Mode v. Person in discussions of the Trinity

[levinas12]

In previous postings about the Trinity, “modalism” is often mentioned. My question is: what is the difference between a “mode” and “a person”?

It’s important to obtain some clarity here.

I do not think “person” is a “mode” of “substance”. But what is the difference?

The Nicene creed assumes that “person” is not a “mode”.

But if “person” is not “substance”, and is not a “mode” of a “substance”, then how do we understand “person”, how does “person” fit into the philosophical vocabulary?

 

[setarcos]

In previous postings about the Trinity, “modalism” is often mentioned. My question is: what is the difference between a “mode” and “a person”?

It’s important to obtain some clarity here.

I do not think “person” is a “mode” of “substance”. But what is the difference?

The Nicene creed assumes that “person” is not a “mode”.

But if “person” is not “substance”, and is not a “mode” of a “substance”, then how do we understand “person”, how does “person” fit into the philosophical vocabulary?

A mode is an expression of action by a “person”. A person can have several different modes. I.e. A person can express the mode of being a police man at work and the mode of being a father at home with his children. A person in comparison is a single entity expressing unique individual characteristics. Each person may express different modes unique to that person. A person may define the expression of a mode but no single mode can define the person as a person can be the source of many modes uniquely expressed. There are many different persons expressing the same mode of being a police man for instance however each expresses the same mode unique to its own person. It is my understanding that substance in the individual is that which gives the person explicit recognition as to belonging to a particular species with the characteristic abilities of said species. If you want a clear and easily understood explanation of substance and person look in the Catholic encyclopedia.

 

[tm21]

Thomas Aquinas in the Summa Theologia, First Part, Question 29 states that a “person” is an individual substance of a rational nature. Here is an excerpt:

"I answer that, Although the universal and particular exist in every genus, nevertheless, in a certain special way, the individual belongs to the genus of substance. For substance is individualized by itself; whereas the accidents are individualized by the subject, which is the substance; since this particular whiteness is called “this,” because it exists in this particular subject. And so it is reasonable that the individuals of the genus substance should have a special name of their own; for they are called “hypostases,” or first substances.

Further still, in a more special and perfect way, the particular and the individual are found in the rational substances which have dominion over their own actions; and which are not only made to act, like others; but which can act of themselves; for actions belong to singulars. Therefore also the individuals of the rational nature have a special name even among other substances; and this name is “person.”

Thus the term “individual substance” is placed in the definition of person, as signifying the singular in the genus of substance; and the term “rational nature” is added, as signifying the singular in rational substances."

 

[setarcos]

Thomas Aquinas in the Summa Theologia, First Part, Question 29 states that a “person” is an individual substance of a rational nature. Here is an excerpt:

"I answer that, Although the universal and particular exist in every genus, nevertheless, in a certain special way, the individual belongs to the genus of substance. For substance is individualized by itself; whereas the accidents are individualized by the subject, which is the substance; since this particular whiteness is called “this,” because it exists in this particular subject. And so it is reasonable that the individuals of the genus substance should have a special name of their own; for they are called “hypostases,” or first substances.

Further still, in a more special and perfect way, the particular and the individual are found in the rational substances which have dominion over their own actions; and which are not only made to act, like others; but which can act of themselves; for actions belong to singulars. Therefore also the individuals of the rational nature have a special name even among other substances; and this name is “person.”

Thus the term “individual substance” is placed in the definition of person, as signifying the singular in the genus of substance; and the term “rational nature” is added, as signifying the singular in rational substances."

Oh yeah and then there’s good ole Thomas…clear as a bell. How could anyone fail to see exactly what is meant with phrases like “…in a certain special way…” and “…in a more special and perfect way…”

 

[Wesrock]

Mode implies that God changes states, like a person’s mood, or vapor/liquid/solid, such that God is now the Father, then Son, then Spirit, that they are modes He changes into, such that the Father is the Son, just in a different mode.

