Mind & Matter

[hecd2]

Continuation

Yes, you are correct about that “that the brain and the mind are separate entities which might interact but which are distinct”. That is not materially different than what I said - the key word there being “interact”.

Interact to such an extent that they are different aspects of the same integrated process.

Your assertion that the “mystical” has no place in knowledge is just that. This is really a tangent, but whether or not human beings are capable of completely understanding the nature of mind and how it interacts with the physical (brain) has no bearing on whether the mind is, in fact, non-physical. Below you state that we can’t know everything - which is it?

We can’t know everything. However it is also true that mystical explanations are not explanations at all. However, as I have pointed out before, I don’t see what practical or ontological difference exists between the view that mind is a property of brain, and the view that they are so deeply interwoven that they cannot be unravelled and that there is no function of mind that cannot be affected through physical operations on the brain (although, interestingly, not the other way round).

The Catholic position (not that there’s any dogmatic position - I’m speaking generally) is different than yours very fundamentally in that you deny that the mind is anything other than a quality derived wholly from the brain. What you are stating, in asserting that the mind is “emergent” from the brain, is that you have no idea what the mind is.

I am stating no such thing. I know that I have a mind, because I experience it (through self-awareness, memories and so on) and other people behave as though they have minds so I accept that they too have minds. I observe that these minds absolutely depend on the presence of a working brain and that the minds are affected by a huge range of physical operations on the brain. We know brains exist and we know minds depend on them. The robust and parsimonious conclusion is that the mind is a property of neural processes - it is unnecessary to appeal to the hypothesis that mind has a separate ontological existence.

To talk about the physiology of the mind is to admit that the mind and the brain are intimately related - nothing more.

But this does not answer my question about how to distinguish between your interdependent dualism and my monism. What difference would we observe if the mind and brain were distinct and separate but intimately related entities compared with what we would observe if the mind is an emergent property of the brain.

Both [Penrose’s argument and the argument from consciousness-causes-collapse] give very good reason to question the assumption that the mind has no non-physical basis. For you materialism is simply that - your assumption, based on your (atheistic) worldview - no? You must at least admit that for you there is really no alternative. And that’s based on philosophical grounds.

We have seen what these two arguments are worth. Penrose’s argument, even if it is correct, does not entail a non-material basis for mind, and consciousness-causes-collapse is a now pretty much abandoned interpretation of quantum mechanics that is neither required to do QM nor to interpret it. I see neither as good reason to abandon my conclusion that the mind has a material basis. It is not an assumption but a conclusion from the available evidence. I have commented in a previous post on your tendency to invert my reasoning - I do not argue from a worldview to my conclusions - I argue from what I see to be the evidence to my conclusions and thence to a worldview. I can explain to you why I think that belief in the existence of a non-material realm is unwarranted and why beliefs about it are arbitrary and unverifiable, but that would be a diversion from this specific instance of an argument for the existence of a non-material entity.

Alec
evolutionpages.com

 

[hecd2]

I can’t wait to hear how you explain free will in terms of a mind that simply directly “emerges” from a collection of neurons! Please do so for us.

Since, as I have said, I agree that we have an experience of free will but that pure or Platonic free will does not exist. This is demonstrated by the fact that what we will to do and when we act on it is always affected by a huge range of external factors ranging from our genetics and our foetal hormonal environment to the most recent sensory (name removed by moderator)ut. There is evidence that our experience of free will arises from neural circuits in the parietal cortex which prepare the intention and pass that intention on to the pre-motor cortex. Now I will not pretend that that is any more than a very coarse understanding with a huge amount of detail still to fill in, but the human brain-mind is one of the most complex entities in the universe and our study of it is in its infancy. Nevertheless, what is clear is that the experience of intention can be caused by physical stimulation of the parietal cortex which confirms that such experience has a material basis that is separate from the actual computational work involved in preparing and executing the action (and this confirms the brain imaging studies that locate intention in the parietal cortex). Desmurget et al, Movement intention after parietal cortex stimulation humans*, Science *324, 811 - 813 (2009). The timing of neural events associated with “free” actions also suggests that the unconscious brain has prepared the decision before the conscious brain becomes aware of them (see for example, Soon et al, Unconscious determinants of free decisions in the human brain, *Nat Neurosci *11, 543 - 545 (2008), Sirigu et al, Nat Neurosci 7, 80 (2004). See also Haggard, Human Volition : towards a neuroscience of will, Nat Rev Neurosci 9, 934 - 946 (2008)). This is a big subject with a large and rapidly growing literature which we can explore further if you wish.

More philosophy, I see.

Indeed, as the topic is a philosophical as well as a scientific one. Don’t you agree?

Asking you to give some basic explanation for your unfounded hypothesis is a ‘straw man’? I disagree.

It’s a strawman in exactly the same sense that YECs’ claims that the fact that we can’t trace the evolution of bats is evidence against the theory of evolution. You asked me to completely capture the essence of pi (your exact words) in neural firings with the implication that if I was unable to do so then this invalidated my hypothesis, and that is clearly a strawman. I cannot describe the neural process or tabulate the precise circuits, but it is incontrovertible that neural circuits are used in thinking about geometry, and that the absence of these circuits either by damage or death disables that aspect of cognition. A survey of the fMRI literature will reveal the neural correlates of geometrical thinking. That, at least is a testable assertion, unlike the idea that mind exists as a distinct non-material entity and in some mysterious way does our abstract thinking for us.

Obviously, we need only define a sphere mathematically to define pi. “We don’t all think of pi the same way”? Really?! Do you know the definition of pi or do you not?

Well do you know *the *definition of pi? It seems by your reference to a sphere that your definition is different (but potentially no less correct) than the most common definition that relies only on two and not three dimensions. I gave two mathematical definitions of pi in the earlier post (the ratio of the circumference to the diameter and the ratio of the area to the square of the radius of a Euclidean circle). And actually you have to do more than define a (presumably Euclidean) sphere to define pi, don’t you (as you have to do more than define a circle)? I accept that pi is an abstract concept (contrary to what I said before - I was wrong), but our ability to think about abstract geometry is rooted in perceiving and measuring physical objects as is arithmetic rooted in our ability to count objects. None of this negates the fact that people *think *about pi in a wide range of ways which is one point that I was making (for example you obviously think about it in terms of properties of spheres - a rather convoluted definition - whereas many people’s initial thought is in terms of properties of circles, while others asked to define pi will give a rational number approximation. The question is not so much what is the correct definition of pi (and there are many correct and equivalent definitions) but how do people perceive or think about pi. And it is clear that not everyone thinks about it the same way, and actually an individual may well think about pi in a different way at different times and in different contexts. Furthermore, it is clear that one does not need two identical computational processes to arrive at the same output.

