Monarchy of the Father

[thinkandmull]

The Spirit is the Love between the Father and Son so they each have a relation to it.

Q 40, 1, 1:
Thus, common spiration is the same as the person of the Father, and the person of the Son; not that it is one self-subsisting person; but that as there is one essence in the two persons

Everything of the essence is personal, so common spiration is personal “as the person of the father, and the person of the Son”, as he says. So doesn’t this contradict him when he says “it is not called a property, because it does not belong to only one person; nor is it a personal relation”.

I don’t know why Aquinas spoke of a combined relation that is not personal. There is nothing impersonal in God!

Doesn’t the below involve a direct contradiction as well?

Q 28, 4:

The relation of the principle of this procession is called spiration; and the relation of the person proceeding **is called **procession: although these two names belong to the processions or origins themselves, and not to the relations.

 

[Vico]

I was wondering if Aquinas thought that the Father was primary in the spiration of the Spirit. In way He is because the Son comes from Him, but once the Son, than the Son can join with the Father the “cause” the Spirit. But in this co-action, is the Father primary?

The Father is the principle without principle. St. Thomas Aquinas uses principle rather than cause because cause (when using the Latin word and meaning for it) implies make so it would not be appropriate for the Holy Trinity since no divine person is created. There is a communication. See below, the Father is the first origin.

Catechism of the Catholic Church
248 … the Father, as “the principle without principle”,79 is the first origin of the Spirit, but also that as Father of the only Son, he is, with the Son, the single principle from which the Holy Spirit proceeds.80

79 Council of Florence (1442): DS 1331.
80 Cf. Council of Lyons II (1274): DS 850.

 

[Vico]

The Spirit is the Love between the Father and Son so they each have a relation to it.

Q 40, 1, 1:
Thus, common spiration is the same as the person of the Father, and the person of the Son; not that it is one self-subsisting person; but that as there is one essence in the two persons

Everything of the essence is personal, so common spiration is personal “as the person of the father, and the person of the Son”, as he says. So doesn’t this contradict him when he says “it is not called a property, because it does not belong to only one person; nor is it a personal relation”.

I don’t know why Aquinas spoke of a combined relation that is not personal. There is nothing impersonal in God!

Doesn’t the below involve a direct contradiction as well?

Q 28, 4:

The relation of the principle of this procession is called spiration; and the relation of the person proceeding **is called **procession: although these two names belong to the processions or origins themselves, and not to the relations.

1. Notions are characteristics we know that allow us to distinguish the Persons.
2. Properties of each Person allow them to be distinguished one from another.

The subsistent property that constitutes the person must be** the** one positive property prior in order of nature, and there may be more than one in consideration.

Procession belongs to the person of the Holy Ghost:

Summa Theologica, I, I, Q30, A2:Now, procession cannot belong to the Father and the Son, or to either of them; for thus it would follows that the procession of the intellect, which in God is generation, wherefrom paternity and filiation are derived, would issue from the procession of love, whence spiration and procession are derived, if the person generating and the person generated proceeded from the person spirating; and this is against what was laid down above (27, 3 and 4). We must frequently admit that spiration belongs to the person of the Father, and to the person of the Son, forasmuch as it has no relative opposition either to paternity or to filiation; and consequently that procession belongs to the other person who is called the person of the Holy Ghost, who proceeds by way of love, as above explained.

 

[thinkandmull]

Q 28, 4:

The relation of the principle of this procession is called spiration; and the relation of the person proceeding is called procession: although these two names belong to the processions or origins themselves, and not to the relations. **

This seems like a self-contradictory sentence. What does the part in italics mean?

Anyway, I think my point stands that Aquinas should not have spoken of two relations in the Trinity as one impersonal relation. Unfitting

 

[Vico]

Q 28, 4:

The relation of the principle of this procession is called spiration; and the relation of the person proceeding is called procession: although these two names belong to the processions or origins themselves**, and not to the relations.

This seems like a self-contradictory sentence. What does the part in italics mean?

Anyway, I think my point stands that Aquinas should not have spoken of two relations in the Trinity as one impersonal relation. Unfitting

Re;** “two names belong to the processions or origins themselves”**

The names spiration and procession do not belong to the relations.