Person makes them distinct on some level. The Father isn’t the Son and doesn’t turn into the Son and back again. They are two different persons. The Father generates the Son as a new person. The Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son as a new person. Not just as different modes of being for the Father and Son.

 

[Wesrock]

Oh yeah and then there’s good ole Thomas…clear as a bell. How could anyone fail to see exactly what is meant with phrases like “…in a certain special way…” and “…in a more special and perfect way…”

It’s very helpful if you’re familiar with the topic.

 

[setarcos]

It’s very helpful if you’re familiar with the topic.

Helpful in what way? As a means of communicating a clearly defined model of reality? The vaguer the terminology and the deeper the esoteric concepts go the more open to uniquely individual “familiarity” the concepts become. I. e., if your were familiar with my way of thinking and meaning you would have to agree with my truth because its “familiarly obvious”… lol. Yeah, I like that. Not trying to be a smart you know what here, just saying, sadly its a rocky and dangerous road which may lead any of us straight to death…as scripture puts it.
I can only pray God leads me to life instead, despite my being unfamiliar with some explanations which may or may not be a meaningful explanation of reality.

 

[Wesrock]

Helpful in what way? As a means of communicating a clearly defined model of reality? The vaguer the terminology and the deeper the esoteric concepts go the more open to uniquely individual “familiarity” the concepts become. I. e., if your were familiar with my way of thinking and meaning you would have to agree with my truth because its “familiarly obvious”… lol. Yeah, I like that. Not trying to be a smart you know what here, just saying, sadly its a rocky and dangerous road which may lead any of us straight to death…as scripture puts it.
I can only pray God leads me to life instead, despite my being unfamiliar with some explanations which may or may not be a meaningful explanation of reality.

It’s thirteenth century Latin literally translated into early 20th century English. Styles and ways of renderings change over time and across languages. Because you might not used to be reading such translations doesn’t mean Aquinas is being vague or indirect in what he’s saying. In fact, he is being careful here to define.

While we can speak of an individual dog and an individual chair, in truth, the dog is an individual in truer way than a chair is. The unity in the whole of the dog, as it being one being and one whole, is greater than the unity that exists in the chair, which is a bunch of unrelated parts physically joined together and arranged by something external. It stems from the difference between a substance and an artifact.

Aquinas goes on further to indicate that the term individual is applied even more strongly to rational substances/persons, that is, beings with voluntary will and “dominion over their own actions.” Perhaps this stems from the Intellect faculty not being a composite of parts but metaphysically simple? That’s a digression, though. The point being that individuals of rational substances are what we call persons.

There’s nothing vague or esoteric about it, though. And if this was a physics discussion and someone quoted a high level source, I’d doubt you’d accuse the author of speaking in vague or esoteric terms because you’re not familiar with it.

I’m not bothered by you not being a Thomist but your casual eyeroll and handwaving dismissal of it.

 

[goout]

…
If you want a clear and easily understood explanation of substance and person look in the Catholic encyclopedia.

I always try to remember that human explanations of the divine will fall short of the reality. WAAAY short. There’s quite a gap between who God is and who we are as creatures. Christ bridges that gap.

Even though God is mysterious, God also reveals himself, and we can observe and know him within our abilities. And so we have Thomas Aquinas, who tries to express these realities and is very difficult to read. I can almost feel Thomas’ headache as he puts into words realities that are not fully expressible.

The Trinity should not be easy to understand.
“If you find the god you think you understand, you have probably built yourself an idol.”

The Trinity seems contradictory. You have One-ness among distinct persons. And not just feelings of togetherness: but a true and full unity of diverse persons.
(It’s no accident that marriage best signifies this reality)

 

[setarcos]

Mode implies that God changes states, like a person’s mood, or vapor/liquid/solid, such that God is now the Father, then Son, then Spirit, that they are modes He changes into, such that the Father is the Son, just in a different mode.

Person makes them distinct on some level. The Father isn’t the Son and doesn’t turn into the Son and back again. They are two different persons. The Father generates the Son as a new person. The Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son as a new person. Not just as different modes of being for the Father and Son.

