Mirdaths Logic.

[Dranu]

Mirdath:

The ontological argument is unjustifiable, and I stand by my statement that I can conceive of the idea of a Perfect Burrito even if I cannot nail down all its properties (although I must say I got real close tonight, except that the sour cream was a little unbalanced toward one corner). Do you know the limits of God’s power? Can you see where his mercy ends, where his justice stops?

The problem is I can add anything to whatever burrito you have and make it greater, more burritoie or anything else as I said before. To have a burrito you must have boundaries, the same with integers, so you can always conceive of a greater. Ya, maybe you can conceive of one that you would be perfectly satisfied with, but then that would leave the problem of time, for it won’t fill you forever. Not to mention just because it satisfies you does not make it the greatest conceivable burrito, for that is just one person for one thing. God, on the other hand, does not need to be defined with boundaries, in a similar fashion that infinity does not need a boundary in the positive direction. However, positive infinity is a maximum than which none greater positive value can be conceived. Do you see the difference? St. Anselm can do it better than me though. Have you read his reply to Guanilo? If so what do you say about it?

It’s not arbitrary, but it’s not consistently logical either.

What exactly is it to you then?

It is open to doubt (why else would there be unbelievers?) and God has nothing on the table. I can perceive the material world; whether it is an illusion or not is entirely beside the point. I cannot perceive God at all. How is the lack of perceptibility supposed to indicate a preponderance of evidence for God?

Sorry, I should be more clear I do not mean perceptions per se, but sensory perception (of the 5). I see strict perception as a result of reason. In other words I should not have said: “*so for perceptions to be a premise for an argument a reason needs to be given why.” * I should have replaced ‘perception’ with ‘sensory perceptions’ to have been more clear.
With that said, God is perceivable, but only through reason. The point I was making is not that ‘the lack of (sensory) perceptibility is supposed to indicate a preponderance of evidence for God’ but rather that sense perception says not one thing about existence, only reason does.

Now here is the question we have to ask. Since the material world might be an illusion, it is conceivable that it merely exists as a concept in your head. The same way a unicorn does. ** Now let’s assume for a second that all of our perceptions are just thoughts in our head, including God (which they certainly are at the least).** So now they are all the same, just thoughts.** Now how do we attribute existence to any one of these thoughts? ** We do so with reason. Which one is most reasonably and easily (simply) extended to reality? God. The others are far more complex to do.

You’re taking me to task for arguing that what ‘seems’ reasonable is good enough, and then turn around and do the same thing? If God seems reasonable to you, that’s great – but it is not a point of view shared universally.

Oh I am not saying that is wrong, I am just saying you are arguing from what seems reasonable. What I am arguing is it may be possible to be more reasonable. And a question of curiosity of mine is that if you disagree, why do you think an agnostic position is more reasonable?

Those atheists have an excellent point you might do well to think further upon. Humans do like to have everything in neat little packages.

And I think it is a perfectly valid, sound, and convincing point which I agree with whole heartedly (at least ideally we do, perhaps not in our corrupted natures though). The problem though is the argument (that they hope to convey) is obviously rhetorical as it says nothing about God’s existence at all. Sure, maybe from it they say we made God up, but the argument doesn’t add any evidence for that and even if it could, it would still say nothing about God’s existence.

I do not believe in free will as you do, but in a somewhat more limited selection of choices. And having given it some further consideration, I do not think I choose to love. I simply am that way.

Aww I had high hopes for this particular line of dialogue, but we have some hurls to leap before we are speaking about the same things. So you do not choose to do good, you just are that way? Am I understanding you correctly? But if you choose to do good why do you do it?

 

[Dranu]

## AFAICS, it is mistaken to call God “mind” - Pure Intellect, Pure Being, Pure Act: but not Pure Mind. Otherwise, one may be assigning God to a genus, & thereby implying that God is not Unique.

I am not quite sure I follow you here. Is not Pure Mind another word for Pure Being, Pure Act, and Pure Intellect? Almost sounds Trinitarian in fact (though maybe I am stretching it hehe).

 

[punkforchrist]

Abstracta such as we are talking about are properties, not objects. There’s no reason one can’t form a proposition based on properties.

Is it your position that properties are not objects?

