Mind & Matter

[PaulF2]

Charles Darwin & I were having a conversation in another thread that was tangential, and that thread was just closed. So I thought I would continue the discussion in this new thread.

What do you believe and why?

I don’t believe in extraordinary claims withour evidence. Why? Because the scientific method is the best means of futhering the knowledge of mankind. I want to futher the knowledge of mankind because it relieves suffering. I think suffering is bad because of empathy.

Well, let me give you a synopsis of what I believe and why, and then respond to your statements above.

Starting from the very general, materialism vs. something other than materialism, I will say that outside of the very good logical evidence, it is self-evident to me that the mind is not matter. Furthermore - and this is critical - I would like to point out to you that your assumption that the mind is physical, and that strong evidence is needed to counteract that assumption, is shakey. On the contrary, it is acknowledged by virtually all materialists - and I’m thinking of materialist mind/brain researchers - that what we call “mind” is separate from the physical brain. What makes them materialists is that they believe that mind - consciousness - “emerges” from the physical brain.

I, and many others, would argue that the natural assumption should not be that the mind is an “emergent” property because to assert that something physical can produce something non-physical is something that itself requires proof, and there is no such proof. Since we know that “consciousness” itself is not the brain, without direct evidence we should not believe something non-material to proceed directly from something material. There is no reason whatsoever to do so - unless one has decided a priori to stick to a personal philosophy of materialism. Such has nothing to do with science or the scientific method. No, it is more logical to assume that matter cannot, by itself, produce something non-material.

I believe you are, quite possibly unintentionally, mistaking the philosophy of materialism - the belief that the physical is all that exists - with “science”. The two are not the same thing at all. You are entirely correct that the scientific method - gathering evidence, producing hypothesis, refining them into theories - is exactly the right way to deal with science. As in, studying the physical universe and the laws behind it. But this is not all their is to life by any means, as mature and honest scientists of all stripes will generally agree. Science answers the “what” of the physical world, not the “why”, and not reality beyond the physical (if there is one).

I will give you some food for thought regarding how you may have been influenced by things you’ve read and whether or not your point of view is truly objective. Here’s a quote from famous Harvard biologist Richard Lewontin:

“Our willingness to accept scientific claims that are against common sense is the key to an understanding of the real struggle between science and the supernatural. We take the side of science in spite of the patent absurdity of some of its constructs, in spite of its failure to fulfill many of its extravagant promises of health and life, in spite of the tolerance of the scientific community for unsubstantiated just-so stories, because we have a prior commitment, a commitment to materialism. It is not that the methods and institutions of science somehow compel us to accept a material explanation of the phenomenal world, but, on the contrary, that we are forced by our a priori adherence to material causes to create an apparatus of investigation and a set of concepts that produce material explanations, no matter how counter-intuitive, no matter how mystifying to the uninitiated. Moreover, that materialism is absolute, for we cannot allow a Divine Foot in the door.” Emphasis is mine.

Note just what he is saying here - atheistic scientists are rarely so candid! He is stating directly that:

1. His materialistic philosophy drives his science: he imposes it upon his science, and does not allow the possibility of any conclusion that contradicts this philosophy.
2. That the above results not infrequently in constructs that are not just untenable or “against common sense” but downright “patently absurd”.
3. It is not at all anything scientific that drives him to materialism: it is his a priori belief/preference.

And we should trust such a person to come up with the correct answers to the great truths of life - why?

Let this quote - which I suspect Dr. Lewontin wishes he’d never put in print - be a lesson to all the disciples of the New Atheists who think they’re really guided by science and impartial with regard to evidence! Now, Lewontin implies above that science and materialism are “one and the same” but that is not at all the case, and that is provable by this simple fact: one can engage in science, using the scientific method, while not accepting materialism. Surely, if that’s not possible, science never would have “gotten” started anyhow, for it was in the Christian West that it did. (And there are probably reasons for that. Christianity brought belief in a rational universe created by a rational God. Creator & created are separate; the latter is not endowed with its own mind, as the pagans tended to imagine the earth, stars, etc. The universe would thus behave rationally and consistently, it was assumed, and could be described mathematically. That is science. In comparison, other cultures, with their beliefs in irrational “gods” that behaved like humans, and heavenly bodies with their own minds and thus no consistent, deterministic behavior, produced “stillbirths” of science (Jaki).)

 

[PaulF2]

So - perhaps you will consider that perhaps what you have been led to believe is obvious and a sensible set of assumptions is not so much either.

Because, frankly, it ought to be entirely obvious to any thinking person, properly educated, who considers the question, that the mind cannot be merely a physical thing. It ought to be intuitively obvious, and don’t make the mistake of thinking that evidence that can’t be easily formalized is not evidence. What am I talking about? I’m talking about the very notion that the consciousness we all know is reducible entirely to neurons is laughable. I’m talking about free will - the fact that I know that I have moral free will. I know this, and so does anyone else who wants to know it. I know that I have the choice to do right or wrong when a choice is put before me. It is a fact that the determinism you assert removes all possibility for true free will - why is it that so few materialists want to acknowledge this? Some do, of course: it has real benefits. “I’m just a biological machine, programmed to do what I do” removes all limits to human behavior and silences the conscience (eventually). However, it seems that most atheists are, in fact, the moralizing kind, decrying the awful, awful morality practiced by us Christians (a totally preposterous assertion in the light of actual history). All such people have simply not come to terms with the irrefutable consequences of their belief system. #1, there can be no free will - you simply can’t logically blame anybody for anything. Secondly, there can be no objective morality. Obviously, for there to be a true moral standard - a true standard of right and wrong - there must be a Source of right and wrong - an infallible Definition of truth. There is no way an atheistic belief system can come up with one - as soon as an atheist tries he is actually talking about God before he knows it.

