Modalism in Aquinas?

[TheLearner]

The discussion on this link suggests that there is modalism in Aquinas: wellofquestions.wordpress.com/2009/04/14/aquinas-conflating-person-and-essence-in-god-redux/

"Since a relation, insasmuch as it is something real in God, is the divine essence itself, and the essence is the same as a person, as we have already made clear, it must be that the relation is the same as a person.”

Aquinas uses the transition above to say that relation is the same as a person.
Let A = relation
In asmuch as A is something real in God, A is equal to the divine essence
Let B = to the divine essence
Given the minor premise, A = B.
Let C= person in God.
B = C as was already stated by Aquinas.
Therefore A = C.

Why isn’t this transition good:

If Father = DivineEssence, and Son = DivineEssence, then Son = Father.

I see nothing wrong with that logic. The conclusion that we would draw is that it seems differentiation in the Godhead only really exists from the perception of those things that are actually differentiated: creatures.

 

[Katholish]

Looks like you have really been studying up on the Trinity.

I can see why it might appear that Thomas or all of the Scholastic tradition might tend toward Sebellianism/Modalism, however, it is only a false impression and is not a real tendency. St. Thomas fully argues that the Father is not the Son and the Son is not the Holy Spirit, etc. The reason why your identity equation does not make Thomas a Modalist is because the terms are unknowing being changed. If A, B, and C were all substances, then you would be correct, or even if all the terms were persons, you would be right, but the equation becomes invalid when you shift back and forth between terms which are substance and terms which are relations.

If you want a real in-depth explanation, here is Thomas. The first two articles of Question 28 deal exactly with the question you are asking. Article 1 asks if they are really disctine, Article two if they are really the same.

 

[Ghosty]

The discussion on this link suggests that there is modalism in Aquinas: wellofquestions.wordpress.com/2009/04/14/aquinas-conflating-person-and-essence-in-god-redux/

There is a total misunderstanding of Aquinas on that page.

When Aquinas says that relation is the same as the Divine Essence, he’s saying that there is nothing in the Persons that is “added on” over the Divine Essence. The Son is not “Divine Essence” plus some other trait, as in how humans are the “human essence” plus this flesh and these bones. So when Aquinas says that the relation (or Person) is the Divine Essence, he’s merely saying that the Person is simple and only Divine.

Aquinas is most assuredly NOT saying that relation A (the Father) is relation B (the Son). They are differentiated by the fact that Father is opposite of Son, so even though they share the identical Essence, and have nothing but the Divine Essence, they are distinguished by origin or opposing relations; the difference does not occur on the level of Essence, nor is the difference the result of anything being added to the Person above and beyond the Divine Essence.

So, when we see the Son, we see God purely and simply, and nothing else. The only thing that distinguishes the Father (which is purely God) and the Son (which is purely God), is the fact that the Father can’t be the Son, as begettor is opposed to begotten.

I can go into more detail if you like, but I’ll wait and see if this simple (or maybe simplistic) explaination is enough.

Peace and God bless!

 

[TheLearner]

I urge you to post these replies in the comment section on the article.

But I think you are ignoring the Q28, A2 and the Q39, A1 of the Summa Theologica, which the article brings up.

Q28

Whether relation in God is the same as His essence?

(…)

** Thus it is manifest that relation really existing in God is really the same as His essence and only differs in its mode of intelligibility; as in relation is meant that regard to its opposite which is not expressed in the name of essence. Thus it is clear that in God relation and essence do not differ from each other, but are one and the same.**
.

Q39

Whether in God the essence is the same as the person?

(…)

I answer that, The truth of this question is quite clear if we consider the divine simplicity. For it was shown above (Q[3], A[3]) that the divine simplicity requires that in God essence is the same as “suppositum,” which in intellectual substances is nothing else than person. But a difficulty seems to arise from the fact that while the divine persons are multiplied, the essence nevertheless retains its unity. And because, as Boethius says (De Trin. i), “relation multiplies the Trinity of persons,” some have thought that in God essence and person differ, forasmuch as they held the relations to be “adjacent”; considering only in the relations the idea of “reference to another,” and not the relations as realities. But as it was shown above (Q[28], A[2]) in creatures relations are accidental, **whereas in God they are the divine essence itself. Thence it follows that in God essence is not really distinct from person;** and yet that the persons are really distinguished from each other. For person, as above stated (Q[29], A[4]), signifies relation as subsisting in the divine nature.**But relation as referred to the essence does not differ therefrom really, but only in our way of thinking;** while as referred to an opposite relation, it has a real distinction by virtue of that opposition. Thus there are one essence and three persons.

