Metaphysics and religion

  • Thread starter Thread starter Qoeleth
  • Start date Start date
Status
Not open for further replies.
inocente said:
The Carnap paper is online here. He makes a good case that metaphysical statements are a content-free zone, interesting but meaningless soundbites, and that metaphysics drops down a hole of its own making halfway between the arts and the sciences, trying to put into words what cannot be put into words:

“Metaphysicians are musicians without musical ability. Instead they have a strong inclination to work within the medium of the theoretical, to connect concepts and thoughts. Now, instead of activating, on the one hand, this inclination in the domain of science, and satisfying, on the other hand, the need for expression in art, the metaphysician confuses the two and produces a structure which achieves nothing for knowledge and something inadequate for the expression of attitude.” 🙂

Most of us, including I think most Catholics, have little time for metaphysics anyway. God is empirical, sensed not reasoned. We preach Christ crucified, not logical essence of unmoved mover. The God of scripture is alive, not hypothesis.
Click to expand...
I like that that expression, content-free zone!

Funnily enough, that bit in Carnap about metaphysics being comparable to music is the one thing that does recommend metaphysics to me. I mean, there is a certain beauty in the wording and imagery of Heidegger, Levinas, or Derrida. It tells us a lot about how they were feeling. But maybe they should have written poems instead- which is basically what Nietzche and Cioran ended up doing.
 
Qoeleth said:
I like that that expression, content-free zone!

Funnily enough, that bit in Carnap about metaphysics being comparable to music is the one thing that does recommend metaphysics to me. I mean, there is a certain beauty in the wording and imagery of Heidegger, Levinas, or Derrida. It tells us a lot about how they were feeling. But maybe they should have written poems instead- which is basically what Nietzche and Cioran ended up doing.
Click to expand...
The idea that metaphysics cannot tell us something true about objective reality is absolutely false.

What is the problem you have exactly with metaphysics? Or is that a content free zone too?
 
Blue_Horizon said:
I can see you are one of the “true believer” types that Portofino speaks of.
This suggests your admirable christian enthusiasm may be blocking you from a more objective appreciation of what I (and perhaps others) are really saying.

Some things that might be useful to further reflect on…
  • saying that Jesus did not literally rise from the dead does not necessarily make either the apostles liars or the Gospels lies.
  • identification of the Sacraments with NT wonders/miracles is a common pious sentiment/analogy but one is objectively visible while the other is not.
Click to expand...
Please read the Catechism of the Church you claim to belong to before asserting such stupid nonsense.
Blue_Horizon said:
  • science may not be your strong suit. It may be worthwhile researching more on the distinction between soft and hard sciences and the difference in certainty involved.
Click to expand...
I didn’t know spirit could be put under and made manifest with a microscope. Perhaps thinking may not be your strong suit - be it the soft or hard kind of thinking.
Blue_Horizon said:
I don’t expect you to agree with any of the above but if you mull over these points I think you may eventually see new angles you haven’t yet considered. No need to respond, I won’t be taking this any further.
Click to expand...
Well thank you for kindly refusing to waste anymore of our time with your classically fallacious and amateur arguments.
 
Linux said:
The idea that metaphysics cannot tell us something true about objective reality is absolutely false.

What is the problem you have exactly with metaphysics? Or is that a content free zone too?
Click to expand...
The problem is that ideas like ‘objectively reality’, ‘absolute truth’, seem to me to illustrate perfectly the point. They are based on a kind of epistemological realism, which, even if I wanted to accept, I couldn’t. As a child of the 21st Century, sure I appreciate Plato, Plotinus, Augustine, as literature- but the issue of ‘truth’ of any metaphysics doesn’t even seem to be a meaninful question.

This is not primarily an intellectual decision, but a cultural one. In the same way, if you started talking to a primitive Native about “Being-as-Such” it would not scan, so for 21st Century person, the idea of ‘objective truth’, ‘reality’, ‘meaning’ are currencies which no longer have value.

