Mirdaths Logic.

[Dranu]

Mirdath:

Is it? I think the legend of Zeus would suffer considerably were his reality demonstrated. People would be less likely to look past his dalliances with Europa, Io, Callisto, Ganymede, and the rest; they’d complain of his picking favorites in war, of his treatment of his worshipers, and on and on. The same could be said for a real case: does an ancient king of Thebes have anything to add to the legend of Heracles?

And the problem remains: conceiving of something, no matter how great the idea may be, does not force it to exist. To reuse one of my favorite examples, I can imagine a burrito than which no greater burrito can exist – but I’ll still have to make do with the excellent but imperfect burritos served by the taqueria up the road.

First off, with Zeus. If we attribute greatness to the concept then it would increase with his existence right? If we also call him (concept) vile or something, all reality would do would magnify whatever the concept is. He might be greater in reality, but it might be awful if he did exist, in other words.

You are quite right with the second paragraph! Because, no concept but God results in a contradiction when you say it doesn’t exist. The reason is this: I can always imagine a greater burrito, so the term is meaningless. But I cannot imagine something greater than ‘that which none greater can be conceived’. This was Guanilo’s objection, which the saint shot down early on. Since the argument is valid (St. Anselm’s version at least), the only way to attack it is to attack the truth of the premises. So perhaps attack the first one, that the concept is meaningless. I do not think this is possible though.

I also do not think St. Anselm is showing that God is possible, but that He exists. Now I haven’t really read all the Proslogion admittedely, but I believe he does make a claim to show that ‘that than which none greater can be conceived’ is meaningful too. Again reason shows us His existence, not us saying ‘God exists’. In a similar fashion as reason shows us causality, and so forth, from sensory data. The fact that there is no sense data is meaningless, as it is not the senses that we reason about, but the perception of them. In other words, the thoughts.

Simple, maybe. Knowable, no. Strictly speaking, I don’t know that I’m sitting here typing – but I’m pretty sure I am. I have no way of knowing God, save through faith, which doesn’t seem to be happening. Poses an interesting question, actually: if hell is the absence of God, am I not already there?

We agree (I think) that only through reason do we know anything. So ‘stuff being right in front of you’ is not only circular, but it relies on senses, which say nothing about reality. Simplicity also makes a thing more knowable, does it not? So I will still pose my question to you again: “what evidence do you have for the world existing?”
Faith in God is different than accepting that God probably exists. One can be done in reason, the other only in love and hope. Demons believe God exists, but they lack faith.
As for the hell thing, no you are not. Hell is eternal with no hope. I also have another question: “Do you love goodness for itself, detached from the things it brings, or just by the things it brings?” That is probably the most important question I’ve asked.

 

[Mirdath]

First off, with Zeus. If we attribute greatness to the concept then it would increase with his existence right? If we also call him (concept) vile or something, all reality would do would magnify whatever the concept is. He might be greater in reality, but it might be awful if he did exist, in other words.

I actually think an extant Zeus would seem pettier and less significant: instead of a deity, he’d seem like just a very powerful, immortal human being, all caught up in this and that like the rest of us. Not very becoming of the father of the gods.

You are quite right with the second paragraph! Because, no concept but God results in a contradiction when you say it doesn’t exist. The reason is this: I can always imagine a greater burrito, so the term is meaningless. But I cannot imagine something greater than ‘that which none greater can be conceived’. This was Guanilo’s objection, which the saint shot down early on. Since the argument is valid (St. Anselm’s version at least), the only way to attack it is to attack the truth of the premises. So perhaps attack the first one, that the concept is meaningless. I do not think this is possible though.

But a burrito than which no greater burrito can be conceived? One cannot, by definition, imagine a greater burrito than this Platonic ideal (Plato’s Burrito… hm… band name there). But Platonic ideals cannot be shown to exist, only theorized; and so with Anselm’s God.

We agree (I think) that only through reason do we know anything. So ‘stuff being right in front of you’ is not only circular, but it relies on senses, which say nothing about reality. Simplicity also makes a thing more knowable, does it not? So I will still pose my question to you again: “what evidence do you have for the world existing?”

As I said, I don’t know for certain – but what I do know is that everything seems to be working as it should. Whether or not it really is this way doesn’t particularly matter, and I don’t see simplicity really affecting that one way or another.

Faith in God is different than accepting that God probably exists. One can be done in reason, the other only in love and hope. Demons believe God exists, but they lack faith.

They do not have faith because they have knowledge, so yes – at least, if one believes demons exist I would disagree that faith requires love. One can dread as well as hope.

I also have another question: “Do you love goodness for itself, detached from the things it brings, or just by the things it brings?” That is probably the most important question I’ve asked.

Probably is, yes – and one that’s going to be tricky to communicate an answer for, given how vastly different our perspectives on the nature of good are.

I do not ‘love’ good at all. Love is something I feel for beings, among which good is not. I love people, I love animals, I even feel a little twinge of it around animate plants (the rest are salad ). But I do not love good or any other abstract concept. To ask if I love good is just as alien to me as asking if I love proper nouns. Good is a worthy goal, and something I strive for almost regardless of personal consequences, but it is not a thing I consider lovable.