 

[Ghosty]

I urge you to post these replies in the comment section on the article.

I won’t post any replies on that article. I know the people involved in the discussion, and responding to them would unfortunately be a waste of time. I used to engage in discussions with several of them years ago, and they’re still on about the same nonsense as they were back then.

If you would like to post responses based on anything we share, however, please be my guest. (I’ve actually done this very thing with Jay Dyer, one of the posters on that article, through another friend).

As for the quotes from the Summa:

Thus it is manifest that relation really existing in God is really the same as His essence and only differs in its mode of intelligibility; as in relation is meant that regard to its opposite which is not expressed in the name of essence. Thus it is clear that in God relation and essence do not differ from each other, but are one and the same.

You’re leaving out the most important portion of context, which is the preceeding sentence:

But in so far as relation implies respect to something else, no respect to the essence is signified, but rather to its opposite term.

Aquinas is working from the philosophical premise that when there is no difference between two things, they are actually the same. In the case of relation, there is no difference between “relation” and “essence”, since relation does not refer to a relationship between Essence and something.

To put it another way, there is nothing in themselves to distinguish “Divine Essence” from “the Son” or “the Father”, since the “what” of the Son is simply the Divine Essence. If you look at the Son, you are seeing God, and if you look at the Father you are seeing the God. The difference doesn’t lie between “Son” and “God” (Divine Essence), but between “Son” and “Father”. So we can say “Father and Son are different”, because their relations are opposed and can’t abide in the same thing (nothing can be both father and son in the same sense at one time; nothing can be its own father or its own son).

So all Aquinas is saying here is that the distinction is not found between the Person and the Essence, but the Person and the other Person. We can’t say “how can you tell the difference between the Son and God” because the Son IS absolutely God, but we can say “how can you tell the difference between the Son and the Father”, since the Son is most definitely NOT the Father. If there was any way to make a real distinction between “Son” (relation) and “God” (Divine Essence), then we would not have one God in three Persons, but a creature we call “the Son of God” (Arianism), or another Divine Essence for the Son that is not the same as the Divine Essence for the Father (polytheism).

But as it was shown above (Q[28], A[2]) in creatures relations are accidental, whereas in God they are the divine essence itself. Thence it follows that in God essence is not really distinct from person; and yet that the persons are really distinguished from each other. For person, as above stated (Q[29], A[4]), signifies relation as subsisting in the divine nature.But relation as referred to the essence does not differ therefrom really, but only in our way of thinking; while as referred to an opposite relation, it has a real distinction by virtue of that opposition. Thus there are one essence and three persons.

This is merely a re-statement of the above: the distinction lies between Persons, not between Person and Essence. Since there IS a real distinction between Persons (Father has a trait that is really distinct and incompatible with Sonship), there are no grounds for accusing Aquinas of Sabellianism (the belief that there is no real distinction between Persons, only a mentally constructed distinction, like how I can distinguish between you as a student and you as a worker despite them really being the same person).

When comparing the Person (Son) to the Essence (God), there can be NO distinction, because the Son is God indeed. When comparing the Son to the Father, however, there is a real distinction. All Aquinas is doing is showing how we can say certainly that the Son and the Father are one God (since on the level of Essence they are identical, not just in appearance but in actually sharing one single Essence in fact and being) while on the level of Person they are really distinct (since Father can’t be Son).

The real problem here is that the people analyzing the articles aren’t familiar with Scholastic use of terms, and aren’t being especially rigorous in applying definitions.

Peace and God bless!

 

[Katholish]

Very well said Ghosty.

 

[Ghosty]

One thing I think is important to add is that this idea of Aquinas’ is not actually his own, but in fact goes back to the Cappadocian Fathers who formalized the understanding of the Trinity in the first place. This is important to note because the people involved in that discussion will say that Aquinas was breaking from Patristic teaching, especially from Eastern teaching, when in fact they’re merely demonstrating their own ignorance of traditional Eastern Roman (i.e. Byzantine/Eastern Orthodox) theology.

