Mind & Matter

[PaulF2]

This is wrong. What you are describing here is not the Copenhagen interpretation but an interpretation of quantum mechanics called “consciousness causes collapse”. It has a number of fundamental flaws (such as the consequence of the unrealised behaviour of the universe before the emergence of minds: see Bohm and Hiley - The Undivided Universe). It has been widely rejected on ontological and scientific grounds, and the development of the concept of decoherence has been the nail in its coffin. Your claim that the cause of the collapse of the wave function in the Copenhagen interpretation cannot be a physical thing and that QM cannot otherwise work is completely wrong.
Not so, as what you have described is not the Copenhagen interpretation, but some other discredited thing, although all credible interpretations have some unpalatable philosophical and scientific aspects.

Alec,

What I described is something that, according to some, follows from the Copenhagan interpretation (or one variation of it). I think if you were well-versed in the history of quantum theory you would be aware of this.

To say that it “has been widely recently on ontological and scientific grounds” and “Your claim that the cause of the collapse of the wave function in the Copenhagen interpretation cannot be a physical thing and that QM cannot otherwise work is completely wrong” is over the top - at best. Since the dawn of quantum mechanics, the notion that Mind is a special type of entity apart from the physical world has indeed be a credible position based on its tenets. To many scientists, it is directly implied by the theory. Yes, there are varying interpretations, but for me and many others this is the most palatable and sensible position - other interpretations have aspects that almost any rational person would find ridiculous.

Dr. Stephen Barr, professor of particle physics at the University of Delaware, in Modern Physics and Ancient Faith, comments that this interpretation - that the mind is a special, non-physical entity “is not the suggestion of a radical fringe of physicists. It is the traditional way of looking at quantum theory, and is so mainstream that it is, as I have said, sometimes called the orthodox view.” He goes on to note, in discussing alternative interpretations, that “None of these reinterpretations at present commands the allegiance of more than a minority of physicists.” (Does this mean that most physicists fully believe the mind to be an entity outside the realm of physics? No, of course not: they consider the matter philosophical and largely ignore it.)

Many modern physicists have expressed the belief that the fundamentals of quantum theory are in conflict with materialism - these scientists do not believe that the human mind can be reduced to physics. Sir Rudolf Peierls stated in regards to quantum theory:

“The premise that you can describe in terms of physics the whole function of a human being… including its knowledge, and its consciousness, is untenable. There is still something missing.”

The Noble-prize winning physicist Eugene Wigner denied (on the basis of quantum theory) that the mind can be solely a material thing. In discussion the philosophical systems that are compatible with quantum mechanics, he declared flatly that “materialism is not”.

Barr points out that von Neumann, London, Bauer, as well as Wigner and Peierls asserted that an observer in quantum mechanism system cannot be physical. We’ll see why below. I am going to go through the basics of quantum theory so we can see where this idea originates. (Not for your benefit, although it does seem like you’ve missed something fundamental.)

The reason for what I’ve said about quantum mechanics and the mind is the very special role the “observer” plays in the theory. By the nature of it, ‘observers’ are fundamentally different than the observed system. They cannot be a part of the system and, it is argued, it is the mind, the consciousness, that cannot be part of the system - that is to say it cannot be described by a wave function. The reason for this is that quantum theory concerns itself only with probabilities. If we put the observer in the system, we have an outcome, not just a probability - the math of QT has no facility for dealing with that.

To quote Dr. Barr: “If one attempted to describe the observe in his totality by the mathematics of quantum theory, then he too would become a part of the world of the merely probable. He would step out of the world of facts, so to speak, and into the realm of the hypothetical and conditional. However, the role that the observer plays in quantum physics is precisely to allow an escape from that realm, and consequently if he were to become part of it himself he would not be able to play his assigned role.”

As Barr points out, the ‘critical’ feature of said observer is his mind - that which knows. That which knows what it true and what is not true. That is where the line is crossed from probability to fact.

 

[PaulF2]

[continued]

To sum up the traditional forumulation, Barr outlines these five tenets: “1) In quantum theory the fundamental theoretical description is in terms of multiple hypothetical possibilities and their relative probabilities. 2) To relate these hypothetical possibilities to the world of facts, measurements must be made by an ‘observer’. 3) A measurement is complete at the point when the observer has made a judgment of fact, that is, when he comes to know that one of the hypothetical possibilities is a fact and the others are not. 4) What makes the observer an observer, therefore, is an act of the intellect. 5) This act cannot be described by the physical theory without inconsistency, for the mathematics of the theory gives us only probabilities while the observations yield definite outcomes.”

How could we go from talk about probabilities to conclusions about the nature of mind? This may strike one as strange - even fishy - at first blush.

But, when probabilities and the reduction of probabilities to actual knowledge about a system are at the very core of a scientific theory, the concept of knowing becomes core as well. Peierls: “The quantum mechanical description is in terms of knowledge and knowledge requires somebody who knows.” We must be aware that probabilities and knowledge in quantum mechanics are not anything analogous to what they mean in classical physics. In classical physics, probabilities are used merely to acknowledge practical limits - in quantum theory, they take on a completely different role - quantum theory, of course, is based on probabilities - the wave function - and what happens when that function collapses to actual knowledge.

As to why an observer cannot be anything physical, Barr goes through a simple thought experiment to attempt to demonstrate that we can’t have a physical observer - a camera, for example. This camera could film a particle traveling and thus collapse the wave function - right? No, it can’t, because the camera is now part of the system - and thus not an observer by definition (if this sounds strange, it’s how quantum mechanics works). The camera along with the rest of the system define the Schrodinger equation and lie entirely within the realm of probabilities only. Barr notes that “the mathematical descriptions of the physical world given to us by quantum theory presuppose the existence of observers who lie outside the mathematical descriptions.”

What part of an ‘observer’ must lie outside the system? What is the ‘special’ characteristic? What will strike many people as ‘fishy’ is that a person’s ‘measurement’ apparatus must lie outside the system as ‘part of the observer’. They’re right - that would be fishy, because that isn’t true. A person’s hand, eyes, and yes, even his brain are physical things and there is no reason why the line that defines the system can’t be made to include them. However, the line has to stop somewhere, and the conclusion that Peierls, Wigner, and the others mentioned above have come to is that it is the mind of the observer that is the observer. Going through von Neumann’s analysis, Barr remarks: “Why? Because it is the mind that knows.” If the mind were reducible totally to the physical, it could not occupy such a privileged position.

Peierls again: “The moment at which you can throw away one possibility and keep only the other is when you finally become conscious of the fact that the experiment has given one result… you see, the quantum mechanical description is in terms of knowledge, and knowledge requires somebody who knows.”

And Wigner: “It will remain remarkable, in whatever way our future concepts may develop, that the very study of the external world led to the conclusion that the content of the consciousness is an ultimate reality.”

Barr, who had previously noted that this interpretation is hardly universal and certainly controversial, sums up: “That the mind is a fundamental reality that is not reducible to physical description was clearly stated by Fritz London and Edmond Bauer, and later defended by Sir Rudolf Peierls and Eugene Wigner, as we have just seen. Henry Stapp of the University of California at Berkeley and Euan Squires of the University of Durham in England are the physicists who have recently argued most forcefully for this point of view.”