 

[Dranu]

Mirdath:

I actually think an extant Zeus would seem pettier and less significant: instead of a deity, he’d seem like just a very powerful, immortal human being, all caught up in this and that like the rest of us. Not very becoming of the father of the gods.

Then it is simply because the concept and the real (if it were so) do not match up in more ways than just existence.

But a burrito than which no greater burrito can be conceived? One cannot, by definition, imagine a greater burrito than this Platonic ideal (Plato’s Burrito… hm… band name there). But Platonic ideals cannot be shown to exist, only theorized; and so with Anselm’s God.

Lol, Plato’s Burritos “Only the most ideal form of Mexican food!” Hehe, but at any rate, I am saying the term is meaningless, because I can always think of a greater burrito. I cannot consent to the term: ‘that burrito than which none greater burrito can be conceived,’ simply because my ability to always be able to conceive of a greater burrito shows it is not possible. Now there are a few logical intrinsic maximums I can think of, but not many, but most things are defined in a negation of infinite. Positive infinity being one (maximum) to positive value. Again, God is the only ‘form’ I can think of that can be shown to exist by itself.

As I said, I don’t know for certain – but what I do know is that everything seems to be working as it should. Whether or not it really is this way doesn’t particularly matter, and I don’t see simplicity really affecting that one way or another.

Simplicity just lies in far less leaps of faith in assumptions. There are a huge amount of leaps of faith in assuming the world is real. Without God I might dare say infinite if attempted to be justified (which of course makes sense if God really is responsible for all reality).
So in response to “what evidence do you have for the world existing?” you say “I don’t know for certain – but what I do know is that everything seems to be working as it should.” So why make that leap of faith there (which is less reasonable) than a leap (a very small one I might add) to believing God exists? Also the evidence to you is: ‘seems to be working as it should’, and what standard do you meassure that with?

Probably is, yes – and one that’s going to be tricky to communicate an answer for, given how vastly different our perspectives on the nature of good are.

I do not ‘love’ good at all. Love is something I feel for beings, among which good is not. I love people, I love animals, I even feel a little twinge of it around animate plants (the rest are salad ). But I do not love good or any other abstract concept. To ask if I love good is just as alien to me as asking if I love proper nouns. Good is a worthy goal, and something I strive for almost regardless of personal consequences, but it is not a thing I consider lovable.

Hehe they might be, they might not be, but lets forget our differences for the sake of dialogue.

Do you not see a contradiction in ‘loving goodness for itself rather than its reward’ and ‘not loving good or any other abstract concept?’
“Good is a worthy goal, and something I strive for almost regardless of personal consequences, but it is not a thing I consider lovable.” Is that not a contradiction as well? If not could you explain more? Perhaps I am a bit confused in what you mean.

 

[Asuno]

First off, I’ll thank you to refrain from accusations of ignorance. I do know what I’m talking about, and if I happen to see it differently from you, call me a heretic, not an idiot. Proper use of invective is always important to a civilized debate.

Sorry about that. I didn’t gather that you did know about that from your posts. I didn’t mean to insult you.

Anyway, Summa, III.2.4: The Person or hypostasis of Christ may be viewed in two ways. First as it is in itself, and thus it is altogether simple, even as the Nature of the Word. Secondly, in the aspect of person or hypostasis to which it belongs to subsist in a nature; and thus the Person of Christ subsists in two natures. Hence though there is one subsisting being in Him, yet there are different aspects of subsistence, and hence He is said to be a composite person, insomuch as one being subsists in two.

That was very well put.

I have never said that Jesus is held to have ‘partial’ natures: quite the opposite, in my first two posts to this thread. I’ve simply said I don’t buy it.

Like I said before, I didn’t get that from reading them the first time. Still, sorry about that. But what I still don’t understand is why you don’t ‘buy it’, as you say.

Does Jesus’ divine nature build upon his human nature, as my human nature builds upon my mammalian nature? If so, why wouldn’t the Mormons be right when they say we’re all capable of apotheosis?

I would say ‘yes’ to that supposition. That’s been my understanding of it, anyway. But the Mormons take it a little too far; the conduit doesn’t become the source of what it channels, it still remains a conduit. “Apotheosis”…that’s a new word for me. I actually had to look it up. That’s actually a cool word…

Unless the recipient wants to be believed, that is. Here, try this on: I can bend spoons with my mind. I’m not going to tell you how, I’m not going to demonstrate it for you, and I’m not even going to show you spoons I have bent. Just trust me, I can do it.

What right do I have to say whether you can or cannot do as you say? The answer is simply, I don’t know. I can have faith that you can do as you say, or not. But the situation is a bit different, I do see that. Basically, I’m asking to take a leap of faith off a high cliff, and you only have my word that somewhere down there - so far you can’t even see it - is your safety net, and that you won’t get hurt. It is a pretty tall order.