Here is what St. Gregory of Nyssa (Cappadocian Father) said about differentiating the Persons of the Trinity:

This is the cause why it says, the Lord our God is one Lord Deuteronomy 6:4, and also proclaims the Only-begotten God by the name of Godhead, without dividing the Unity into a dual signification, so as to call the Father and the Son two Gods, although each is proclaimed by the holy writers as God. The Father is God: the Son is God: and yet by the same proclamation God is One, because no difference either of nature or of operation is contemplated in the Godhead. For if (according to the idea of those who have been led astray) the nature of the Holy Trinity were diverse, the number would by consequence be extended to a plurality of Gods, being divided according to the diversity of essence in the subjects. But since the Divine, single, and unchanging nature, that it may be one, rejects all diversity in essence, it does not admit in its own case the signification of multitude; but as it is called one nature, so it is called in the singular by all its other names, God, Good, Holy, Saviour, Just, Judge, and every other Divine name conceivable: whether one says that the names refer to nature or to operation, we shall not dispute the point.

If, however, any one cavils at our argument, on the ground that by not admitting the difference of nature it leads to a mixture and confusion of the Persons, we shall make to such a charge this answer—that while we confess the invariable character of the nature, we do not deny the difference in respect of cause, and that which is caused, by which alone we apprehend that one Person is distinguished from another—by our belief, that is, that one is the Cause, and another is of the Cause; and again in that which is of the Cause we recognize another distinction. For one is directly from the first Cause, and another by that which is directly from the first Cause; so that the attribute of being Only-begotten abides without doubt in the Son, and the interposition of the Son, while it guards His attribute of being Only-begotten, does not shut out the Spirit from His relation by way of nature to the Father.

But in speaking of cause, and of the cause, we do not by these words denote nature (for no one would give the same definition of cause and of nature), but we indicate the difference in manner of existence. For when we say that one is caused, and that the other is without cause, we do not divide the nature by the word cause, but only indicate the fact that the Son does not exist without generation, nor the Father by generation: but we must needs in the first place believe that something exists, and then scrutinize the manner of existence of the object of our belief: thus the question of existence is one, and that of the mode of existence is another. To say that anything exists without generation sets forth the mode of its existence, but what exists is not indicated by this phrase. If one were to ask a husbandman about a tree, whether it were planted or had grown of itself, and he were to answer either that the tree had not been planted or that it was the result of planting, would he by that answer declare the nature of the tree? Surely not; but while saying how it exists he would leave the question of its nature obscure and unexplained. So, in the other case, when we learn that He is unbegotten, we are taught in what mode He exists, and how it is fit that we should conceive Him as existing, but what He is we do not hear in that phrase. When, therefore, we acknowledge such a distinction in the case of the Holy Trinity, as to believe that one Person is the Cause, and another is of the Cause, we can no longer be accused of confounding the definition of the Persons by the community of nature.

It’s a lengthy passage, but it’s worth reading over a few times. St. Gregory, like St. Thomas, is saying that the Divine Nature is singular and undifferentiated, and that the Father is God and the Son is God, but that when speaking of the relation between Father and Son we come to the distinction. We don’t find the distinction between “Son” and “God”, since God is One and simple, and the Son is God. If there was a distinction between Person and God, then the Son would not be fully God, after all. Even St. Gregory says that the only distinction that can be spoken of is between Persons, between Father and Son, unbegotten and begotten. St. Thomas falls directly in line with the Patristic tradition, East and West.

Peace and God bless!

 

[TheLearner]

Thanks for your answers. That seems to settle the issue really.

 

[Ghosty]

Thanks for your answers. That seems to settle the issue really.

I pray that it’s settled the issue in favor of the orthodoxy of St. Thomas Aquinas.

Peace and God bless!

 

[TheLearner]

After thinking abit about it, please meditate on this statement:

“Since a relation, insasmuch as it is something real in God, is the divine essence itself, and the essence is the same as a person,"

Even if Aquinas doesn’t conflate person with person, wouldn’t it be fair to say he equates/conflates person and essence, as the article I linked originally said? “The essence is the same as a person” is hardly ambiguous on that point.

 

[Ghosty]

After thinking abit about it, please meditate on this statement:

“Since a relation, insasmuch as it is something real in God, is the divine essence itself, and the essence is the same as a person,"

Even if Aquinas doesn’t conflate person with person, wouldn’t it be fair to say he equates/conflates person and essence, as the article I linked originally said? “The essence is the same as a person” is hardly ambiguous on that point.

Again, Person MUST be the same as the Divine Essence if the Person is wholly God and not something else. If the Son is equally God as the Father is God, then Divine Essence MUST be the same as Person.

The original Latin does lose something in the translation into English.

