Q
Qoeleth
Guest
I am with William of Ockham- names/concepts which designate unity are just that (mental concepts). In reality, there are only particulars. We may call something ‘one’, or think of it as ‘one’- but that is all.But of course this is exactly the problem I brought up. If we accept that man has parts (a soul and a body) then how is he essentially one? For he exists of heterogeneous and clashing essences and additionally, assuming your example is generalizable as a law of nature (that the separation of a thing into parts suffices to prove that it has no real unity), he dies when his parts are separated.
So your reply agrees with my problems and so they both accord in contradicting the parts of metaphysics that I’m trying to render non-contradictory.
I mean, take ‘one’ minute. There’s no oneness about it. I could equally call a unit of time lasting seventy seconds ‘one’ (if a name was invented for it). There is no unity in the thing itself.
Similarly, ‘forms’ are only in our minds. Take the form of ‘the good’. We have a word ‘good’, and the meaning attached to that word is ‘the form of the good’. If we slightly changed the definition of the word ‘good’, the ‘form of the good’ would change also.
Now, I am not diminishing the important of words/concepts- on the contrary, since our entire understanding of the ‘universe’, even down to the ‘oneness’ of any ‘object’ is a function of language and conceptualisation- it seems that even if ‘oneness’ is only a mental concept and a name, it still ‘exists’ (for us, who are exists within the web of language).