In what way are they equal then if distinct? How can God include differences within its own nature? What does it mean to say the Father “generates” the Son? If they are co-equal and co-eternal its just as justified to say the Son generates the Father which is meaningless and superfluous to description. What do you mean generates the Son as a “new person”? In what way is the Son new if he is eternal? Why is it that we say the spirit proceeds from the Son and Father when its just as well to say they proceed from the spirit since they are all co- equal? Isn’t God uniform throughout? Because each person within the Godhead can have separate and distinct modes you of necessity generate separate and distinct persons each capable of being indistinguishable from being called God uniquely apart from the other persons in the Godhead such that it would be just as accurate if not necessary to say there were three Gods instead of one. As soon as you pluralize person you pluralize unique existence. Seems the old arguments have never been settled. Because they aren’t able to be settled. No amount of description of the trinity or the relationship between its so called “expressive parts” can ever be adequate. God is ineffable in his constituents. Yet men continue to try. The persons in the Godhead have been described as a unique expression of love, a perfect family, a mathematical expression of pure truth, a necessary projection of each others completeness…and on and on, all fail without bringing into the equation ill defined and vague terminology which border on the meaningless and equivocation. When the Son is crucified, do we not consider him God? In all Gods fullness? Yet the Son is fulfilling a particular mode. When we call upon the holy spirit to guide us do we not call upon God, in all his fullness? Yet the holy spirit is fulfilling a particular mode. When we praise the Father in prayer do we not praise God in all his fullness? Yet the Father is filling a particular mode. How then do we distinguish between One God fulfilling three different modes and One Godhead fulfilling three different modes? If one person in the Godhead is fulfilling a particular mode is not God in his equality with himself fulfilling the same? Is God not capable of emotion? Is he not capable of “mood”? Love itself is an expression of mood which only has meaning if the ability of not loving is also realistic. If there is no choice but to love it would be like a raindrop having no choice which path it takes down the window. It merely follows the path provided for it not by it. Is he static in all his constituency? Is he not capable of wrath? Of mercy? Of action? All these entail a change of state. The Christian God demands this ability to change state that his grace may be given or withheld as he sees fit. Gods creation is Gods changing state but only from our perspective. Since God “IS” at all times and before all times its the same to say God changed expressive mode from Father to expression of his fullness in the form of the Son as it is to say the Father remains the Father uniquely and the Son uniquely.

 

[goout]

In what way are they equal then if distinct? How can God include differences within its own nature?

so much. Let me just put this simple thing out there.

God is not a something, he is a someone. God is also love.

Imagine God before creation when there are no human beings or any other created things. Just God, and God is love.

What is love and how can God be love if we are not there to be loved?
If love is relationship between persons and if God is love, there must be “interplay” between persons. And yet love is unitive at the same time as it is between persons. Diversity and unity. Or unity through diversity.

Think of marriage as the best analogy of the Trinity. Two persons united as one and fruitful in that love. The unitive love is a third reality.

Father loving Son in the power of the Spirit, and creation comes from from the creative outpouring of that power.

 

[Wesrock]

I am posting for my phone. Please forgive any mistypes.

In what way are they equal then if distinct? How can God include differences within its own nature?

There is one nature and three persons. The Father is not the Son is not the Spirit. But all equally are the one nature.

What does it mean to say the Father “generates” the Son? If they are co-equal and co-eternal its just as justified to say the Son generates the Father which is meaningless and superfluous to description. What do you mean generates the Son as a “new person”? In what way is the Son new if he is eternal?

New was a poor choice of word, then, as it might imply a beginning. The Son has no beginning. It is more accurate to say the Father generates a person who is not Himself. Going back to the first point, is there something confusing of the word generate? I suppose we are used to the idea that a different person is a different being, but that is not so in the Triune God. The Father generates the Son, a new person, but not a new being. It however is not equally justified to say the Son generates the Father. By definition, the Father is the generator, and the Son the generated. They are distinguished from each other in their relationship to each other. They are equal in power, glory, and eternity, but the relationship of the Son to the Father is not the same as the relationship of the Father to the Son. This results in no lesser status, though.