If you doubt the point that Aquinas is making, just think of the alternative: Divine Essence is NOT the same as Person. If that were the case, then none of the Divine Persons are truly and fully God, since they are all something other than God. If only the Father is the same as the Divine Essence, and the other Persons are different, then Arius was correct. If the Divine Essence is simply “an essence in general”, it lacks concrete being, and is therefore less than infinite, and is in fact less than each individual member of the Trinity (which is a self-contradiction), or it is simply a general nature that the three have in common (like three humans share humanity) in which case polytheism is true.

It is only if each Person is entirely the Divine Essence, and that their sole difference is by relation of origin, that we have the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity. So the logic problem posed in the first post can’t apply, since A (Father) = B (God), and C (Son) = B (God), but A does not = C, since A contradicts C, but neither contradict B (and that is precisely Aquinas’ point, that there is no distinction/contradiction between each individual Person and “God”).

Peace and God bless!

 

[TheLearner]

After reading an article about Thomas, I’ve yet again found some issues that I am trying to find an answer to.

(…)

I will focus on just one example of this: namely Thomas’ treatment of the Divine persons as ‘subsisting relations’. Kilby traces this idea first to Gregory of Nazianzus and then to Augustine. She goes on to contrast this with the so-called ‘social Trinitarian’ model of three ‘somethings’ united in love. Aquinas appears to be exclusively speaking of ‘relations without relata’, a thought which is unthinkable for the human imagination (and hence enters the realm of the apophatic). I think this assessment is accurate in regards to Aquinas, but that he has also mutated the tradition in a significant way.

Aquinas begins with the Boethian definition of person: ‘persona est rationalis naturae individua substantia.’ as a translation of the Greek hypostasis which Thomas further defines as ‘an individual in the genus of substance’.[85] This does not suggest relations without remainder but rather indicates an individual existence for each hypostasis. However, in light of what we have argued earlier regarding Thomas’ doctrine of analogy defining terms univocally and then applying them in the ‘mode of supereminence’, Aquinas appears to apply the term ‘persons’ to God exclusively as ‘relations’(‘persona est relatio’),[86]. He is attempting to strip the term of its empirical limitations, leaving only the perfection and not the finite mode of signification. McCabe comments:

“Aquinas quotes with ostensible approval Boethius’ definition of a person as ‘an individual substance of rational nature.’ **But, as speedily emerges, the ‘persons’ of the Trinity are not individuals, not substances, not rational and do not have natures.** What Aquinas labours to show is that in this unique case ‘person’ can mean relation.”[87]

An investigation of the trajectory of ‘persons as relations’ within the tradition however reveals that Aquinas’ reductionist interpretation is a novelty. [88] Augustine, for example, who also deployed the language of relations could at the same time still link these to their relata.[89] So in De Trinitate he writes:

“..every being that is called something by way of relationship is also something besides the relationship; thus a master is also a man, and a slave is a man…….If the Father is not also something with reference to himself, there is nothing there to be talked about with reference to something else.”[90]

Commenting on the Augustinian understanding in contrast to that of Aquinas, Moltmann writes:

“…this relational understanding of the Persons has as its premise the ‘substantial’ interpretation of their individuality; the one does not replace the other.”[91]

(…)

Likewise Basil[93] speaks boldly (and by modern Barthian standards somewhat crudely) of Peter, Andrew and John united by the common predicate ‘man’ as an analogy of Father, Son and Spirit united in the one nature ‘God.’[94]

(…)

** A primary consideration for the shift to a reductionist interpretation of persons in terms of ‘relations’ seems to be for Aquinas his commitment to a strong form of Divine simplicity. ** (…)

Although attractive for Christian apologetics in providing a possible solution to the Euthyphro dilemma and in strengthening the cosmological argument,** this doctrine of God has the weakness of not being taught in the Scriptures [or consensus of patristic tradition] themselves**.

(…)

The traditional doctrine of the trinity, in contrast to the heresy of modalism, associated with Sabellius in the early third century AD, demands that there are real distinctions in God (and therefore real generation and real procession). Modalism teaches that ultimately God is only one person. In order to hold onto orthodoxy, Aquinas agrees in Summa Theologiae that “relations exist in God really.”[106] and that:

“if the relations were not really distinguished from each other, there would be no real trinity in God, but only an ideal trinity, which is the error of Sabellius.”[107]

The problem with Aquinas, is not in what he says, but in what he also says. Aquinas’ instinct, arising from the organising principle of Simplicity, leads him towards the very modalism he seeks to avoid, when he asserts,** “it is manifest that relation really existing in God is really the same as His essence and only differs in its mode of intelligibility.”**[108]

Aquinas illustrates his position with Aristotle’s example of action, passion and motion to show that fatherhood and sonship are **logically **distinct in a similar way.[109] This could be criticised however as pointing to the conclusion that God is one person (in the modern sense of the term) with logically distinct self-relations. In other words, this still leads to Sabellianism.