Not linguistic constructs, although that itself could make for a very interesting discussion elsewhere. They’re human constructs that describe particular properties.

I’m only being technical at this point, but if abstracta are not linguistic constructs, then what kind of human constructs are they?

Avogadro’s Number would be the number of entities in a mole regardless of what it’s called or which substance we’re talking about, but that number is a property of the mole itself, which is an extant bit of matter.

I agree.

‘My house’ and ‘mi casa’ are two labels describing the same idea of ownership of a house, but that ownership is not a thing – you are and the house is. ‘My house’ or ‘mein Haus’ or ‘mi casa’ describe your relationship with a building, but they do not define you, the house, or even your title deed.

This is where I disagree. If you deny that my ownership is not a thing, then there cannot be any actual states of affairs. My owning a house is not just limited to the existence of myself and the existence of a house. If there is no relationship between the two, then there is no objective ownership. It may also help if you define “thing” for me, since I haven’t used that word. I’m only talking about “realities”.

 

[Mirdath]

The problem is I can add anything to whatever burrito you have and make it greater, more burritoie or anything else as I said before. To have a burrito you must have boundaries, the same with integers, so you can always conceive of a greater. Ya, maybe you can conceive of one that you would be perfectly satisfied with, but then that would leave the problem of time, for it won’t fill you forever. Not to mention just because it satisfies you does not make it the greatest conceivable burrito, for that is just one person for one thing. God, on the other hand, does not need to be defined with boundaries, in a similar fashion that infinity does not need a boundary in the positive direction. However, positive infinity is a maximum than which none greater positive value can be conceived. Do you see the difference? St. Anselm can do it better than me though. Have you read his reply to Guanilo? If so what do you say about it?

Unsatisfactory. I doubt Gaunilo found it convincing either.

Gaunilo, I would say, made a mistake in using an island for his example. An island is necessarily bounded on all sides, and landmass is indeed a major consideration in its value – and in his criticism of that, the saint is perfectly right.

But still, give the idea of finite perfection some consideration. I contend that you are wrong in thinking that perfection is impossible in the finite, especially as a Christian – for was not the earth created in a state of perfection? Were not Adam and Eve perfect after the manner of humans?

What exactly is it to you then?

A personal choice, whether it be based on reason, on desire, on hope, on misanthropy, or anything else. I don’t think we can get much more specific than that.

With that said, God is perceivable, but only through reason. The point I was making is not that ‘the lack of (sensory) perceptibility is supposed to indicate a preponderance of evidence for God’ but rather that sense perception says not one thing about existence, only reason does.

Sense perception says plenty; all reason does is act as an interpreter, mediator, and chooser. I think we may be suffering from a clash of definitions here.

Now how do we attribute existence to any one of these thoughts? We do so with reason. Which one is most reasonably and easily (simply) extended to reality? God. The others are far more complex to do.

Descartes, hm? Unfortunately, in order to establish the reality of things at all, Descartes must needs turn to God in more or less exactly the same manner Anselm did, and we already know what I think of that.

I attribute existence to the material not out of strict reasoning, but out of convenience – and I fail to see anything wrong with that. The question of the reality of the material doesn’t particularly interest me, so long as things are as they are. I have many better and more useful things to worry about.

In short, I don’t know whether the world is real or a dream, and I don’t care one way or the other.

Oh I am not saying that is wrong, I am just saying you are arguing from what seems reasonable. What I am arguing is it may be possible to be more reasonable. And a question of curiosity of mine is that if you disagree, why do you think an agnostic position is more reasonable?

Because agnosticism suspends judgment on that which cannot be impartially judged. If one has not had direct revelation as to God’s reality, it is the most reasonable position to take on the matter.

The problem though is the argument (that they hope to convey) is obviously rhetorical as it says nothing about God’s existence at all. Sure, maybe from it they say we made God up, but the argument doesn’t add any evidence for that and even if it could, it would still say nothing about God’s existence.

Very true.

Aww I had high hopes for this particular line of dialogue, but we have some hurls to leap before we are speaking about the same things. So you do not choose to do good, you just are that way? Am I understanding you correctly? But if you choose to do good why do you do it?