It is important to realize that nobody is claiming here that the act of knowing changes the physical world. If the wave function is taken to mean the observer’s knowledge of the system, rather than the actual state of the system, we avoid the impossible paradoxes like Schrodinger’s alive/dead cat. But we are still left with the notion that the mind is not an entity describable by physics; it is, at its very nature, something wholly different from anything in the physical world and existing apart from it.

So, as I said, your out-of-hand dismissal was certainly over the top. Your clearly condescending rhetoric implying that I didn’t know what I was talking about was empty - don’t you think?

 

[PaulF2]

Your primary source on the matter is not “primary” if it is not Penrose himself.

I think you missed the point completely. I acknowledged that Penrose was not a non-materialist. What are you arguing here? I am aware of exactly what Penrose was arguing and his beliefs behind the argument (which are surely secondary).

You are wrong to say that that is Penrose’s position (that the mind cannot be represented by *any *physical computing machine). Penrose claims, using the fact that our minds can see the truth of a Goedel proposition even though it is not formally decidable in the system, that our minds cannot arise from an *algorithm *running on a Turing machine. That is quite plain if you read the two books that Penrose wrote on the subject (the Emperor’s New Mind and the Shadows of the Mind). It is *not *the case that Penrose claims that minds cannot arise from physical processes (which can, in principle, run on an artificial physical foundation). Even in this claim, there are many issues which other analysts disagree with. Turing himself, who was no mean mathematician, and who also laid out undecidability theorems for Turing machines, pointed out that the Goedel proposition for natural arithmetic is easy to assent to, but that there are other Goedel propositions that are by no means easy to perceive. There is no reason in principle why Goedel propositions should not be coded as axiomatic in a machine, up to the meta-level at which human intuitive assent breaks down. (Penrose accepts that Goedel propositions can be accepted into a coded algorithm by axiomatic goedelisation. The problem then becomes whether there is a meta-level at which human minds can decide truth in a formal system where machines cannot. It is not self-evident that the answer is yes; there is also a problem in deciding how to do the the systematisation, but we’ll leave that for another day). He also pointed out that algorithms do things other than natural arithmetic. (See for example Alan Turing, Computing Machinery and Intelligence, *Mind *59, 433- 460 (1950))

I may have overstated the case of Penrose but you are understating it. Penrose’s argument that the human mind cannot be analogous to a computer program upset the materialist apple cart well enough - that the mind is entirely analogous to a computer, and that a computer could be built that would somehow magically become “self-aware” (though it’s always acknowledged that nobody has any idea what that means) is more than just the prevailing view among the materialists I’ve read - it’s about the only view.

So, being aware that Penrose did still weakly (hopefully) assert some variation of materialism, he clearly believed that what constitutes “mind” has not been explained and cannot be explained in the usual terms (of physical computers). In that, he flatly disagreed with virtually all materialists. That this is true is evident by the effort that’s been expended trying to debunk his argument, I think.

You have posted a lot of details that do not have anything to do with the core question, or issue. I have not myself come across any materialists who do not believe (assume) that their mind are, to be informal, identical to computers in basic function. They believe the difference in not in ‘quality’, but only in ‘quantity’, and that at some point a computer becomes powerful enough that it “becomes” self-aware. Do you agree with that? They believe this by assumption: they assume that consciousness must be an emergent property of the brain, which is simply a very highly parallelized computer. Penrose’s strong argument that this cannot be the case cannot be cast aside so easily for any honest person. However, I realize you’re not really telling us what you believe, but Penrose’s argument is surely enough to upset the worldviews of a great many materialists. Is it “proof” that the mind is non-physical? Of course not. What it does do, though, is uncover the naivety and posturing behind so many of the ubiquitous “new atheists”.

I’m not surprised you feel that it’s not “self-evident” that the answer is affirmative to the question “is there a meta-level at which human minds can decide truth in a formal system where machines cannot?” - a positive answer there is the death of materialism, isn’t it?

Having said all of that, whether Penrose is right or wrong is neither here nor there with regard to the question at hand: even if it is true that the the mind cannot arise from an algorithm running on a Turing machine, that does not in any way preclude the assertion that the mind arises from a physical possibly non-algorithmic, possibly non-digital computer process.

Again, of course it doesn’t entirely banish the possibility of any completely material basis for the mind - it IS evidence against it, however, certainly at the very least the common notion of materialism.

(If the brigades of new atheists were aware of such things, maybe they wouldn’t say so many stupid things.)

 

[PaulF2]

The fact that you are aware of them does not in itself negate them; but in any case this is moot as I have pointed out above. (By the way, there is no way in which you can properly describe Penrose’s argument as a “proof” - you only have to read chapters 4 and 10 of the Emperor to see that);

If I termed Penrose’s thought-experiment based on Goedel’s Theorem a proof then I misspoke: it would be properly termed an “argument”.

No, I don’t. But, I will make the point that *all *interpretations have severe problems with regard to how we ordinarily perceive the macro-world. As Richard Feynman, a great bongo playing hero of mine, famously said “if you think you understand quantum mechanics, you don’t”. His sum over histories method is extremely useful in calculating outcomes although it has a couple of severe philosophical problems (as they all do) .It seems that the quantum world is so different from the macro-world that it lies outside the ability of perception that our minds/brains have evolved to comprehend.

First of all Feynman was not primarily a bongo player and it is disingenuous for you to describe him as such. (Did you do a double-take? Yes, that’s a joke. )

I think the only people who believe the interpretation I summarized previously has “severe philosophical problems” are those for whom materialism is the only possible belief system! It is the belief of many that it is the alternative interpretations, that are rife with avoidance of the philosophical issues or constructs much more absurd than the entirely reasonable notion that the human mind is not a machine, that are far less palatable. Certainly by Occam’s Razor!

Most Catholic philosophers from the scholastics to Descartes propose some form of dualism - that the brain and the mind are separate entities which might interact but which are distinct. In scholasticism the mind is a real substance. For if the mind is entirely dependent on the brain (physicalism) or the brain on the mind (idealism) we have a monist solution.

Yes, you are correct about that “that the brain and the mind are separate entities which might interact but which are distinct”. That is not materially different than what I said - the key word there being “interact”.

Well, explanations that resort to “mystical” processes are not explanations at all, in science or in philosophy. We should try to make our explanations transparent… Since we agree that the brain is necessary for human cognition, the question is whether the mind is a phenomenon of the action of the brain or a separate entity. But if, as you say, all Catholics agree that the mind is dependent on the brain, and we agree that the brain is necessary for cognition, then how is that different from my position, that the brain and the mind are ontologically identical with a physical foundation.

Your assertion that the “mystical” has no place in knowledge is just that. This is really a tangent, but whether or not human beings are capable of completely understanding the nature of mind and how it interacts with the physical (brain) has no bearing on whether the mind is, in fact, non-physical. Below you state that we can’t know everything - which is it?

The Catholic position (not that there’s any dogmatic position - I’m speaking generally) is different than yours very fundamentally in that you deny that the mind is anything other than a quality derived wholly from the brain. What you are stating, in asserting that the mind is “emergent” from the brain, is that you have no idea what the mind is. Would you care to offer even the barest outline of how such “emergence” works? If you do have one, it’s nothing but conjecture.