There are only three personal notions, constituting a person: paternity, filiation, and procession (or passive spiration).

The * common spiration *is the same as the person of the Father and the person of the Son because there is one property in the two persons. Paternity is the Father Himself, and filiation is the Son, and procession is the Holy Ghost.

See Summa Theologica I, I, Q40, 1, 1:Reply to Objection 1. Person and property are really the same, but differ in concept. Consequently, it does not follow that if one is multiplied, the other must also be multiplied. We must, however, consider that in God, by reason of the divine simplicity, a twofold real identity exists as regards what in creatures are distinct. For, since the divine simplicity excludes the composition of matter and form, it follows that in God the abstract is the same as the concrete, as “Godhead” and “God.” And as the divine simplicity excludes the composition of subject and accident, it follows that whatever is attributed to God, is His essence Itself; and so, wisdom and power are the same in God, because they are both in the divine essence. According to this twofold identity, property in God is the same person. For personal properties are the same as the persons because the abstract and the concrete are the same in God; since they are the subsisting persons themselves, as paternity is the Father Himself, and filiation is the Son, and procession is the Holy Ghost. But the non-personal properties are the same as the persons according to the other reason of identity, whereby whatever is attributed to God is His own essence. Thus, common spiration is the same as the person of the Father, and the person of the Son; not that it is one self-subsisting person; but that as there is one essence in the two persons, so also there is one property in the two persons, as above explained (30, 2).

 

[thinkandmull]

**Q 28, 4:

The relation of the principle of this procession is called spiration; and the relation of the person proceeding is called procession: although these two names belong to the processions or origins themselves, and not to the relations. **

This is a direct contradiction in words

 

[Vico]

Q 28, 4:

**The relation of the principle of this procession is called spiration; and the relation of the person proceeding is called procession: although these two names belong to the processions or origins themselves, and not to the relations. **

This is a direct contradiction in words

How so?

I. Procession of the Word
principle of generation
Name: paternity
Type of name: of person
Person: Father
the one proceeding from the principle
Name: filiation
Type of name: of person
Person: Son
II. Procession of Love
principle of this procession
Name: spiration
Type of name: of origin
Person: Father and Son

person proceeding
Name: procession
Type of name: of procession
Person: Holy Spirit

 

[thinkandmull]

Q 28, 4:

The **relation **of the principle of this procession is called spiration; and the **relation **of the person proceeding is called procession: although these two names [spiration and procession?] belong to the processions or origins themselves, and **not **to the relations.

Contradiction?

 

[Vico]

Q 28, 4:

The **relation **of the principle of this procession is called spiration; and the **relation **of the person proceeding is called procession: although these two names [spiration and procession?] belong to the processions or origins themselves, and **not **to the relations.

Contradiction?

I broke it out for you in the last post, but it seems you did not understand it. A name is how the subject is called. The two names are spiration and procession and "the procession of Love has no proper name of its own (27, 4); and so neither have the ensuing relations a proper name of their own."Q28. 4: I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Metaph. v), every relation is based either on quantity, as double and half; or on action and passion, as the doer and the deed, the father and the son, the master and the servant, and the like. Now as there is no quantity in God, for He is great without quantity, as Augustine says (De Trin. i, 1) it follows that a real relation in God can be based only on action. Such relations are not based on the actions of God according to any extrinsic procession, forasmuch as the relations of God to creatures are not real in Him (13, 7). Hence, it follows that real relations in God can be understood only in regard to those actions according to which there are internal, and not external, processions in God. These processions are two only, as above explained (27, 5), one derived from the action of the intellect, the procession of the Word; and the other from the action of the will, the procession of love. In respect of each of these processions two opposite relations arise; one of which is the relation of the person proceeding from the principle; the other is the relation of the principle Himself. The procession of the Word is called generation in the proper sense of the term, whereby it is applied to living things. Now the relation of the principle of generation in perfect living beings is called paternity; and the relation of the one proceeding from the principle is called filiation.* But the procession of Love has no proper name of its own (27, 4); and so neither have the ensuing relations a proper name of their own. The relation of the principle of this procession is called spiration; and the relation of the person proceeding is called procession: although these two names belong to the processions or origins themselves, and not to the relations. *

