Missing links in bold argument against brain-mind correlation

[SentinelofTruth]

Hey, I’m looking to disprove the common idea that there is a direct causal correlation between brain events and mind events (other than perception, of course). I am aware of how bold this is, since even the wikipedia articles on the brain and such are explicitly at odds with me, but I won’t be stopped just because I’m (probably) alone in this. So here’s what I’ve got so far:

Proof for the existence of free will:

1. 
   *]Introspection is the means by which we perceive our conscious phenomena, including thoughts, emotions, desires, perceptions, and… free decisions.
   *]Following from the definition of “conscious”, it is impossible for a conscious event to occur in my mind without my knowledge, or for me to think a conscious event occurs in my mind but be mistaken.
   *]Thus, to suggest that introspection is not infallible is incoherent.
   *]And introspection tells me that I make free decisions. Therefore, I do.
   
   Proof of immateriality of free will:
   1. 
      *]Free will exists.
      *]Physical things are deterministic.
      *]Therefore free will can’t be explained in terms of any physical system. Our decisions, at least, must therefore be made in the soul rather than the brain.
      
      Proof for substantivity of the soul:
      1. 
         *]Everything is either a substance or an abstract concept.
         *]Nothing abstract is self-existing. Abstracts only exist insofar as they are instantiated in substances.
         *]The soul, however, as perceived through introspection, is clearly a conscious, and therefore inherently existing thing.
         *]Therefore the soul is a substance.
         
         Solid so far, right? Post any objections. Here’s where my difficulties start:
         Proof for immateriality of other conscious phenomena:
         1. 
            *]The meaning of the patterns of pixels I am using to convey these arguments is not inherent to the pattern of the pixels, because if I had spoken a different language, different pixel patterns would have conveyed the same ideas.
            *]The same can be seen to be true of other physical things used to convey meanings (pictures, sound waves, etc).
            *]Thus, the meaning of a physical thing is never inherent.
            *]But my belief in the validity of this argument (and all other mental things) do not derive their meaning in this way. Their meaning is inherent.
            *]Therefore they can’t be explained in material terms either.
            
            The problem is that this last argument doesn’t seem able to refute the claim that despite the immateriality of these phenomena, they can be caused by neural events. In the case of free will, of course, this is incoherent because if it’s caused deterministically then it’s not free. But I can’t find any such incoherence in saying that about other mental events. Any fellow extremist dualists or Idealists here that can help? I’ve developed the following argument in addition to the above four, but it seems to have a problem.
            Proof for derived reality of physical “substances”:
            1. 
               *]Imagine the computer you are using right now.
               *]Would you think it more accurate to say that you are imagining a computer, or that you are imagining what your visual field would look like if it contained the computer?
               *]Undeniably, the second proposition is correct.
               *]Thus, to imagine a physical thing is only to imagine a perception of it.
               *]Therefore, parallelly, for a physical thing to exist is only for a perception of it to exist.
               
               It is supposed to follow that it is questionable how these non-inherently existing things could affect us inherently existing things. Of course, they affect us through perception, but that makes sense because the whole idea of perception implies the existence of something to be perceived. But it makes far less sense to extend this causal correlation to mental phenomena whose natures have nothing to do with physical things. But here is the first problem: just because we can’t imagine the existence of a physical thing shouldn’t mean it’s impossible. The second problem: why can’t the Creator have programmed a causal correlation between a physical, derivedly existent thing and a mental event?
               If there is anyone that can help me answer these objections, please do.

 

[tonyrey]

An excellent post!

But it makes far less sense to extend this causal correlation to mental phenomena whose natures have nothing to do with physical things. But here is the first problem: just because we can’t imagine the existence of a physical thing shouldn’t mean it’s impossible.

The second problem: why can’t the Creator have programmed a causal correlation between a physical, derivedly existent thing and a mental event?

There is no obvious reason why there shouldn’t be a correlation between mental and physical activity if there is interaction. Why can’t the mind and brain influence each other?