Shall we talk about prime numbers instead? Do you understand that that concept does not rely on the physical?

Sure - let’s talk about prime numbers. So, what’s your point?

Alec
evolutionpages.com

 

[grannymh]

What difference would we observe if the mind and brain were distinct and separate but intimately related entities compared with what we would observe if the mind is an emergent property of the brain.

Alec
evolutionpages.com

The difference one observes is similar to that between a sentient chimp and a rational human when a forest fire approaches.

For example, when a forest fire approaches, a chimp’s material brain/body reactions are in accord with survival instincts plus some “learned” adaptive techniques as to which escape is the safest, etc.

When a wild fire in California approaches, a person’s material brain/body reactions are also in accord with fleeing instincts. However, the human mind, being separate, can sort out the various ways to combat the fire and then choose the most reasonable. The mind is distinctive because one can reason and choose actions counter to the normal instinct of fleeing. Only a human would consider using backfire to control the blaze.

 

[grannymh]

Since, as I have said, I agree that we have an experience of free will but that pure or Platonic free will does not exist. This is demonstrated by the fact that what we will to do and when we act on it is always affected by a huge range of external factors ranging from our genetics and our foetal hormonal environment to the most recent sensory (name removed by moderator)ut.

Not only is a person affected by a huge range of external factors, but at times, these factors will hinder free will. If research is being done on actual free will action, then the conditions surrounding the experiment have to be free of inhibiting factors such as force.

The physical stimulation of the brain in the referenced Desmurget Research Paper (Alec, Post 42) was part of a functional mapping technique used with Awake Brain Surgery. This “mapping” marks critical areas of the brain which control the patient’s vision, language and body movement. This physical, direct electrical stimulation
“…was delivered with a bipolar electrode using standard increasing intensities (2, 5, and 8mA) and durations (1, 2, and 4 s). Up to four replications were performed for each stimulation site. Replications were delivered non-consecutively to avoid profound seizures.” (Desmurget)

The patient’s experience of the stimulation, intention, motor awareness and motor activity was essential for the ultimate success of the surgery. Given the circumstances and external factors, one realizes that the patient was not in control. This means that true free will was not exercised as part of the Desmurget project. This does not mean that the faculty of free will is absent. “Free will” exists as part of the spiritual soul of the human being.

Blessings,
granny

All human life is sacred from the moment of conception.

 

[grannymh]

However, as I have pointed out before, I don’t see what practical or ontological difference exists between the view that mind is a property of brain, and the view that they are so deeply interwoven that they cannot be unravelled …

Pointing to the idea that the mind and brain are so interwoven and can’t be unraveled is not the issue. The issue is what is the true nature of the human being.

Practically speaking, when one views the mind as a property of brain/matter, one places intellect and will within the boundaries of the corporeal brain. In this scenario, one has to then accept that the mind and its companion free will have all the specifications and limitations of matter instead of all the freedoms belonging to the spiritual soul.

 

[grannymh]

We know brains exist and we know minds depend on them.

Alec
evolutionpages.com

Please.
And what do brains depend on?
Do brains depend on life?
If so, what is life?
If not, what?

 

[PaulF2]

I am arguing that, even if Penrose is precisely correct, and the mind cannot be represented by an algorithm running on a Turing machine, then that does not entail the conclusion that mind cannot be an emergent property of matter. Furthermore, not only does Penrose recognise this and make no such claim, but he has put forward (with Stuart Hameroff) a specific physical model (orch OR) on which to base mental processes. It therefore seems perverse to advance an inference from Penrose’s argument, which Penrose himself rejects. I am arguing that if you wish to use Penrose’s argument as a basis for showing that mind cannot have a physical foundation, then a primary acquaintance with Penrose’s actual arguments (rather than with what some other potentially biased person claims for them) is a minimum condition for developing reasoned inferences from them. It is particularly the case that should you wish to base your case on Penrose’s arguments in direct opposition to Penrose’s own inferred conclusions, then you should at least point out why Penrose, familiar as he is with his own argument, has drawn false inferences (ie that a physical basis for mind is not excluded by his rejection of a Turing machine base) and why yours are correct.

We had already covered what Penrose believed and its relevance. I understand you wanting to spend the most time on the points that may seem to work in your favor, but it’s getting tiresome. While you’ve presented some good and interesting information, I’m afraid I have to see most of it as essentially an effort towards obfuscation: an inundation with largely irrelevant data that distracts from the meat of the matter (more on that later).

Penrose’s argument has merit regardless of the inferences that Penrose himself drew from it - that much should really be obvious. Dr. Barr himself did point out that Penrose did not really buy into the non-material mind and - to repeat myself - also sees that as irrelevant. His argument is strong evidence against the specific type of material mind that most scientists imagine or imagined - and thus it is relevant. To further repeat myself, Dr. Barr does not contend and I do not contend that Penrose’s argument provides proof for a non-material mind - it is simply evidence, and demonstrates at the very least the high level of wrong thinking that is at the heart of so much of the materialist mindset.

I’m not going to go into further detail (again) of why Penrose might have inferred what he did and why it is not very relevant as I think most readers will see that for themselves.

I think that you have overstated the case, but I have *not *understated it. I have represented it as precisely as a summary in a sentence or two can do. Let me repeat this summary. Penrose argues by reference to Goedel’s First Incompleteness Theorem which states that in any formal system of axiomatised and consistent arithmetic there are propositions which are true but which cannot be decided within the system. He uses this proof to argue that minds cannot be based on an algorithm running on a Turing machine, because such algorithms are subject to the incompleteness theorem, whereas minds are able to see the truth of Goedel propositions which are, themselves undecidable by classical computation. That is exactly as I have represented it before and is the extent of Penrose’s arguments. I recommend that you read the primary source yourself.

Thanks for that nice summary of Penrose’s argument - I did and could read it from Penrose as well as from anyone who’s ever commented on the subject - I have no idea what you were attempting to add here.

Well it would have upset the materialist apple cart if these conditions pertained:

1. that his argument constituted a proof or was so strong that it led to a consensual agreement
2. that his argument in itself precluded a physical basis for mind
3. that the only material model for mind processes is a classical computer (ie a Turing machine)

However, none of these conditions pertain. Penrose’s argument is not a proof and is disputed, it does not preclude a physical basis for mind, and there a number of neurophysical non-classical hypotheses for the material basis of mind processes (I can give you a long list of references if you wish).

I also have access to Google, so thanks anyway (and I’ve read all of the attempts to disprove the argument as well). Again - I do not see you adding anything meaningful to the discussion here. You’re arguing against a straw man you’ve setup.