For what does it mean to be generated, one analogy of the Father might be the mind, while the Son is the reflective self-knowledge of the mind, but any analogy will be imperfect.

Why is it that we say the spirit proceeds from the Son and Father when its just as well to say they proceed from the spirit since they are all co- equal? Isn’t God uniform throughout?

Because it is not just as well to state that the Father and Son proceed from the Spirit. What you said here and above is anti-Trinitarianism and is heresy. The Trinity is defined by the relationship between Father, Son, and Spirit. To say that the Son generates, and that the Father proceeds from the Spirit, is to eliminate the what makes them distinct.

One point that might be made is to distinguish between what and who. In our common experience, a different who from me exists in a different what from me. In God, there is only one what. In terms of whatness (essence) the Father, Son, and Spirit are one being. They are not three different whats, nor three identical whats, but one what. In this one “what,” though are these distinct relationships, or whos. Why? We don’t know. There’s no way to philosophically determine it. It’s simply how God has revealed Himself to us.

Because each person within the Godhead can have separate and distinct modes you of necessity generate separate and distinct persons each capable of being indistinguishable from being called God uniquely apart from the other persons in the Godhead such that it would be just as accurate if not necessary to say there were three Gods instead of one. As soon as you pluralize person you pluralize unique existence.

There is one nature who is three persons. That this is not in your common experience does not make it a metaphysical impossibility.

ignatiusinsight.com/features2011/print2011/fsheed_trinity_may2011.html

Seems the old arguments have never been settled. Because they aren’t able to be settled.

It is settled. Dogmatically. That it can’t be modeled based on our finite experience doesn’t mean modalism, arianism, and such haven’t been ruled out as incorrect heresies. What we can say is dogmatically defined. Getting your head around jt isn’t a requirement.

No amount of description of the trinity or the relationship between its so called “expressive parts” can ever be adequate. God is ineffable in his constituents.

Perfectly true.

Yet men continue to try. The persons in the Godhead have been described as a unique expression of love, a perfect family, a mathematical expression of pure truth, a necessary projection of each others completeness…and on and on, all fail without bringing into the equation ill defined and vague terminology which border on the meaningless and equivocation.

It’s easier to say what the Trinity is not.

When the Son is crucified, do we not consider him God? In all Gods fullness? Yet the Son is fulfilling a particular mode.

Yes, yes, no.

When we call upon the holy spirit to guide us do we not call upon God, in all his fullness? Yet the holy spirit is fulfilling a particular mode.

Yes, yes, no.

When we praise the Father in prayer do we not praise God in all his fullness? Yet the Father is filling a particular mode.

Yes, yes, no.

 

[Wesrock]

How then do we distinguish between One God fulfilling three different modes and One Godhead fulfilling three different modes? If one person in the Godhead is fulfilling a particular mode is not God in his equality with himself fulfilling the same?

There are no modes.

Is God not capable of emotion? Is he not capable of “mood”?

Emotion is natural to the nature of man. It is not natural to the divine nature.

Love itself is an expression of mood which only has meaning if the ability of not loving is also realistic.

No. There are emotions and feelings and moods we associate with love, but none are love. Love is a movement of the will. It is willing the good of another. It is an intellectual faculty, not an emotional one, even if our own wills aee influenced by emotion.

If there is no choice but to love it would be like a raindrop having no choice which path it takes down the window. It merely follows the path provided for it not by it. Is he static in all his constituency? Is he not capable of wrath? Of mercy? Of action? All these entail a change of state.

God does not change states. The finite changes in reference to Him. God has one act which stretches through all eternity. He does not move sequentially in time.

The Christian God demands this ability to change state that his grace may be given or withheld as he sees fit.

God changing states is not required.

Gods creation is Gods changing state but only from our perspective.

Correct. God is the same yesterday, today, and tomorrow. We change in reference to Him.

