Mirdaths Logic.

[freesoulhope]

This thread is a reponse to John Dorans claim that God did not create Logic.

Mirdath brought up some interesting concepts which i want to have a discussion about. He believed that proving Gods existence would make him a slave to human logic. I think this is worth debating, because Mirdaths agnosticism is partly based on the idea that God is unknowable; because God supposedly transcends human Logic. If we can show Mirdath otherwise, then we can destroy one of the foundations of Mirdaths agnosticism. .

The chains of Logic

One can say that God is bound by Logic, but this would simply mean that Logic is Ultimate reality. In otherwords, Logic is a kind of God because everything is explained by it.
This could mean that people are God because we bind God within the boundrys of are logic.

However, If God is pure Mind as much as he is pure act. It can follow then that Logic needn’t be above or below God, but rather it is apart of Gods nature; just like “God is Love”.

As for Mirdaths claim; I also argue that If God is above Logic, as in the creator of it; then alsong as man is given the concept of God through specail revelation, i argue that, even though it would be impossible to prove Gods existence with human logic, man could still know, indirectly, that God most “probably” exists; without him being bound by are human Logic. For instance, if one rules out all physical causes as a reasonable explanation for why the world exists, then the concept of God, which God has in fact given us, would be the only other cuase that we knew of. And therefore on that basis we could have a reasonable faith that God exists, considering that all natural causes were not reasonable. In this way God has not been bound, and can still remain above Logic.

What do you think?

 

[Mirdath]

Mirdaths agnosticism is partly based on the idea that God is unknowable; because God supposedly transcends human Logic.

To say ‘partly’ is doing it a disservice. That is my principal objection to the use of reason to justify faith. Due to other issues, if you manage to convince me that belief in a God is reasonable, you’ll still have a long ways to go before you make a Christian of me.

However, If God is pure Mind as much as he is pure act. It can follow then that Logic needn’t be above or below God, but rather it is apart of Gods nature; just like “God is Love”.

And here we get into a variation on the problem of the hypostatic union. X possesses simultaneously natures A and B, whether that be God and Man or Love and Logic. I am not a Thomist; I do not buy the idea that something can possess dual natures.

I also argue that If God is above Logic, as in the creator of it; then alsong as man is given the concept of God through specail revelation, i argue that, even though it would be impossible to prove Gods existence with human logic, man could still know, indirectly, that God most “probably” exists; without him being bound by are human Logic.

I do not discount personal revelation as an excellent reason to believe in God. That revelation, though, is valid only for the person to whom it is given: others have no such certainty.

For instance, if one rules out all physical causes as a reasonable explanation for why the world exists, then the concept of God, which God has in fact given us, would be the only other cuase that we knew of. And therefore on that basis we could have a reasonable faith that God exists, considering that all natural causes were not reasonable. In this way God has not been bound, and can still remain above Logic.

‘We don’t know yet’ is still a perfectly reasonable answer to the problem of How Things Came To Be. To say that a supernatural being made everything simply removes the problem a step – Occam’s Razor does not take kindly to adding epicycle after epicycle.

Basically, Kierkegaard was right.

 

[RobNY]

Hey Mirdath,

I can’t really contribute much on the main topic, but I just wanted to make a comment or two on your comments.

To say ‘partly’ is doing it a disservice. That is my principal objection to the use of reason to justify faith. Due to other issues, if you manage to convince me that belief in a God is reasonable, you’ll still have a long ways to go before you make a Christian of me.

Naturally, we must take the stairs one step at a time.

And here we get into a variation on the problem of the hypostatic union. X possesses simultaneously natures A and B, whether that be God and Man or Love and Logic. I am not a Thomist; I do not buy the idea that something can possess dual natures.

It helped me when I conceptualized what the Christian tradition (not just Thomas) means by human nature. They mean primarily, as the Athanasian creed says, of a “reasonable mind” and physical body. If human nature is having a human soul and a human body, then it makes sense that something could have a human nature by addition, were it possible to create both as a single unity and to attach them to one’s person. Is it somewhat fantastic? Naturally. But I don’t see the problem in it, and the problem seems to be less of a problem when instead of “human nature” we say “a soul and a body united together, added to His person.”

I don’t know if that helps at all in understanding what Christians see when they profess the hypostatic union.