 

[PaulF2]

You are right that he disagreed with those who support the strong AI programme - but your statement that this is “virtually all materialists” is wrong - to what extent do you keep up to date with various mind-brain studies, for example through the Journal of Consciousness Studies? The need to abandon classical computing models of mind is debatable (see my comments about critiques of Penrose’s argument), but in any case, there is substantial work being undertaken in non-classical computing solutions.

To what extent do you, beyond boning up for this thread?

Everything’s debatable, but not everything is true.

But what is your argument: that Penrose has caused consternation amongst materialists or that Penrose has an overwhelming argument against the material foundations of mind?

I would say it was apparent that Penrose’s argument did cause consternation given the amount of effort that was expended in attempting to refute it. My argument echoes Dr. Barr’s - that is, that this is one piece of evidence in favor of the tenet that that mind cannot be reduced entirely to physics.

I assume you are referring to my comments about Alan Turing’s and other mathematicians’ criticisms of Penrose’s (or Lucas’s) argument. I fail to see how considerations as to the validity of Penrose’s conclusion - the principle argument that you are advancing - do not have “anything to do with the core question”. It seems to me that thinking considerations as to whether Penrose is justified in his argument in the first place are very relevant. I am not saying that Penrose does not make a good case; but his argument is far from a proof and there are very thoughtful, informed and well argued criticisms of it which we must take into account before concluding that Penrose has “upset the apple cart”.

You really liked the apple cart euphemism, didn’t you? (I would translate this phrase as “caused an uproar” or “caused consternation” - not “changed the world”, which is what you seem to be reading into it.)

Once again, I already acknowledged that Penrose’s argument is not a proof - in my very first reply on the subject, I believe. And once again, the inferences Penrose drew from his argument - whether the mind was non-physical or simply some other, completely unknown, completely indescribable type of physics - are indeed independent from the argument. If you want to continue to dispute this point I have some lovely analogies in the gate.

Well you have come across Penrose. I have introduced you to Hameroff. Read Michael Frayn. I could give you a very long list. Do you want one? However the strong AI programme is not dead, and it is not certain that the view that brains are computers is wrong on the basis of Penrose’s arguments.
I agree, but it can be considered and rejected, or considered and accepted for what it is…

I could give you a long list of good books too that would probably do you more than that those you suggest would do me. Again, Alec, for those who will refuse to assent to a truth they do not like, nothing is certain. I cannot make the horse drink and neither does God. *

Here’s an interesting thing. Thinkers who are religious, be they ever so intelligent and thoughtful, as you obviously are, commonly invert cause and effect in the thinking of atheists. In other words, you commonly assert that conclusions about the world arise from our philosophical perspective - the “you would think that, wouldn’t you” approach. On the contrary, my worldview is a consequence of what I see in the world. I think that it is not self-evident that there is a meta-level at which human minds can decide truth in a formal system (ie an axiomatised mathematical system) where machines cannot (allowing axiomatisation of Goedel propositions) because I have considered the question, not because I am a “materialist”. If you disagree with my conclusion, tell us why you think that it is self-evident that there *must *

be a meta-level where humans can decide truth where machines cannot in a formal system given Goedel’s theorems and formal theorems in computer science.

Of course you will assert that your worldview is a consequence of the “evidence” and nothing more. However, I would assert that your worldview is primarily a consequence of an act of the will. I would argue that you have the worldview you do, ultimately, because you want to - because you have in fact deliberately chosen to ignore certain self-evident truths. From that point, you, consciously or not, go looking for evidence to support the worldview you have chosen and ignore what does not. That sort of rationalization is a common human mechanism.

I hold that the knowledge that my mind is not a simple by-product of matter with all that necessarily entails (see below) is self-evident. I would turn your challenge back on you and again assert that it is illogical to start with assumption that the mind is merely matter as you do (is matter, proceeds directly from matter - that’s just semantics) and demand proof of the contrary.*

 

[PaulF2]

Really? I don’t know of many knowledgeable people who currently adhere to the consciousness-causes-collapse interpretation of quantum mechanics - perhaps Barr is one, Wigner certainly was another. The philosophical problems relate to the nature of the consciousness required if we hold that the superposition and the collapse is real: is the consciousness of a bacterium sufficient, a slime mould, a fungus, a flea, a fish, a cat, a chimp? Or does it require human consciousness? In the last case are we to suppose that the universe exists in a state of extreme superposition until humans come along after 13.7 billion years; that only those parts of the universe that have been observed by humans (or primates or mammals or whatever level of consciousness we choose to be the critical one) have had their wave function collapse, so that no event or causal chain can be said to have actually taken place unless the appropriate biological species has directly observed it? And, in dualism, what about the interplay between mind and brain - the observer cannot make an observation without affecting the states of his brain so that the observation is not free of consequences for the wave function so that the mind becomes effectively part of the system. (Or do we think that superposition and collapse do not really happen, that the universe is deterministic in the classical sense (ie particles always have distinct positions and momentums) and that what appears to be superposition is merely a reflection of our lack of knowledge about the actual state of the system and that in observing the actual state then the superposition of probabilities collapses in our minds to a single actuality, ie some sort of hidden variables interpretation like de Broglie’s or Bohm’s? In this case, it’s hard to see how this lack of knowledge would be any different from the classical case of macrosystems except for the complication of EPR type experiments based on Bell’s theorem which do not support local hidden variable interpretations so one is forced to abandon locality which is a pretty unpalatable step to take.)

First of all, do I really have to point out that the relative number of adherents to any particular tenet, philosophy, etc. is not directly related to its truth? Do you so readily jump off the bridges that your friends do?

Secondly, the question of whether a bacterium “consciousness” is qualitatively equivalent to that of a human’s (a true consciousness) is not a “philosophical problem” except to those who have already more or less accepted materialism! Some of us are quite comfortable with the notion that us human beings are indeed set apart, thank you.

Thirdly, you appear to have missed what I stated about the nature of the wavefunction (echoing Dr. Barr): it represents a distinct observer’s knowledge about a system and not the actual state of the system. Your contention that what is implied about the mind in this view implies that the observation (which causes collapse) also changes the system is not the case. Thus that particular argument is also moot. You do speak to this in the latter part of the paragraph, of course, and I won’t speak to how this view differs substantially from classical physics.

[Fourth - though this is a nit - haven’t you already had the Catholic view of dualism explained to you? Who are the dualists you are addressing?

I am not sure that you fully understand what you arguing here - it seems to me quite clear that you have taken a view from a single source that does properly equip you to see what problems exist in each interpretation of QM. Whether one accepts Catholic style dualism or not, consciousness causes collapse has the difficulties that I have described; accepting that human mind is not a machine and adhering to the Wigner interpretation does not make these difficulties go away. A fuller understanding of the scientific and philosophical difficulties inherent in the range of interpretations that have been advanced would give you a more balanced view.