 

[SentinelofTruth]

An excellent post!

Wow. Really surprised you agree with me.

tonyrey:

There is no obvious reason why there shouldn’t be a correlation between mental and physical activity if there is interaction. Why can’t the mind and brain influence each other?

It’s counter-intuitive, to say the least. But NB I didn’t say that there is no causal correlation between neural and mental events, I said that it was limited only to perception.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

*]Nothing abstract is self-existing. Abstracts only exist insofar as they are instantiated in substances.

So types of things do not exist in the mind of God, before they become instantiated? That would be very hard for me to believe.

 

[inocente]

1. 
   *]Introspection is the means by which we perceive our conscious phenomena, including thoughts, emotions, desires, perceptions, and… free decisions.
   *]Following from the definition of “conscious”, it is impossible for a conscious event to occur in my mind without my knowledge, or for me to think a conscious event occurs in my mind but be mistaken.
   *]Thus, to suggest that introspection is not infallible is incoherent.
   *]And introspection tells me that I make free decisions. Therefore, I do.

1. 
   Sorry to rain on your parade but all your “proofs” are circular. For instance, the one quoted is based on you being aware of thoughts you’re aware of and being unaware of thoughts you’re not aware of!!!
   
   And so on.
   
   Philosophers have been arguing about this stuff for hundreds of years so it’s unlikely to get solved on an internet forum. Trying to use our own mind to understand how our mind works means we can get fooled very easily. A better approach is to study other minds, by for instance looking at how accidental brain damage has affected people. When this is done, all the evidence is that the mind comes from the brain.

 

[dmar198]

Proof for the existence of free will:

1. 
   *]Introspection is the means by which we perceive our conscious phenomena, including thoughts, emotions, desires, perceptions, and… free decisions.
   *]Following from the definition of “conscious”, it is impossible for a conscious event to occur in my mind without my knowledge, or for me to think a conscious event occurs in my mind but be mistaken.
   *]Thus, to suggest that introspection is not infallible is incoherent.
   *]And introspection tells me that I make free decisions. Therefore, I do.

1. 
   I think there’s a potential problem with #2. The definition of conscious does not seem to imply the second thing: “[if I] think a conscious event occurs in my mind * be mistaken.” I might think there’s a little person in my mind pulling levers. (The humunculus delusion.) Or I might think, like a schizophrenic, that there’s two persons operating in my mind. (That’s a mischaracterization, but it’s still not impossible to think that.) Now in both of these cases I would be imagining that someone was engaging in conscious acts within my mind, and I would be wrong. Thus it seems that there are all sorts of conscious events I might think are occurring in my mind, yet be mistaken.
   
   Coming from another angle, the definition of conscious seems to just mean being aware that you are thinking or doing something. But that doesn’t imply that you are aware of everything you are thinking or doing. It also doesn’t imply that you are always conscious – sometimes we are unconscious. Either of those “holes” in awareness seem to suggest that mistakes in our awareness may be possible, and therefore aren’t excluded by the definition of conscious.
   
   In the subsequent syllogisms you get a little beyond what I am prepared to ruminate, so hopefully somebody else will be able to help with those.*

 

[dmar198]

Sorry to rain on your parade but all your “proofs” are circular. For instance, the one quoted is based on you being aware of thoughts you’re aware of and being unaware of thoughts you’re not aware of!!!

And so on.

Philosophers have been arguing about this stuff for hundreds of years so it’s unlikely to get solved on an internet forum. Trying to use our own mind to understand how our mind works means we can get fooled very easily. A better approach is to study other minds, by for instance looking at how accidental brain damage has affected people. When this is done, all the evidence is that the mind comes from the brain.

I’ve looked at arguments from brain damage before and they seem to be perfectly compatible with either side re: whether the brain causes the mind or whether it’s just an instrument of the mind. If it’s just an instrument of the mind, then it would still follow that brain damage would impair mental ability, just as a musician’s ability to play good music is impaired by damage to his instrument. The arguments from brain damage always seem to ignore this, and suppose that if you damage the brain and it impairs mental ability, it automatically implies that mental ability comes from the brain. But that doesn’t follow unless you already assume what you have to prove – that correlation implies causation.