Cornelius Plantinga observes that, to avoid modalism, it is not enough for Aquinas simply to show that these relations are logically distinct, Aquinas must show that they are really distinct[110].

Instead, Thomas presents a position which appears to endorse two mutually incompatible beliefs: namely that subsisting relations really differ from each other and not only in our understanding but also that they differ only in our understanding. Karen Kilby observes the same dilemma in her essay.[111]

Another problem not addressed by Thomas is how, within his model of the Trinity, the Son can know that he is the Son and distinct from the Father? and how the father can know that he is the Father and distinct from the Son when according to simplicity there is only one knowledge and one consciousness?

Source: quodlibet.net/articles/darley-aquinas.shtml

The highlighted parts are especially important and especially the part about God being really just one person with logically distinct self-relations, with relation being simply redefined as signifying person. And the question of how such a “relation” itself knows that it is really distinct from another relation if there is only one knowledge and one consciousness.

 

[Ghosty]

The entire article is absurd, and shows no understanding of Aquinas’ use of terms. Honestly, if you’re going to keep digging up sloppy articles and relying on them as a source of understanding Aquinas, you’ll never get past these difficulties.

I strongly recommend getting a good book by experts in Thomistic thought, like those by Peter Kreeft. These people you’re quoting don’t seem to know the first thing about the terms being used, and are building faulty arguments from the very start.

For example, when Aquinas says that the Persons are relations, he’s not making a reductionist argument at all, but merely pointing out that “God begotten”, which is a term of relation, is the same thing as “God the Son”, which is Person. There is no distinction between “God begotten” and “God the Son”, there is no “Son” before “begotten”, not just in time, but also ontologically. “Son” and “begotten” are identical, because the term of relation “God begotten” refers directly to Person in God, and not to an accidental relationship affixed to a Person (the Son’s very identity is that He’s begotten; His entire identity is founded on the relation, not on anything else that could be called distinct from the other Divine Persons).

Aquinas can not be accused of Sabellianism because he makes it very clear that the relations (begotten, spirated, begetting, ect.) refer directly to the distinct Persons as subsisting. These people seem to be ignoring this glaring fact in favor of keeping to their faulty interpretation of his terms. They prefer their mistaken definitions to the actual statements of Aquinas, accusing him of inconsistancy rather than evaluating where they may have gone wrong in their understanding.

Peace and God bless!

 

[TheLearner]

The entire article is absurd, and shows no understanding of Aquinas’ use of terms. Honestly, if you’re going to keep digging up sloppy articles and relying on them as a source of understanding Aquinas, you’ll never get past these difficulties.

Well, I hope you are right, and I only have in mind to eliminate these difficulties, not to purposefully create them. Better to address it and finish it than let it affect my views of Aquinas.

The statement they quoted from Aquinas to support the idea that he is only making the relations distinct logically:

“it is manifest that relation really existing in God is really the same as His essence and only differs in its mode of intelligibility.”

does seem kind of modalistic, though.

I strongly recommend getting a good book by experts in Thomistic thought, like those by Peter Kreeft. These people you’re quoting don’t seem to know the first thing about the terms being used, and are building faulty arguments from the very start.

For example, when Aquinas says that the Persons are relations, he’s not making a reductionist argument at all, but merely pointing out that “God begotten”, which is a term of relation, is the same thing as “God the Son”, which is Person. There is no distinction between “God begotten” and “God the Son”, there is no “Son” before “begotten”, not just in time, but also ontologically. “Son” and “begotten” are identical, because the term of relation “God begotten” refers directly to Person in God, and not to an accidental relationship affixed to a Person (the Son’s very identity is that He’s begotten; His entire identity is founded on the relation, not on anything else that could be called distinct from the other Divine Persons).

But how does this mean that a person can be said to be just a “relation”? This idea does not seem to be present in Gregory of Nazanzius or Augustine, where relation is all that distinguishes the persons, but is not something that the person is reducible to.

For instance, how does the relation have knowledge of itself and that it is a relation distinct from the other relation?

Aquinas can not be accused of Sabellianism because he makes it very clear that the relations (begotten, spirated, begetting, ect.) refer directly to the distinct Persons as subsisting. These people seem to be ignoring this glaring fact in favor of keeping to their faulty interpretation of his terms. They prefer their mistaken definitions to the actual statements of Aquinas, accusing him of inconsistancy rather than evaluating where they may have gone wrong in their understanding.