Most of the difficulties you described are, actually, manufactured difficulties, and the alternate interpretations I have seen have far worse problems. I’ve noticed you have not discussed any alternative interpretations at all.

Again, you seem to be flaunting your knowledge, and that’s fine. It’s relevant to this tangent, but not the big picture. Our contentions about the mind are just as strong without either or both the Penrose & quantum mechanical arguments.

It’s a strawman in exactly the same sense that YECs’ claims that the fact that we can’t trace the evolution of bats is evidence against the theory of evolution. You asked me to completely capture the essence of pi (your exact words) in neural firings with the implication that if I was unable to do so then this invalidated my hypothesis, and that is clearly a strawman. I cannot describe the neural process or tabulate the precise circuits, but it is incontrovertible that neural circuits are used in thinking about geometry, and that the absence of these circuits either by damage or death disables that aspect of cognition. A survey of the fMRI literature will reveal the neural correlates of geometrical thinking. That, at least is a testable assertion, unlike the idea that mind exists as a distinct non-material entity and in some mysterious way does our abstract thinking for us.

I didn’t mean to imply that you must be able to show conclusively how an abstract concept can be represented as a sequence of neural firings in order for your argument to have any merit. However, it is entirely reasonable to expect that you ought to be able to describe at a conceptual level how this could be done and I don’t think you have done that or can do it. As you note, the brain is largely still a mystery - and the conjecture that mind is an entirely ‘emergent’ ‘property’ is nothing more than a weak hypothesis. It’s accepted, again, because it’s the only allowable possibility in the materialist philosophy that holds sway at the moment.

As for straw men and obfuscation, you seem to be providing them in abundance. Once again, nobody denies that the brain is directly involved in cognitive activity. Do you think that theists believe that that those 100 billion neurons are there for show?

 

[PaulF2]

Well do you know *the *definition of pi? It seems by your reference to a sphere that your definition is different (but potentially no less correct) than the most common definition that relies only on two and not three dimensions. I gave two mathematical definitions of pi in the earlier post (the ratio of the circumference to the diameter and the ratio of the area to the square of the radius of a Euclidean circle). And actually you have to do more than define a (presumably Euclidean) sphere to define pi, don’t you (as you have to do more than define a circle)? I accept that pi is an abstract concept (contrary to what I said before - I was wrong), but our ability to think about abstract geometry is rooted in perceiving and measuring physical objects as is arithmetic rooted in our ability to count objects. None of this negates the fact that people *think *about pi in a wide range of ways which is one point that I was making (for example you obviously think about it in terms of properties of spheres - a rather convoluted definition - whereas many people’s initial thought is in terms of properties of circles, while others asked to define pi will give a rational number approximation. The question is not so much what is the correct definition of pi (and there are many correct and equivalent definitions) but how do people perceive or think about pi. And it is clear that not everyone thinks about it the same way, and actually an individual may well think about pi in a different way at different times and in different contexts. Furthermore, it is clear that one does not need two identical computational processes to arrive at the same output.

I misspoke in using the word ‘sphere’ instead of ‘circle’ - of course we need only two dimensions to define pi. [My semantic mistake there is nowhere near as serious as your denial of pi as an abstract concept but I’ll call it even out of charity. ]

Regardless of how various people think about pi, it remains an obvious truth that it is an abstract concept at its core, and some people some of the time ponder that. I think you have done nothing here but distract from the heart of the matter and that it remains fundamentally true and obvious that a strictly material mind (or a mind “emerging” completely from the physical - same thing) could not really consider such a thing. At the very least, you should argue that such is a “mystery” in your worldview (which you have tacitly admitted by acknowledging the primitive state of understanding of the brain).

Sure - let’s talk about prime numbers. So, what’s your point?

Since you have reversed yourself on the question of pi being an abstract concept, bringing in prime numbers does not really broaden the discussion. If you had not, it would - it’s obviously just another of the nearly infinite number of truly abstract concepts that exist.

We can’t know everything. However it is also true that mystical explanations are not explanations at all. However, as I have pointed out before, I don’t see what practical or ontological difference exists between the view that mind is a property of brain, and the view that they are so deeply interwoven that they cannot be unravelled and that there is no function of mind that cannot be affected through physical operations on the brain (although, interestingly, not the other way round).

Mystical explanations are explanations to the extent that we are capable of understanding something infinite or beyond our grasp in our present state.

Your assumption that the brain affects the will but not the other way around is nothing more than that and is certainly one any theist I know of would reject! As a matter of fact when it comes to certain thought patterns, or acts, and their physiological attendances, we have no way to determine in which way the causality flows.

As for whether or not this discussion is relevant, it’s pretty much not if you completely gloss over the importance of free will, which you do. Whether or not we possess true free will is actually a critical point (which I will speak to more below).

I am stating no such thing. I know that I have a mind, because I experience it (through self-awareness, memories and so on) and other people behave as though they have minds so I accept that they too have minds. I observe that these minds absolutely depend on the presence of a working brain and that the minds are affected by a huge range of physical operations on the brain. We know brains exist and we know minds depend on them. The robust and parsimonious conclusion is that the mind is a property of neural processes - it is unnecessary to appeal to the hypothesis that mind has a separate ontological existence.

You conclude that the “mind depends on a working brain” only because you have not seen otherwise - a very narrow-minded view, actually.

Assuming that the mind is anything other than that which “follows from” the brain is unnecessary only if you ignore the glaring problems that your view entails - such as no logical basis at all for the ability to reason abstractly that we obviously possess and the true free will that honest people are forced to admit they possess. I think your conclusion is far from robust and far too parsimonious.

 

[PaulF2]

But this does not answer my question about how to distinguish between your interdependent dualism and my monism. What difference would we observe if the mind and brain were distinct and separate but intimately related entities compared with what we would observe if the mind is an emergent property of the brain.

Spoken to above and below. In point of fact, our ‘views’ are radically divergent indeed.

When you say that the mind is “dependent” on the brain do you mean existentially dependent? Of course you do - but the observation that in our experience a mind is correlated with the presence of a brain does not demand the latter, much stronger, postulate, of course. You would argue that this (mind emerges from brain, period) is the simplest model that fits the evidence but, once again, I would argue that your model fits the evidence only when you explain away what you can’t really explain. (We are beginning to go in circles now but so be it.)