Of course, with God, it is not the case that His divine nature has “parts” in any real sense, merely that our minds employ discursive reasoning which divides things into parts, and thus we hold that there is a divine unity and simplicity which is not strictly understandable from our perspective.

‘We don’t know yet’ is still a perfectly reasonable answer to the problem of How Things Came To Be. To say that a supernatural being made everything simply removes the problem a step – Occam’s Razor does not take kindly to adding epicycle after epicycle

In my opinion, Ockham’s razor is used in a rather shifty way to justify arguments. I don’t understand why it is quite so popular on the internet. (I don’t mean to be accusing you, just noting my perplexity over the way it seems to pop up everywhere. )

You are right in saying that “I don’t know” is a legitimate answer. But, if it is the case that we know 1. that the world came to be, and 2. that the world did not come to be by any physical cause, then it is not at all a leap to conclude that 3. the world came to be by an immaterial cause. Granted that #3 is only a “slice” of God, it doesn’t seem to be a problem if you accept #s 1-2. It is certainly not a valid objection to simply plead Ockham’s razor. The problem would be somehow accepting #s 1-2 and not accepting 3.

Some people do formulate such arguments clumsily so that the Ockham’s razor objection seems cogent, but it seems to me to miss the heart of the argument (i.e., interpreting the argument by its ‘best case’ scenario).

-Rob

 

[Mirdath]

Naturally, we must take the stairs one step at a time.

And the first step is believing in upper floors, hey?

It helped me when I conceptualized what the Christian tradition (not just Thomas) means by human nature. They mean primarily, as the Athanasian creed says, of a “reasonable mind” and physical body. If human nature is having a human soul and a human body, then it makes sense that something could have a human nature by addition, were it possible to create both as a single unity and to attach them to one’s person. Is it somewhat fantastic? Naturally. But I don’t see the problem in it, and the problem seems to be less of a problem when instead of “human nature” we say “a soul and a body united together, added to His person.”

This poses the instant problem of proving the existence of the soul. Let’s not get into that just yet.

Accepting the existence of the soul, then, whether mortal or immortal, I would have to argue that the body is not that important a part of what makes one human or what gives one a human nature. People are no less people who have lost limbs or organs, and decapitation or immolation does not make a former human but a dead one. It is the soul, then, that comprises human nature (and here Aquinas agrees, Summa I.75.4).

Yet Jesus is held to be, as stated in the Credo, ‘true God and true man’. He has a human nature – therefore a human soul – and is simultaneously divine. Can a thing possess two natures? Are there any other examples? Is there any being in existence who is, say, true cod and true man? Not to my knowledge. An exception to this general rule of ‘one thing, one nature’ – and what an exception, at that! – doesn’t make sense.

In my opinion, Ockham’s razor is used in a rather shifty way to justify arguments. I don’t understand why it is quite so popular on the internet. (I don’t mean to be accusing you, just noting my perplexity over the way it seems to pop up everywhere. )

Try debating a topic that doesn’t sit up and beg for it to be used, and you’ll notice it a lot less

I do agree that it is both frequently and horrifically abused. I try not to add to the suffering of William’s legacy. A lot of people seem to think it’s just ‘simplest answer = best’, end of discussion – when it isn’t that at all. All the Razor says is ‘don’t get too happy with the variables’. Don’t overcomplicate things unless you can prove you need them.

You are right in saying that “I don’t know” is a legitimate answer. But, if it is the case that we know 1. that the world came to be, and 2. that the world did not come to be by any physical cause, then it is not at all a leap to conclude that 3. the world came to be by an immaterial cause. Granted that #3 is only a “slice” of God, it doesn’t seem to be a problem if you accept #s 1-2. It is certainly not a valid objection to simply plead Ockham’s razor. The problem would be somehow accepting #s 1-2 and not accepting 3.

Point 2 sounds sketchy, but I’m no cosmologist so I will spare us all the spectacle of me making an *** of myself.

So handwaving that objection away, I would still say we are in legitimate need of a close shave here. The omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent supernatural being posited as the Ultimate Cause in the argument is a huge variable, and has not been demonstrated to be necessary. It is one possible answer, not the answer. If it can be shown that there are no possible simpler answers, God will make the cut as far as the Razor is concerned. As I said, I’m not a cosmologist; but I think just about anything is probably simpler than constructing an entire transcendent reality and populating it with deities.