But - these are nebulous things. By that I don’t mean not momentous or extremely important, as they are, but that they are things that can be ignored by a soul easily enough who has decided he won’t ponder them.

I will now speak a bit to your statement that the primary goal [of humanity] should be to reduce suffering and that the best way to do that is via science. First of all, I think you’re setting up some kind of false dichotomy by implying that scientific progress (especially WRT medicine) and Christianity are somehow mutually exclusive. That is a very silly notion. (It is via science and medicine that God works His mercy very often, I would argue, and it in seeing the compassion and kindness that takes place in the practice of medicine that made me realize why God works through it.)

Secondly, once again, you must acknowledge that your assertion here that easing human suffering is a primary goal is nothing other than arbitrary unless you will acknowledge a Source for such moral law.

Thirdly, it is definitely fair to point out that those in pursuit of certain types of science with a certain a priori worldview (see above) have produced untold human suffering and death, especially in the 20th century. If you are not aware that the Nazis used social Darwinism to justify their eugenics and ultimately their genocide, please look into it. Stalin and the Communists used their atheist Marxism and its belief in the “common good” to justify their mass murders as well.

[As to what I believe, more specifically: I believe in the basics of the Christian worldview. I believe every dogma formalized by the Holy Catholic Church, each of which was revealed at least in kernel form by the apostles. Note that there are almost no dogmas that have anything even tangentially to do with science, evolution, etc. It is dogma that the universe was created ex nihilo by God at the beginning of time - a postulate long-regarded as unfounded if not absurd by the scientific community and then completely vindicated in the 20th century. It is also dogma that Adam and Eve were actual human beings. Belief in the evolution of their bodies is not forbidden. While I have been or was a firm believer in theistic evolution for two decades or so I am increasingly swayed by the evidence that neo-Darwinism is not a plausible or convincing explanation for macroevolution.]

 

[PaulF2]

A couple more thoughts for the moment:

• There is strong empirical evidence for the mind being non-material that I did not touch upon above.
• I am aware that one or two of the “new atheists” have claimed that they are not, in fact, moral relativists after all! Their assertions and arguments make no sense - they either dodge the issue completely or end up talking about God by another name.

 

[reggieM]

Starting from the very general, materialism vs. something other than materialism, I will say that outside of the very good logical evidence, it is self-evident to me that the mind is not matter.

The products of the mind are not material either. Rational thought, imaginations, memories, understanding of mathematical constants, logic itself – those are all immaterial.

 

[PaulF2]

The products of the mind are not material either. Rational thought, imaginations, memories, understanding of mathematical constants, logic itself – those are all immaterial.

Good point.

I did touch on the impossibility of a purely physical mind dealing with abstract thought in a previous reply to CD.

What I posted here, of course, is little more than a teaser.

I’d PMed a couple of the resident “enthusiastic” atheists about this thread but it seems that perhaps nobody wants to play.

Anybody who does post here should stay on topic, please. The topic is: Is the mind a (completely) physical thing, and what are the implications for theism either way?

 

[hecd2]

Good point.

I did touch on the impossibility of a purely physical mind dealing with abstract thought in a previous reply to CD.

What I posted here, of course, is little more than a teaser.

I’d PMed a couple of the resident “enthusiastic” atheists about this thread but it seems that perhaps nobody wants to play.

Anybody who does post here should stay on topic, please. The topic is: Is the mind a (completely) physical thing, and what are the implications for theism either way?

Of course the mind isn’t physical - but I contend that the mind arises from and is dependent on the brain, which is physical.

Let me append some points I made in the now closed thread:

As a teaser, though, here is some of the very strong evidence that the Mind cannot be strictly physical:

I assume you mean “the Mind cannot arise from a strictly physical ground, ie the brain”. It is obvious that the mind itself is not physical (almost by definition, otherwise we wouldn’t have the mind-body problem), just as pain is not a physical entity itself although it arises from physical or material processes - the question is whether the mind is grounded in the physical world - is it an epiphenomenon of physical processes? My view is that the mind, and consciousness are grounded in the physical brain and I’ll explain why I think that in a minute - but first I need to correct a couple of errors you make below:

• The eminent theoretical physicist Roger Penrose used Godel’s Theorem (a logic theorem) to demonstrate exactly this - that the mind cannot be analogous to a physical computer of any kind.

In “The Emperor’s New Mind”, Penrose used arguments based on part of one of Goedel’s theorems (that in any formal mathematical system, there are propositions which are true that cannot be proven within the system) along with other arguments to support his opinion that the mind cannot be represented by an algorithm running on a Turing machine. In no way did he imply (nor does he apparently believe) that the mind is not grounded in the physical brain (indeed the whole point of the book is to find a non-algorithmic but physical process to account for mind), nor that the mind did not evolve in a purely naturalistic way.