No; I love because I am that way; I choose to do good because I love – although, being human, I screw up sometimes

 

[Mirdath]

punkforchrist:

Is it your position that properties are not objects?

Yes.

I’m only being technical at this point, but if abstracta are not linguistic constructs, then what kind of human constructs are they?

Languages themselves are abstracta in this sense. If one argues that abstracta are linguistic constructs, then languages become self-creating – and I’m sure you don’t want that! I would call these things ‘mental conceits’ or some such.

If you deny that my ownership is not a thing, then there cannot be any actual states of affairs. My owning a house is not just limited to the existence of myself and the existence of a house. If there is no relationship between the two, then there is no objective ownership.

I think that double negative just bit you

Relationships are not things; they are properties. Since we’re on a bit of a language kick, look at Latin, where relation is established by case: in this instance, ownership would be expressed in the genitive. ‘Being owned’, and by you specifically, is a property possessed by that house.

It may also help if you define “thing” for me, since I haven’t used that word. I’m only talking about “realities”.

A ‘thing’ is an object having real existence.

 

[archiecs2007]

THIS IS NOT TO OFFEND ANYBODY BUT I THINK THAT THOSE WHO RAISE THEIR VOICES SAYING THAT THERE IS NO GOD ARE JUST AFFIRMING GOD’S EXISTENCE. WHY? IT IS BECAUSE HOW COULD THEY KNOW THAT GOD DOESN’T EXIST IF THEY HAVE NOT IN THE FIRST PLACE KNOW AND EVEN FELT HIS EXISTENCE?

“THERE ARE TWO TYPES OF MEN, THOSE WHO ARE AFRAID TO LOSE GOD, AND THOSE WHO ARE AFRAID THAT THEY MIGHT FIND HIM.”-Blaise Pascal, philosopher and scientist

 

[punkforchrist]

Yes.

What is you definition of “property”?

Languages themselves are abstracta in this sense. If one argues that abstracta are linguistic constructs, then languages become self-creating – and I’m sure you don’t want that! I would call these things ‘mental conceits’ or some such.

I’m not arguing that abstracta are linguistic constructs; that’s often what the nominalist’s position is. My question is: what kind of human constructs are abstracta? “Mental conceits” sounds like just another way of referring to mental concepts.

I think that double negative just bit you

Ouch!

Relationships are not things; they are properties.

Do properties exist?

Since we’re on a bit of a language kick, look at Latin, where relation is established by case: in this instance, ownership would be expressed in the genitive. ‘Being owned’, and by you specifically, is a property possessed by that house.

Ah, I love Latin. Very Catholic of you! I don’t disagree with this assessment, but I don’t see how this demonstrates that the relation isn’t itself a thing.

A ‘thing’ is an object having real existence.

I agree.

 

[Mirdath]

What is you definition of “property”?

A property is an idea by which an object may be described or known, such as color or volume. It has no existence in and of itself, but serves only as a descriptor.

I’m not arguing that abstracta are linguistic constructs; that’s often what the nominalist’s position is. My question is: what kind of human constructs are abstracta? “Mental conceits” sounds like just another way of referring to mental concepts.

It is.

Do properties exist?

No.

Ah, I love Latin. Very Catholic of you! I don’t disagree with this assessment, but I don’t see how this demonstrates that the relation isn’t itself a thing.

This particular relationship is a descriptor of the house: it is owned, by you. The deed, now, is a real object, and one that serves to make the relationship between you and your house obvious and legally satisfactory, but it is not the relationship itself.

 

[punkforchrist]

A property is an idea by which an object may be described or known, such as color or volume. It has no existence in and of itself, but serves only as a descriptor.

Please bear with me on this, but it seems indubitable to me that descriptors exist. If they’re non-existent, then they cannot validly describe anything. If they’re not non-existent, then it follows that they exist.

 

[Mirdath]

Please bear with me on this, but it seems indubitable to me that descriptors exist. If they’re non-existent, then they cannot validly describe anything. If they’re not non-existent, then it follows that they exist.