I think it is possible to identify properties of ‘intellect’ that only man possesses, and that are the hallmark of abstract reasoning that cannot have at its root something entirely physical: abstraction in general, judgment, volition. These “acts” are not constrained by nor in any way defined by any sort of spatial dimensionality or anything physical; their formal objects are not anything physical or anything derived from the physical either. “Concept is universal, but image is particular.” You are simply glossing away the clearly illogical notion that these clear properties of the intellect would exist as byproducts of a biological machine. Either you’re going to see this and acknowledge it or you won’t - and after several turns around the merry-go I think the path you’ve chosen is clear.

The intellect does depend on the senses and other physiological sources for data but its ability to ‘pull out’ an abstract concept from such data is not an inherent property of the biological component of ‘mind’. We can say - very logically, and with much evidence - that in our current state, our minds are indeed ‘dependent’ on our brains, but such is not an existential, permanent dependence.

[These thoughts are based in part on the work of Dr. Dennis Bonnette.]

Since, as I have said, I agree that we have an experience of free will but that pure or Platonic free will does not exist. This is demonstrated by the fact that what we will to do and when we act on it is always affected by a huge range of external factors ranging from our genetics and our foetal hormonal environment to the most recent sensory (name removed by moderator)ut.

And here is the most important part of the whole story. You acknowledge (finally) that true free will does not exist in your view (it can’t) and then follow it up with a bunch of completely irrelevant physiology. (And even though according to you people have no real control over their beliefs or behavior you are attempting to change them…)

Most people - I would say all truly honest people - recognize that free will - that is true free will - does exist. It is self-evident and very easily demonstrable to oneself, regardless of whether or not it is quantifiable or formally provable to ‘others’. And no matter what they say when pressed everyone, including atheists, do think & behave as if free will exists in their day-to-day lives. I have never yet run into an atheist who could look me in the eye and tell me that, no, he truly believes he does not actually have the ability to make moral choices. (I am sure they exist and perhaps you are the first, but most atheists seem unwilling to acknowledge this fairly basic consequence of their philosophy.)

“This is demonstrated by the fact that what we will to do and when we act on it is always affected by a huge range of external factors ranging from our genetics and our foetal hormonal environment to the most recent sensory (name removed by moderator)ut.” - surely you must be able to see how completely illogical this assertion is? You will argue that because a person’s choices can be influenced by something, an actual choice is not made? This is obfuscation and absolute nonsense.

Let’s take a look at just how, well, insidiously evil, a tenet this is that you are proposing. If there is no moral free will then, obviously, people cannot be blamed for their actions, nor is there really any point in trying to instill any type of morality. What would your comments be about such foolishness as the Nuremberg trials and the effort to stamp out slavery in the 19th century? First of all, it makes no sense at all to ever punish anyone for anything since in actuality they have no control over their behavior - correct? Is there any act in the history of humanity that you believe a person should have been actually punished for? Secondly, if our choices and morality are, ultimately, a direct by-product of our physiology, and our free will a sad illusion, how does one explain the moral firebrands that go against the tide and make real progress in ending some evil, such as Wilberforce with respect to slavery? Misfiring neurons? What a sad and pathetic worldview, I must say.

I suppose you will assert that societal influences do shape how people behave and thus it is possible to achieve “good” behavior through manipulation (your definition of “good” being necessarily completely arbitrary). But it doesn’t make sense - if people are to be influenced, etc., then those doing the deciding of whom to influence about what and how are making the moral choices! This is just more evidence of you not really accepting the consequences of your belief system. As I said, no matter what they will say when pressed, atheists always behave as if free will does exist - because the alternative is so preposterous and so obviously, intuitively wrong to thinking people. (As a matter of fact, in general the neo atheist is a very judgmental soul with very much vigor devoted to preaching.)

This is the heart of the reason why people like me fence with people like you - your philosophy, as innocent and plausible and “scientific” as you make it look - is, in addition to being nonsensical, a cancer upon humanity that needs to be condemned in the strongest possible terms.

 

[grannymh]

to what extent do you keep up to date with various mind-brain studies, for example through the Journal of Consciousness Studies?

Regarding the Journal of Consciousness Studies, 8 No. 11, 2001,pp. 47-63

Patrick Haggard and Benjamin Libet, "Conscious Intention and Brain Activity

I: Introduction
“Voluntary action is fundamental to human existence.” This is true.

"Libet and colleagues asked subjects to fixate a small clock hand, which rotated once every 2.56 s. Subjects then made a voluntary movement (they were instructed to flex their wrist ‘freely and capriciously’) at a time which they themselves chose. " The theme of voluntary action is carried out in this paper.

Google brought me to “Free Will: Action Theory Meets Neuroscience” by Alfred R. Mele, Florida State University without stating source of paper. However his issue of conceptual distinctions is universally important. He writes: “Because Libet uses such terms as “decision,” “intention,” “wanting,” “wish,” and “urge” interchangeably, some conceptual preliminaries are in order in interpreting his work.” I have seen some of these terms used with an explanation of free will action with the result that the concept of actual free will becomes clouded.

It is extremely important to clarify what “experience of free will” is and isn’t.

What becomes hazy is scientists’ understanding of free will. Patrick Haggard writes in above cited article. “Most of us navigate through our daily lives with the belief that we have conscious free will: that is, we have conscious intentions to perform specific acts, and those intentions can drive our bodily actions, thus producing a desired change in the external world.”

Belief in conscious intentions does not really describe what is going on regarding actual free will.

As I read more of Patrick Haggard’s work and reread Michel Desmurget’s “Movement Intention after Parietal Cortex Stimulation in Humans,” Science 324 811–813 (2009),
my conclusion is that these scientists are talking about something involved with free will but actually is not free will. A good example is: "Modern neuroscience would reverse these causal roles, and would describe conscious intention as a consequence or correlate of neural preparation of action. (Haggard)

Conscious intention cannot be considered the very same as actual free will nor can they be used interchangeably per se.

Alec, you have referred to your own experience of free will. Haggard commented that the concept of conscious free will remains in our individual lives and then he quoted Hume.

May I ask you to expand with details (or verbatim) what people mean when they say they experience free will? Thank you.

Blessings,
granny

All human life is sacred.

 

[reggieM]

Most people - I would say all truly honest people - recognize that free will - that is true free will - does exist. It is self-evident and very easily demonstrable to oneself, regardless of whether or not it is quantifiable or formally provable to ‘others’. And no matter what they say when pressed everyone, including atheists, do think & behave as if free will exists in their day-to-day lives. I have never yet run into an atheist who could look me in the eye and tell me that, no, he truly believes he does not actually have the ability to make moral choices. (I am sure they exist and perhaps you are the first, but most atheists seem unwilling to acknowledge this fairly basic consequence of their philosophy.)

I’ve found this to be true also. The atheistic claim is that free-will does not exist. But this claim is contradicted in practice. To be consistent, our legal systems would need to change radically (the idea of “responsiblity” for one’s actions would be meaningless), as would our educational systems which seek to train the will of students for discipline and consistency with the truth of various matters. But atheists do not even argue that way – it is assumed that free-will does exist in practice, while it is denied in theory.