Since God “IS” at all times and before all times its the same to say God changed expressive mode from Father to expression of his fullness in the form of the Son as it is to say the Father remains the Father uniquely and the Son uniquely.

No, God did not change from Father to Son. The Father, Son, and Spirit have always been, eternally, distinct persons. It is not the same as saying “vapor isn’t water isn’t ice, but all are the same H2O molecules in different states.” That is not a Trinitarian model.

Whether under the name Sabellianism in the east or patripassianism in the west, modalism is a condemned, non-Trinitarian belief.

 

[setarcos]

It’s thirteenth century Latin literally translated into early 20th century English. Styles and ways of renderings change over time and across languages. Because you might not used to be reading such translations doesn’t mean Aquinas is being vague or indirect in what he’s saying. In fact, he is being careful here to define.

I’m aware of the inherent difficulties in accurately transmitting meaning from one language to another. In so much as we are dealing with the translation into English this only reinforces my point. Aquinas was disputed in his time and he’s disputed in ours. Does your understanding of his reasoning come from reading the original 13th century Latin or from the translation? Fortunately for us English is closely related to Latin as many of its roots are taken from the Latin enabling a reasonably accurate translation of meaning to be communicated. The phrases I quoted are vague and ill-defined and if you would have read my post unemotionally you would have realized that I qualified my statement… “Not trying to be a smart you know what here, just saying, sadly it’s a rocky and dangerous road which may lead any of us straight to death…as scripture puts it.
I can only pray God leads me to life instead, despite my being unfamiliar with some explanations which may or may not be a meaningful explanation of reality”

While we can speak of an individual dog and an individual chair, in truth, the dog is an individual in truer way than a chair is. The unity in the whole of the dog, as it being one being and one whole, is greater than the unity that exists in the chair, which is a bunch of unrelated parts physically joined together and arranged by something external. It stems from the difference between a substance and an artifact.

The problem here as I see it is, your comparing two individual things as if they were in the same class of existence. The dog is an animate creature, the chair an inanimate object. Each serves the purpose for which it was created. The chair was not created to be aware, the dog to be unaware. How then can we say a dog is an individual in a truer way than a chair if the frame of reference isn’t equal to begin with? Is not the chair one being and one whole chair having the essence of being a chair? Don’t the parts of a chair relate to one another in a specific way? Isn’t the dogs parts physically joined together and arranged by something external to itself or did the dog bring itself into being? Technically by definition we may consider both the dog and the chair to be artifacts of creation and both may be considered to have substance here again depending on definitional preference which may or may not have any bearing on the reality of being what a thing is.

Aquinas goes on further to indicate that the term individual is applied even more strongly to rational substances/persons, that is, beings with voluntary will and “dominion over their own actions.” Perhaps this stems from the Intellect faculty not being a composite of parts but metaphysically simple? That’s a digression, though. The point being that individuals of rational substances are what we call persons.

Again Aquinas has merely applied a term preferentially according to his own view of reality. How is it applied “even more strongly”? Why then should an individual which may be considered having rationality be more of an individual than that which has none? Is it that a chair which has no rationality is somehow less of a chair because of it, Or less of a human therefore less of an individual chair than an individual human? What has calling individuals of rational substance persons to do with individual chairs? Are you saying chairs are lesser persons? Are you saying chairs fulfill their individual essence lesser than rational persons?

There’s nothing vague or esoteric about it, though. And if this was a physics discussion and someone quoted a high level source, I’d doubt you’d accuse the author of speaking in vague or esoteric terms because you’re not familiar with it.

It wouldn’t be an accusation. It would be a fact, for me as an individual. If someone quoted a high level source in a physics discussion in order that something can be proven or disproven to the person/s it was intended for it would behoove the communicator to ensure his/her audience received well defined and understood terms in order to prove a comprehensive premise or theory. With physics everyone starts out with an agreement on the terms and a theory is developed from there based on equally communicable ideas and/or experience among each other. With philosophy, theology most especially, the terms themselves often times aren’t even agreed upon as to their meaning, especially when dealing with revelatory expressions from God and personal revelations or understanding is not easily communicable to others simply because they are not equally understood or experienced.