Physiology refers to physical, mechanical and biochemical processes. To talk about the physiology of the mind, accepts implicitly that the mind has a material basis. Your ideas of the mind-body problem seem to accept, contrary to what you assert in the OP, that the mind is grounded in the physical brain or that they are so interconnected as to be ontologically identical. Your interdependent dualism and my monism seem practically the same: a difference that makes no difference.

Perhaps what you should do is to suggest what difference we would observe if the mind and brain were distinct and separate entities compared with what we would observe if the mind is an emergent property of the brain.

To talk about the physiology of the mind is to admit that the mind and the brain are intimately related - nothing more. I don’t claim to know exactly how, although my assertion is certainly easier to support than yours (that the mind magically ‘emerges’ from matter).

Already done so. They were your argument from Penrose and your argument from consciousness causes collapse. Neither is nearly sufficient to show that the mind must have a non-physical basis. Perhaps you have others. You said that there are empirical reasons to reject the physical basis for mind - care to tell us what they are?

Both give very good reason to question the assumption that the mind has no non-physical basis. For you materialism is simply that - your assumption, based on your (atheistic) worldview - no? You must at least admit that for you there is really no alternative. And that’s based on philosophical grounds.

Penrose’s argument, the traditional interpretation of quantum theory, and logical arguments based on the existence of free will, objective morality, and other areas are all very strong evidence for thinking, honest people that our minds are more than what can be explains by neurons sending electrical impulses between cells. Because their exist very intelligent people whose biases are so strong they hold positions that defy rationality is not much evidence for the contrary.

 

[PaulF2]

I believe that the experience of free-will exists. I do not believe that there is such a thing as Platonic or idealised free-will, independent of the influences of genetics, environment, and other physical aspects that affect the brain. Michael Frayn in The Human Touch is extremely perceptive and entertaining about this, devoting two chapters to the choice of honey or marmalade at breakfast.

I can’t wait to hear how you explain free will in terms of a mind that simply directly “emerges” from a collection of neurons! Please do so for us.

Now we get near the heart of the matter. You are a distinguished scientist, with a lot of raw knowledge of this subject, yet your worldview is based on impossible contradictions that you must simply allow yourself to ignore.

Please do not dodge this question and at least make some attempt to demonstrate how a human being can have true free will if his “mind” is nothing more than a pack of neurons (that evolved only to survive long enough to mate at that).

We agree well enough to communicate intelligibly about the redness of pillar boxes and the heat of a midday Sahara sun. But, in a sense you are making a key point: truth claims about the world can never be 100% certain, never amenable to formal proof and always subjective. (The scientific method mitigates the subjective and personal nature of experience and improves our confidence in what we claim - that is its power).

More philosophy, I see.

This is a strawman. I can’t describe to you how any specific experience or memory or concept (say that the setting sun is red but not as red as a stop light) is reduced to a specific neurophyisiological process. But the fact that the concept of pi (which, by the way is about the relationship between two things that are physical and can be sensed, the circumfrence and the diameter of a Euclidean circle, so not truly abstract, and in fact undefined in natural numbers) is dependent on some neurophysiological process is easily proven by dropping head first onto a concrete floor from a height of two feet. Some people think that pi is 3 or 3.1 or 3.14 or 3.14159265 or 22/7 or the relationship between the square of the radius and the area of a Euclidean circle, so we don’t all think of pi the same way.

Asking you to give some basic explanation for your unfounded hypothesis is a ‘straw man’? I disagree.

Pi is certainly abstract: it need not be based on anything physical. That is a very silly argument. Are you off your game? I was told to expect much from you. Obviously, we need only define a sphere mathematically to define pi. “We don’t all think of pi the same way”? Really?! Do you know the definition of pi or do you not?

Shall we talk about prime numbers instead? Do you understand that that concept does not rely on the physical?

The fact that we can represent the same concept with brains that are not identical is, however, not remarkable for the reasons I have already pointed out - properly working brains make a more or less truthful and communicable (and therefore practically identical) representation of the world even though they are not themselves identical. Brains might not be Turing machines, but the idea that result of a computation can be independent of the actual configuration of the computer is hardly news.

With this business about pi, are you groping for the concept of universals?

You think there’s no problem at all in asserting that two brains that are obviously not identical can represent the same abstract concept, yet you went to all that trouble to propose the (ridiculous) line of reasoning that the definition of pi is not an abstract concept?

You have failed to honestly or pointedly address this line of reasoning - and I don’t think it’s because you didn’t follow it. You simply dodged it, and introduced unrelated tangents.

It evolved to make us fitter in a competitive world. One aspect of that fitness is the ability of the brain to accept sensory (name removed by moderator)ut and to conduct processing that results in representations of the external world, and other people’s states of mind (important in a social species), and relationships between things, and memories and analyses of interactions with other people (important in a co-operative species) and meta-representations of representations that correspond more or less to reality and that guide appropriate action - in other words that are more or less true.

Yes, that’s already true, as I’ve already clearly acknowledged.

 

[PaulF2]

Well, apart from the fact that understanding “the entire reason for being of the universe” is probably above the pay-grade of any human mind, don’t you think that the evolution of human cognition made us more likely to survive and to thrive in a competitive world? Here we are, population approaching 7 billion having started at less than a million people less than thirty thousand years ago, having eliminated all other hominims by competition, the future of millions of other species not to mention the planet in our hands, having changed the face of the planet with our cities and memorials and roads, here we are, having experienced rapid and unprecedented (for a primate) population explosion fuelled by our ability to create novel technological, agricultural and co-operative societal solutions, supported by our ability to communicate and to build an edifice of knowledge through verbal and written recording, and you tell me that human cognition is not adaptive?

I told you that human cognition is not adaptive?

Your reasoning is circular here. You seem to be implying that because human beings have done all these things, a materialistic mind “works”. Of course human beings have done all these things - and maybe this is evidence the mind is not material! That is, while some of these activities would be possible for intelligent animals with no true intellect, all of what human beings do is not.

What I’ve been saying is that according to the neo-darwinian worldview combined with materialism there is no reason to expect the brain to be able to know truth from fiction in any area not directly related to survival. That is really a fact, frankly, if one accepts neo-darwinism and materialism together. (You can try to wiggle out of it by claiming that philosophy is ‘beautiful’ and thus a desirable trait in a mate, etc., but this is still working the realm of what’s ‘desirable’, etc., and not what’s true.)

I didn’t say that my experience is that I have figured out the universe. I did say that my experience is that my brain reasonably accurately represents reality - and since truth is conformation to reality, my experience is that my brain truthfully represents reality, at least insofar as things that are critical to life. As I said, if it didn’t, life would be untenable and would have been untenable for those beings that would then have been destined never to be my ancestors.

Who understands reality completely? No-one, nor is anyone likely to.

Understanding reality completely and having the capacity to do so are two completely different things.

I agree with you that your mind understands reality - more than just physical reality. That is not evidence for your assumptions. The problem with your worldview is that you cannot explain why it does, or should. In my worldview - where the intellect is a specific, created entity with the natural capacity to reason and find and know truth - it’s to be expected. My worldview explains your observations much better than yours does.