Let’s take a look at just how, well, insidiously evil, a tenet this is that you are proposing. If there is no moral free will then, obviously, people cannot be blamed for their actions, nor is there really any point in trying to instill any type of morality. What would your comments be about such foolishness as the Nuremberg trials and the effort to stamp out slavery in the 19th century? First of all, it makes no sense at all to ever punish anyone for anything since in actuality they have no control over their behavior - correct? Is there any act in the history of humanity that you believe a person should have been actually punished for? Secondly, if our choices and morality are, ultimately, a direct by-product of our physiology, and our free will a sad illusion, how does one explain the moral firebrands that go against the tide and make real progress in ending some evil, such as Wilberforce with respect to slavery? Misfiring neurons? What a sad and pathetic worldview, I must say.

I find the moral argument to be very strong also. Physical/material nature does not command or forbid any human behavior at all. But at the same time, we see atheists outraged by various human moral behaviors through history. It’s an obvious contradiction.

But it doesn’t make sense - if people are to be influenced, etc., then those doing the deciding of whom to influence about what and how are making the moral choices! This is just more evidence of you not really accepting the consequences of your belief system. As I said, no matter what they will say when pressed, atheists always behave as if free will does exist - because the alternative is so preposterous and so obviously, intuitively wrong to thinking people.

Excellent point again. I find that argument to be crystal-clear and irrefutable. The moral behavior and attitudes of the atheists who claim that the moral law and free-will do not exist provide strong evidence about how confused and illogical the atheistic system really is. It cannot even be embraced by its own, most passionate, adherents.

This is the heart of the reason why people like me fence with people like you - your philosophy, as innocent and plausible and “scientific” as you make it look - is, in addition to being nonsensical, a cancer upon humanity that needs to be condemned in the strongest possible terms.

I fully agree.

 

[hecd2]

And here is the most important part of the whole story. You acknowledge (finally) that true free will does not exist in your view (it can’t) and then follow it up with a bunch of completely irrelevant physiology. (And even though according to you people have no real control over their beliefs or behavior you are attempting to change them…)

Most people - I would say all truly honest people - recognize that free will - that is true free will - does exist…

You will argue that because a person’s choices can be influenced by something, an actual choice is not made? This is obfuscation and absolute nonsense…

Let’s take a look at just how, well, insidiously evil, a tenet this is that you are proposing… … What a sad and pathetic worldview, I must say.

…atheists always behave as if free will does exist - because the alternative is so preposterous and so obviously, intuitively wrong to thinking people. (As a matter of fact, in general the neo atheist is a very judgmental soul with very much vigor devoted to preaching.)

…your philosophy, as innocent and plausible and “scientific” as you make it look - is, in addition to being nonsensical, a cancer upon humanity that needs to be condemned in the strongest possible terms.

Perhaps you think you have succeeded in persuading others with your outburst. Perhaps you have persuaded those for whom rhetoric and emotive pleading takes precedence over evidence and reason.

And here I was, thinking that we were engaged in a civil discussion about two opposing approaches to interpreting the source of what we call our minds. Both approaches, as I have acknowledged from the outset, have a long and respectable track record in the history of thought and good prima facie cases can be made for both - although, naturally, I believe mine is correct and yours is mistaken for reasons that I have laid out in some detail. Nevertheless, the question of mind and its relationship to brain is interesting and practically important and deserves better than you serve it.

I think your charge that atheists are judgemental and vigorous in preaching is deeply ironic given the vitriolic nature of your opinions which surround it.

You have questioned the sincerity of my explicit explanation of how I arrive at my worldview, you call irrelevant and obfuscating things that oppose your view that are clearly relevant to the discussion, you rely on scientific arguments that you obviously don’t understand and thus misuse, you ask for physiological explanations for volitional phenomena and then pretend that they are irrelevant; but worst of all you take my comment about the non-existence of *pure *free-will (which is a thoughtful and demonstrable position), gratuitously assume that that implies that I reject personal responsibility on principle (which I do not), and then launch into a tirade based upon that misconception.

I can only assume that losing an argument makes you antsy. For the record this is where your arguments stand:

1. The argument that Penrose put forward that the mind cannot be based on an algorithm running on a Turing machine. We have seen a) that Penrose’s argument has serious and persuasive critics with good and persuasive counter-arguments, b) that even if we accept his argument then that does not exclude *material *bases for mind.
2. QM. It has been difficult to pin down just which QM interpretation you are relying on. You started out by talking about the Copenhagen interpretation but it’s clearly not that; we have been working with the Wigner consciousness-causes-collapse interpretation for a while, but now it’s apparent that you are relying on some sort of hidden variables de Broglian interpretation (the wavefunction…represents a distinct observer’s knowledge about a system and not the actual state of the system). Well that certainly doesn’t argue for a distinct ontological basis for mind. The fact is that you don’t really know enough about QM to make the argument coherently or to realise that there is no coherent argument to make.
3. Mathematical concepts. The claim that mathematical concepts such as pi or prime numbers cannot have a physical basis in the brain is an unsupported assertion. Mathematical concepts are either based in physical things (if they are physically conceivable such as circles and diameters) or based on a combination of physical things and formal symbolic language or entirely unphysical but based on provable propositions from axioms using formal symbolic language. None of this excludes a material basis for mind or if it does, you haven’t explained why.
4. Free will. It is obvious, in spite of your rant, that pure free-will does not exist, and that wise jurisprudence the world over recognises degrees of responsibility. The subject of free-will is more nuanced than you allow. Furthermore, physiological studies have begun to reveal the neural basis of volition and the experience of free-will. The existence of free-will is no reason to reject a material basis for mind.

Good-bye

Alec
evolutionpages.com

 

[grannymh]

Free will. It is obvious, in spite of your rant, that pure free-will does not exist, and that wise jurisprudence the world over recognises degrees of responsibility. The subject of free-will is more nuanced than you allow. Furthermore, physiological studies have begun to reveal the neural basis of volition and the experience of free-will. The existence of free-will is no reason to reject a material basis for mind.

Alec
evolutionpages.com

The last sentence “The existence of free-will is no reason to reject a material basis for mind.” is intriguing because it needs the location of free-will. Could a Gedanken experiment be used to illustrate what would happen if free-will existed in the material brain and what would happen if free-will existed in a spiritual soul?

I am sure we will eventually get back on track with our discussion on free will. I have had a great time with kids and grandkids. Even went to the Harry Potter Exhibit. In the meantime, you have brought up terms which I am not familiar with. Here you use “pure free-will”. I also remember the use of Platonic. Would you please explain them to me?