I’m not bothered by you not being a Thomist but your casual eyeroll and handwaving dismissal of it.

I’m not comfortable with being labeled an ist anything. Simply a believer in Jesus’s simple message to a simple people and that is to believe in him. The eyeroll was to indicate that I was being sarcastic when I said it was simple and clear. I don’t believe Aquinas is to everyone. The “hand waving” emote is actually a shrug, meaning I’m not sure. I’m sorry this bothered you. I meant no disrespect for your beliefs only confusion on my behalf.
As always…blessings be upon you….

 

[tm21]

I’m aware of the inherent difficulties in accurately transmitting meaning from one language to another. In so much as we are dealing with the translation into English this only reinforces my point. Aquinas was disputed in his time and he’s disputed in ours.

I suppose you could make the same claim of St. Paul and his writings…that he can be confusing in the use of language (many have made this claim). I would point out that Aquinas is a Doctor of the Church and therefore the Church strongly recommends his writings for those persons studying Theology. In addition to that, the encyclical by Pope Pius XI “STUDIORUM DUCEM” (On St. Thomas Aquinas), points out the following:

“The metaphysical philosophy of St. Thomas, although exposed to this day to the bitter onslaughts of prejudiced critics, yet still retains, like gold which no acid can dissolve, its full force and splendor unimpaired. Our Predecessor therefore rightly observed: “To deviate from Aquinas, in metaphysics especially, is to run grave risk” (Encycl.Pascendi of the 8th September, 1907).”

 

[Vico]

In previous postings about the Trinity, “modalism” is often mentioned. My question is: what is the difference between a “mode” and “a person”?

It’s important to obtain some clarity here.

I do not think “person” is a “mode” of “substance”. But what is the difference?

The Nicene creed assumes that “person” is not a “mode”.

But if “person” is not “substance”, and is not a “mode” of a “substance”, then how do we understand “person”, how does “person” fit into the philosophical vocabulary?

For the Trinity, person means real distinction, whereas mode refers to manifestions of one person.

Moderin Catholic Dictionary
MODALISM. A cluster of Trinitarian heresies of the second and third centuries claiming that there is only one person in God, but that this one person manifests himself in three different ways or modes, e.g., as creator (Father), redeemer (Son), and sanctifier (Holy Spirit), (Etym. Latin modus, way, manner, method.)

Catechism

251 In order to articulate the dogma of the Trinity, the Church had to develop her own terminology with the help of certain notions of philosophical origin: “substance”, “person” or “hypostasis”, “relation” and so on. In doing this, she did not submit the faith to human wisdom, but gave a new and unprecedented meaning to these terms, which from then on would be used to signify an ineffable mystery, “infinitely beyond all that we can humanly understand”.82

252 The Church uses * (I) the term “substance” (rendered also at times by “essence” or “nature”) to designate the divine being in its unity, * (II) the term “person” or “hypostasis” to designate the Father, Son and Holy Spirit in the real distinction among them, and * (III) the term “relation” to designate the fact that their distinction lies in the relationship of each to the others.

 

[levinas12]

For the Trinity, person means real distinction, whereas mode refers to manifestions of one person.

Each human person has his own singular intellect and will. My intellect and will is not yours.

But there is only One Intellect and One Will in the Trinity, not three intellects and wills … yet there are three Persons.

You can see why explanations of the Trinity are not easy.

What is key to the discussion is the distinction between “person” and “substance”. “Person” responds to the “who” question; “substance” to the “what” question.

But we need to be careful to qualify the “what” when discussing the Trinity - the “what” is not a localized “thing” (“localized” in terms of space and time). And the “what” is not a “thing-like” entity. The 'what" is an activity (Love).

To return to the OP. “Mode” in traditional philosophical terminology refers to how a “substance” manifests itself . “Mode” thus falls on the side of “what” questions.