But what I do assert is that the Darwinian process would eliminate “adaptations” that cause the brain to make erroneous representations of reality (untrue propositions if you like) in critical-to-life areas. People who think they can fly or that they are Superman and can stop trucks with one hand tend not to survive. Have you heard of the Darwin awards?

A non-sequitur, really. Does believing that there is no God when in fact there is one reduce survivability? Nobody made the argument that a Darwinian Mind should readily believe anything - come on. You’re not following or being intentionally obtuse.

I don’t “confuse” what works with what is true. I do however contend that what works as a functional cognitive perspective as we make our way through this vale of tears is most often closely correlated with reality (ie with what is true). Can you give me counter-examples of false representations of reality which would be adaptive? Actually, I can think of some, but they are to do with projecting agency where no real agency exists.

I can give you plenty of examples where false representations of reality have essentially no bearing on survivability: virtually all philosophical and theological matters.

In summary, Alec, you’re clearly very intelligent and very knowledgeable. However, neither of those things has much to do with whether or not a person accepts reality. I suspect we are near the limits of what this back-and-forth can produce, but I will keep replying as long as you do.

 

[reggieM]

Obviously, we need only define a sphere mathematically to define pi. “We don’t all think of pi the same way”? Really?! Do you know the definition of pi or do you not?

That’s an important point. Pi can be worked out with mathematical precision and it is understood the same way by all human beings. It does not rely on a physical model because circles in nature are not perfect. Pi is abstract and pure math in that sense. So, in a materialistic view, pi would need to be the product of a precise neurophysical activity. Certain neurons would produce pi in the mind. Then, every human mind that sees pi in the same manner would need neurons to produce the same output. The neurons would be generating numbers that are not reflective of anything

Shall we talk about prime numbers instead? Do you understand that that concept does not rely on the physical?

Prime numbers would have to be produced by the same kind of mental activity. So, every human mind that recognized that 317 is a prime number would have to use the same neurons which would produce that “number” – which is a symbol for something that, in this case, does not exist in nature. The same would be true for the square root of 152.2756 for example.

The challenge for materialism is to describe precisely how these abstract numbers, or human memories, imaginations or perceptions are reduced to specific neurophysical processes, and also – how is it possible for brains which are quite different in capability, size and composition all produce exactly the same results.

To, multiple human brains which are not identical in their own functioning powers and material composition come to exactly the same results with non-physical, abstract concepts, which cannot even be modelled in nature (e.g. the difference in red between a setting sun and a stop light).

 

[hecd2]

It sounds to me that the key is the observation that the mind is not in itself a physical entity. If I understand correctly, and I do trust you will correct my understanding when necessary, one may conclude that what we call the mind is an emergent property of physical brain activity. The mind is grounded in the physical brain. This conclusion is definitely debatable.

Of course it is debatable, because dualism has had a long and distinguished history and still has a few credible adherents (although many fewer than in the past). Nevertheless I think that the conclusion that the mind is grounded in the physical brain is correct and inescapable on the evidence.

Sometime ago, because of my curiosity about the brain, you offered the following paper as a good example of current research: Desmurget et al, “Movement Intention after Parietal Cortex Stimulation in Humans,” Science 324 811 – 813 (2009)…

…The paper follows reasonable protocol regarding the activitiy of the brain and body. However, it does not disprove the fact of the immaterial/spiritual component of the human being. An analysis of the research shows that the results of this paper cannot be atttributed to an experiment of will existing in matter. Therefore, the source of the will/mind cannot be attributed to physical matter.

I think that you are planning a post or posts to support the opinions you give above about the paper. I look forward to that. For my part, I think it supports my view that intention or will arises in and is a property of the material processes in the brain.

Alec
evolutionpages.com

 

[grannymh]

Of course it is debatable, because dualism has had a long and distinguished history and still has a few credible adherents (although many fewer than in the past). Nevertheless I think that the conclusion that the mind is grounded in the physical brain is correct and inescapable on the evidence.

I think that you are planning a post or posts to support the opinions you give above about the paper. I look forward to that. For my part, I think it supports my view that intention or will arises in and is a property of the material processes in the brain.

Alec
evolutionpages.com

The exciting thing is that as I worked on a post to support my opinions about the paper, I was drawn into a variety of interesting ideas…

Your point about dualism having fewer credible adherents than in the past may be due to the idea that modern dualism has swept its spiritual dimension, void of any sensory data, under the rug in favor of materialism now ensconced in the parlour of everyday living.

Because I am approaching the paper from an analytical perspective, I have divided it into the following areas. The first is the philosophical reference to dualism which needs to be discussed because it is the wrong basis for the Catholic concept of free will. Second, one needs to understand the surgery involved and how it could influence free will. Third, the question as to whether real science actually took place needs to be answered. The fourth is to examine the concept of free will.

Obviously, anyone can jump in at any place and are duly welcomed to do so.

Blessings,
granny

All human beings are worthy of profound respect.

 

[hecd2]

Alec,

What I described is something that, according to some, follows from the Copenhagan interpretation (or one variation of it). I think if you were well-versed in the history of quantum theory you would be aware of this.

I think that I am at least as well versed in the history of quantum theory (and in quantum theory) as you are. And I tell you that what you have described is not the Copenhagen interpretation but the (Wigner) consciousness-causes-collapse interpretation. Collapse is necessary to the Copenhagen interpretation, but the cause of collapse is open to a wide range of phenomena, and the boundary between measurement and system and the definition of measurement or observation are ambiguous. Modern experimentation and the development of technologies aimed at quantum computing have confirmed that collapse effectively occurs through many physical interactions between the quantum system and the rest of the universe, such as thermal noise. No mind is required.

To say that it “has been widely recently on ontological and scientific grounds” and “Your claim that the cause of the collapse of the wave function in the Copenhagen interpretation cannot be a physical thing and that QM cannot otherwise work is completely wrong” is over the top - at best.

How so? Show me a few current working quantum physicists who follow the consciousness causes collapse interpretation; you *are *also completely wrong to claim that QM cannot work without a necessarily non-physical mind because you have confused two different interpretations.

To many scientists, it is directly implied by the theory. Yes, there are varying interpretations, but for me and many others this is the most palatable and sensible position - other interpretations have aspects that almost any rational person would find ridiculous.

Mind-causes-collapse, the interpretation of QM that you are arguing from, particularly in its “human-mind-causes-collapse” form, has aspects that are even more ridiculous than most of the others (although they all have what appears to us to be ridiculous aspects).

Dr. Stephen Barr, professor of particle physics at the University of Delaware, in Modern Physics and Ancient Faith, comments that this interpretation - that the mind is a special, non-physical entity “is not the suggestion of a radical fringe of physicists. It is the traditional way of looking at quantum theory, and is so mainstream that it is, as I have said, sometimes called the orthodox view.” He goes on to note, in discussing alternative interpretations, that “None of these reinterpretations at present commands the allegiance of more than a minority of physicists.”

I respect Stephen Barr, but here, if he writes as you claim he does, he is conflating two things - those physicists who use the Copenhagen interpretation as a working system and those who believe that it implies that the mind is a “special non-physical entity”. The former are indeed the majority of working physicists , the latter a tiny minority.