And yet he refers to relations as only differs in their mode of intelligibility from the Divine Essence as such, which he has already defined as completely void of any distinctions.

 

[Ghosty]

Well, I hope you are right, and I only have in mind to eliminate these difficulties, not to purposefully create them. Better to address it and finish it than let it affect my views of Aquinas.

I understand that you’re not looking to create difficulties, I’m just pointing out that you seem to be looking in the wrong places if you want to understand Aquinas. Best to start with experts on Aquinas first, since they have a much better grasp of the terms being used, and the context in which they were used. If you start with those who study Aquinas in a mistaken and polemical fashion, it’s really no different than taking a course in Catholicism at a fundamentalist Baptist college.

“it is manifest that relation really existing in God is really the same as His essence and only differs in its mode of intelligibility.”

This relates directly to what we said before about the fact that there is no difference between Divine Essence and Divine Person, in terms of points of distinction. What is there in the Divine Essence that is not in the Son? Nothing. What is in the Son that is not in the Divine Essence? Nothing. If any of the Divine Persons have anything in them that is “other” than the Divine Essence, then they would be “other than God” by definition. This is brought out in the Creed when we say “of one substance”, because they don’t merely share a nature in a general way, as humans do, but share the very same identical nature, and in terms of substance are not just “like” eachother, but identical to each other.

But how does this mean that a person can be said to be just a “relation”? This idea does not seem to be present in Gregory of Nazanzius or Augustine, where relation is all that distinguishes the persons, but is not something that the person is reducible to.

For instance, how does the relation have knowledge of itself and that it is a relation distinct from the other relation?

This is an example of the terms not being understood as Aquinas uses them. Remember that Aquinas makes it absolutely clear that, in God, relations “subsist”; they are not attributes, but rather are the Divine Essence, are God, and are therefore Personal. He is not using “relation” in God and “relation” in creatures univocally, and he makes this very clear.

So, whereas in us we might say that “humanity proceeding from Adam”, we would be saying that there are two or more distinct human beings, and not one substance. “Proceeding from Adam” is an attribute of Eve, and does not subsist in itself because “humanity proceeding” is not its own being (because “humanity” is not its own being), but rather is an attribute/accident of “this human person, Eve”. Relation, in the case of all creatures, is something less than being, and is rather a description of one being’s relation to another.

With God, however, whenever we say “God” refering properly to the Divine Nature Itself, we automatically assume subsisting being, since God fundamentally is, and is Personal (“I Am that Am” is the only proper name of God, after all). So when we say “God proceeding from the Father”, this relation automatically is, and is Personal. It’s not an accident, because it is self-subsisting by definition in being “God”. So when we say “God begotten”, it is not describing the relational attribute of the Son, but the very being and Person of the Son, whereas when we say “humanity begotten” it carries no such connotation of individual subsistence.

The knowledge of the Son is the knowledge of the Father. These are not two seperate beings who confront eachother and learn externally of eachother, nor two individual beings who come to knowledge of self by exposure to “other”, but rather two Persons who share the very same singular being and knowledge. The Son knows the Father by the Divine Essence Itself, which is the very same substance (not generally, but totally) for the Father and the Son. This is why Christ can say “nobody knows the Son except the Father, and nobody knows the Father except the Son”. The Son has all the knowledge of the Father, not as a seperate knowledge, but as one single knowledge; the difference is that this knowledge is unbegotten in the Father, and begotten in the Son. The distinction of Persons lies in their relation to eachother, not in any difference of substance in any way.

And yet he refers to relations as only differs in their mode of intelligibility from the Divine Essence as such, which he has already defined as completely void of any distinctions.

They differ from the Divine Essence only in the mind, but Aquinas never says they differ from eachother only in the mind (this was the error of Sabellius, who said that “Father” and “Son” were merely mental distinctions, like “Ghosty the typist” and “Ghosty the Thomist”). Again, these people are falling into the trap of collapsing all the terms into eachother, rather than maintaining the very precise distinctions that Aquinas has laid out. When Aquinas says that “God begotten” is the same as “God”, this is because “God begotten” neither lacks nor adds anything to “God” as an Essence. Aquinas does NOT say that “begotten is the same as begettor”. Begotten is, by definition, opposite of begettor, but begotten is in no way distinct from God. And even though both begotten and begettor do not differ in any way from God, they are distinct from eachother, so that the distinction lies between relations/Persons, and not on the level of substance. If “God begotten” in any way differed from “God”, then there would be a difference of substance between “God begotten” and “God”, and we would have two Gods, and not one.