They are not things in and of themselves. Is ‘greenness’ a thing? The color green may be said to be an extant object in a way, but that is really more a matter of our perception of light at a particular wavelength. Colorblind people and most animals have no concept of ‘green’ at all. Greenness, however, doesn’t even have that paltry argument in its favor; it is merely an idea, a conceit or concept, by which we indicate that a particular object has the property of reflecting light at that wavelength.

Descriptors are ideas, not objects. And ideas do not exist in the way a house or other real object exists. They are merely artificial constructs we use to better define and realize the world around us. ‘Greenness’ has no meaning to anyone who is not a human who can perceive color. It cannot be said to exist as an independent thing.

 

[punkforchrist]

Descriptors are ideas, not objects. And ideas do not exist in the way a house or other real object exists. They are merely artificial constructs we use to better define and realize the world around us. ‘Greenness’ has no meaning to anyone who is not a human who can perceive color. It cannot be said to exist as an independent thing.

I should say at this point that properties are different from propositions. I’ve only been arguing about the necessary truth-value of propositions. It’s true that ideas do not exist the same way physical objects do, but it doesn’t follow that they therefore have no existence whatsoever. Abstract objects are called abstract specifically because they are not concrete. Now, if you’re assuming that in order for something to exist it must be physical, then a reason ought to be given.

I also think it’s fallacious to assume that if some cannot perceive the color green that green must not objectively exist. That would be just like saying that Neptune had no objective existence until Le Verrier and others discovered it.

 

[Mirdath]

I should say at this point that properties are different from propositions. I’ve only been arguing about the necessary truth-value of propositions. It’s true that ideas do not exist the same way physical objects do, but it doesn’t follow that they therefore have no existence whatsoever. Abstract objects are called abstract specifically because they are not concrete. Now, if you’re assuming that in order for something to exist it must be physical, then a reason ought to be given.

I also think it’s fallacious to assume that if some cannot perceive the color green that green must not objectively exist. That would be just like saying that Neptune had no objective existence until Le Verrier and others discovered it.

I think a few times I’ve qualified ‘abstracta do not exist’ as ‘abstracta have no meaningful existence’. They are not ‘real objects’ – one might say that abstracta are, but at the same time that they are not real. Apologies if I managed to become obtuse through brevity.

I do not say green objectively exists, but it is not because of the existence of colorblind people or animals who lack the receptors for light of particular wavelengths. You’re quite right that that’s fallacious: if it held, the existence of atheists would instantly disprove God for all. And if you’ve been reading my discussions with Dranu, I have constantly been arguing that belief does not create

Green does not objectively exist. ‘Green’ is a label we attach to things we perceive reflecting visible light which possesses the property of greenness, that is, a wavelength between roughly 495 and 570 nanometers. It is a property, a label, a convenient descriptor – no more. It is not an object.

 

[punkforchrist]

I think a few times I’ve qualified ‘abstracta do not exist’ as ‘abstracta have no meaningful existence’. They are not ‘real objects’ – one might say that abstracta are, but at the same time that they are not real. Apologies if I managed to become obtuse through brevity.

Could you explain what you mean by “meaningful existence”? I think you would agree that the phrase, “the cat is on the mat”, is a meaningful proposition apart from the existence of any particular cat and mat. In other words, it is an intelligible statement that we can coherently conceive of in our minds.

Green does not objectively exist. ‘Green’ is a label we attach to things we perceive reflecting visible light which possesses the property of greenness, that is, a wavelength between roughly 495 and 570 nanometers. It is a property, a label, a convenient descriptor – no more. It is not an object.

As before, I think you’re conflating words with words-as-used. The word “green” is indeed subjective, but what that label describes is not.

 

[Dranu]

Mirdath:

No; I love because I am that way; I choose to do good because I love – although, being human, I screw up sometimes

So the argument is that you are not responsible for your good actions, it is just the product of the nature given to you by the universe? Or is there a real choice involved? If there is, why do you choose to do good?

But still, give the idea of finite perfection some consideration. I contend that you are wrong in thinking that perfection is impossible in the finite, especially as a Christian – for was not the earth created in a state of perfection? Were not Adam and Eve perfect after the manner of humans?

Since only God is perfect I would say no, nothing has the quality of perfection save Him. It being in His harmony though is something else, but perfect in itself, never (for as itself, you could always conceive of a greater).
What I want is a proof (or at least a valid argument) that a burrito or any other finite is conceivable as ‘that X than which none greater could be conceived’. Just like an island a burrito must have boundaries to be a burrito, and as such you run into the integer problem.