• The classical (Copenhagen) interpretation of quantum mechanics asserts that the mind - an observer - cannot be a physical thing! The entire theory of quantum mechanics cannot work unless this is the case.

This is wrong. What you are describing here is not the Copenhagen interpretation but an interpretation of quantum mechanics called “consciousness causes collapse”. It has a number of fundamental flaws (such as the consequence of the unrealised behaviour of the universe before the emergence of minds: see Bohm and Hiley - The Undivided Universe). It has been widely rejected on ontological and scientific grounds, and the development of the concept of decoherence has been the nail in its coffin. Your claim that the cause of the collapse of the wave function in the Copenhagen interpretation cannot be a physical thing and that QM cannot otherwise work is completely wrong.

The only counters to this have been alternative interpretations that involve postulates far more wild, numerous, and unobservable than the simple tenet that the Mind is not physical.

Not so, as what you have described is not the Copenhagen interpretation, but some other discredited thing, although all credible interpretations have some unpalatable philosophical and scientific aspects.

So let us move on to the reasons why I hold that the mind is grounded in the physical brain - and it’s very simple. First of all it is clear that that the brain is necessary for the operation of the mind. No demonstration of a mind working independently of a physical brain has even been made. Furthermore, things that affect the brain - trauma, drugs, hormones, disease, etc, fundamentally affect the operation of the mind (and everything that makes us what we are - personality, intelligence, consciousness, discernment, free will). Secondly, there is absolutely no reason to think that the brain is not sufficient for the operation of the mind. Your examples of arguments to show that the mind must have an non-physical basis are wrong, and I know of no other good arguments in support of the notion that the brain is an insufficient basis for the mind.

To summarise: the brain is indisputably necessary for the existence of the mind; and there is no reason to think that it is not sufficient.

If your mind is nothing but a collection of neurons and their interactions - physical, particular things - then no two brains are obviously alike.

Any two healthy human brains are indeed alike, having as they do, the same structure, the same centres etc; but they are not identical.

to be continued

 

[hecd2]

continuation

There is no basis at all to assert that two such disparate brains could represent an abstract concept identically

Well, two brains represent physical entities similarly - we agree on what is red, what is hot, what is cold, what is bigger or further away than what. It is, after all, the function of brains (and minds) to represent reality with some degree of accuracy - if they didn’t we’d all be dead the first time we tried to cross the street.) Why are abstract concepts different, especially since there is good evidence that abstract thinking is an extension of concrete thinking conducted in a similar mode (see, for example, Steven Pinker’s The Stuff of Thought)?

• as a matter of fact, there’s no evidence or reason to believe that a single such brain could understand any abstract concept.

Why on earth do you say that? What is of course, certain, is that no representation of an abstract concept can occur in the absence of a brain.

I did assert that it is illogical for you to claim both that your mind is nothing but a physical thing that evolved via natural selection and that it is capable of discerning truth from error with certainty.

This is the bare bones of Alvin Plantinga’s argument against naturalism - he claims that naturalism is self-defeating for more or less the reason you propose (his argument of course uses more ink than you do, and much bigger words). But Plantinga’s argument is fatally flawed. Although, it is impossible to *prove *that any proposition about reality is true if the mind is grounded in the brain and has evolved, that is no reason to abandon the pragmatic assertion that the brain has evolved to make representations of reality that are true. That is, after all, its function.

Now, do you think perhaps you could answer our very basic question: If you believe your Mind, your entire ‘you’, is nothing but a blob of matter that evolved via natural selection, why do you have ANY confidence in anything it tells you? Why?

Let me try to answer the question: I am confident that my mind, which is an epiphenomenon of my physical brain which has evolved, can discern truth about reality because that is the function that it has evolved to have - a brain that did not reasonably accurately represent reality - that acted randomly or capriciously or totally inaccurately would not allow its possessor to survive long enough to reproduce. In other words, I have confidence that my brain/mind represents and interprets reality reasonably accurately, not because it is some sort of magical Platonic entity with supernatural powers, but because my experience is that it works.

Alec
evolutionpages.com

 

[grannymh]

So let us move on to the reasons why I hold that the mind is grounded in the physical brain - and it’s very simple. First of all it is clear that that the brain is necessary for the operation of the mind. No demonstration of a mind working independently of a physical brain has even been made. Furthermore, things that affect the brain - trauma, drugs, hormones, disease, etc, fundamentally affect the operation of the mind (and everything that makes us what we are - personality, intelligence, consciousness, discernment, free will). Secondly, there is absolutely no reason to think that the brain is not sufficient for the operation of the mind. Your examples of arguments to show that the mind must have an non-physical basis are wrong, and I know of no other good arguments in support of the notion that the brain is an insufficient basis for the mind.

To summarise: the brain is indisputably necessary for the existence of the mind; and there is no reason to think that it is not sufficient.
to be continued

Hi Alec,

I agree with you. It is clear that that the brain is necessary for the operation of the mind. Not only that, but the brain is necessary for the operation of every part of the body. Awake Brain Surgery is an excellent example of the importance of each part of the brain. Considering just one category of surgical technology, we stand in awe at the sufficiency of the brain. What is rather interesting is that our own brains can conceive of other brains going further and further in understanding how still other brains operate in the presence of tumors/disease.