Remember, we don’t just say we have one Divinity, but one Divine. We don’t just have one Godliness, but one God. This is not something we say of humanity and human. Neither you, nor I are the same as humanity itself; we are both human, but we are not one humanity, let alone one human. If the Son is not just Godly like the Father, but is one God with the Father, then Father must equal God, and Son must equal God, but Father need not equal Son.

Modern (and ancient heretical) attempts to equate these Persons as A = B = C miss the entire sublety of Apostolic theology, from the Cappadocian Fathers through Aquinas. It’s attempting to put Divinity into a straightjacket of creaturely reasoning; God is reasonable, for sure, but our reasoning is limited when dealing with the Divine Infinite.

 

[sillyfrog]

Your answers settle down the question.http://www.photosnag.com/img/4713/n09x0302vnsn/clear.gif

 

[TheLearner]

I understand that you’re not looking to create difficulties, I’m just pointing out that you seem to be looking in the wrong places if you want to understand Aquinas. Best to start with experts on Aquinas first, since they have a much better grasp of the terms being used, and the context in which they were used. If you start with those who study Aquinas in a mistaken and polemical fashion, it’s really no different than taking a course in Catholicism at a fundamentalist Baptist college.

This relates directly to what we said before about the fact that there is no difference between Divine Essence and Divine Person, in terms of points of distinction. What is there in the Divine Essence that is not in the Son? Nothing. What is in the Son that is not in the Divine Essence? Nothing. If any of the Divine Persons have anything in them that is “other” than the Divine Essence, then they would be “other than God” by definition. This is brought out in the Creed when we say “of one substance”, because they don’t merely share a nature in a general way, as humans do, but share the very same identical nature, and in terms of substance are not just “like” eachother, but identical to each other.

This is an example of the terms not being understood as Aquinas uses them. Remember that Aquinas makes it absolutely clear that, in God, relations “subsist”; they are not attributes, but rather are the Divine Essence, are God, and are therefore Personal. He is not using “relation” in God and “relation” in creatures univocally, and he makes this very clear.

So, whereas in us we might say that “humanity proceeding from Adam”, we would be saying that there are two or more distinct human beings, and not one substance. “Proceeding from Adam” is an attribute of Eve, and does not subsist in itself because “humanity proceeding” is not its own being (because “humanity” is not its own being), but rather is an attribute/accident of “this human person, Eve”. Relation, in the case of all creatures, is something less than being, and is rather a description of one being’s relation to another.

With God, however, whenever we say “God” refering properly to the Divine Nature Itself, we automatically assume subsisting being, since God fundamentally is, and is Personal (“I Am that Am” is the only proper name of God, after all). So when we say “God proceeding from the Father”, this relation automatically is, and is Personal. It’s not an accident, because it is self-subsisting by definition in being “God”. So when we say “God begotten”, it is not describing the relational attribute of the Son, but the very being and Person of the Son, whereas when we say “humanity begotten” it carries no such connotation of individual subsistence.

The knowledge of the Son is the knowledge of the Father. These are not two seperate beings who confront eachother and learn externally of eachother, nor two individual beings who come to knowledge of self by exposure to “other”, but rather two Persons who share the very same singular being and knowledge. The Son knows the Father by the Divine Essence Itself, which is the very same substance (not generally, but totally) for the Father and the Son. This is why Christ can say “nobody knows the Son except the Father, and nobody knows the Father except the Son”. The Son has all the knowledge of the Father, not as a seperate knowledge, but as one single knowledge; the difference is that this knowledge is unbegotten in the Father, and begotten in the Son. The distinction of Persons lies in their relation to eachother, not in any difference of substance in any way.

They differ from the Divine Essence only in the mind, but Aquinas never says they differ from eachother only in the mind (this was the error of Sabellius, who said that “Father” and “Son” were merely mental distinctions, like “Ghosty the typist” and “Ghosty the Thomist”). Again, these people are falling into the trap of collapsing all the terms into eachother, rather than maintaining the very precise distinctions that Aquinas has laid out. When Aquinas says that “God begotten” is the same as “God”, this is because “God begotten” neither lacks nor adds anything to “God” as an Essence. Aquinas does NOT say that “begotten is the same as begettor”. Begotten is, by definition, opposite of begettor, but begotten is in no way distinct from God. And even though both begotten and begettor do not differ in any way from God, they are distinct from eachother, so that the distinction lies between relations/Persons, and not on the level of substance. If “God begotten” in any way differed from “God”, then there would be a difference of substance between “God begotten” and “God”, and we would have two Gods, and not one.