So, I feel that Christian theology should not tie itself to any metaphysics, as if it were ‘actually’ true, or philosophical discourse was anything other than any art-form of words. In this context, when no philosophy can be believed (or conversely, when all philosophies can be ‘believed’ simultaneously), there seems to be a case for a non-philosophical approach to Christianity- focusing, instead of on the conviction of ideas (which have run out of steam), instead to consider personal experience and first hand evidence.

If we really do believe in God, we do not need to prove His existence, but He will speak to us through prayer, through spiritual experiences in the Sacraments and Scripture, to the events of life, through the aesthetic response to art. After all, Christianity is not a system of thought, but an observable and experiential encounter…
 
Hi Qoeleth,
He says that to be meaningful, a statement must either be logical (in the sense of being analytically true), or, at least in principle, relate to some empirical content. If not, he argues, it is technically meaningless.
Click to expand...
If Carnap’s principle for meaningfulness makes sense, it must satisfy its own criteria. Does it? If not, then his anti-metaphysics is rubbish.

Kilbourne
 
Is his principle the type that can be proved by factual evidence? No. Is it the type that can be demonstrated to be logical according some given definition or rule? No.

So how can this principle be believed, given that it isn’t self-consistent?
 
Here is another way to see why Carnap’s principle has problems with self-consistency. If the meaningfulness of a proposition is only established by a) finding factual evidence that can prove it true or false, or b) showing it is true by some (arbitrary) definition, then only contingent propositions can be meaningful. They cannot be necessary. Yet the principle itself seems to be unqualified and necessary. There are no other criteria for meaningfulness.

Put another way, Carnap is saying that only contingent propositions can be meaningful, or that is necessarily true that only contingent propositions can be meaningful.
 
Kilbourne said:
Is his principle the type that can be proved by factual evidence? No. Is it the type that can be demonstrated to be logical according some given definition or rule? No.

So how can this principle be believed, given that it isn’t self-consistent?
Click to expand...
The factual evidence in support of his position is the case advanced by Wittgenstein (a devout Catholic, by the way)- that most metaphysical questions do not actually affect how we live our lives. For example, if we suddenly found out, by divine revelation, for example, that Kant’s or Heidegger’s metaphysical positions were absolutely true, would it make a difference to any practical things?

Second, the criteria he present for meaningfulness is that there must be a criteria for correct application of a word. Empircally, this seems to accord with how words are used meaningfully.

Questions about values (i.e. what is good, what is desirable, what is right) are NOT metaphysical or even theoretical uestions, but essentially practical judgements. Similarly, a question about the status of the soul after death is not a metaphysical question, either- since, although we don’t have access to the evidence, in principle someone who did have (like Jesus) would give us empirical testimony.
 
Hi Qoeleth,

It would make one heck of a lot of difference to how I live my life if the proposition “God exists” were meaningless.

So I don’t agree that metaphysical statements make no difference to how we live. Our underlying metaphysical assumptions can have a profound impact on how we live.

Another empirical observation that I would make is that metaphysical assumptions are unavoidable. Even the proposition “There are no metaphysical propositions,” is a metaphysical proposition. I recall reading somewhere that the Vienna Circle would have someone shout out “Metaphysics!” every time someone committed a metaphysical sin in conversation. But they soon realized that this made conversation impossible.

Carnap’s principle just isn’t logical for it boils down to this: “All meaningful propositions are contingent; they all have alternatives.” But what is the alternative to the principle itself? It would have to be its logical contradictory, “There are some (at least one) meaningful propositions which are necessary.” One can’t maintain both.
 
Kilbourne said:
Hi Qoeleth,

It would make one heck of a lot of difference to how I live my life if the proposition “God exists” were meaningless.

So I don’t agree that metaphysical statements make no difference to how we live. Our underlying metaphysical assumptions can have a profound impact on how we live.