 

[davidv]

As I said, I’m not a cosmologist; but I think just about anything is probably simpler than constructing an entire transcendent reality and populating it with deities.

The point of simplicity caught my eye. This thought that the transcendent reality is complex is in direct contrast to the Thomist view the the reality the we call God is the ultimate in simplicity. How does this fit?

 

[Mirdath]

The point of simplicity caught my eye. This thought that the transcendent reality is complex is in direct contrast to the Thomist view the the reality the we call God is the ultimate in simplicity. How does this fit?

Like I said, I’m also not a Thomist I admire the man, I consider him one of the greatest theologians ever to have walked the earth, but I respectfully disagree with him on quite a bit.

That said, I think ‘complexity’ is the wrong term. While from a Thomist point of view, God is simplicity itself (and here people gripe about how evolution is impossible because the simple cannot give rise to the complex!), the surrounding milieu one would need in order to accommodate deity is much less simple. It requires an entirely new reality that transcends our own.

Since I’m a programmer, let’s talk arrays. One-dimensional arrays are basically linear lists of items. Two-dimensional arrays are lists of lists, and can be represented by grids. Three-dimensional arrays are lists of lists of lists – cubes.

You can have a four-dimensional array, or keep going as long as you like (allowing for limitations of the language). A 4D array is a list of cubes. This super-reality may be likened to a 4D array, taking our reality as a 3D one. Even if our ‘cube’ is the only item in the 4D list, you’re still introducing plenty of things that haven’t been proven necessary. Work in the cube we know, and it’ll be a lot more believable.

 

[punkforchrist]

Hey Mirdath,

I had started a thread over the Conceptualist Argument, and I think that the CA is highly relevant to the issue of God’s relation to logic.

It will be necessary, of course, for me to understand what it is you believe about abstract objects in general, and logic in particular. Do you believe that the propositions “there are no married bachelors” and “2 + 2 = 4” are true in all possible worlds (i.e. are they necessarily true, as opposed to contingencies)?

 

[Mirdath]

Do you believe that the propositions “there are no married bachelors” and “2 + 2 = 4” are true in all possible worlds (i.e. are they necessarily true, as opposed to contingencies)?

No.

 

[punkforchrist]

No.

So there is a possible world in which squares can also be circles, and where the moon can both exist and not exist?

Assuming this is the case, and that logic is merely a human convention, then why maintain agnosticism? After all, if logic is just conventional, then if you want to believe in God you can just adopt my own standards of logic, and if you don’t you can accept another standard.

 

[Mirdath]

So there is a possible world in which squares can also be circles, and where the moon can both exist and not exist?

Hypothetical universes behave according to hypothetical laws.

Assuming this is the case, and that logic is merely a human convention, then why maintain agnosticism? After all, if logic is just conventional, then if you want to believe in God you can just adopt my own standards of logic, and if you don’t you can accept another standard.

Your standards of logic are not necessarily those by which our universe operates. Nor are mine, admittedly, but I am fond of them and I find them to make sense. Yours I do not.

I have attempted to believe in God. I am not able to do so.

 

[punkforchrist]

Hypothetical universes behave according to hypothetical laws.

Is this claim necessarily or only contingently true?

Your standards of logic are not necessarily those by which our universe operates. Nor are mine, admittedly, but I am fond of them and I find them to make sense. Yours I do not.

In essence, then, you’re saying that there are no universals. Is this, though, not a universal claim?

I have attempted to believe in God. I am not able to do so.

I understand the frustration of trying to believe something, but to no avail. I would simply encourage you to keep trying and to keep the open mind that you have.

 

[Mirdath]

Is this claim necessarily or only contingently true?

Necessarily. All possible universes must operate under some set of descriptive rules.

In essence, then, you’re saying that there are no universals. Is this, though, not a universal claim?

I am saying nothing of the sort. Universals are fine. I am saying that I have absolutely no reason to believe you’ve got them right.

 

[punkforchrist]

Necessarily. All possible universes must operate under some set of descriptive rules.

Perhaps I misunderstood you before. You agree, then, that there are universals and necessary abstracta.