 

[SentinelofTruth]

inocente:

Philosophers have been arguing about this stuff for hundreds of years so it’s unlikely to get solved on an internet forum. Trying to use our own mind to understand how our mind works means we can get fooled very easily. A better approach is to study other minds, by for instance looking at how accidental brain damage has affected people. When this is done, all the evidence is that the mind comes from the brain.

You accuse me of circular reasoning and then assert that I must be wrong because the mind comes from the brain? If you don’t think that’s circular, I ask you to cease debating with me.

dmar198:

Coming from another angle, the definition of conscious seems to just mean being aware that you are thinking or doing something. But that doesn’t imply that you are aware of everything you are thinking or doing. It also doesn’t imply that you are always conscious – sometimes we are unconscious. Either of those “holes” in awareness seem to suggest that mistakes in our awareness may be possible, and therefore aren’t excluded by the definition of conscious.

How could it be a conscious event if the subject wasn’t conscious of it?

dmar198:

I’ve looked at arguments from brain damage before and they seem to be perfectly compatible with either side re: whether the brain causes the mind or whether it’s just an instrument of the mind. If it’s just an instrument of the mind, then it would still follow that brain damage would impair mental ability, just as a musician’s ability to play good music is impaired by damage to his instrument. The arguments from brain damage always seem to ignore this, and suppose that if you damage the brain and it impairs mental ability, it automatically implies that mental ability comes from the brain. But that doesn’t follow unless you already assume what you have to prove – that correlation implies causation.

I agree that the brain damage → mind damage thing is technically compatible with non-materialistic theories. But with the loss of the instrument the musician himself is not impaired, just his ability to make music. So if this is a good analogy, then brain damage should not impair mental functioning, just our ability to control our bodies and/or our ability to perceive our environment.
Prodigal Son:

So types of things do not exist in the mind of God, before they become instantiated? That would be very hard for me to believe.

This would not follow. Assuming that by types you just mean that God has the intentions to create things before he does, then these intentions are part of his very substantive mind and are not abstract.

 

[tonyrey]

A better approach is to study other minds, by for instance looking at how accidental brain damage has affected people.

Is that surprising? A damaged guitar affects the ability of the guitarist to play…

When this is done, all the evidence is that the mind comes from the brain.

What precisely is “all the evidence” that the mind comes from mindless, purposeless molecules?

 

[dmar198]

How could it be a conscious event if the subject wasn’t conscious of it?

It wouldn’t be a real conscious event but it would be mistaken for one. That isn’t excluded by the fact that consciousness means awareness of what you’re thinking or doing.

Of course this assuming that “aware” is an sufficient definition of “conscious.” In reality, it’s just a synonym. And there are more familiar synonyms that might be more helpful: consciousness is knowing that you’re thinking or doing something. But this still doesn’t apparently preclude false knowledge or mistakes. I might think I am conscious of free will, but it’s not really free will (say the atheists), in the same way that I might think I am conscious of a second person controlling my thoughts, even though there really isn’t.

I agree that the brain damage → mind damage thing is technically compatible with non-materialistic theories. But with the loss of the instrument the musician himself is not impaired, just his ability to make music. So if this is a good analogy, then brain damage should not impair mental functioning, just our ability to control our bodies and/or our ability to perceive our environment.

That’s an interesting response. Taking the analogy on a more parallel line though reveals a closer similarity to what we actually observe in the case of brain-damaged individuals:

Musician + instrument damaged = poor music
Person + brain damage = poor thinking.

That doesn’t just suggest that they would have problems controlling their body (which is often true) but also with thinking itself.

 

[manualman]

Look up the work of Dr. John Eccles. If I’m remembering correctly, he’s a renowned neuroscientist who devoted much of his life’s work studying the mind - brain link. If I’m remembering right, he came to the conclusion that the brain simply is NOT the source of thought, but a two way receiver/transmitter of thought.