After reading miles of posts devoted to free will, I definitely agree that free will is more nuanced than one sees on first reading. I would venture that a serious discussion of free will and volition will reveal the Achilles heel of brain research.

Blessings,
granny

The quest is worthy of the adventures of the journey.

 

[reggieM]

Free will involves a decision-making process. It’s not sufficient to merely show that certain aspects of the brain are related to the control of various motor functions. In making a free choice, abstract concepts are compared and contrasted. This happens prior to the implementation of the will. It’s free-will because it responds to the choice.

In order to reduce free-will to physical-material nature alone, one would have to find what material substances the abstract thoughts are composed of. Again, it’s not sufficient to point to a part of the brain as having an influence. Abstract thoughts are “held” in the mind, compared and contrasted, and then a decision follows from them. Where, precisely are those thoughts located? What physical substance are they composed of? What combination of neutrons is the one thought that was rejected, versus the neutrons which are the thought that was accepted?

Decision-making is an expression of free-will. That’s how we arrive at the concept of “responsbility” since it is universally accepted that human beings are not determined by physical laws.

This leads directly to the obvious contradiction found widely among atheistic-materialists whenever one finds expressions of moral outrage from the same.

Morality is tied to free will. I note many atheists on CAF vehemently proclaiming how moral they are, and yet at the same time denying that they have free-will. It’s an obvious contradiction. If human behaviors are determined by physical processes, then those who believe such a thing should have no interest in morality since it would be rendered meaningless. Every human action would simply be driven by blind, unintelligent, unconscious, physical properties. There could be no responsiblity assigned to any actions – and thus no expectation of “good” or “bad” behavior.

Atheistic-materialism is amoral. Human behavior can only be judged as morally good or bad if free-will exists. There is nothing to condemn in human behavior if there is no free-will. At the same time, we see atheists expressing wild moral outrage about many things (very often about the Catholic Church), and rendering their own ideas as illogical at best and more often just incoherent.

Logic itself is an expression of free-will. If not, then the rules of logic would need to be hard-coded into physical material somewhere. Additionally, logical errors would also need to be found in some physical properties – perhaps as a mutation of what correct logic should produce.

The universality of logic is a problem beyond free-will, but it touches it. The most primative and uneducated human societies use basic logic in their reasoning function. Supposedly, the concept of logic, along with all the products of logical reasoning, would be reducible to natural-material components.

All apes want bananas
I have some bananas
Therefore, some ape will probably want these and I should run rather than walk back to my hut.

That’s basic reasoning – the rules for which would need to be found in specific cells or genetic code. This code would then be found in every human being.

When humans share abstract concepts – those abstractions would be material as well. Otherwise, there would exist non-material “things” which have a profound influence on nature. If non-material things exist and can influence the development of nature (and thus evolution) --then this refutes Darwinism.

Along with morality and logic – there is also the example of language itself which is a prime example of free-will in action.

According to linguist, Noam Chomsky, language cannot be reduced to matter and physical laws. Every sentence is a unique creation, often involving several expressions of free-will decision-making. The speaker or writer (as I’m doing now) searches through bits of language, words, ideas, etc (which exist only as immaterial substances) --and choose them for sentences.

In the materialist view, those words must be composed of material substances of some kind. Otherwise, they would be non-material. The decision to write or say any sentence is determined by an unconscious, fixed natural law acting on unintelligent matter.

That really only scratches the surface of the implications involved in the proposal that free-will does not exist.

The most common argument against all of this that I’ve seen is:

“We all act as if free-will exists because that is how we’re materially determined to think and act. But it really doesn’t exist.”

This is easily refuted because if the atheist knows that free-will doesn’t exist but acts like it does, then he has accepted an illusion which he pretends is real.

Supposedly the same fixed, natural law which tells him that free-will doesn’t exist also tells him to act and think as if free-will does exist. So, material nature has created this illusion and has convinced him to believe it, even though the same material nature has taught him that the illusion is false.

 

[reggieM]

that should be “neurons” …

 

[edwest2]

Intuitive and creative processes involve abstraction and, in some cases, profound discovery. The creators of radio, television and computers, to name a few. While some tool use has been found in primates and birds, man’s capacity to create, which involves making a great many choices and contexting decisions, often very rapidly, is many magnitudes greater by comparison.

Squirrels have a finites set of functions. They can build nests, bury nuts and hunt for more, but that’s pretty much it. We say they operate by instinct. Man is far more complex. In a desperate attempt to reduce man to a biological mechanism, there is no rational basis for doing much that involves good or bad. Right now, attempts are being made to realize an abstract concept, a values neutral society. You want to have sex with whoever? Why not? You want to kill embryos? What’s the big deal? You want to ‘cure’ death so you can do what you want forever? Sure. Why not? This is the will in action. Given many, many possible courses of action, this is the will, and abstract thought, in action.

Right now. Today. Men die. The flesh leads to corruption. That’s the reality.

Peace,
ED

 

[PaulF2]

Perhaps you think you have succeeded in persuading others with your outburst. Perhaps you have persuaded those for whom rhetoric and emotive pleading takes precedence over evidence and reason.

You’ve offered some evidence to discount certain parts of certain non-critical elements of my general argument but no evidence nor reason in support of your worldview - unlike me, as a matter of fact. What you’ve offered is arguments from authority (majority rules), evidence knocking down a straw-man you created - that being basically If the mind was immaterial then there would be no relationship between thoughts and brain activity - and great obfuscation (I may tire of that word someday) on the most critical points.

And here I was, thinking that we were engaged in a civil discussion about two opposing approaches to interpreting the source of what we call our minds. Both approaches, as I have acknowledged from the outset, have a long and respectable track record in the history of thought and good prima facie cases can be made for both - although, naturally, I believe mine is correct and yours is mistaken for reasons that I have laid out in some detail. Nevertheless, the question of mind and its relationship to brain is interesting and practically important and deserves better than you serve it.

You seem to be upset because I called you on the fact that your worldview is (a) inconsistent and (b) itself a moral evil that leads and has lead to moral evil.

The discussion has been civil, but you do not care for the conclusions. And where did you think this was going? I’m sorry, but I cannot, as a Catholic, consider your worldview - materialism, with the consequence of atheism - to be ‘legitimate’ in any sense. It is falsehood and that is that, and I believe, like every Catholic, that such things are knowable definitively to us human beings. Not every subject in life is a matter for pleasant debate where only ‘opinions’ are relevant. I have been polite, and civil, and have provided plenty of evidence and demonstration of reason.

I am honestly sorry if I “hurt your feelings” (and I’m not being sarcastic as it actually sounds that way); you as a person are not under attack but, yes, your worldview is.