I am saying nothing of the sort. Universals are fine. I am saying that I have absolutely no reason to believe you’ve got them right.

I think we both agree that principles like the law of non-contradiction, the law of excluded middle, and so forth, and universally true.

 

[Mirdath]

Perhaps I misunderstood you before. You agree, then, that there are universals and necessary abstracta.

Yes.

I think we both agree that principles like the law of non-contradiction, the law of excluded middle, and so forth, and universally true.

Universally in this universe

 

[punkforchrist]

Cool, so we’re both advocating a version of realism.

My next question is: are abstract objects mental concepts, or do they hold mind-independently?

 

[Dranu]

Mirdath:

I have attempted to believe in God. I am not able to do so.

Perhaps you should try doubting your agnosticism, and find what is the most reasonable thing to hold instead.

Universally in this universe

I don’t want to butt in the dialogue that you and PunkforChrist are having, since it seems to be going the right way, but I have a question for you.

1.) If those universals apply only in this universe, how can we even posit existence to other universes? In other words, if logic is our highest faculty of sense (on which all other senses submit in utter subordination), what shred of evidence would we have for any multi-verse theory, unless all the universes held to the same standards of our existence?

freesoulhope:

One can say that God is bound by Logic, but this would simply mean that Logic is Ultimate reality. In otherwords, Logic is a kind of God because everything is explained by it.

Logic is merely a tool we use to find truth. Ultimately logic is dependent on truth being real, otherwise logic has no value. Since God is Truth, what is to say that logic, or better yet, the mind’s eye, is the best faculty we have to come to see Him? In other words, it is just the eye to the thing being seen, not the thing itself. Therefore, God can be bound by logic in the sense that He has provided a way to see Him. For if God is unchangeable, then this existence is always and will always be what He wanted (or rather what He wants always). Therefore, if we can see God through logic, then He is ‘bound by it’. Not in the sense that logic is greater or He is entrapped by it, but that He allows something to see Him. So it is not that He is really ‘bound by it’ literally, as it is His own creation. It is just that He will not change Himself, but only by His unchanging and constant will, not by some external constraint.

On to that, I must add I think logic quite clearly ‘proves’ God’s existence more distinctly than anything. I have yet to seen a clear refutation of St. Anselm’s Ontological Argument (an argument based on pure reasoning!! No empirical assumptions), or arguments clearly refuted of a first cause being necessary. I mean, God is the only thing in which you cannot conceive of Him not existing (am I wrong?). As a side note, it is funny when I see models set up of existence without God, since they are illogical and posit things like an always existing existence. They are like someone trying to conceive of a round square without giving up! They just stick to one ‘side’ of the round-square and stretch it ever onward without ever trying to get at the first corner. So ya, maybe you can never be absolutely certain (since you can assume maybe some day you’ll see the round square ), since only God can absolutely know Himself, but we don’t sustain our own existence so we could never be the Word of God Himself (the perfect knowledge). However, God (and maybe our own existence) seems more certain than anything else!

Hope I added something to this.

 

[Mirdath]

My next question is: are abstract objects mental concepts, or do they hold mind-independently?

Abstract concepts are not things in themselves.

Dranu:

Perhaps you should try doubting your agnosticism, and find what is the most reasonable thing to hold instead.

You say this like I haven’t tried. Where I am now makes the most sense to me; why else would I remain so?

If those universals apply only in this universe, how can we even posit existence to other universes? In other words, if logic is our highest faculty of sense (on which all other senses submit in utter subordination), what shred of evidence would we have for any multi-verse theory, unless all the universes held to the same standards of our existence?

You’ll notice I’m not proposing the existence of other universes, only stating that if they exist they may be described – which sounds perfectly reasonable from here.

I have yet to seen a clear refutation of St. Anselm’s Ontological Argument (an argument based on pure reasoning!! No empirical assumptions), or arguments clearly refuted of a first cause being necessary.

Then you haven’t looked very hard. Aquinas himself rejected Anselm’s argument.

 

[punkforchrist]

Abstract concepts are not things in themselves.

By this, I take it you mean that abstracta are not mind-independent. Please correct me if I’m wrong about that. For what it’s worth, I agree that abstract objects are not concrete things.