In other words, the brain connects the mind and body like your cell phone connects you with a far away friend. If you are in the middle of a conversation with that friend and I walk up, grab you phone and smash it, I have not obliterated the friend, have I? I merely severed the link that connected you.

I’m not remotely scholar enough to explain it better, but was agog when I first heard it explained. Look him up. He, at least, is one brilliant scientist (MD at age 22, Nobel Prize later in life!) who studied the issue his whole life and never could believe that thoughts actually were generated inside the brain itself.

 

[SentinelofTruth]

dmar198:

Of course this assuming that “aware” is an sufficient definition of “conscious.” In reality, it’s just a synonym. And there are more familiar synonyms that might be more helpful: consciousness is knowing that you’re thinking or doing something. But this still doesn’t apparently preclude false knowledge or mistakes. I might think I am conscious of free will, but it’s not really free will (say the atheists), in the same way that I might think I am conscious of a second person controlling my thoughts, even though there really isn’t.

You appear to be saying that while we cannot be wrong that there is or is not a certain conscious event in our minds, we can be wrong about what these events are. This, however, is still incoherent. What if you just “think you’re conscious” of your belief in the brain-mind correlation but are actually wrong? As just illustrated, the only way you could know for certain that you don’t share me belief in the infallibility of introspection is if you accept that introspection is infallible.

dmar198:

Musician + instrument damaged = poor music
Person + brain damage = poor thinking.

This seems circular: the reason damage to the instrument impairs the musician’s ability to play music is because the instrument is the means by which he is playing the music. To assert that the same logic applies to the brain/mind issue requires the assumption that the brain is the means by which thinking is done. That, however, is precisely what is being disputed.

manualman:

In other words, the brain connects the mind and body like your cell phone connects you with a far away friend. If you are in the middle of a conversation with that friend and I walk up, grab you phone and smash it, I have not obliterated the friend, have I? I merely severed the link that connected you.

 

[polytropos]

Proof for substantivity of the soul:

1. 
   *]Everything is either a substance or an abstract concept.
   *]Nothing abstract is self-existing. Abstracts only exist insofar as they are instantiated in substances.
   *]The soul, however, as perceived through introspection, is clearly a conscious, and therefore inherently existing thing.
   *]Therefore the soul is a substance.

1. 
   I would say “abstracts” are not instantiated in substances but are abstracted from substances. You could argue, for instance, that the soul is not an abstraction. Or perhaps, you could argue that consciousness cannot be an abstraction because, if it were, there would be nothing to do the abstracting.

 

[yppop]

Sent
Maybe this will get your interest you:

Objective Reality
When we look at an apple sitting on a table, what do we see? We might answer that we see a smooth, round, red object. That answer describes a texture, a form, and a color. However, science tells us that the apple consists of molecules; that molecules are made up of atoms; that atoms are made up of protons, neutrons and electrons; and protons and neutrons are made up of quarks. But we don’t see that hierarchy of matter; we see a smooth three dimensional red form that we recognize as an apple. What we really see is the light that is reflected from the skin molecules of the apple in the form of photons of a particular energy (wavelength). When protons that are reflected from the apple enter our eyes they are focused by the lens on the retina where neurons are excited and send electric impulses along peripheral nerves to the various parts of the brain. In the brain, specific groups of neuronal circuits are excited and we “see” an image of the smooth, three dimensional, red form that we recognize as an apple. The question is: which is real, the configuration of molecules sitting on the table or the image of a smooth 3-D red object formed in the mind? Of course, both aspects exist and are therefore real. It is evident that these two aspects of reality, although existing in different ways, are intimately connected. The ordered arrangement of photons is manifested as both the form of the apple on the table and the “form” of the redness in the mind. Objective reality is essentially nothing but forms; and forms are nothing more than orderly configurations of individual (discrete) atoms and photons that exist outside our mind… *Objective reality is external and discrete. *