I doubt it and no, respectively. If I am the recipient of divine revelation, I expect I’d believe. Logic doesn’t seem to be the right tool to use here.

I’m sorry to hear you say that, and not just because you would doubt all those others. It is good to know that you don’t rely on logic alone, though. I profoundly and truly wish you would have a direct experience. Maybe you will yet.

I’d be the person saying ‘hey, believe what you want, I’m not gonna say definitively it isn’t true but I don’t see it’.

You kind of remind me of St Thomas (the Doubter, not Aquainus) when you say that. I’m actually glad of that; he’s always been one of my favorites.

What’s worse about being delusional and honest?

Trust me, it’s worse when people whom you love and care about think you’re crazy, though not as bad as when they do believe you, but just don’t care about what you have to say. Jesus was definitely right about the “no prophet is without honor except in his native place” stuff. I have had a harder time trying to convince my own family about my experiences than strangers.

That said, I quite intentionally haven’t cast aspersions on anyone’s intelligence, honesty, or sanity – as, thankfully, at least everyone else in the thread has. I don’t know what you’ve got that gives you faith, and I don’t think I ever will.

Don’t bet on that. Your life isn’t over yet, and I firmly believe that as long there’s life, there’s always hope. Yes, Mirdath, I actually have hope - and even faith - for you and in you.

But if you wanna post in a callout thread dedicated to what I think, expect to hear it. If you don’t like what you hear, move on.

I thought this thread is about what you really think. And no, I don’t always like what I hear, either in these threads or any place else, for that matter. But I always listen. Why? Because I gotta do it; because even if what I hear is something I don’t agree with, I come away with a little better understanding. And sometimes, like in this post, I learn things I never knew before…like cool new words.

 

[punkforchrist]

Mirdath, with the qualifications we’ve made so far, my question is: how do we have knowledge of necessary abstract objects?

Abstract objects, after all, do not stand in causal relations. “2 + 2 = 4” cannot mow my lawn, for example (as much as I would love that!). But if there’s a causal relationship between the knower and the object known, then how can we have knowledge of abstract objects? What I’m suggesting is that abstracta are actually mental concepts of a mind, but they cannot be concepts of just any mind, since you and I are contingent.

 

[Mirdath]

Then it is simply because the concept and the real (if it were so) do not match up in more ways than just existence.

So might one say for the God of Abraham.

Lol, Plato’s Burritos “Only the most ideal form of Mexican food!” Hehe, but at any rate, I am saying the term is meaningless, because I can always think of a greater burrito. I cannot consent to the term: ‘that burrito than which none greater burrito can be conceived,’ simply because my ability to always be able to conceive of a greater burrito shows it is not possible.

You can conceive of a perfect Being, but not of a perfect Burrito? If there is an infinitely ascending scale of greater and greater burritos, either we’ve broken the universe or the Platonic Burrito is, in fact, God.

Simplicity just lies in far less leaps of faith in assumptions. There are a huge amount of leaps of faith in assuming the world is real. Without God I might dare say infinite if attempted to be justified (which of course makes sense if God really is responsible for all reality).

If I do not believe that what I sense is real, just how human can I claim to be? I’d be useless (and really bad conversation). If I do not believe in God, I am still perfectly capable of everything except belief. Believing in my senses has a point; belief in God does not seem to, excepting only that which people who already believe tell us but cannot empirically verify.

So in response to “what evidence do you have for the world existing?” you say “I don’t know for certain – but what I do know is that everything seems to be working as it should.” So why make that leap of faith there (which is less reasonable) than a leap (a very small one I might add) to believing God exists? Also the evidence to you is: ‘seems to be working as it should’, and what standard do you meassure that with?

Leap of faith? From ‘fire hurts, that’s probably real’ to ‘believe in God, no evidence’, just like that? The latter is the smaller leap?

Do you not see a contradiction in ‘loving goodness for itself rather than its reward’ and ‘not loving good or any other abstract concept?’

No contradiction, they’re just talking about two different things.

“Good is a worthy goal, and something I strive for almost regardless of personal consequences, but it is not a thing I consider lovable.” Is that not a contradiction as well? If not could you explain more? Perhaps I am a bit confused in what you mean.

I love beings, not abstracta; and unlike you, I do not believe Good is a being. So I do not love Good. I like it, sure, I pursue it, I try to make a point of spreading it – but I do not love it. Good comes about because I love, not the other way around.

Asuno:

I would say ‘yes’ to that supposition. That’s been my understanding of it, anyway. But the Mormons take it a little too far; the conduit doesn’t become the source of what it channels, it still remains a conduit.

The parable of the wise and foolish architects come to mind – does Jesus’ perfect, divine nature build upon the foundation of mere human nature? Granted, according to Catholic theology Jesus’ human nature is also perfected, but it’s still a shaky foundation to build a God upon: he wept, he bled, he blasted a fig tree for no more reason than it being out of season.

A further problem is that Jesus is supposed to have assumed a human nature at a specific point in time – much later than he’d been around as the Word.