A personal choice, whether it be based on reason, on desire, on hope, on misanthropy, or anything else. I don’t think we can get much more specific than that.

So I take it I can safely assume that reason need not be the primary concern with it? Do you know what you give primacy in that choice? Just want to make sure before I proceed.

Sense perception says plenty; all reason does is act as an interpreter, mediator, and chooser. I think we may be suffering from a clash of definitions here.

An interpreter sure, but my point still stands. This is why:
“Now here is the question we have to ask. Since the material world might be an illusion, it is conceivable that it merely exists as a concept in your head. The same way a unicorn does. Now let’s assume for a second that all of our perceptions are just thoughts in our head, including God (which they certainly are at the least). So now they are all the same, just thoughts. Now how do we attribute existence to any one of these thoughts? We do so with reason. Which one is most reasonably and easily (simply) extended to reality? God. The others are far more complex to do.”
Existence is only seen with reason. We need thoughts to look at, but we can only see if we have the eye of reason, senses are just more thoughts before we can suppose anything.

Descartes, hm? Unfortunately, in order to establish the reality of things at all, Descartes must needs turn to God in more or less exactly the same manner Anselm did, and we already know what I think of that.

It shouldn’t matter what we think of it, but what logic reveals. He does St. Anselm’s, but he also does one from efficient causality. Both should be proven wrong. I don’t think St. Anselm’s can, not sure about the other though.

I attribute existence to the material not out of strict reasoning, but out of convenience – and I fail to see anything wrong with that. The question of the reality of the material doesn’t particularly interest me, so long as things are as they are. I have many better and more useful things to worry about.

In short, I don’t know whether the world is real or a dream, and I don’t care one way or the other.

What I am trying to show is not whether the world is real or not, but that it is reason that makes determinations. What is wrong with convenience is that it stands on irrational or at least less reasoned grounds for you (that is not an insult, it is likely I could be less reasonable than you are on many things). What I am trying to point out is that the leap of faith is not reasonable, or at least less reasonable than the acceptance of God, and I am curious as to why make those leaps there but not for God Who solidifies reason as a first principle. I could understand total agnosticism (radical skepticism of sorts). I just don’t understand why one would make that exception for God, which is far more reasonable than the material world.

Because agnosticism suspends judgment on that which cannot be impartially judged. If one has not had direct revelation as to God’s reality, it is the most reasonable position to take on the matter.

Again, we cannot impartially judge the world to exist. At least not without the belief in God or horribly unreasoned assumptions. Direct revelation seems like it might be less convincing than reason to me. I could assume it is something telling me it is God, etc. I could only see the argument for ‘most reasonable’ being made if you suspended judgment on all else, which in that case, we wouldn’t be having this dialogue in the first place.

 

[Mirdath]

Could you explain what you mean by “meaningful existence”? I think you would agree that the phrase, “the cat is on the mat”, is a meaningful proposition apart from the existence of any particular cat and mat. In other words, it is an intelligible statement that we can coherently conceive of in our minds.

‘Meaningful existence’ as in exists in a material, tangible, measurable form. ‘The cat is on the mat’ is a proposition comprising two Real Objects and one not-meaningfully-existent preposition which describes the relationship between the objects. Does ‘on’ exist independently of the cat and the mat? No; it is entirely dependent on the cat and the mat.

As before, I think you’re conflating words with words-as-used. The word “green” is indeed subjective, but what that label describes is not.

Sure, light exists at wildly varying wavelengths; some of those most humans perceive as the color green. But different people ascribe different levels of ‘greenness’ to objects reflecting those wavelengths (or cannot perceive it at all); hence, ‘greenness’ is subjective.

 

[Mirdath]

Dranu:

So the argument is that you are not responsible for your good actions, it is just the product of the nature given to you by the universe? Or is there a real choice involved? If there is, why do you choose to do good?

Not at all. My love is part of my nature; my good is what I choose to do with that nature. Good is a choice; love, I think, far less so.