Subjective Reality
Science has shown us that the redness doesn’t inhere in the apple; but rather is associated with the nature of the photons reflected from the skin of the apple. However, we know that the photons are not red, nor does the redness arise in the eye, which brings us to the neurons in the brain. Obviously the redness of the apple is created somewhere in the brain. The unresolved question is how is the redness of the apple actualized, by which I mean, brought into reality? No one knows; all we can say for certain is that redness is real, but real in a different sort of way than the configuration of molecules that we identify as the form of the apple that occupies a specific segment of space outside our eyes. The redness, on the other hand, is formless and resides in the mind. We refer to the molecular structure of the apple as objective reality and we refer to the image created by the brain as subjective reality. We conclude that both the molecular configuration of the apple and the image it creates within one’s mind are real. However the only thing that exists in objective reality is the configurations of discrete particles all else—light, color, odor, touch, sound inheres as formless subjective experience. In other words the apple exists at two levels of reality: the objectively and the subjectively.
Redness isn’t the only property of the apple that exists subjectively; there are tastes, smells, and sensations of touch, sounds, and sight. In fact, all of the images that the senses create in the mind are called qualia. After all what exists outside our minds is nothing more than the arrangement of discrete elements we call atoms. Although each quale is most likely associated with a specific neuronal circuit in the brain, science has no plausible explanation for qualia other than to say that they are an emergent property of the brain. When we are conscious and the senses are awake and alert, the mind acts to integrate the form of objects with the associated qualia to create a percept that can be stored in our memory. The details of how this works will be discussed in a later chapter. In this chapter, I am presenting my view of existence in general terms. Suffice it to say at this point, the percept that is produced and stored does not have specific form—as I will explain later—that is, it conveys not a sense of discreteness, but rather that of continuity. Notes are transformed into melody, photons into redness of a sunset, molecules into the feel of a baby’s cheek. Discrete becomes continuous within the mind. Qualia do not exist externally, the redness exists only within the brain. The configuration of atoms and molecules are transformed in the entire experience of sensations, the magical mysticism of subjective reality. Subjective reality is internal and continuous.

Obviously there is a duality in the brain; neuronal circuits form the material memory; the spiritual forms the perceptual memory where all the qualia, feelings, emotions, percepts and concepts are stored.
Yppop

 

[dmar198]

You appear to be saying that while we cannot be wrong that there is or is not a certain conscious event in our minds, we can be wrong about what these events are. This, however, is still incoherent. What if you just “think you’re conscious” of your belief in the brain-mind correlation but are actually wrong? As just illustrated, the only way you could know for certain that you don’t share me belief in the infallibility of introspection is if you accept that introspection is infallible.

This seems circular: the reason damage to the instrument impairs the musician’s ability to play music is because the instrument is the means by which he is playing the music. To assert that the same logic applies to the brain/mind issue requires the assumption that the brain is the means by which thinking is done. That, however, is precisely what is being disputed.

Well, the conversation is now a little bit above where my brain wants to go, so to you in your endeavor to get a philosophically rigorous semi-modern (like that matters) proof of free will. I look forward to seeing it when it’s complete.

 

[Aloysium]

I am floating in a dark sea of my own ignorance, but what the heck, here are a few thoughts on the subject:

Human existence is relational, which you can split up into subjective and objective categories if it helps clarify something within reality, but doing so will alter the particular relationship you have with that which you are trying to understand.

The intellectual frameworks of mind, body, soul act like individual lenses that block the other colors to reveal what is occurring within a certain part of the spectrum (i.e.: mental, physical or spiritual); using this analogy, the unity of the human person would be equivalent to white light.
In other words they are different ways we have of understanding the person who exists in union with his environment.
So, it’s not so much that the mind and brain interact as it is that but that these are ways in which we can describe what we observe.
If I have a stroke and it knocks out my speech, I will lose my words, and as I write, that centre is being very active. One person doing stuff here and now - very complicated though.