And finally the big gun, Summa III.2.1:
Thirdly, a thing is made up of things not mixed nor changed, but imperfect; as man is made up of soul and body, and likewise of divers members. But this cannot be said of the mystery of Incarnation. First, because each nature, i.e. the Divine and the human, has its specific perfection. Secondly, because the Divine and human natures cannot constitute anything after the manner of quantitative parts, as the members make up the body; for the Divine Nature is incorporeal; nor after the manner of form and matter, for the Divine Nature cannot be the form of anything, especially of anything corporeal, since it would follow that the species resulting therefrom would be communicable to several, and thus there would be several Christs. Thirdly, because Christ would exist neither in human nature nor in the Divine Nature: since any difference varies the species, as unity varies number, as is said (Metaph. viii, text. 10).

You kind of remind me of St Thomas (the Doubter, not Aquainus) when you say that. I’m actually glad of that; he’s always been one of my favorites.

One of mine too, even if (or especially because) he got trash-talked by Jesus for being careful

 

[Dranu]

What I’m suggesting is that abstracta are actually mental concepts of a mind, but they cannot be concepts of just any mind, since you and I are contingent.

Hmm I rather like that idea. It is a more in depth explanation than saying they are real outside our minds (which they must be), but a reasonable idea of what they are themselves.

 

[Mirdath]

Mirdath, with the qualifications we’ve made so far, my question is: how do we have knowledge of necessary abstract objects?

I thought I denied the existence of necessary abstract objects pretty early on Unless you’re talking about the universals in our frame of reference here, which I don’t deny are necessary but do deny they’re objects.

Abstract objects, after all, do not stand in causal relations. “2 + 2 = 4” cannot mow my lawn, for example (as much as I would love that!). But if there’s a causal relationship between the knower and the object known, then how can we have knowledge of abstract objects? What I’m suggesting is that abstracta are actually mental concepts of a mind, but they cannot be concepts of just any mind, since you and I are contingent.

But aren’t such abstracta really just human labels slapped on the behaviors of the universe? You’re treating, say, Avogadro’s Number as a thing-in-itself, when all it is is a descriptor of how much stuff is in one mole.

 

[Dranu]

Mirdath:

So might one say for the God of Abraham.

‘God of Abraham’ carries so much emotional baggage, lets stick with ‘That than which none greater can be conceived’ for now.

You can conceive of a perfect Being, but not of a perfect Burrito? If there is an infinitely ascending scale of greater and greater burritos, either we’ve broken the universe or the Platonic Burrito is, in fact, God.

As I said, burrito must be defined with conceivable limits. To call something a burrito (for example) I must say that in is something like refried beans and meat wrapped in a tortilla. So I could keep thinking of a larger one, meatier one, etc. For being, there is not a conceivable limit. Sort of like for positive integers I can always think of a greater, so ‘that positive integer than which none greater numerical value can be conceived’, is meaningless. But 'that positive value than which none greater numerical value can be conceived’ is meaningful and it is positive infinity.

If I do not believe that what I sense is real, just how human can I claim to be? I’d be useless (and really bad conversation). If I do not believe in God, I am still perfectly capable of everything except belief. Believing in my senses has a point; belief in God does not seem to, excepting only that which people who already believe tell us but cannot empirically verify.

So what is that point without God?

You make the leap for the material world but not for God, does the answer as to why rest in the question I asked you above?

Leap of faith? From ‘fire hurts, that’s probably real’ to ‘believe in God, no evidence’, just like that? The latter is the smaller leap?

The latter is smaller since it makes far less assumptions, where as the first makes so many on far less firm evidence, as those bits of evidence lie on further assumptions.

I love beings, not abstracta; and unlike you, I do not believe Good is a being. So I do not love Good. I like it, sure, I pursue it, I try to make a point of spreading it – but I do not love it. Good comes about because I love, not the other way around.

So you love the beings for themselves you say. Are there any beings you do not love? If so what is the connecting factor between the things that you love?
Also, why do good for itself? I think that is the most important question in this post.

 

[Mirdath]

As I said, burrito must be defined with conceivable limits. To call something a burrito (for example) I must say that in is something like refried beans and meat wrapped in a tortilla. So I could keep thinking of a larger one, meatier one, etc. For being, there is not a conceivable limit. Sort of like for positive integers I can always think of a greater, so ‘that positive integer than which none greater numerical value can be conceived’, is meaningless. But 'that positive value than which none greater numerical value can be conceived’ is meaningful and it is positive infinity.

So you cannot conceive of an infinitely large, infinitely meaty burrito which never goes bad and won’t give you the runs, a burrito you could just walk on and dig into with a shovel whenever you felt the urge.

O thou of little imagination!

But seriously, greater size is not always a positive attribute; a perfect burrito, then, would be exactly the right size, with not an infinite but rather just the right amount of meat, and so on and on. It’s perfectly conceivable.

So what is that point without God?

Belief in God, in and of itself, doesn’t lend a point to existence either.