Remember, we don’t just say we have one Divinity, but one Divine. We don’t just have one Godliness, but one God. This is not something we say of humanity and human. Neither you, nor I are the same as humanity itself; we are both human, but we are not one humanity, let alone one human. If the Son is not just Godly like the Father, but is one God with the Father, then Father must equal God, and Son must equal God, but Father need not equal Son.

Modern (and ancient heretical) attempts to equate these Persons as A = B = C miss the entire sublety of Apostolic theology, from the Cappadocian Fathers through Aquinas. It’s attempting to put Divinity into a straightjacket of creaturely reasoning; God is reasonable, for sure, but our reasoning is limited when dealing with the Divine Infinite.

Thanks for that explanation. Yet again the criticism of Aquinas stands corrected, and it seems it’s based simply on a total lack of in-depth engagement and understanding of Aquinas.

 

[Ghosty]

Thanks for that explanation. Yet again the criticism of Aquinas stands corrected, and it seems it’s based simply on a total lack of in-depth engagement and understanding of Aquinas.

Something to keep in mind is that St. Thomas Aquinas’ work was not immediately considered the comprehensive treatment of systematic theology. It was poured over for centuries by great minds, and it wasn’t upheld as a “standard” outside the Dominican Order until the Council of Trent, 300 years after he ceased work on the Summa. His work was even translated by the Eastern Orthodox Patriarch of Constantinople who rejected the Council of Florence, and despite his distaste for the West (and certain Latin approaches like the filioque, defended by St. Thomas), he upheld it as the most complete work of Apostolic theology to that date, both East and West. It wasn’t until very recently, in the past century or so, that Aquinas (or at least his theology) has been dropped by portions of the Eastern Orthodox.

So his work has been vetted by the best minds, by people who in some cases had a vested interest in finding heresy, and he’s stood the test of time. I’m not saying he’s the only game in town, but in terms of systematic theology I’ve never found anyone who can stand up better to all angles of attack. I credit that to the fact that he was fundamentally a mystic first and foremost, and that he “translated” his mystical understanding into a systematic format. He also took pains to come up with every argument against orthodoxy he could think of, and pit it against his own arguments; in many cases he argued better for heresy in his “objections” than the heretics themselves ever did, and then he proceeded to show the case for orthodoxy.

I bring this up not to dissuade you from your studies of the flaws and holes in Aquinas’ arguments (it was by the very same study, and lots of prayer, that I became convinced of his authority in systematic theology), but only to point out that it’s well worth your time to become familiar with the works of Thomistic experts who can translate his work into more accessible English. I think you’ll find that most of the “glaring flaws” in Aquinas are errors of understanding on the part of his detractors, and even when he does make definite mistakes (he denied the Immaculate Conception, for example), his reasoning is perfectly sound and holds as far as it goes.

Keep up the study and prayer! I still read the Summa almost every day, and it’s a great spiritual exercise IMO.

Peace and God bless!

 

[Ghosty]

While reading the Summa today I came across a very clear explaination of how Aquinas makes the distinction between “opposing relations” even though both are identical to the Divine Essence.

Part I, Q.28 A.3 :

According to the Philosopher (Phys. iii), this argument holds, that whatever things are identified with the same thing are identified with each other, if the identity be real and logical; as, for instance, a tunic and a garment; but not if they differ logically. Hence in the same place he says that although action is the same as motion, and likewise passion; still it does not follow that action and passion are the same; because action implies reference as of something “from which” there is motion in the thing moved; whereas passion implies reference as of something “which is from” another. Likewise, although paternity, just as filiation, is really the same as the divine essence; nevertheless these two in their own proper idea and definitions import opposite respects. Hence they are distinguished from each other.

This example shows how two things can be identical with one thing, without being identical with eachother. Action is fully motion, and nothing is added to action to make it “other” than motion, so they are identical. Likewise passion (the “receiving end” of action) is also identical with motion, since there is nothing in the definition of passion that is other than motion itself. Action and passion are distinct from eachother, however, not by any added difference, but by opposite relations. Both are exactly motion (point A to point B), but since the terms describe opposite relations (yet these relations are not added to motion, since they remain “movement from point A to point B”) they are absolutely distinguished from eachother while both being identical to the same thing.

Hope that helps!