In addition, you hold that the mind is grounded in the physical brain… and you point out that things that affect the brain - trauma, drugs, hormones, disease, etc, fundamentally affect the operation of the mind (and everything that makes us what we are - personality, intelligence, consciousness, discernment, free will). All of this sounds to me, like a description of the mind and brain being different yet intimately united in the corporal existence of both body and intellect.

We can agree that the physical brain in an animal is sentient regardless of species. Nonetheless, the list above which makes us what we are is seen in far greater degrees in the human species. Is the mind calling the shots and the brain and body responding?

Blessings,
granny

The quest is worthy of the adventures of the journey.

 

[grannymh]

I assume you mean “the Mind cannot arise from a strictly physical ground, ie the brain”. It is obvious that the mind itself is not physical (almost by definition, otherwise we wouldn’t have the mind-body problem), just as pain is not a physical entity itself although it arises from physical or material processes - the question is whether the mind is grounded in the physical world - is it an epiphenomenon of physical processes? to be continued

So that I can get up to speed. What is the mind-body problem you refer to above?
Depending on your answer, I may look again at the comparison of pain and mind as not a physical entity itself but both are grounded in the physical world.

Blessings,
granny

The quest is worthy of the adventures of the journey.

 

[grannymh]

A couple more thoughts for the moment:

• There is strong empirical evidence for the mind being non-material that I did not touch upon above.

As a direct descendent of Thomas the Apostle, I would appreciate putting my hand to that evidence. References please. Thank you.

Blessings,
granny

All human life is sacred.

 

[PaulF2]

Of course the mind isn’t physical - but I contend that the mind arises from and is dependent on the brain, which is physical.

Of course that’s what you contend. I pointed out that this is what a materialist believes regarding the mind.

but first I need to correct a couple of errors you make below:
In “The Emperor’s New Mind”, Penrose used arguments based on part of one of Goedel’s theorems (that in any formal mathematical system, there are propositions which are true that cannot be proven within the system) along with other arguments to support his opinion that the mind cannot be represented by an algorithm running on a Turing machine. In no way did he imply (nor does he apparently believe) that the mind is not grounded in the physical brain (indeed the whole point of the book is to find a non-algorithmic but physical process to account for mind), nor that the mind did not evolve in a purely naturalistic way.

I am entirely aware that there is no evidence that Penrose was not a materialist - as is my primary source on the matter - that is not the point. What he did believe was that the mind was in no way analogous to any physical computing machine - he asserted a different type of physical reality altogether. Penrose’s views on mind still buck the materialist party line very heavily and his adaptation of Godel’s Theorem is powerful.

(By the way, I’m aware of the various attempted refutations of Penrose’s proof.)

This is wrong. What you are describing here is not the Copenhagen interpretation but an interpretation of quantum mechanics called “consciousness causes collapse”. It has a number of fundamental flaws (such as the consequence of the unrealised behaviour of the universe before the emergence of minds: see Bohm and Hiley - The Undivided Universe). It has been widely rejected on ontological and scientific grounds, and the development of the concept of decoherence has been the nail in its coffin. Your claim that the cause of the collapse of the wave function in the Copenhagen interpretation cannot be a physical thing and that QM cannot otherwise work is completely wrong.

I’m going to get back to you on this one - I need to do some research.

However, for now: Do you accept one of the many-worlds interpretations? Do you believe the collapse results in a splitting?

So let us move on to the reasons why I hold that the mind is grounded in the physical brain - and it’s very simple. First of all it is clear that that the brain is necessary for the operation of the mind. No demonstration of a mind working independently of a physical brain has even been made. Furthermore, things that affect the brain - trauma, drugs, hormones, disease, etc, fundamentally affect the operation of the mind (and everything that makes us what we are - personality, intelligence, consciousness, discernment, free will). Secondly, there is absolutely no reason to think that the brain is not sufficient for the operation of the mind. Your examples of arguments to show that the mind must have an non-physical basis are wrong, and I know of no other good arguments in support of the notion that the brain is an insufficient basis for the mind.

If you think that any credible Catholic theologian or philosopher has ever proposed that the mind is not dependent upon the brain you are not aware of the basic teaching on the matter - are you attempting to setup a straw man here? Human beings are body and spirit, united and interwoven in a mystical way. The ‘ghost in the machine’ euphemism doesn’t apply - on that much we agree.

With that, none of the rest of your point has any bearing, really. It it not and should not be surprising that the physiology of the brain and the mind are related. Again - who do you think believes the contrary?

I’m afraid that ‘Your examples of arguments to show that the mind must have an non-physical basis are wrong’ doesn’t really hold much water as a bare assertion, does it? Would you care to address them in some way, perhaps?

And what of free will? Do you believe it exists, or not?

Well, two brains represent physical entities similarly - we agree on what is red, what is hot, what is cold, what is bigger or further away than what. It is, after all, the function of brains (and minds) to represent reality with some degree of accuracy - if they didn’t we’d all be dead the first time we tried to cross the street.) Why are abstract concepts different, especially since there is good evidence that abstract thinking is an extension of concrete thinking conducted in a similar mode (see, for example, Steven Pinker’s The Stuff of Thought)?