You make the leap for the material world but not for God, does the answer as to why rest in the question I asked you above?

I trust my senses because they appear to generally serve me well. They are the basis of my knowledge; you’re right that I use reason to act upon what I determine empirically, but I can’t use my reason to act upon nothing, which is all the evidence I have for God.

The latter is smaller since it makes far less assumptions, where as the first makes so many on far less firm evidence, as those bits of evidence lie on further assumptions.

The latter makes only one assumption, but it’s a doozy. The former isn’t assuming anything, so long as one makes the caveat that fire may not really exist, but it sure seems to hurt like hell.

So you love the beings for themselves you say. Are there any beings you do not love?

Not that I’m aware of.

Also, why do good for itself? I think that is the most important question in this post.

I don’t do good for the sake of good. That’s my point. I do it because I love.

 

[punkforchrist]

I thought I denied the existence of necessary abstract objects pretty early on Unless you’re talking about the universals in our frame of reference here, which I don’t deny are necessary but do deny they’re objects.

I’m only talking about our own frame of reference (incidentally, though, I believe abstracta hold for alternate universes, as well, assuming alternate universes are possible). If you deny that they’re objects, then I don’t see how anyone can meaningfully form true propositions, since both propositions and their alethic-values are themselves abstract realities.

But aren’t such abstracta really just human labels slapped on the behaviors of the universe? You’re treating, say, Avogadro’s Number as a thing-in-itself, when all it is is a descriptor of how much stuff is in one mole.

I’m actually making a very minimalistic claim, here. Avogadro’s constant need not apply, but we could get into that if you’d like to discuss conceptual relativity and Alston’s critique (see his book A Realist Conception of Truth). All I’m talking about are the truth-value of propositions.

In essence, when you say that abstracta are just human labels, I assume you mean that they’re merely linguistic constructs. However, I think this conflates language with language-as-used. The words we use to describe objective truth-values are themselves contingent, but the objects that these words refer to exist independently of our linguistic constructs. I’m sitting in my house, but if I were to use some Spanish, I would say I’m sitting in mi casa. Although the words are different, the referent is one and the same. Likewise, the labels we attach to the construction of propositions need to be distinguished from the truth-value that propositions refer to.

 

[punkforchrist]

Hi Dranu,

Dranu:

Hmm I rather like that idea. It is a more in depth explanation than saying they are real outside our minds (which they must be), but a reasonable idea of what they are themselves.

Yes, I think this has the potential to be a very compelling argument for God’s existence, and His necessary existence at that. We can formulate the argument like this:

1. Abstract objects are either: a) contingent; b) necessary and mind-independent; or c) necessary concepts of a mind.
2. Abstract objects are: a) not contingent; and b) not mind-independent.
3. Therefore, abstract objects are necessary concepts of a mind.

Assuming that at least some abstract objects hold necessarily, that leaves us with two options. We can either say that abstracta are mind-independent realities, or that they are mental concepts. The difficulty with the former is that abstract objects do not stand in causal relations, so if they are mind-independent, then it would appear that we could have no knowledge of them. But since we do have knowledge of them, then it follows that abstracta cannot be mind-independent.

Chad McIntosh argues at length in favor of what is called the “Conceptualist Argument”. In my estimation, it is an excellent treatment of the issue. doxazotheos.com/?p=66#more-66

 

[Mirdath]

I’m only talking about our own frame of reference (incidentally, though, I believe abstracta hold for alternate universes, as well, assuming alternate universes are possible). If you deny that they’re objects, then I don’t see how anyone can meaningfully form true propositions, since both propositions and their alethic-values are themselves abstract realities.

Abstracta such as we are talking about are properties, not objects. There’s no reason one can’t form a proposition based on properties.

In essence, when you say that abstracta are just human labels, I assume you mean that they’re merely linguistic constructs. However, I think this conflates language with language-as-used. The words we use to describe objective truth-values are themselves contingent, but the objects that these words refer to exist independently of our linguistic constructs. I’m sitting in my house, but if I were to use some Spanish, I would say I’m sitting in mi casa. Although the words are different, the referent is one and the same. Likewise, the labels we attach to the construction of propositions need to be distinguished from the truth-value that propositions refer to.

Not linguistic constructs, although that itself could make for a very interesting discussion elsewhere. They’re human constructs that describe particular properties. Avogadro’s Number would be the number of entities in a mole regardless of what it’s called or which substance we’re talking about, but that number is a property of the mole itself, which is an extant bit of matter. ‘My house’ and ‘mi casa’ are two labels describing the same idea of ownership of a house, but that ownership is not a thing – you are and the house is. ‘My house’ or ‘mein Haus’ or ‘mi casa’ describe your relationship with a building, but they do not define you, the house, or even your title deed.

 

[Dranu]

So you cannot conceive of an infinitely large, infinitely meaty burrito which never goes bad and won’t give you the runs, a burrito you could just walk on and dig into with a shovel whenever you felt the urge.

O thou of little imagination!