And I do good not for the sake of good itself, but for the sake of love and, I must admit, enlightened self-interest. Making the world a better place makes it a better place for me. When everyone else gains, so too do I – even if my personal gains are not readily apparent, are delayed in coming, or even come with disadvantages.

Since only God is perfect I would say no, nothing has the quality of perfection save Him. It being in His harmony though is something else, but perfect in itself, never (for as itself, you could always conceive of a greater).

Were that the case, Jesus’ exhortation to be perfect as the Father is would be completely meaningless, making him no more than a false prophet. Adam and Eve are held to have been created in a state of perfection – Summa I.94.3: Hence, as the first man was produced in his perfect state, as regards his body, for the work of generation, so also was his soul established in a perfect state to instruct and govern others.

What I want is a proof (or at least a valid argument) that a burrito or any other finite is conceivable as ‘that X than which none greater could be conceived’. Just like an island a burrito must have boundaries to be a burrito, and as such you run into the integer problem.

I have already shown that the Angelic Doctor himself states that finite humans were originally created in a state of perfection. Granted, Aquinas himself is human and fallible, but his words carry considerable weight as far as Catholic theology goes.

As to the Platonic Burrito, as I said, it need not be infinite in size – what it could use, however, is the ability to regenerate itself once eaten.

But let us take a type of object, X. X is a finite type – it possesses boundaries, it is not eternal, and so on. X-type objects vary in quality, and exist within the boundaries of the universe; thus, there cannot be an infinite number of X-type objects. Since the set of X is then necessarily finite, there being only so much room for such objects, it stands to reason that there is an X-type object which is greater than all others of that type.

And since X is by definition finite, there must needs be an upper bound to the greatness of X-type objects. Therefore, it is possible to conceive of an X-type than which no greater X-type can be conceived.

So I take it I can safely assume that reason need not be the primary concern with it? Do you know what you give primacy in that choice? Just want to make sure before I proceed.

Enlightened self-interest. I want my life to be something I can look back on with satisfaction as I am about to leave it.

Existence is only seen with reason. We need thoughts to look at, but we can only see if we have the eye of reason, senses are just more thoughts before we can suppose anything.

Existence is perceived through empiricism, not reason. The senses are the (name removed by moderator)ut; reason is the controller. Reason would have no purpose without (name removed by moderator)ut.

What is wrong with convenience is that it stands on irrational or at least less reasoned grounds for you (that is not an insult, it is likely I could be less reasonable than you are on many things).

It may not be completely rational, but it is most certainly reasonable in the colloquial sense of the term.

What I am trying to point out is that the leap of faith is not reasonable, or at least less reasonable than the acceptance of God, and I am curious as to why make those leaps there but not for God Who solidifies reason as a first principle.

So for you, Reason is divine. For me, it’s no more than a tool.

I could understand total agnosticism (radical skepticism of sorts). I just don’t understand why one would make that exception for God, which is far more reasonable than the material world.

God has not been demonstrated to be more reasonable, or indeed reasonable at all. Certainly many people have exercised reason to indicate God’s possibility and may even have believed as a result of that, but ‘many’ is not ‘all’.

 

[Dranu]

Mirdath:

Not at all. My love is part of my nature; my good is what I choose to do with that nature. Good is a choice; love, I think, far less so.

So what do you choose when you do not choose good? What makes you, or why do you choose the good over not (when you choose good)?

Were that the case, Jesus’ exhortation to be perfect as the Father is would be completely meaningless, making him no more than a false prophet. Adam and Eve are held to have been created in a state of perfection – Summa I.94.3: Hence, as the first man was produced in his perfect state, as regards his body, for the work of generation, so also was his soul established in a perfect state to instruct and govern others.

As I said one can only achieve it in relation to God, but not of themselves. In other words I can always conceive of a greater X that is finite. I would like you use an argument from reason rather than trying authoritarian ones from doctrine since we both don’t agree on doctrine, and probably won’t even agree what is doctrine in the Catholic sense. Of course I would be very happy if you showed what I said wrong doctrinally so I can be corrected, however for the sake of our dialogue I would want to talk outside of it.