Red, hot, cold, and the distances of objects involve nothing other than the processing of sensory data. Nobody doubts that the physiology of the brain is completely sufficient for such processing, I think; animals do it. [But, as a matter of fact, it’s well-known that things like perceived temperatures, and colors, are quite subjective - we don’t really ‘all agree’.]

Abstract concepts are different because they are not merely descriptions of sensory data or something following directly from them. They are a completely different category. Can you describe to me how the concept of pi can be reduced to a pattern of neural firings? Don’t forget that if you are not completely capturing the ‘essence’ of pi it doesn’t really work. Now, you may argue that different people understand pi in subtly different ways - if you do argue that I’ll explain how it doesn’t work.

Why on earth do you say that? What is of course, certain, is that no representation of an abstract concept can occur in the absence of a brain.

A brain is indeed necessary, as is a mind.

 

[PaulF2]

This is the bare bones of Alvin Plantinga’s argument against naturalism - he claims that naturalism is self-defeating for more or less the reason you propose (his argument of course uses more ink than you do, and much bigger words). But Plantinga’s argument is fatally flawed. Although, it is impossible to *prove *that any proposition about reality is true if the mind is grounded in the brain and has evolved, that is no reason to abandon the pragmatic assertion that the brain has evolved to make representations of reality that are true. That is, after all, its function.

It evolved to keep you alive long enough to mate - that is about the end of it. Right? If we don’t agree about that, please explain.

Understanding the entire the reason for being of the universe is well above the pay-grade of the neo-darwinian ‘mind’. So, I would indeed agree, by your worldview, that you are qualified to tell hot from cold, and near from far, and pursue with great determination the largest breasts within your field of view so as assure surviving offspring, but I would argue that you have not given us any reason at all to suppose that you’re well-equipped to participate in the exercise we are now.

Let me try to answer the question: I am confident that my mind, which is an epiphenomenon of my physical brain which has evolved, can discern truth about reality because that is the function that it has evolved to have - a brain that did not reasonably accurately represent reality - that acted randomly or capriciously or totally inaccurately would not allow its possessor to survive long enough to reproduce. In other words, I have confidence that my brain/mind represents and interprets reality reasonably accurately, not because it is some sort of magical Platonic entity with supernatural powers, but because my experience is that it works.

See the above. I think your ‘experience’ that you’ve figured out the universe is highly suspicious.

You also confuse ‘what works’ with ‘what’s true’. The Darwinian process would accept any adaptation that gave survival advantage - are you REALLY going to assert that surviving to mate and knowing and understanding reality completely - especially abstract reality - are the same thing?!

 

[hecd2]

Hi Alec,

I agree with you. It is clear that that the brain is necessary for the operation of the mind. Not only that, but the brain is necessary for the operation of every part of the body. Awake Brain Surgery is an excellent example of the importance of each part of the brain. Considering just one category of surgical technology, we stand in awe at the sufficiency of the brain. What is rather interesting is that our own brains can conceive of other brains going further and further in understanding how still other brains operate in the presence of tumors/disease.

In addition, you hold that the mind is grounded in the physical brain… and you point out that things that affect the brain - trauma, drugs, hormones, disease, etc, fundamentally affect the operation of the mind (and everything that makes us what we are - personality, intelligence, consciousness, discernment, free will). All of this sounds to me, like a description of the mind and brain being different yet intimately united in the corporal existence of both body and intellect.

This is the traditional Catholic philosophy of interdependent dualism - that the mind and the brain are truly separate entities which co-operate intimately in human cognition. My problem with that is that, in practice, we can clearly see that the working brain is an entity in its own right, but it is not at all clear that the mind is an entity separate from and separable from the brain. If the mind is a separate entity, its nature is entirely opaque - we cannot say anything about the domain in which it operates, how it interacts with other entities in that domain, by what process it influences or controls the brain or other parts of the physical body, or how it is in turn influenced by material phenomena. It is far more parsimonious, pragmatic and, it turns out, efficacious to conclude that what we call the mind is a (emergent) property of physical brain activity.

We can agree that the physical brain in an animal is sentient regardless of species. Nonetheless, the list above which makes us what we are is seen in far greater degrees in the human species. Is the mind calling the shots and the brain and body responding?

That seems highly unlikely, given what we know about the details (location and timing) of brain activity associated with intentional acts. Don’t forget that physical brain activity can be detected *before *the mind is conscious of a decision to act. Furthermore, the mind would be a very weak officer to allow itself to be so influenced and undermined by mutinies, infiltrators and dissidents in the rank and file as it is. It seems to me, given the evidence, far more accurate to say the opposite - the brain is calling the shots and what we call the mind reflects what is going on in the brain. Brains, no matter how primitive, are neural networks that take sensory (name removed by moderator)uts, carry out processing and determine and control appropriate actions: there is no reason to think that brains in humans, although hugely more sophisticated than those in planarians, have deserted their post on the pretext that mere information processing and motor control is beneath them.

Alec
evolutionpages.com

 

[hecd2]

So that I can get up to speed. What is the mind-body problem you refer to above?

It is the problem that we are discussing here - what is the relationship of the mind to the body and vice versa. We don’t have a bone marrow-red blood cell problem; or an insulin-pancreas problem The fact that we have a mind-body problem that is the source of a river of ink is evidence that what we call the mind is not in itself a physical entity.