Many modern physicists have expressed the belief that the fundamentals of quantum theory are in conflict with materialism - these scientists do not believe that the human mind can be reduced to physics. Sir Rudolf Peierls stated in regards to quantum theory:

“The premise that you can describe in terms of physics the whole function of a human being… including its knowledge, and its consciousness, is untenable. There is still something missing.”

Indeed, but Peierls does not think the something missing lies outside of nature - in other words, he is not advocating the idea that mind is independent of and separate from material brain - his opinion is that it lies outside current physics, but that is all. He says in Surprises in Theoretical Physics - ‘In claiming that biology is not likely to be a branch of the current physics, I do not wish to imply that life can in some mysterious way evade the laws of physics…It is at least possible, and to me probable that similarly new concepts [similar in their newness to Maxwellian EM theory in its day] have to be added to our present physical ones before an adequate description of life is possible.’

The Noble-prize winning physicist Eugene Wigner denied (on the basis of quantum theory) that the mind can be solely a material thing.

Yes, but you do know that Wigner was the author of the consciousness causes collapse interpretation that you are using? And that very very few physicists accepted it or used it. And that Wigner himself thought that the entire universe might be conscious?

I am going to go through the basics of quantum theory so we can see where this idea originates. (Not for your benefit, although it does seem like you’ve missed something fundamental.)

You’re going to go through the basics of quantum theory? - on this thread? That’ll be something to look forward to. Let me know when you get round to it.

It seems to me that what you know about quantum theory, you have learned from Barr’s book - and good as Barr is about most things he is wrong about the need for a non-material mind in QM. It seems to me that you have never actually studied quantum mechanics, even so far as thinking in elementary terms about the time evolution of a quantum system and the significance of the Schrödinger equation. You have never really thought about what measurement means, say in the context of a quantum Young’s experiment, or about the influence of decoherence on the quantum computing project. A very few people knowledgeable in QM think that QM implies a non-material mind but the idea that QM *necessarily requires *a non-material mind is flat-out wrong, and is not even a common view amongst physicists.

Alec
evolutionpages.com

 

[hecd2]

[continued]

To sum up the traditional forumulation, Barr outlines these five tenets: “1) In quantum theory the fundamental theoretical description is in terms of multiple hypothetical possibilities and their relative probabilities. 2) To relate these hypothetical possibilities to the world of facts, measurements must be made by an ‘observer’. 3) A measurement is complete at the point when the observer has made a judgment of fact, that is, when he comes to know that one of the hypothetical possibilities is a fact and the others are not. 4) What makes the observer an observer, therefore, is an act of the intellect. 5) This act cannot be described by the physical theory without inconsistency, for the mathematics of the theory gives us only probabilities while the observations yield definite outcomes.”

But Barr does not describe the only or even the common view or interpretation of QM in these ‘tenets’, and particularly not in #3, #4 and #5; for collapse is not generally regarded as an act of intellect, but an event whereby the quantum system interacts in such a way with the rest of the universe that causes the wave function to collapse to a single eigenstate, so that other states can no longer be realised - the example of the camera below is apposite, for in spite of Barr’s reasoning, it is clear that the absorption of a photon by a process (say a photon multiplier) that unequivocally records its position corresponds to a collapse of the wave function for that particle regardless of its observation at the time, later or never by a conscious observer.

So, as I said, your out-of-hand dismissal was certainly over the top.

My dismissal that QM *necessarily *implies the existence of a mind that is outside of material processes and my dismissal of your claims that QM *cannot *work in the absence of such a mind were correct and certainly not “over-the-top”.
Alec
evolutionpages.com

 

[PaulF2]

I think that I am at least as well versed in the history of quantum theory (and in quantum theory) as you are. And I tell you that what you have described is not the Copenhagen interpretation but the (Wigner) consciousness-causes-collapse interpretation. Collapse is necessary to the Copenhagen interpretation, but the cause of collapse is open to a wide range of phenomena, and the boundary between measurement and system and the definition of measurement or observation are ambiguous. Modern experimentation and the development of technologies aimed at quantum computing have confirmed that collapse effectively occurs through many physical interactions between the quantum system and the rest of the universe, such as thermal noise. No mind is required.

I hope that you are better-versed in the subject, actually, given that the doctorate in physics I believe you possess does trump my bachelor’s in comp sci with physics minor.

As a preamble, and I believe I did previously make this clear if not abundantly so, I was not attempting to assert that quantum mechanics definitely requires the existence of the non-physical mind and that this is definite proof that the (human) mind is non-physical. You are correct, as I also stated clearly, that my main source on this topic was Dr. Barr, and Dr. Barr’s point (and mine) could be summarized like this: There are currently many materialistic atheist scientists who would like to foster the illogical view that science somehow “trumps God” and makes belief in God “unnecessary”, etc. What topics like this demonstrate, on the contrary, is that modern science has, in many areas, actually given us rather more evidence for God. I’m speaking about anthropic coincidence, the ex niliho creation, etc. And - quantum mechanics. Because, while is is not a foregone conclusion that quantum mechanics gives us God wrapped-up with a ribbon, it is some definite food for thought!

I would like to see references that “collapse effectively occurs through many physical interactions between the quantum system and the rest of the universe, such as thermal noise. No mind is required.” I suspect this is simply another philosophical interpretation - but we’ll see!

How so? Show me a few current working quantum physicists who follow the consciousness causes collapse interpretation; you *are *also completely wrong to claim that QM cannot work without a necessarily non-physical mind because you have confused two different interpretations.
Mind-causes-collapse, the interpretation of QM that you are arguing from, particularly in its “human-mind-causes-collapse” form, has aspects that are even more ridiculous than most of the others (although they all have what appears to us to be ridiculous aspects).

I did not claim that quantum mechanics “CANNOT WORK” without a non-physical mind - I said that that was and has been a respectable philosophical conclusion.

I’m not sure how relevant the number of working physicists who accept this there are (well, there’s Dr. Barr) - does it have anything at all to do with the practical application of quantum mechanics?? It is a philosophical issue - no?

What are the ‘ridiculous aspects’ you’re referring to with respect to this interpretation? I suspect it is nothing more than that non-physical mind problem - am I right? Many of us find that FAR more palatable than the true ridiculousness at the heart of all the many-universe variants, etc.

I respect Stephen Barr, but here, if he writes as you claim he does, he is conflating two things - those physicists who use the Copenhagen interpretation as a working system and those who believe that it implies that the mind is a “special non-physical entity”. The former are indeed the majority of working physicists , the latter a tiny minority.
Indeed, but Peierls does not think the something missing lies outside of nature - in other words, he is not advocating the idea that mind is independent of and separate from material brain - his opinion is that it lies outside current physics, but that is all. He says in Surprises in Theoretical Physics - ‘In claiming that biology is not likely to be a branch of the current physics, I do not wish to imply that life can in some mysterious way evade the laws of physics…It is at least possible, and to me probable that similarly new concepts [similar in their newness to Maxwellian EM theory in its day] have to be added to our present physical ones before an adequate description of life is possible.’
Yes, but you do know that Wigner was the author of the consciousness causes collapse interpretation that you are using? And that very very few physicists accepted it or used it. And that Wigner himself thought that the entire universe might be conscious?