But seriously, greater size is not always a positive attribute; a perfect burrito, then, would be exactly the right size, with not an infinite but rather just the right amount of meat, and so on and on. It’s perfectly conceivable.

Hehe, I can lack imagination I must admit! But again it is not conceivable. Even if I consented size (which I do not, since it adds more substance or reality) I could still say the burrito gives different attributes to the person, or is flavorful in a way that you need greater and greater taste buds to be able to experience it. Furthermore, you cannot have an infinite burrito, since you need boundaries for it to be a burrito in the first place. At any rate you can keep on going up since it is a particular, just like the number example. Again God is the only thing it works for, since even the things that have an intrinsic maximum are not proved to exist in themselves.

Belief in God, in and of itself, doesn’t lend a point to existence either.

Yes it does, but I won’t argue that now, or yet. What I want to know is ‘what is that point you are talking about?’ Or do you consent there is none without God? (lets not assume if there is or not one with God yet though)

And sorry to ask again, but I think it is important: You make the leap for the material world but not for God, does the answer as to why rest in the question I asked you above?

I trust my senses because they appear to generally serve me well. They are the basis of my knowledge; you’re right that I use reason to act upon what I determine empirically, but I can’t use my reason to act upon nothing, which is all the evidence I have for God.

Again on what basis do they ‘appear’ to serve you well?

Also you could not act upon God whether He is real or not, He is immutable by His nature. But you could certainly act with that knowledge, and maybe that is what you are saying (the latter that is). All the innumerable evidence for God lies with reason, and although you may see God through the things around you, it is ultimately an induction that you make when going this way (sort of like how I think Plato figured it out to some extent).

The latter makes only one assumption, but it’s a doozy. The former isn’t assuming anything, so long as one makes the caveat that fire may not really exist, but it sure seems to hurt like hell.

Is it not obvious the multitude of assumptions taking the world as real makes? Even if you make the caveat that it may not exist, in reality I would think you act in a way in which you really do assume the world to be real. So we may pretend we are agnostic to it, but I doubt that is the reality. Or am I wrong?

I don’t do good for the sake of good. That’s my point. I do it because I love.

And why do you choose to love?

 

[Mirdath]

Hehe, I can lack imagination I must admit! But again it is not conceivable. Even if I consented size (which I do not, since it adds more substance or reality) I could still say the burrito gives different attributes to the person, or is flavorful in a way that you need greater and greater taste buds to be able to experience it. Furthermore, you cannot have an infinite burrito, since you need boundaries for it to be a burrito in the first place. At any rate you can keep on going up since it is a particular, just like the number example. Again God is the only thing it works for, since even the things that have an intrinsic maximum are not proved to exist in themselves.

Suffice to say I can easily conceive of a Perfect Burrito, and I really want it. But I doubt either of us will ever be able to convince the other, so let’s shake hands and leave it at that

Yes it does, but I won’t argue that now, or yet. What I want to know is ‘what is that point you are talking about?’ Or do you consent there is none without God? (lets not assume if there is or not one with God yet though)

Life doesn’t come prepackaged with a raison d’etre. We make those for ourselves. Yours happens to be to love God and to be with him forever in heaven; mine is to live well, do good, have fun, and die old and happy.

And sorry to ask again, but I think it is important: You make the leap for the material world but not for God, does the answer as to why rest in the question I asked you above?

No; it’s because God is not apparent to me through the sensory (name removed by moderator)ut I possess, or through the application of reason to that (name removed by moderator)ut.

Again on what basis do they ‘appear’ to serve you well?

When my hands appear to be on the keyboard typing furiously, words which I have conceived seem to form on the screen just above them. And so it goes. Even if it’s illusory, it’s still good enough for me.

Also you could not act upon God whether He is real or not, He is immutable by His nature. But you could certainly act with that knowledge, and maybe that is what you are saying (the latter that is). All the innumerable evidence for God lies with reason, and although you may see God through the things around you, it is ultimately an induction that you make when going this way (sort of like how I think Plato figured it out to some extent).

I’m not speaking of acting upon God, but of acting upon what I know and can reason out to find him.

Is it not obvious the multitude of assumptions taking the world as real makes? Even if you make the caveat that it may not exist, in reality I would think you act in a way in which you really do assume the world to be real. So we may pretend we are agnostic to it, but I doubt that is the reality. Or am I wrong?

What would be the point of always acting as if the world is (possibly) an illusion? One gains nothing, and one is a stifling bore to boot. It may be my personal hallucination, but if it is I like my dream-people enough to try not to make my presence among them (appear to be) insufferable.

Besides, solipsists are almost universally jerks.

And why do you choose to love?

It’s not something I had ever really thought of as a conscious choice. Now that you’ve asked, I’m not even sure it is one. I may not always act out of love towards others, but I think of that more as a sign of my own imperfection than as hatred or lack of love.

 

[archiecs2007]

Definitely There Is No Point Of Discussing And Arguing About God’s Existence.