Alec
evolutionpages.com

 

[hecd2]

hecd2:

In “The Emperor’s New Mind”, Penrose used arguments based on part of one of Goedel’s theorems (that in any formal mathematical system, there are propositions which are true that cannot be proven within the system) along with other arguments to support his opinion that the mind cannot be represented by an algorithm running on a Turing machine. In no way did he imply (nor does he apparently believe) that the mind is not grounded in the physical brain (indeed the whole point of the book is to find a non-algorithmic but physical process to account for mind), nor that the mind did not evolve in a purely naturalistic way.

I am entirely aware that there is no evidence that Penrose was not a materialist - as is my primary source on the matter - that is not the point. What he did believe was that the mind was in no way analogous to any physical computing machine - he asserted a different type of physical reality altogether. Penrose’s views on mind still buck the materialist party line very heavily and his adaptation of Godel’s Theorem is powerful.

Your primary source on the matter is not “primary” if it is not Penrose himself.

You are wrong to say that that is Penrose’s position (that the mind cannot be represented by *any *physical computing machine). Penrose claims, using the fact that our minds can see the truth of a Goedel proposition even though it is not formally decidable in the system, that our minds cannot arise from an *algorithm *running on a Turing machine. That is quite plain if you read the two books that Penrose wrote on the subject (the Emperor’s New Mind and the Shadows of the Mind). It is *not *the case that Penrose claims that minds cannot arise from physical processes (which can, in principle, run on an artificial physical foundation). Even in this claim, there are many issues which other analysts disagree with. Turing himself, who was no mean mathematician, and who also laid out undecidability theorems for Turing machines, pointed out that the Goedel proposition for natural arithmetic is easy to assent to, but that there are other Goedel propositions that are by no means easy to perceive. There is no reason in principle why Goedel propositions should not be coded as axiomatic in a machine, up to the meta-level at which human intuitive assent breaks down. (Penrose accepts that Goedel propositions can be accepted into a coded algorithm by axiomatic goedelisation. The problem then becomes whether there is a meta-level at which human minds can decide truth in a formal system where machines cannot. It is not self-evident that the answer is yes; there is also a problem in deciding how to do the the systematisation, but we’ll leave that for another day). He also pointed out that algorithms do things other than natural arithmetic. (See for example Alan Turing, Computing Machinery and Intelligence, *Mind *59, 433- 460 (1950))

It is also the case that brains and computers do many tasks other than proofs of mathematics; Penrose overstates the case with regard to the non-algorithmic nature of mathematician’s thinking. It’s all very well claiming that mathematicians do not perceive the truth of propsitions by formal proof, and that is possibly true for proofs that are familiar, but is this true for new complex propositions? The recent proof for Fermat’s Last Theorem is highly complex, and cannot be assented to other than through a formal step by step process that is perfect grist to a Turing mill. Penrose’s “proof” here amounts to no more than anecdotes about how mathematicians work.

Having said all of that, whether Penrose is right or wrong is neither here nor there with regard to the question at hand: even if it is true that the the mind cannot arise from an algorithm running on a Turing machine, that does not in any way preclude the assertion that the mind arises from a physical possibly non-algorithmic, possibly non-digital computer process.

(By the way, I’m aware of the various attempted refutations of Penrose’s proof.)

The fact that you are aware of them does not in itself negate them; but in any case this is moot as I have pointed out above. (By the way, there is no way in which you can properly describe Penrose’s argument as a “proof” - you only have to read chapters 4 and 10 of the Emperor to see that);

Do you accept one of the many-worlds interpretations? Do you believe the collapse results in a splitting?

No, I don’t. But, I will make the point that *all *interpretations have severe problems with regard to how we ordinarily perceive the macro-world. As Richard Feynman, a great bongo playing hero of mine, famously said “if you think you understand quantum mechanics, you don’t”. His sum over histories method is extremely useful in calculating outcomes although it has a couple of severe philosophical problems (as they all do) .It seems that the quantum world is so different from the macro-world that it lies outside the ability of perception that our minds/brains have evolved to comprehend .

Alec
evolutionpages.com

 

[grannymh]

It is the problem that we are discussing here - what is the relationship of the mind to the body and vice versa. We don’t have a bone marrow-red blood cell problem; or an insulin-pancreas problem The fact that we have a mind-body problem that is the source of a river of ink is evidence that what we call the mind is not in itself a physical entity.

Alec
evolutionpages.com

I knew that!!! as my kids say when caught with asking a silly question.

Your patience with my questions as always is appreciated. Deep down, in all my life, I have never considered the mind-body relationship a basic problem. Since being here, I’ve learned differently. In fact, who we are as human beings, is a very serious topic.

It sounds to me that the key is the observation that the mind is not in itself a physical entity. If I understand correctly, and I do trust you will correct my understanding when necessary, one may conclude that what we call the mind is an emergent property of physical brain activity. The mind is grounded in the physical brain. This conclusion is definitely debatable.