[If you respect Dr. Barr, you might be interested to learn that he refers to those minds who believe their minds aren’t really minds as “pathetic”. Them’s fightin’ words.]

Again, I think that I, and Dr. Barr, made it clear that this is not the prevailing scientific opinion - and that that hardly matters. Since materialism holds sway, that is not at all surprising. Did you think that I was asserting that all theoretical physicists are staunch theists because they see the need for the mind in quantum mechanics? The point is just that it is something that followed quite naturally from the theory.

I didn’t know Peierls’ actual opinion on the mind but it seems it’s about the same as Penrose - again, not a surprise. I’d say it’s a cop-out, though, and absolutely nothing more than a completely unsubstantiated guess. So, the mind cannot be physical as we know it, or behave as most materialists assume and believe (akin to a mechanical computer), so it must be - some ‘other’ kind of physics? And that’s ‘better’ than simply saying that the mind is not physical? Well, I certainly see how it is to a physicist with peers to face in a culture with an overwhelming materialist bias.

What these physicists’ larger philosophical beliefs were or are is not relevant - why would it be, when we’re simply discussing the merits of what they taught directly about the subject at hand?

 

[PaulF2]

You’re going to go through the basics of quantum theory? - on this thread? That’ll be something to look forward to. Let me know when you get round to it.

Funny stuff! I’ve been told that you get a little nasty when pushed into a corner.

It seems to me that what you know about quantum theory, you have learned from Barr’s book - and good as Barr is about most things he is wrong about the need for a non-material mind in QM. It seems to me that you have never actually studied quantum mechanics, even so far as thinking in elementary terms about the time evolution of a quantum system and the significance of the Schrödinger equation. You have never really thought about what measurement means, say in the context of a quantum Young’s experiment, or about the influence of decoherence on the quantum computing project. A very few people knowledgeable in QM think that QM implies a non-material mind but the idea that QM *necessarily requires *a non-material mind is flat-out wrong, and is not even a common view amongst physicists.

Not quite - although Barr’s been it in the recent past there was study of the basics in college (now 15+ years ago) as well as reading of many layman’s type books. Again, a doctorate in physics, no, but I’m still doing not bad at all, according to my wife, the cats, and some others, and, well, so what? - this entire sub-topic is ancillary to my main arguments, which are as simple as they are airtight.

 

[grannymh]

**The Mystery of Mind and Matter from the Scientific Perspective **Part 1. ( Part 2. will follow in the future.)

Advanced technology makes it possible to literally expose the living brain to the scrutiny of researchers who ask: Where are intention and volition located? In the physical brain laid bare on the operating table? Or in a spiritual non-physical component that belongs to the nature of the human species? Both locations are possibilities. At this point, it is necessary to understand what both these possibilities entail and how each qualifies the uniqueness of the human species. If Edison did not consider all possibilities, we would be using our computers by candle light.

Definition of mystery:
The word mystery simply means that which is really there but cannot be easily seen nor readily understood. The ending of a good “whodunit” has the reader wondering how clues were missed. Scientists experience amazement when a “discovery” is no longer mysterious. It is easy to be lulled into thinking that all mysteries are to be solved by prime time news. The greatest mystery is the one which reaches beyond the material yet is within the grasp of human minds.

Scientific Research:
Michel Desmurget, Karen T. Reilly, Nathalie Richard, Alexandru Szathmari, Carmine Mottolese, Angela Sirigu
“Movement Intention after Parietal Cortex Stimulation in Humans,”
Science 324 811–813 (2009)

The research was conducted in France during Awake Brain Surgery, also called Awake Craniotomy. It is based on brain mapping techniques used as part of surgical procedures for brain tumors and epileptic seizures previously considered inoperable. This “mapping” marks critical areas of the functional brain which control the patient’s vision, language and body movement. Along with computer image technology, it enables surgeons to remove as much brain tumor or seizure tissue as possible, lowering the patient’s risk of losing critical body functions as a result of the surgery.

For an overview of Awake Brain Surgery, refer to Mayo Clinic, Rochester, Minnesota, U.S.A., web site www.mayoclinic.org/awakebrainsurgery
For additional information about the anesthesia for this type of surgery, refer to
http://bja.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/90/2/161

Basis for analysis:
The choice of a material evolutionary explanation for the human species does not exclude other possibilities. A prime example is man’s natural, inherent ability to act freely, that is, to implement his choice engaging his physical being in so doing. This analysis will refer to scientific theories and investigations and to various philosophical systems. Research data will be compared with the Catholic understanding of free will.

Beginning of Desmurget Paper:
“A central question in the study of human behavior concerns the origin of willed actions. Where in the brain are intentions formed? How do we become aware of these intentions? According to the dualist philosophy (1), our encephalon is just the recipient of conscious intentions formed elsewhere in a nonphysical realm. This implies that conscious intention comes first, as the leading cause of our actions. Although appealing from a spiritual point of view, this hypothesis was progressively challenged by a large set of studies (2–4). Results showing that the decision to move did not precede, but instead lagged, the onset of brain activity signaling motor preparedness were especially convincing (5–7). Thus, researchers suggested that conscious intention of a movement emerged as a consequence of increased neural activity in a premotor-parietal circuit, which elaborates motor plans before action.”

Footnote (1) reads “R. Descartes, Meditations Metaphysiques (1641) (Flammarion, Paris, 1992).”

Continued on post 35.

 

[grannymh]

The Mystery of Mind and Matter from the Scientific Perspective
Continued from Post 34

Clarification of Catholic philosophy in regard to Cartesian dualism referenced by Desmurget:

Post 13, “Mind & Matter”. Comment from Alec: This is the traditional Catholic philosophy of interdependent dualism - that the mind and the brain are truly separate entities which co-operate intimately in human cognition.

Post 17. “Mind & Matter” Comment from Alec: Most Catholic philosophers from the scholastics to Descartes propose some form of dualism - that the brain and the mind are separate entities which might interact but which are distinct. In scholasticism the mind is a real substance. For if the mind is entirely dependent on the brain (physicalism) or the brain on the mind (idealism) we have a monist solution.

“Scholasticism is not a philosophy or theology in itself but a tool and method for learning which places emphasis on dialectical reasoning.”* (Wikipedia)* Scholasticism is a rationalistic movement in that reason is used in the elucidation of spiritual truth. One history commentator offered the opinion that the reason that the Catholic Church chose the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas was that he made the most sense. Consequently, extreme dualistic ideas, such as those of Rene Descartes, failed in Catholic circles.

Descartes claimed that the mind and body are two different types of substance, yet interacting with each other. As subsequent philosophers struggled with the “how” the interaction happened, the material dimension of dualism became the primary focus and the spiritual dimension shifted to the skepticism of David Hume. Along with the popularity of Charles Darwin’s evolutionary theory, the philosophical position that all reality is material was unable to address the uniqueness of the human species.

Consequently, man was considered as another species of animals but with higher degrees of certain abilities. The reasoning was that science, by definition, was limited to the natural world. This definition was then used to exclude the non-material.