But the notion of “person” transcends Aristotle’s categories which are rooted in “substance” and “accidents of substance”. “Person” is not an instance of a class. There is no genus and species for a “person”, e.g., for Abraham Lincoln qua Abraham Lincoln. Of course, there is a genus and species for Abraham Lincoln qua human being.

The singularity of “person” is worth thinking about. There are no copies of a “person”; and “person” is not due to the “matter”. “Person” is a perfection, an actuality deeper than “substance”.

 

[levinas12]

addendum:

“Intellect” and “will” are on the side of the “what” question, not the “who” question.

Yet this is hard to comprehend when it comes to the Trinity. The Divine Unity is so “without parts”, so “simple” (in the Thomistic sense of “simple”) that the Father, Son and Holy Spirit have the “same” Divine Intellect and Will.

Of course, the Son also has a human intellect and will (in addition to the Divine Intellect and Will).

 

[Vico]

Each human person has his own singular intellect and will. My intellect and will is not yours.

But there is only One Intellect and One Will in the Trinity, not three intellects and wills … yet there are three Persons.

You can see why explanations of the Trinity are not easy.

What is key to the discussion is the distinction between “person” and “substance”. “Person” responds to the “who” question; “substance” to the “what” question.

But we need to be careful to qualify the “what” when discussing the Trinity - the “what” is not a localized “thing” (“localized” in terms of space and time). And the “what” is not a “thing-like” entity. The 'what" is an activity (Love).

To return to the OP. “Mode” in traditional philosophical terminology refers to how a “substance” manifests itself . “Mode” thus falls on the side of “what” questions.

But the notion of “person” transcends Aristotle’s categories which are rooted in “substance” and “accidents of substance”. “Person” is not an instance of a class. There is no genus and species for a “person”, e.g., for Abraham Lincoln qua Abraham Lincoln. Of course, there is a genus and species for Abraham Lincoln qua human being.

The singularity of “person” is worth thinking about. There are no copies of a “person”; and “person” is not due to the “matter”. “Person” is a perfection, an actuality deeper than “substance”.

Creatures are not discussed in the same way as God. With spiritual beings there is uniqueness, no general universal. God is absolutely simple so the is only the essence with three persons by opposition. As Aquinas put it, it is a real difference, but it is only by our way of thinking.

THE HOLY TRINITY
Saint Thomas Aquinas
Excerpt from: LIGHT OF FAITH, The Compendium of Theology
62 Effect of intellectual removal of personal properties

If the question were to be asked whether, in consequence of the removal of the personal properties by intellectual abstraction, the divine essence would remain, the answer is that in one respect it would remain, but in another it would not. Intellectual abstraction can take place in two ways. The first is by abstracting form from matter. In this abstraction the mind proceeds from the more formal to the more material; the first subject remains until the end, and the ultimate form is removed first. The second way of abstracting is by the abstraction of the universal from the particular, and this proceeds according to an order that is, in a sense, the opposite; the individuating material conditions are first removed, so that what is common may be retained.

In God, of course, there are neither matter and form, nor universal and particular. Nevertheless there is in the Godhead something that is common, and something that is proper and that supposes the common nature. In our human way of thinking, the divine persons are to the divine essence what individual supposita are to a common nature. According to the first type of intellectual abstraction, therefore, if we remove the personal properties, which are the subsisting persons themselves, the common nature does not remain. But in the second type of abstraction it does remain.

ewtn.com/library/Theology/SIPLIGHT.HTM

 

[levinas12]

As Aquinas put it, it is a real difference, but it is only by our way of thinking …

I read the quote from Thomas.

I can understand the second abstraction (I think), that is, the abstracting of the form from the matter. But I am having difficulty understanding the first abstraction. Could you possibly elaborate in your own words the distinction between the two abstractions?

When you say “real difference but it is only by our way of thinking” - at first, this would seem to diminish the “in re” aspect of the three Divine Persons - but I don’t think this is what you mean - could you also elaborate a bit more in your own words?