Another empirical observation that I would make is that metaphysical assumptions are unavoidable. Even the proposition “There are no metaphysical propositions,” is a metaphysical proposition. I recall reading somewhere that the Vienna Circle would have someone shout out “Metaphysics!” every time someone committed a metaphysical sin in conversation. But they soon realized that this made conversation impossible.

Carnap’s principle just isn’t logical for it boils down to this: “All meaningful propositions are contingent; they all have alternatives.” But what is the alternative to the principle itself? It would have to be its logical contradictory, “There are some (at least one) meaningful propositions which are necessary.” One can’t maintain both.
Click to expand...
Hi Kilbourne,

I like the story about the Vienna Circle! You are quite right about the point of the contingency of meaningful propositions. In fact, maybe it is meaningfulness is itself something which has to be contextualized. And I suppose mathematic statements are not generally contingent, but are not regarded as meaningless.

Is “God exists” necessarily a metaphysical statement? I suppose that depends upon how God is understood. If God is understood as being encounterable through observable experience (which may or may not be the case), then I think it is not.
 
Qoeleth said:
The problem is that ideas like ‘objectively reality’, ‘absolute truth’, seem to me to illustrate perfectly the point. They are based on a kind of epistemological realism, which, even if I wanted to accept, I couldn’t. As a child of the 21st Century, sure I appreciate Plato, Plotinus, Augustine, as literature- but the issue of ‘truth’ of any metaphysics doesn’t even seem to be a meaninful question.

This is not primarily an intellectual decision, but a cultural one. In the same way, if you started talking to a primitive Native about “Being-as-Such” it would not scan, so for 21st Century person, the idea of ‘objective truth’, ‘reality’, ‘meaning’ are currencies which no longer have value.
Click to expand...
Hmm, I think all metaphysics is representational, and so there isn’t necessarily a “right” one. Neo-Platonism and Thomism for instance start from different bases. To be a Thomist is not to deny that Platonism can establish any truths.

I’m not sure exactly what you mean when you say that “‘objective truth’, ‘reality’, ‘meaning’ are currencies which no longer have value.” They may not have value for the intellectual mainstream. But even on a non-philosophical basis, as Christians we do believe that there is objective truth in Christ. The question, then, would be, if there is objective truth in Christ, why not in the world created by God, and why would it not be accessible to those created in God’s image?
Qoeleth said:
So, I feel that Christian theology should not tie itself to any metaphysics, as if it were ‘actually’ true, or philosophical discourse was anything other than any art-form of words.
…
If we really do believe in God, we do not need to prove His existence, but He will speak to us through prayer, through spiritual experiences in the Sacraments and Scripture, to the events of life, through the aesthetic response to art. After all, Christianity is not a system of thought, but an observable and experiential encounter…
Click to expand...
I think it is somewhat unfortunate that philosophical discussions get lodged so much in debates over whether God exists, as though the chief reason of something like Thomism has ever been to prove to skeptics that God exists. I do think that negative theology gives us a powerful way to figure out what we know about God - and what we don’t. God gave us reason. It is, I think, implausible that philosophy should not cohere with Christianity, even though philosophy is not ultimately important.
 
Flimmy said:
Don’t listen to Rudolf Carnap. If he is faulty in one thing, he may be faulty in teaching, or “ruminating”, other things.
Click to expand...
Why is that not true of every philosopher? Better to say read with caution and do not assume a-prior validity until you have taken a look at opposing views.
 
Qoeleth said:
(i.e. what is good, what is desirable, what is right) are NOT metaphysical or even theoretical questions, but essentially practical judgments.
Click to expand...
To ask whether or not right or wrong has an objective standard is certainly a metaphysical question, because it is a question of about the act of existence and how it relates to personal values.

The idea that morality is nothing more than a practical judgment is a philosophical belief and is usually expressed as a logical conclusion by those who assume the validity of metaphysical naturalism as the fundamental basis for the validity of the claim.