By all means, the realm of science is that of the material and physical world. But that does not automatically eliminate the immaterial or spiritual realm from inquiry as if it were non-existent. Ah, one says. The immaterial cannot be put under a microscope. True. But that does not exclude the reality of its existence which can be known by the tools of reason, self reflection, logical evaluation, and analytical thought.

When it came to the spiritual and corporeal components of the human being, Descartes erroneously viewed them as two distinct substances. Darwin reduced them to the material one. Consequently, we are left with questions. What does the materialistic base of evolutionary theory do with the experience of free will which can be described as non-physical? What is meant by “non-physical”? Ah, one says. Non-physical is the same as immaterial. It is something which isn’t there. In real life, that defies the practical experience of free will.

In real life, there is a working union of neurobiological and spiritual sources within a human person. Soul is the proper name for the spiritual source or immaterial internal principle of the human person.

Soul and matter are so one that these components are not things in themselves. The key is their intimate union expressed by hylemorphism (also spelled hylomorphism). Aristotle used hylemorphism as a conceptual framework which underlies his mature theorizing. According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (): Hylomorphism is simply a compound word composed of the Greek terms for matter (hulê) and form or shape (morphê); thus one could equally describe Aristotle’s view of body and soul as an instance of his “matter-formism.” Hylemorphism accounts for the unity of mind and matter.

Continued post 36

 

[grannymh]

The Mystery of Mind and Matter from the Scientific Perspective
Continued from Post 35

While any analogy regarding the intimate union of mind and matter falls short, one might find the analogy of chocolate chip cookies useful. When a waft of warm chocolate chip cookies greets you as the oven door opens, do you differentiate between the flour and the brown sugar lying between melting chocolate chips? Of course not. We already know by experience that the recipe works. Think back to the beginning when the flour and the brown sugar were in their respective packages. Did you look into the flour bag and say: “There you are, you yummy cookie you!” Flour and brown sugar are not identical to each other. Neither one, by itself, is a chocolate chip cookie. On the other hand, both become mouthwatering chocolate chip cookies.

There is no real comparison between a baked cookie and a person. On the other hand, the wonderful existence of both depends upon the union of their components. A person is completely human because the soul and the body are so intimately united that each not only contributes to the whole but becomes the whole.

Philosophy’s relationship with science:
Philosophy is how we view the what and who which surround us. In practice, some would consider it a “ worldview”. Others might relate it to a deep curiosity about life and environment. As an intellectual, reasoned, generally systematic discipline, philosophy seeks answers to human questions. In its basic meaning, philosophy is “love of wisdom” the Greek φιλοσοφία [philosophia].

“Philosophy of mind is a branch of modern analytic philosophy that studies the nature of the mind, mental events, mental functions, mental properties, consciousness and their relationship to the physical body, particularly the brain.” (Wikipedia underscored)
Together both philosophy and science can answer the opening question of the Desmurget Paper: "A central question in the study of human behavior concerns the origin of willed actions. “

The dual areas of research:

Post 464. “Crackpot Challenge Part 2 - Evolution”. Comment from granny: This paper addresses motor intention and awareness which, appears to me, is in the physical body rather than coming from some non-physical spiritual domain.

Reply from Alec: Yes, but it shows that claims that there is a spiritual non-physical dimension that overlies and controls the physical brain in humans is an illusion. Both our intention and our experience of what we call free will arise entirely from neurobiological processes in the brain.

This paper, in effect, deals with two areas.

First. Activity of the brain. “Our study suggests that motor intention and awareness are emerging consequences of increased parietal activity before movement execution.” (Desmurget Paper) The data presented supports this conclusion.

Second. The experience of free will. This is related to the OP

Post 1. “Mind & Matter” Starting from the very general, materialism vs. something other than materialism, I will say that outside of the very good logical evidence, it is self-evident to me that the mind is not matter.

Post 2. “Mind & Matter” I’m talking about free will - the fact that I know that I have moral free will.

The Desmurget Paper presents a conundrum of an Awake Brain Surgery technique doubling as a scientific challenge to a spiritual location of the human experience of willed actions. The paper’s reference to Cartesian dualism is addressed here. The remaining issues will be addressed in the future.

Continued on post 37

 

[grannymh]

The Mystery of Mind and Matter from the Scientific Perspective
Continued from Post 36

Conclusion:
Scientists have every right to wonder where in the physical brain intentions are formed. Furthermore a scientist, just as any individual, has every right to look to philosophy for answers if intellect and will are not a material part in the brain. In practical terms, man’s true nature invites one to explore the intrinsic value of human life which is beyond the technical limits of evolutionary theory.

“… we can embrace Darwin’s account of evolution without embracing his metaphysical naturalism and unbelief. Dawkins and others like him are in a way confusing the two faces of Charles Darwin. They are under the illusion that to be an evolutionist is essentially to be an atheist. Darwin, to his credit, rejected the equation of these two stances as illogical, even if he didn’t always maintain, within his own life, a clear distinction between his science and his animus toward God.”
“The Evolution of Darwin,” Christianity Today, January 2009.

Blessings,
granny

All human beings are worthy of profound respect.

 

[hecd2]

I acknowledged that Penrose was not a non-materialist. What are you arguing here? I am aware of exactly what Penrose was arguing and his beliefs behind the argument (which are surely secondary).

I am arguing that, even if Penrose is precisely correct, and the mind cannot be represented by an algorithm running on a Turing machine, then that does not entail the conclusion that mind cannot be an emergent property of matter. Furthermore, not only does Penrose recognise this and make no such claim, but he has put forward (with Stuart Hameroff) a specific physical model (orch OR) on which to base mental processes. It therefore seems perverse to advance an inference from Penrose’s argument, which Penrose himself rejects. I am arguing that if you wish to use Penrose’s argument as a basis for showing that mind cannot have a physical foundation, then a primary acquaintance with Penrose’s actual arguments (rather than with what some other potentially biased person claims for them) is a minimum condition for developing reasoned inferences from them. It is particularly the case that should you wish to base your case on Penrose’s arguments in direct opposition to Penrose’s own inferred conclusions, then you should at least point out why Penrose, familiar as he is with his own argument, has drawn false inferences (ie that a physical basis for mind is not excluded by his rejection of a Turing machine base) and why yours are correct.

I may have overstated the case of Penrose but you are understating it.

I think that you have overstated the case, but I have *not *understated it. I have represented it as precisely as a summary in a sentence or two can do. Let me repeat this summary. Penrose argues by reference to Goedel’s First Incompleteness Theorem which states that in any formal system of axiomatised and consistent arithmetic there are propositions which are true but which cannot be decided within the system. He uses this proof to argue that minds cannot be based on an algorithm running on a Turing machine, because such algorithms are subject to the incompleteness theorem, whereas minds are able to see the truth of Goedel propositions which are, themselves undecidable by classical computation. That is exactly as I have represented it before and is the extent of Penrose’s arguments. I recommend that you read the primary source yourself.

Penrose’s argument that the human mind cannot be analogous to a computer program upset the materialist apple cart well enough - that the mind is entirely analogous to a computer, and that a computer could be built that would somehow magically become “self-aware” (though it’s always acknowledged that nobody has any idea what that means) is more than just the prevailing view among the materialists I’ve read - it’s about the only view.