I believe a very compelling argument can be put forth in favor of God’s existence based on this. We agree that at least some abstract objects are both necessary and mental concepts. The question is: what kind of mind is required for this? Surely abstracta cannot be concepts of just any contingent minds. There are possible worlds in which you and I do not exist; in fact, there are possible worlds in which no contingent beings exist. However, if abstract objects hold in all possible worlds (necessary = true in all possible worlds), then they must be concepts of a necessary mind. This sounds a lot like God.

 

[Dranu]

Mirdath:

Then you haven’t looked very hard. Aquinas himself rejected Anselm’s argument.

He wasn’t infalliable now was he? All he seems to show to me is make a claim that:
A: perhaps logic is not ontologically attuned to reality. Result: radical skepticism
B:That ‘That than which none greater can be conceived’ is an non-meaningful concept. But I see no logical contradiction in the idea of ‘That than which none greater can be conceived’. Just because an atheist denies it, does not mean the atheist is making sense. I want to see a proof of contradiction in the term.

-Maybe I am missing him? The Summa Theologiae P1? The thing on ‘it only proves existence in intellect (to him of course) not in reality?’

You’ll notice I’m not proposing the existence of other universes, only stating that if they exist they may be described – which sounds perfectly reasonable from here.

Yes, and it is a logical contradiction to say they would exist. So why even assume them as an ‘if’, like a round square for instance?

You say this like I haven’t tried. Where I am now makes the most sense to me; why else would I remain so?

Since when does doubt hold any positive value? If you had a 75% probability of getting something right (which you could stand to gain by getting it right, and stand to lose far more than you have by getting it wrong or by not choosing at all), would you say it makes more sense to refrain from choosing?
My question I am trying to ask, more or less, is what logical doubts seem to make your ‘probability’ thoughts of God existing so mediocre? Hehe, if I am making any sense .

 

[Mirdath]

By this, I take it you mean that abstracta are not mind-independent. Please correct me if I’m wrong about that.

Pretty much.

I believe a very compelling argument can be put forth in favor of God’s existence based on this. We agree that at least some abstract objects are both necessary and mental concepts.

And here we part ways. Particular abstract items are not necessary to the proper function of every possible universe. Can’t you imagine a universe without hatred, anger, lust, or fear? Your religion teaches that our own was once like that, and will be again.

Dranu:

Maybe I am missing him? The Summa Theologiae P1? The thing on ‘it only proves existence in intellect (to him of course) not in reality?’

1A.2: Perhaps not everyone who hears this word “God” understands it to signify something than which nothing greater can be thought, seeing that some have believed God to be a body. Yet, granted that everyone understands that by this word “God” is signified something than which nothing greater can be thought, nevertheless, it does not therefore follow that he understands that what the word signifies exists actually, but only that it exists mentally. Nor can it be argued that it actually exists, unless it be admitted that there actually exists something than which nothing greater can be thought; and this precisely is not admitted by those who hold that God does not exist.

Things do not exist through sheer force of will or imagination on our part, and that goes double for gods.

Yes, and it is a logical contradiction to say they would exist. So why even assume them as an ‘if’, like a round square for instance?

They were brought up. I personally am not convinced either way of the existence of multiple universes, and do not consider them to be necessarily contradictory. I don’t know enough to make a final judgment, and even though much more is known about physics and cosmology than about God I doubt I ever will. I don’t do so well in the physics lab.

Since when does doubt hold any positive value? If you had a 75% probability of getting something right (which you could stand to gain by getting it right, and stand to lose far more than you have by getting it wrong or by not choosing at all), would you say it makes more sense to refrain from choosing?

Restating Pascal’s Wager isn’t helping, I can tell you that much

Positive value? I do not have to look over my shoulder constantly for vengeful deities or malicious demons; I am the source of my own good and my own evil. When I do good, it is not out of fear of hell or greed for heaven. I don’t get to make excuses or pretend that I’m more selfless than I am. May not sound positive to you, and it is a great responsibility, but it’s one I am proud to bear.

My question I am trying to ask, more or less, is what logical doubts seem to make your ‘probability’ thoughts of God existing so mediocre?

I’m not so presumptuous as to make odds on God’s existence. It’s a complete unknown. What I would lay money on is the proposition that I, barring personal revelation and/or psychosis, will never know whether God exists.