But let us take a type of object, X. X is a finite type – it possesses boundaries, it is not eternal, and so on. X-type objects vary in quality, and exist within the boundaries of the universe; thus, there cannot be an infinite number of X-type objects. Since the set of X is then necessarily finite, there being only so much room for such objects, it stands to reason that there is an X-type object which is greater than all others of that type.

And since X is by definition finite, there must needs be an upper bound to the greatness of X-type objects. Therefore, it is possible to conceive of an X-type than which no greater X-type can be conceived.

Hehe, quoting St. Aquinas will deffinately get me thinking and secodn guessing myself like crazy, but only doctrinal proof that my position is inconsistent with the Church or reason will get me to falter on my position. The latter will be alot easier since it would allow us to have a more common language. Even if I consent to Catholic doctrine, I’m pretty sure you aren’t 100% convinced by Catholic doctrine though (at least yet ).

Even if I consented a finite universe, that doesn’t bind my conceptions to it. We are talking about conceptions, not the amount of matter available. A unicorn might not exist, but it is possible in the sense of logically conceivable. Given one glass cup I can conceive of two, three, four, etc. even if there is not enough glass in the universe available to even make a second. We are talking about the bounds of reasonable ideas, otherwise we are already supposing existence in reality. If limited universe is true, we could always add the premise that ‘A can’t be greater than X in reality’, but even then we can still conceive of A being greater than X, and that is all St. Anselm’s argument needs.

Enlightened self-interest. I want my life to be something I can look back on with satisfaction as I am about to leave it.

And what makes you think it is the best choice for you (that is self-interest)? Also note that the belief in God can do the same thing, so it could not be grounds to reject the belief in God. That is unless you think belief in God would prevent that, and then this line takes a new twist.

Existence is perceived through empiricism, not reason. The senses are the (name removed by moderator)ut; reason is the controller. Reason would have no purpose without (name removed by moderator)ut.

Now I hate to bother you by repeating the same thing, maybe what I am presenting is total rubbish, but please correct me if it is, and how it is so, because my refutation of this is again (sorry ) :
"*“Now here is the question we have to ask. Since the material world might be an illusion, it is conceivable that it merely exists as a concept in your head. The same way a unicorn does. Now let’s assume for a second that all of our perceptions are just thoughts in our head, including God (which they certainly are at the least). So now they are all the same, just thoughts. Now how do we attribute existence to any one of these thoughts? We do so with reason. Which one is most reasonably and easily (simply) extended to reality? God. The others are far more complex to do.”

Existence is only seen with reason. We need thoughts to look at, but we can only see if we have the eye of reason, senses are just more thoughts before we can suppose anything.*"

 

[Dranu]

Continued…

Mirdath:

It may not be completely rational, but it is most certainly reasonable in the colloquial sense of the term.

Then let us abandon this colloquial sense for the true sense.
Why the rejection of God, but not the material world? Which is rationaly easier to accept?

So for you, Reason is divine. For me, it’s no more than a tool.

So would you consent that belief in God is the most reasonable position, even if it may not be right per se? Reason is still a tool for me too, but I am curious as to why you say that I hold it is divine, and you give yourself a more menial appreciation of it.

God has not been demonstrated to be more reasonable, or indeed reasonable at all. Certainly many people have exercised reason to indicate God’s possibility and may even have believed as a result of that, but ‘many’ is not ‘all’.

So you reject:

“*I could understand total agnosticism (radical skepticism of sorts). I just don’t understand why one would make that exception for God, which is far more reasonable than the material world. *”

because you do not think the belief in God is reasonable or because you think agnosticism (the type you adhere to at least, with belief in the material world and all) is more reasonable?

 

[Mirdath]

So what do you choose when you do not choose good? What makes you, or why do you choose the good over not (when you choose good)?

Evil, obviously; and I choose it at times because however much I may love, I am not perfect.

I would like you use an argument from reason rather than trying authoritarian ones from doctrine since we both don’t agree on doctrine, and probably won’t even agree what is doctrine in the Catholic sense.

(snip)

Hehe, quoting St. Aquinas will deffinately get me thinking and secodn guessing myself like crazy, but only doctrinal proof that my position is inconsistent with the Church or reason will get me to falter on my position.

So, ah, which is it again?