Let Us Consider This That God Is Not Anymore God If We Can Know And Understand Him Fully. That Is, God Had Given Us The Capacity To Grasp A Partial Knowledge Of Him And His Nature Most Probably Because We Human Ourselves Come From Him And Was Created By Him. Thus, We Partake The Divinity Of God. However, We Cannot Fully Put God In The Ground Because We Are Finite Beings And God Is Infinite. That Is, We Can Never Comprehend God To The Fullest Unless We Become God Ourselves But That Is Impossible Because In The Very First Place We Are Not God By Ourselves; God As In Capital “g”. Also Our Human Limitedness Will Hinder Us Of Doing So.

God Is Immutable !!!

For How Many Years Already That Man Strive To Understand God But He Can’t Because In The Very First Place God Is Not Bound In Our Human Knowledge…we Humans Are Limited Beings…we Are Finite!

Thank You And God Bless Us All!!!

 

[Dranu]

Suffice to say I can easily conceive of a Perfect Burrito, and I really want it. But I doubt either of us will ever be able to convince the other, so let’s shake hands and leave it at that

I would love to shake hands and call it a day, but I feel the need to vindicate St. Anselm’s argument in what little way I can. I still say you cannot, and that doing so is like trying to conceive a round square. Even if the term were to be applied relative to you as a standard, I am sure you could always think of a greater one, as there are many reasons, such as being hungry latter, having the taste diminish etc. Just on the definition we can add to it infinitely, and always be able to conceive of a greater. And that just leads back into my last post.
If you can conceive of this ‘burrito (or any material item for that matter) than which none greater can be conceived’ could you describe it in a way in which it could not be conceived greater, and is itself meaningful? If you would like to drop the subject on this feel free, but I can’t do it myself . I like St. Anselm’s argument too much, since I think it is sound and valid. Maybe not convincing though (I think because it is too obvious that we feel as if it is just too good to be true, but with no solid reason for the rejection).

Life doesn’t come prepackaged with a raison d’etre. We make those for ourselves. Yours happens to be to love God and to be with him forever in heaven; mine is to live well, do good, have fun, and die old and happy.

So is the choice arbitrary or is it based off reason? If the latter, what is the standard in which that point you chose makes sense?

No; it’s because God is not apparent to me through the sensory (name removed by moderator)ut I possess, or through the application of reason to that (name removed by moderator)ut.

Even if it were conceivably open to doubt, the evidence is stacked in God’s favor, and the evidence is much more firm than that for the material world existing.

When my hands appear to be on the keyboard typing furiously, words which I have conceived seem to form on the screen just above them. And so it goes. Even if it’s illusory, it’s still good enough for me.

Why is it good enough? The evidence there is very far from conclusive. As with all argumentation we work with reason, so for perceptions to be a premise for an argument a reason needs to be given why.

I’m not speaking of acting upon God, but of acting upon what I know and can reason out to find him.

Reason is far more conclusive about God than the material world. And since reason is the one thing we use to determine reality, it just seems odd (to me) to suspend judgment about God but not the real world (at least practically speaking). I am curious to understand your position on this better.

What would be the point of always acting as if the world is (possibly) an illusion? One gains nothing, and one is a stifling bore to boot. It may be my personal hallucination, but if it is I like my dream-people enough to try not to make my presence among them (appear to be) insufferable.

Besides, solipsists are almost universally jerks.

Hehe, ya, but those pesky nihilist and militant atheist seem worse to me.

There would be a point if you thought the world is false (which I don’t mind you). But what is the point of acting on the belief that the world is real? Is it arbitrary or is it based on a solid logical standard? What I am trying to point out is it looks (to me) that God is the most reasonably solid belief about reality. I’ve even heard a couple of atheist argue that the idea of God was just made because we humans ‘want to make everything logical’. The concept of a first principle provides that quite nicely, but unfortunately for the atheist, the argument is merely rhetorical.

It’s not something I had ever really thought of as a conscious choice. Now that you’ve asked, I’m not even sure it is one. I may not always act out of love towards others, but I think of that more as a sign of my own imperfection than as hatred or lack of love.

But so long as your choices are made on free will, you can choose what you love or hate based on them. So why love in the way that is a choice, not a feeling? I think I like where this part is going, but I am not sure yet.

 

[Dranu]

archiecs2007:

Definitely There Is No Point Of Discussing And Arguing About God’s Existence.

You are quite right in stating that God is above our comprehension, but so is infinity. We still make argumentation about it though, and I think it is fruitful to discuss God’s existence. We might not be able to comprehend God fully, but I, along with many others, believe God allows us to see Him through our reason.

 

[Mirdath]

I would love to shake hands and call it a day, but I feel the need to vindicate St. Anselm’s argument in what little way I can. I still say you cannot, and that doing so is like trying to conceive a round square. Even if the term were to be applied relative to you as a standard, I am sure you could always think of a greater one, as there are many reasons, such as being hungry latter, having the taste diminish etc. Just on the definition we can add to it infinitely, and always be able to conceive of a greater. And that just leads back into my last post.
If you can conceive of this ‘burrito (or any material item for that matter) than which none greater can be conceived’ could you describe it in a way in which it could not be conceived greater, and is itself meaningful? If you would like to drop the subject on this feel free, but I can’t do it myself . I like St. Anselm’s argument too much, since I think it is sound and valid. Maybe not convincing though (I think because it is too obvious that we feel as if it is just too good to be true, but with no solid reason for the rejection).