In any case you are just asserting.
 
inocente said:
The Carnap paper is online here. He makes a good case that metaphysical statements are a content-free zone, interesting but meaningless soundbites, and that metaphysics drops down a hole of its own making halfway between the arts and the sciences, trying to put into words what cannot be put into words:

“Metaphysicians are musicians without musical ability. Instead they have a strong inclination to work within the medium of the theoretical, to connect concepts and thoughts. Now, instead of activating, on the one hand, this inclination in the domain of science, and satisfying, on the other hand, the need for expression in art, the metaphysician confuses the two and produces a structure which achieves nothing for knowledge and something inadequate for the expression of attitude.” 🙂

Most of us, including I think most Catholics, have little time for metaphysics anyway. God is empirical, sensed not reasoned. We preach Christ crucified, not logical essence of unmoved mover. The God of scripture is alive, not hypothesis.
Click to expand...
Again, she turns to the ad hominem to prove her point. Will it ever end, this constant urge to belittle those with whom one disagrees? Of course we are all perfectly aware of your dedicated antigonism to metaphysics. So nice of you to remind us every post or so!

Scripture is alive good, prove it. Fire away, there are dozens of atheists, agnostics, skeptics, cultists, etc right on this Forum, some on this thread just waiting for you to convert them. So let’s get cracking. Start preaching.

Linus2nd
 
inocente said:
The Carnap paper is online here. He makes a good case that metaphysical statements are a content-free zone, interesting but meaningless soundbites, and that metaphysics drops down a hole of its own making halfway between the arts and the sciences, trying to put into words what cannot be put into words:

“Metaphysicians are musicians without musical ability. Instead they have a strong inclination to work within the medium of the theoretical, to connect concepts and thoughts. Now, instead of activating, on the one hand, this inclination in the domain of science, and satisfying, on the other hand, the need for expression in art, the metaphysician confuses the two and produces a structure which achieves nothing for knowledge and something inadequate for the expression of attitude.” 🙂

Most of us, including I think most Catholics, have little time for metaphysics anyway. God is empirical, sensed not reasoned. We preach Christ crucified, not logical essence of unmoved mover. The God of scripture is alive, not hypothesis.
Click to expand...
Here, here, more ad hominems please. Sort of tells us where you are coming from.

Linus2nd
 
Linux said:
To ask whether or not right or wrong has an objective standard is certainly a metaphysical question, because it is a question of about the act of existence and how it relates to personal values.

The idea that morality is nothing more than a practical judgment is a philosophical belief and is usually expressed as a logical conclusion by those who assume the validity of metaphysical naturalism as the fundamental basis for the validity of the claim.

In any case you are just asserting.
Click to expand...
Any moral position requires, as its fundament, an estimation of ‘the good’. Now, it seems as if ‘the good’ cannot be determined without some practical judgment (e.g. Happiness is good, Kindness is good, peace is good). None of these things, it seems, a logically self-evident.

Well, I would suggest that the practical determination of ‘the good’ is more fundamental and practical than its metaphysical or theoretical determination. For example, most people start with a practical judgment “It good to receive and give kindness”. Now, this as a practical, experiential judgment seems to be more fundamental and necessary than any theoretical argument in favour of charity (such as those advanced by Kant).

And a person could possibly ditch completely their ‘moral philosophy’ (e.g. suddenly realise that our theoretical system was wentirely wrong), but he or she would still be governed, it seems, by their practical judgments about what is ‘good’ or ‘bad’ to do.

For example, if a person radically changed their metaphysics (e.g. they swapped from being a nominalist to a realist, or vice versa, or they became an idealist, or a materialist, or a solipsist) would it affect his or her moral judgments and activities? Possibly a little, but I don’t think there would be any real upheaval. Perhaps I am wrong, but this is my instinct.
 
Linusthe2nd said:
Here, here, more ad hominems please. Sort of tells us where you are coming from.

Linus2nd
Click to expand...
Perhaps I am being as thick as the proverbial whale sandwich, but I seem to have missed the ad hominen attack…If am sure no offense was meant by anyone, and if it was me, I apologize unreservedly.
 
Status
Not open for further replies.
Back
Top