I believe that physical things are not “deterministic”. This is an assumption that allows us to construct our theories, but it is God’s Word that brings creation into existence, including the material and even randomness.
Our will cannot change the physical or the psychological directly, although it can act physically and communicate to cause change materially, socially or spiritually.

Something like that . . .

 

[Tomdstone]

Hey, I’m looking to disprove the common idea that there is a direct causal correlation between brain events and mind events (other than perception, of course). I am aware of how bold this is, since even the wikipedia articles on the brain and such are explicitly at odds with me, but I won’t be stopped just because I’m (probably) alone in this. So here’s what I’ve got so far:

Proof for the existence of free will:

1. 
   *]Introspection is the means by which we perceive our conscious phenomena, including thoughts, emotions, desires, perceptions, and… free decisions.
   *]Following from the definition of “conscious”, it is impossible for a conscious event to occur in my mind without my knowledge, or for me to think a conscious event occurs in my mind but be mistaken.
   *]Thus, to suggest that introspection is not infallible is incoherent.
   *]And introspection tells me that I make free decisions. Therefore, I do.
   
   .

1. 
   This is really an interesting question that you have brought up here. I have asked myself how could consciousness arise from a rock or a handful of sand? It is baffling to me.
   Anyway, there have been several books written on consciousness. Have you read any of them?
   Consciousness and the Universe: Roger Penrose
   Quantum physics of consciousness: Roger Penrose
   Cosmology of consciousness: Deepak Chopra
   Consciousness: Simon Raggett
   Quantum enigma - Physics encounters consciousness: Bruce Rosenblum
   Mystery of consciousness: john Searle

 

[SentinelofTruth]

I have read only one book about the subject (Philosophy of Mind, by Edward Feser). However it was not this book that sparked my interest in philosophy and all of my arguments (except the one about inherent meaning) are my own invention.

Aloysium:

I believe that physical things are not “deterministic”. This is an assumption that allows us to construct our theories, but it is God’s Word that brings creation into existence, including the material and even randomness.

By deterministic I meant that they follow a rigid, causal pattern and don’t do anything unless caused to. But what you appear to mean by denying their “deterministicity” is simply that God created them. Not sure what their created-by-God-ness has to do with their being deterministic.

Aloysius:

Our will cannot change the physical or the psychological directly, although it can act physically and communicate to cause change materially, socially or spiritually.

You say we can’t change the physical directly and then you say our will can act physically. ???. Also it is undeniable that our will can change our own mind, and that is physchological.

polytropos:

I would say “abstracts” are not instantiated in substances but are abstracted from substances.

I don’t see the difference.

dmar198:

Well, the conversation is now a little bit above where my brain wants to go, so to you in your endeavor to get a philosophically rigorous semi-modern (like that matters) proof of free will. I look forward to seeing it when it’s complete.

Hold your horses, the proof of free will is totally complete. The only part that’s not complete is the proof that mental faculties other than free will have no direct causal correlation with neural events. And despite my failure to prove that, I did (with the argument labeled “immateriality of other mental phenomena”) prove at least that they aren’t identical to brain states, so your brain can’t want anything

 

[polytropos]

I don’t see the difference.

Suppose there are 3 bears standing in front of you. Do you abstract the number 3 from them, or is the number 3 “instantiated” in them?

 

[Tomdstone]

Suppose there are 3 bears standing in front of you. Do you abstract the number 3 from them, or is the number 3 “instantiated” in them?

I would say both. First of all, what is the number 3. The number 3 is written as 11 in base 2, but it means the same thing as 3 in the base 10. What is meant by 3. It means that there is a 1-1 correspondence between your first 3 fingers and the 3 bears. So in a sense you have abstracted the fact that the count of the number of bears is 3. However, the fact that there are 3 bears is also an instance of an example of 3 items, just as your first 3 fingers is an instance of an example of 3 items. Since both are instances of 3, it is clear that 3 is instantiated in them.