Look, I have a soft spot for Anselm myself, but it’s not stopping me from tearing him a new one when he has it coming – spare the rod, spoil the theologian. The ontological argument is unjustifiable, and I stand by my statement that I can conceive of the idea of a Perfect Burrito even if I cannot nail down all its properties (although I must say I got real close tonight, except that the sour cream was a little unbalanced toward one corner). Do you know the limits of God’s power? Can you see where his mercy ends, where his justice stops? Reread the end of Job! That’s all about what Anselm is trying to do

So is the choice arbitrary or is it based off reason? If the latter, what is the standard in which that point you chose makes sense?

It’s not arbitrary, but it’s not consistently logical either. People come up with their own meanings to life – you picked yours, I picked mine.

Even if it were conceivably open to doubt, the evidence is stacked in God’s favor, and the evidence is much more firm than that for the material world existing.

It is open to doubt (why else would there be unbelievers?) and God has nothing on the table. I can perceive the material world; whether it is an illusion or not is entirely beside the point. I cannot perceive God at all. How is the lack of perceptibility supposed to indicate a preponderance of evidence for God?

What I am trying to point out is it looks (to me) that God is the most reasonably solid belief about reality.

You’re taking me to task for arguing that what ‘seems’ reasonable is good enough, and then turn around and do the same thing? If God seems reasonable to you, that’s great – but it is not a point of view shared universally.

I’ve even heard a couple of atheist argue that the idea of God was just made because we humans ‘want to make everything logical’. The concept of a first principle provides that quite nicely, but unfortunately for the atheist, the argument is merely rhetorical.

Those atheists have an excellent point you might do well to think further upon. Humans do like to have everything in neat little packages.

But so long as your choices are made on free will, you can choose what you love or hate based on them. So why love in the way that is a choice, not a feeling? I think I like where this part is going, but I am not sure yet.

I do not believe in free will as you do, but in a somewhat more limited selection of choices. And having given it some further consideration, I do not think I choose to love. I simply am that way.

 

[Gottle_of_Geer]

This thread is a reponse to John Dorans claim that God did not create Logic.

Mirdath brought up some interesting concepts which i want to have a discussion about. He believed that proving Gods existence would make him a slave to human logic. I think this is worth debating, because Mirdaths agnosticism is partly based on the idea that God is unknowable; because God supposedly transcends human Logic. If we can show Mirdath otherwise, then we can destroy one of the foundations of Mirdaths agnosticism. .

If God does not transcend logic, God is not God at all; He becomes a mere godlet ​

If by searching we can find out God, if God is not beyond all imaginations & all concepts, if IOW He is not ineffable & transcendent & utterly unlike any creature whatever of ant kind or degree or possibility: then God is not Holy, because He then becomes inextricably & necessarily part of His creation - & nothing more.

The chains of Logic

One can say that God is bound by Logic, but this would simply mean that Logic is Ultimate reality. In otherwords, Logic is a kind of God because everything is explained by it.
This could mean that people are God because we bind God within the boundrys of are logic.

However, If God is pure Mind as much as he is pure act. It can follow then that Logic needn’t be above or below God, but rather it is apart of Gods nature; just like “God is Love”.

AFAICS, it is mistaken to call God “mind” - Pure Intellect, Pure Being, Pure Act: but not Pure Mind. Otherwise, one may be assigning God to a genus, & thereby implying that God is not Unique.​

As for Mirdaths claim; I also argue that If God is above Logic, as in the creator of it; then alsong as man is given the concept of God through specail revelation, i argue that, even though it would be impossible to prove Gods existence with human logic, man could still know, indirectly, that God most “probably” exists; without him being bound by are human Logic. For instance, if one rules out all physical causes as a reasonable explanation for why the world exists, then the concept of God, which God has in fact given us, would be the only other cuase that we knew of. And therefore on that basis we could have a reasonable faith that God exists, considering that all natural causes were not reasonable. In this way God has not been bound, and can still remain above Logic.

What do you think?

I liked your last paragraph. This sounds like a form of the doctrine of innate ideas - it cuts out dependence on the world as a way to knowledge of God (which is good IMHO); but St.Thomas refuted the doctrine, which is tiresome of him. ​

I think it’s possible to say logic has its uses in knowing God without saying that God is logical - did you mean that God’s works & Being are susceptible of logical analysis, or, that logicality is an attribute of God ? If the latter, isn’t that like saying that the whiteness of a Host is an attribute of the Eucharistic Body of Christ ? Qualities can be real to us, & important for us as means of grace, without being real “from God’s POV”, as it were. We are needy - He isn’t