Sometime ago, because of my curiosity about the brain, you offered the following paper as a good example of current research: Desmurget et al, “Movement Intention after Parietal Cortex Stimulation in Humans,” Science 324 811 – 813 (2009)

I can understand why this paper was chosen to demonstrate intentionality. It addresses motor intention and awareness which is in the physical body rather than coming from some non-physical spiritual domain. This paper asks: “Where in the brain are intentions formed?” I now have the complete paper, including the Verbatim samples, so it will be easier to follow its reasoning. The following is at the beginning of the paper:

“A central question in the study of human behavior concerns the origin of willed actions. Where in the brain are intentions formed? How do we become aware of these intentions? According to the dualist philosophy (1), our encephalon is just the recipient of conscious intentions formed elsewhere in a nonphysical realm. This implies that conscious intention comes first, as the leading cause of our actions. Although appealing from a spiritual point of view, this hypothesis was progressively challenged by a large set of studies (2–4). Results showing that the decision to move did not precede, but instead lagged, the onset of brain activity signaling motor preparedness were especially convincing (5–7). Thus, researchers suggested that conscious intention of a movement emerged as a consequence of increased neural activity in a premotor-parietal circuit, which elaborates motor plans before action.”

Footnote (1) reads R. Descartes, Meditations Metaphysiques (1641) (Flammarion, Paris, 1992).

The paper follows reasonable protocol regarding the activitiy of the brain and body. However, it does not disprove the fact of the immaterial/spiritual component of the human being. An analysis of the research shows that the results of this paper cannot be atttributed to an experiment of will existing in matter. Therefore, the source of the will/mind cannot be attributed to physical matter.

Blessings,
granny

The quest for truth is worthy of the adventures of the journey.

 

[hecd2]

hecd2:

So let us move on to the reasons why I hold that the mind is grounded in the physical brain - and it’s very simple. First of all it is clear that that the brain is necessary for the operation of the mind. No demonstration of a mind working independently of a physical brain has even been made. Furthermore, things that affect the brain - trauma, drugs, hormones, disease, etc, fundamentally affect the operation of the mind (and everything that makes us what we are - personality, intelligence, consciousness, discernment, free will). Secondly, there is absolutely no reason to think that the brain is not sufficient for the operation of the mind. Your examples of arguments to show that the mind must have an non-physical basis are wrong, and I know of no other good arguments in support of the notion that the brain is an insufficient basis for the mind.

If you think that any credible Catholic theologian or philosopher has ever proposed that the mind is not dependent upon the brain you are not aware of the basic teaching on the matter - are you attempting to setup a straw man here?

Most Catholic philosophers from the scholastics to Descartes propose some form of dualism - that the brain and the mind are separate entities which might interact but which are distinct. In scholasticism the mind is a real substance. For if the mind is entirely dependent on the brain (physicalism) or the brain on the mind (idealism) we have a monist solution.

Human beings are body and spirit, united and interwoven in a mystical way. The ‘ghost in the machine’ euphemism doesn’t apply - on that much we agree.

Well, explanations that resort to “mystical” processes are not explanations at all, in science or in philosophy. We should try to make our explanations transparent… Since we agree that the brain is necessary for human cognition, the question is whether the mind is a phenomenon of the action of the brain or a separate entity. But if, as you say, all Catholics agree that the mind is dependent on the brain, and we agree that the brain is necessary for cognition, then how is that different from my position, that the brain and the mind are ontologically identical with a physical foundation.

With that, none of the rest of your point has any bearing, really. It it not and should not be surprising that the physiology of the brain and the mind are related. Again - who do you think believes the contrary?

Physiology refers to physical, mechanical and biochemical processes. To talk about the physiology of the mind, accepts implicitly that the mind has a material basis. Your ideas of the mind-body problem seem to accept, contrary to what you assert in the OP, that the mind is grounded in the physical brain or that they are so interconnected as to be ontologically identical. Your interdependent dualism and my monism seem practically the same: a difference that makes no difference.

Perhaps what you should do is to suggest what difference we would observe if the mind and brain were distinct and separate entities compared with what we would observe if the mind is an emergent property of the brain.

continued

 

[hecd2]

Continuation

I’m afraid that ‘Your examples of arguments to show that the mind must have an non-physical basis are wrong’ doesn’t really hold much water as a bare assertion, does it? Would you care to address them in some way, perhaps?

Already done so. They were your argument from Penrose and your argument from consciousness causes collapse. Neither is nearly sufficient to show that the mind must have a non-physical basis. Perhaps you have others. You said that there are empirical reasons to reject the physical basis for mind - care to tell us what they are?

And what of free will? Do you believe it exists, or not?

I believe that the experience of free-will exists. I do not believe that there is such a thing as Platonic or idealised free-will, independent of the influences of genetics, environment, and other physical aspects that affect the brain. Michael Frayn in The Human Touch is extremely perceptive and entertaining about this, devoting two chapters to the choice of honey or marmalade at breakfast.

Well, two brains represent physical entities similarly - we agree on what is red, what is hot, what is cold, what is bigger or further away than what. It is, after all, the function of brains (and minds) to represent reality with some degree of accuracy - if they didn’t we’d all be dead the first time we tried to cross the street.) Why are abstract concepts different, especially since there is good evidence that abstract thinking is an extension of concrete thinking conducted in a similar mode (see, for example, Steven Pinker’s The Stuff of Thought)?

Red, hot, cold, and the distances of objects involve nothing other than the processing of sensory data. Nobody doubts that the physiology of the brain is completely sufficient for such processing, I think; animals do it. [But, as a matter of fact, it’s well-known that things like perceived temperatures, and colors, are quite subjective - we don’t really ‘all agree’.]