Well it would have upset the materialist apple cart if these conditions pertained:

1. that his argument constituted a proof or was so strong that it led to a consensual agreement
2. that his argument in itself precluded a physical basis for mind
3. that the only material model for mind processes is a classical computer (ie a Turing machine)

However, none of these conditions pertain. Penrose’s argument is not a proof and is disputed, it does not preclude a physical basis for mind, and there a number of neurophysical non-classical hypotheses for the material basis of mind processes (I can give you a long list of references if you wish).

So, being aware that Penrose did still weakly (hopefully) assert some variation of materialism…

Weakly? I hardly think that Penrose’s confidence that mind arises from physical processes can be described as weak, given his investment in orch OR and other programmes.

…he clearly believed that what constitutes “mind” has not been explained and cannot be explained in the usual terms (of physical computers). In that, he flatly disagreed with virtually all materialists. That this is true is evident by the effort that’s been expended trying to debunk his argument, I think.

You are right that he disagreed with those who support the strong AI programme - but your statement that this is “virtually all materialists” is wrong - to what extent do you keep up to date with various mind-brain studies, for example through the Journal of Consciousness Studies? The need to abandon classical computing models of mind is debatable (see my comments about critiques of Penrose’s argument), but in any case, there is substantial work being undertaken in non-classical computing solutions.

But what is your argument: that Penrose has caused consternation amongst materialists or that Penrose has an overwhelming argument against the material foundations of mind?

to be continued

 

[hecd2]

Continuation

You have posted a lot of details that do not have anything to do with the core question, or issue.

I assume you are referring to my comments about Alan Turing’s and other mathematicians’ criticisms of Penrose’s (or Lucas’s) argument. I fail to see how considerations as to the validity of Penrose’s conclusion - the principle argument that you are advancing - do not have “anything to do with the core question”. It seems to me that thinking considerations as to whether Penrose is justified in his argument in the first place are very relevant. I am not saying that Penrose does not make a good case; but his argument is far from a proof and there are very thoughtful, informed and well argued criticisms of it which we must take into account before concluding that Penrose has “upset the apple cart”.

I have not myself come across any materialists who do not believe (assume) that their mind are, to be informal, identical to computers in basic function. They believe the difference in not in ‘quality’, but only in ‘quantity’, and that at some point a computer becomes powerful enough that it “becomes” self-aware.

Well you have come across Penrose. I have introduced you to Hameroff. Read Michael Frayn. I could give you a very long list. Do you want one? However the strong AI programme is not dead, and it is not certain that the view that brains are computers is wrong on the basis of Penrose’s arguments.

Penrose’s strong argument that this cannot be the case cannot be cast aside so easily for any honest person.

I agree, but it can be considered and rejected, or considered and accepted for what it is…

However, I realize you’re not really telling us what you believe, but Penrose’s argument is surely enough to upset the worldviews of a great many materialists.

Really? Why? By the way, I am happy to tell you what I think, for what it’s worth, but I am more interested at the moment to stick to the knitting and examine your evidence for the mind being a separate and non-material entity, which is, after all, your point in the OP.

Is it “proof” that the mind is non-physical? Of course not. What it does do, though, is uncover the naivety and posturing behind so many of the ubiquitous “new atheists”.

Perhaps you would tell us just how it uncovers this putative naivety and posturing, referring of course to the documented views of so many “new atheists”.

I’m not surprised you feel that it’s not “self-evident” that the answer is affirmative to the question “is there a meta-level at which human minds can decide truth in a formal system where machines cannot?” - a positive answer there is the death of materialism, isn’t it?

Here’s an interesting thing. Thinkers who are religious, be they ever so intelligent and thoughtful, as you obviously are, commonly invert cause and effect in the thinking of atheists. In other words, you commonly assert that conclusions about the world arise from our philosophical perspective - the “you would think that, wouldn’t you” approach. On the contrary, my worldview is a consequence of what I see in the world. I think that it is not self-evident that there is a meta-level at which human minds can decide truth in a formal system (ie an axiomatised mathematical system) where machines cannot (allowing axiomatisation of Goedel propositions) because I have considered the question, not because I am a “materialist”. If you disagree with my conclusion, tell us why you think that it is self-evident that there *must *be a meta-level where humans can decide truth where machines cannot in a formal system given Goedel’s theorems and formal theorems in computer science.

And no - a positive answer to the question is not the death of materialism for a clear reason that I have explained - ie that Penrose’s arguments even if true, do not entail the rejection of a material basis for mind.

Alec
evolutionpages.com

 

[hecd2]

I think the only people who believe the interpretation I summarized previously has “severe philosophical problems” are those for whom materialism is the only possible belief system!

Really? I don’t know of many knowledgeable people who currently adhere to the consciousness-causes-collapse interpretation of quantum mechanics - perhaps Barr is one, Wigner certainly was another. The philosophical problems relate to the nature of the consciousness required if we hold that the superposition and the collapse is real: is the consciousness of a bacterium sufficient, a slime mould, a fungus, a flea, a fish, a cat, a chimp? Or does it require human consciousness? In the last case are we to suppose that the universe exists in a state of extreme superposition until humans come along after 13.7 billion years; that only those parts of the universe that have been observed by humans (or primates or mammals or whatever level of consciousness we choose to be the critical one) have had their wave function collapse, so that no event or causal chain can be said to have actually taken place unless the appropriate biological species has directly observed it? And, in dualism, what about the interplay between mind and brain - the observer cannot make an observation without affecting the states of his brain so that the observation is not free of consequences for the wave function so that the mind becomes effectively part of the system. (Or do we think that superposition and collapse do not really happen, that the universe is deterministic in the classical sense (ie particles always have distinct positions and momentums) and that what appears to be superposition is merely a reflection of our lack of knowledge about the actual state of the system and that in observing the actual state then the superposition of probabilities collapses in our minds to a single actuality, ie some sort of hidden variables interpretation like de Broglie’s or Bohm’s? In this case, it’s hard to see how this lack of knowledge would be any different from the classical case of macrosystems except for the complication of EPR type experiments based on Bell’s theorem which do not support local hidden variable interpretations so one is forced to abandon locality which is a pretty unpalatable step to take.)

For these reasons, Wigner’s interpretation is pretty much rejected these days (not just by people with a materialist axe to grind), particularly as decoherence theory and experiment, which has only really been developed since Wigner’s demise, has eased the measurement problem and the need to separate system from observer. Most scientists use the Copenhagen interpretation as a working model, but Everett’s and other histories interpretations are becoming increasingly used and useful.

It is the belief of many that it is the alternative interpretations, that are rife with avoidance of the philosophical issues or constructs much more absurd than the entirely reasonable notion that the human mind is not a machine, that are far less palatable. Certainly by Occam’s Razor!

I am not sure that you fully understand what you arguing here - it seems to me quite clear that you have taken a view from a single source that does properly equip you to see what problems exist in each interpretation of QM. Whether one accepts Catholic style dualism or not, consciousness causes collapse has the difficulties that I have described; accepting that human mind is not a machine and adhering to the Wigner interpretation does not make these difficulties go away. A fuller understanding of the scientific and philosophical difficulties inherent in the range of interpretations that have been advanced would give you a more balanced view.

To be continued