Even if I consented a finite universe, that doesn’t bind my conceptions to it. We are talking about conceptions, not the amount of matter available. A unicorn might not exist, but it is possible in the sense of logically conceivable. Given one glass cup I can conceive of two, three, four, etc. even if there is not enough glass in the universe available to even make a second. We are talking about the bounds of reasonable ideas, otherwise we are already supposing existence in reality. If limited universe is true, we could always add the premise that ‘A can’t be greater than X in reality’, but even then we can still conceive of A being greater than X, and that is all St. Anselm’s argument needs.

Granted, the greatest X may not be the greatest conceivable X (after all, it is possible to conceive of a perfect human, which specimen has yet to walk the earth). But since we’re dealing with a limited number of parts, one may easily conceive of an X possessing these parts in perfection according to its nature.

And what makes you think it is the best choice for you (that is self-interest)? Also note that the belief in God can do the same thing, so it could not be grounds to reject the belief in God. That is unless you think belief in God would prevent that, and then this line takes a new twist.

I can think of no better option. True, belief in God in a general sense does not necessarily preclude enlightened self-interest, but if that belief includes the idea that God is a moral arbiter (ie, Christianity), it very well could.

Now here is the question we have to ask. Since the material world might be an illusion, it is conceivable that it merely exists as a concept in your head. The same way a unicorn does. Now let’s assume for a second that all of our perceptions are just thoughts in our head, including God (which they certainly are at the least). So now they are all the same, just thoughts. Now how do we attribute existence to any one of these thoughts? We do so with reason. Which one is most reasonably and easily (simply) extended to reality? God. The others are far more complex to do.

How many times are you going to repeat this? God may, as the Thomists suppose, be infinitely simple (that itself could be seen as a contradiction in terms), but that in no way makes his existence more reasonable. The world around me I can perceive through my senses, which are my only interface between my reason and what (seems to be) reality; God, I cannot. Therefore I am unable to accept God’s existence as real, because it is not demonstrated through the only ways I am able to sense reality – whether those perceptions reflect ‘true’ reality or not does not matter. It is what I can perceive, so it is what I must work with. This is my first, only, and final answer. If you cannot take it and work toward a new line of inquiry instead of repeating the same thing, I suggest you abandon it.

So would you consent that belief in God is the most reasonable position, even if it may not be right per se? Reason is still a tool for me too, but I am curious as to why you say that I hold it is divine, and you give yourself a more menial appreciation of it.

No. Belief in the divine is not justifiable through ordinary sensory perception, which is how we perceive the world around us. As to the ‘divine’ comment, you stated that God ‘solidifies reason as a first principle’.

So you reject [radical skepticism] because you do not think the belief in God is reasonable or because you think agnosticism (the type you adhere to at least, with belief in the material world and all) is more reasonable?

As I have said repeatedly, I can never be entirely certain that my senses are accurate; but as I also said, solipsists tend to be jerks. I am perfectly content to admit that my perceptions may be completely erroneous; however, until they have been proven so, I will act as if they are generally accurate because I have no reason to think otherwise.

 

[punkforchrist]

‘Meaningful existence’ as in exists in a material, tangible, measurable form.

What is the basis for assuming this, though?

‘The cat is on the mat’ is a proposition comprising two Real Objects and one not-meaningfully-existent preposition which describes the relationship between the objects. Does ‘on’ exist independently of the cat and the mat? No; it is entirely dependent on the cat and the mat.

The word “on” is meaningful so long as it is part of a truth-bearing proposition. Even in a world without cats and mats, the proposition, “the cat is on the mat”, is meaningful, since it is either true or false.

Sure, light exists at wildly varying wavelengths; some of those most humans perceive as the color green. But different people ascribe different levels of ‘greenness’ to objects reflecting those wavelengths (or cannot perceive it at all); hence, ‘greenness’ is subjective.

This brings us back to conceptual relativity. The fact that some ascribe one level of greenness to an object is irrelevent to the object’s corresponding wavelength. Imagine both of us are at opposite ends of a garden and we’re looking at the same flower. I see a purple flower and you see a white one. Our conceptual relativity does not determine what the corresponding wavelength is that the flower is instantiating. There may be a light above the garden that tints some flowers a purple color if you are standing at a certain angle.