[In my defense I must point out that the choices I have made in the course of this thread were dictated solely by that slab of meat in my skull. Its neurons are, obviously, entirely deterministic and “I” cannot have any say in how and when they fire - in fact, there is really no such thing as “I” at all - for if there is no free will there is no ‘person’. If I did anything “wrong” this is the result of evolution and my environment, including the nutrients flowing through my blood from the snack I ate just before posting last.]

I think your charge that atheists are judgemental and vigorous in preaching is deeply ironic given the vitriolic nature of your opinions which surround it.

The inconsistency you’re charging me with is a complete non-sequitur, for I did not mean to imply in any way by my statement that judgment (of anything) is inherently wrong, but that for you it is entirely inconsistent. And judge you do, and completely inconsistent with your professed worldview it is.

[As another side, I have noticed this trend in atheists: they are very willing to “admit” there is no free will except when its brought up in the context of their own evangelizing.]

You have questioned the sincerity of my explicit explanation of how I arrive at my worldview, you call irrelevant and obfuscating things that oppose your view that are clearly relevant to the discussion, you rely on scientific arguments that you obviously don’t understand and thus misuse, you ask for physiological explanations for volitional phenomena and then pretend that they are irrelevant; but worst of all you take my comment about the non-existence of *pure *free-will (which is a thoughtful and demonstrable position), gratuitously assume that that implies that I reject personal responsibility on principle (which I do not), and then launch into a tirade based upon that misconception.

Yes, I do question the sincerity of anyone who claims to believe he does not have true free will in making moral decisions. Either his sincerity or his diligence in considering the matter. I did not at all “gratuitously assume that you reject personal responsibility on principle” - you missed the point. I knew you would not admit that, not directly as such, since it is obviously a tenet that leads to anarchy, but what I did say was that your own words and your worldview directly imply it, and that is the case.

I did not call the sub-topics that we have discussion irrelevant, but only pointed out that they are not the heart of the matter.

The quantum mechanical subject is not at the heart of the matter because if it turns out that it is true that a Mind is not necessary for wave-function collapse that has no bearing at all on whether or not true minds exist.

Let’s take tally of the argument and tangents now:

1. Quantum mechanics: It’s essentially a draw. You base your entire case here, really, on a simple argument from authority: more modern physicists accept your philosophical conclusions and so they are true. I have Dr. Barr, a particle physicist, and others on my side, of course. But this is a question, mostly, it seems, of philosophical preference.
2. The Penrose argument: mostly as above. [And both (1) and (2) are, indeed, merely small pieces of the puzzle indeed. Although I do admit I put substantial stock in them initially.]
3. Abstract thought: a sound trouncing for your assertions, I’m afraid.
4. Free will: even more so. What you are really saying (more below) is that there is free will and there is not free will. It is a simple and transparent semantic game.

 

[PaulF2]

I can only assume that losing an argument makes you antsy. For the record this is where your arguments stand:

Look in the mirror for the antsy guy, I would have to say. But there is no reason to get personal.

1. The argument that Penrose put forward that the mind cannot be based on an algorithm running on a Turing machine. We have seen a) that Penrose’s argument has serious and persuasive critics with good and persuasive counter-arguments, b) that even if we accept his argument then that does not exclude *material *bases for mind.

Once again, there is no shortage of truths in the world that have “serious critics”. Their ability to persuade in this particular area is due more to one’s philosophical preconceptions than anything else, really.

1. QM. It has been difficult to pin down just which QM interpretation you are relying on. You started out by talking about the Copenhagen interpretation but it’s clearly not that; we have been working with the Wigner consciousness-causes-collapse interpretation for a while, but now it’s apparent that you are relying on some sort of hidden variables de Broglian interpretation (the wavefunction…represents a distinct observer’s knowledge about a system and not the actual state of the system). Well that certainly doesn’t argue for a distinct ontological basis for mind. The fact is that you don’t really know enough about QM to make the argument coherently or to realise that there is no coherent argument to make.

You should debate Dr. Barr (whom you claim to respect). I pulled my material from his book quite directly as acknowledged. I did, in fact, make his argument here, and it is what it is. So, are you telling me that I have misrepresented Dr. Barr and his sources or that he and none of them know anything about quantum mechanics? If the former, you should have posted exactly how I misrepresented the argument - you never made any suggestion of doing so.

1. Mathematical concepts. The claim that mathematical concepts such as pi or prime numbers cannot have a physical basis in the brain is an unsupported assertion. Mathematical concepts are either based in physical things (if they are physically conceivable such as circles and diameters) or based on a combination of physical things and formal symbolic language or entirely unphysical but based on provable propositions from axioms using formal symbolic language. None of this excludes a material basis for mind or if it does, you haven’t explained why.

I think that is absolute nonsense. I, and others, have indeed clearly explained why abstract concepts cannot (almost by definition) be represented (truly represented - as concepts) in matter. You simply do not want to accept the explanation.

A book could be written about this subject alone, and maybe I will post more material.

1. Free will. It is obvious, in spite of your rant, that pure free-will does not exist, and that wise jurisprudence the world over recognises degrees of responsibility. The subject of free-will is more nuanced than you allow. Furthermore, physiological studies have begun to reveal the neural basis of volition and the experience of free-will. The existence of free-will is no reason to reject a material basis for mind.

It is now obvious that (“true”) free will does not exist! How foolish mankind has been, indeed, since the moment the first of us found himself thinking.

The concept of free will is very basic and very clear. I hold that what you are doing, as I said, is simply playing semantic games so that you can have it both ways. It seems, according to you, that there is “sort of” free will - just enough that you don’t get caught in the bind of facing the implications of your worldview.

You have not provided any remotely convincing evidence that this “sort of” free will exists but that “true” free will does not - come on. A person cannot "sort of " make a moral choice - choosing is, shall we say, atomic - it is either there or it is not. What you seem to be saying - if there is any clear statement - is that the illusion of free will may exist. But that is not free will at all.

As for whether or not you reject personal responsibility, this is a direct consequence of the above: it either exists or it does not. Since you say you reject “true” free will, can we say that you reject “true” personal responsibility? And what, then, is left? The actual answer is no responsibility at all.

My “rant” stands as entirely relevant to the discussion, thank you.

Good-bye

If you were actually to vacate this site entirely and stop your efforts to tear Catholics from their faith and convince everyone you run into here that the universe is an empty, cold place with no purpose, no God, and no morality, that would be a positive thing. It would be an even more positive thing if you were to reconsider your worldview, based on the incredible evidence against it.

[You like neuroscience - have you read “The Spiritual Brain”? I just got into that and it’s really good. Lots more material there as well.]

I bear you no personal malice - far from it.