We agree well enough to communicate intelligibly about the redness of pillar boxes and the heat of a midday Sahara sun. But, in a sense you are making a key point: truth claims about the world can never be 100% certain, never amenable to formal proof and always subjective. (The scientific method mitigates the subjective and personal nature of experience and improves our confidence in what we claim - that is its power).

Abstract concepts are different because they are not merely descriptions of sensory data or something following directly from them. They are a completely different category. Can you describe to me how the concept of pi can be reduced to a pattern of neural firings? Don’t forget that if you are not completely capturing the ‘essence’ of pi it doesn’t really work.

This is a strawman. I can’t describe to you how any specific experience or memory or concept (say that the setting sun is red but not as red as a stop light) is reduced to a specific neurophyisiological process. But the fact that the concept of pi (which, by the way is about the relationship between two things that are physical and can be sensed, the circumfrence and the diameter of a Euclidean circle, so not truly abstract, and in fact undefined in natural numbers) is dependent on some neurophysiological process is easily proven by dropping head first onto a concrete floor from a height of two feet. Some people think that pi is 3 or 3.1 or 3.14 or 3.14159265 or 22/7 or the relationship between the square of the radius and the area of a Euclidean circle, so we don’t all think of pi the same way.

The fact that we can represent the same concept with brains that are not identical is, however, not remarkable for the reasons I have already pointed out - properly working brains make a more or less truthful and communicable (and therefore practically identical) representation of the world even though they are not themselves identical. Brains might not be Turing machines, but the idea that result of a computation can be independent of the actual configuration of the computer is hardly news.

With this business about pi, are you groping for the concept of universals?

Alec
evolutionpages.com

 

[tjm190]

If the mind was not of this world, would we have things like Alzheimer’s?

 

[hecd2]

This is the bare bones of Alvin Plantinga’s argument against naturalism - he claims that naturalism is self-defeating for more or less the reason you propose (his argument of course uses more ink than you do, and much bigger words). But Plantinga’s argument is fatally flawed. Although, it is impossible to *prove *

It evolved to make us fitter in a competitive world. One aspect of that fitness is the ability of the brain to accept sensory (name removed by moderator)ut and to conduct processing that results in representations of the external world, and other people’s states of mind (important in a social species), and relationships between things, and memories and analyses of interactions with other people (important in a co-operative species) and meta-representations of representations that correspond more or less to reality and that guide appropriate action - in other words that are more or less true.

Understanding the entire the reason for being of the universe is well above the pay-grade of the neo-darwinian ‘mind’.

So, I would indeed agree, by your worldview, that you are qualified to tell hot from cold, and near from far, and pursue with great determination the largest breasts within your field of view so as assure surviving offspring, but I would argue that you have not given us any reason at all to suppose that you’re well-equipped to participate in the exercise we are now.

Well, apart from the fact that understanding “the entire reason for being of the universe” is probably above the pay-grade of any human mind, don’t you think that the evolution of human cognition made us more likely to survive and to thrive in a competitive world? Here we are, population approaching 7 billion having started at less than a million people less than thirty thousand years ago, having eliminated all other hominims by competition, the future of millions of other species not to mention the planet in our hands, having changed the face of the planet with our cities and memorials and roads, here we are, having experienced rapid and unprecedented (for a primate) population explosion fuelled by our ability to create novel technological, agricultural and co-operative societal solutions, supported by our ability to communicate and to build an edifice of knowledge through verbal and written recording, and you tell me that human cognition is not adaptive?

Let me try to answer the question: I am confident that my mind, which is an epiphenomenon of my physical brain which has evolved, can discern truth about reality because that is the function that it has evolved to have - a brain that did not reasonably accurately represent reality - that acted randomly or capriciously or totally inaccurately would not allow its possessor to survive long enough to reproduce. In other words, I have confidence that my brain/mind represents and interprets reality reasonably accurately, not because it is some sort of magical Platonic entity with supernatural powers, but because my experience is that it works.

See the above. I think your ‘experience’ that you’ve figured out the universe is highly suspicious.

I didn’t say that my experience is that I have figured out the universe. I did say that my experience is that my brain reasonably accurately represents reality - and since truth is conformation to reality, my experience is that my brain truthfully represents reality, at least insofar as things that are critical to life. As I said, if it didn’t, life would be untenable and would have been untenable for those beings that would then have been destined never to be my ancestors.

You also confuse ‘what works’ with ‘what’s true’. The Darwinian process would accept any adaptation that gave survival advantage - are you REALLY going to assert that surviving to mate and knowing and understanding reality completely - especially abstract reality - are the same thing?!

Who understands reality completely? No-one, nor is anyone likely to.

But what I do assert is that the Darwinian process would eliminate “adaptations” that cause the brain to make erroneous representations of reality (untrue propositions if you like) in critical-to-life areas. People who think they can fly or that they are Superman and can stop trucks with one hand tend not to survive. Have you heard of the Darwin awards?

I don’t “confuse” what works with what is true. I do however contend that what works as a functional cognitive perspective as we make our way through this vale of tears is most often closely correlated with reality (ie with what is true). Can you give me counter-examples of false representations of reality which would be adaptive? Actually, I can think of some, but they are to do with projecting agency where no real agency exists.

Alec
evolutionpages.com