wafer of bread is not literally a hunk of flesh…

No; substance is that which subsists per se. In a hylomorphic compound, substance is a composition of form and matter.

 

[IndigoLove]

No, actually I wasn’t thinking of the trope nominalist.

Nominalists do not deny that there really are red things, that there really are human beings, that there really are cats, etc. None of them do, so far as I know. If you want to claim otherwise, please refer to something specific.

“Nominalism comes in at least two varieties. In one of them it is the rejection of abstract objects; in the other it is the rejection of universals.”
“The word ‘Nominalism’ carries an implication that the corresponding doctrine asserts that everything is particular or concrete, and that this is not vacuously true.”
-“Nominalism in Metaphysics” Stanford encyclopedia of Philosophy

So, by this definition, one who beileves there is only one concrete thing, that is the universe (and rejects ideas such as red things), is a nominalist.

Out of curiosity: Where does Quine reject universals? Where does he reject sets??

This comes from a statement my professor gave during a lecture where he sums up quines definition of Nominalism, in which he states that nominalists only believe in concrete entities, so such ideas as set theory or trope theory are not technically nominalism. He the stated that this “pure” form of nomialism is know as “austere nominalism” Though he did say after this, that later down the line Quine found that he was forced into a set nominalist ontology. I realize this is a argument to authority, however its the best i got lol.

 

[Betterave]

“Nominalism comes in at least two varieties. In one of them it is the rejection of abstract objects; in the other it is the rejection of universals.”
“The word ‘Nominalism’ carries an implication that the corresponding doctrine asserts that everything is particular or concrete, and that this is not vacuously true.”
-“Nominalism in Metaphysics” Stanford encyclopedia of Philosophy

So, by this definition, one who beileves there is only one concrete thing, that is the universe (and rejects ideas such as red things), is a nominalist.

But what is ‘the universe’? Why claim that it exists? Why is it not an ‘abstract object’?

From the SEP article again (bolding added):

But Nominalism is not simply the rejection of universals or abstract objects. For if that were the case, a nihilist, someone who believed that there are no entities at all, would count as a nominalist. Similarly, someone who rejected universals or abstract objects but were agnostic about the existence of particulars or concrete objects would count as a nominalist. Given how the term ‘Nominalism’ is used in contemporary philosophy, such philosophers would not be nominalists. The word ‘Nominalism’ carries an implication that the corresponding doctrine asserts that everything is particular or concrete, and that this is not vacuously true.

This comes from a statement my professor gave during a lecture where he sums up quines definition of Nominalism, in which he states that nominalists only believe in concrete entities, so such ideas as set theory or trope theory are not technically nominalism. He the stated that this “pure” form of nomialism is know as “austere nominalism” Though he did say after this, that later down the line Quine found that he was forced into a set nominalist ontology. I realize this is a argument to authority, however its the best i got lol.

Well if even *Quine *found himself forced to abandon ‘austere nominalism’ (whatever that means exactly), certainly I don’t think we need to get into why the Church would likely also reject it. What would be the motivation for that exercise? Unless you feel like defending some form of ‘austere nominalism’…