Q27, 4: Reply to Objection 3. We can name God only from creatures (13, 1). As in creatures generation is the only principle of communication of nature, procession in God has no proper or special name, except that of generation. Hence* the procession which is not generation has remained without a special name; but it can be called spiration, as it is the procession of the Spirit. *

 

[thinkandmull]

I’m pretty sure Aquinas here made a direct contradiction of himself in one complex sentence. Read my post and notice what I put in bold

 

[thinkandmull]

At least he could have clarified in say “although they are called so and so they are not properly used so and so”.

 

[Vico]

At least he could have clarified in say “although they are called so and so they are not properly used so and so”.

He did: “the procession of Love has no proper name of its own (27, 4); and so neither have the ensuing relations a proper name of their own.”.
Respondeo dicendum quod, secundum Philosophum, in V Metaphys., relatio omnis fundatur vel supra quantitatem, ut duplum et dimidium; vel supra actionem et passionem, ut faciens et factum, pater et filius, dominus et servus, et huiusmodi. Cum autem quantitas non sit in Deo (est enim sine quantitate magnus, ut dicit Augustinus), relinquitur ergo quod realis relatio in Deo esse non possit, nisi super actionem fundata. Non autem super actiones secundum quas procedit aliquid extrinsecum a Deo: quia relationes Dei ad creaturas non sunt realiter in ipso, ut supra dictum est. Unde relinquitur quod relationes reales in Deo non possunt accipi, nisi secundum actiones secundum quas est processio in Deo, non extra, sed intra.

• Huiusmodi autem processiones sunt duae tantum, ut supra dictum est: quarum una accipitur secundum actionem intellectus, quae est processio verbi: alia secundum actionem voluntatis, quae est processio amoris. Secundum quamlibet autem processionem oportet duas accipere relationes oppositas, quarum una sit procedentis a principio, et alia ipsius principii. Processio autem verbi dicitur generatio, secundum propriam rationem qua competit rebus viventibus. Relatio autem principii generationis in viventibus perfectis dicitur paternitas: relatio vero procedentis a principio dicitur filiatio. Processio vero amoris non habet nomen proprium, ut supra dictum est: unde neque relationes quae secundum ipsam accipiuntur. Sed vocatur relatio principii huius processionis spiratio; relatio autem procedentis, processio; quamvis haec duo nomina ad ipsas processiones vel origines pertineant, et non ad relationes.*

 

[thinkandmull]

That doesn’t help.

**these two names [spiration and procession] belong to the processions or origins themselves, and not to the relations. **

But they have no proper name. Still, it actually does apply to the relations, even though I just say that do not!:

The relation of the principle of this procession is called spiration; and the relation of the person proceeding is called procession

The opening of the Summa says that he intends to avoid repetition and cloudiness. I believe the Summa does not live up to its introduction

 

[Vico]

That doesn’t help.

**these two names [spiration and procession] belong to the processions or origins themselves, and not **to the relations.

But they have no proper name. Still, it actually does apply to the relations, even though I just say that do not!:

The relation of the principle of this procession is called spiration; and the relation of the person proceeding is called procession

The opening of the Summa says that he intends to avoid repetition and cloudiness. I believe the Summa does not live up to its introduction

He says “… without a special name; but it can be called spiration” (Q27, A4, R3).

• the relation of the principle of generation in perfect living beings is called paternity
• the relation of the one proceeding from the principle is called*** filiation***
• the relation of the principle of procession which is not generation is called nameless 1 (but can be called spiration - active spiration, the common spiration *)
• the relation of the one proceeding not by generation from the principle is called **nameless 2 (but can be called procession - a.k.a., passive spiration *)

** this name belongs to the procession or origin not to the relation.

 

[thinkandmull]

Are you not seeing how jarring it is for Aquinas to say in one sentence that something a language applies to the relations and then that it doesn’t? He doesn’t say “although more properly”…

 

[Vico]

Are you not seeing how jarring it is for Aquinas to say in one sentence that something a language applies to the relations and then that it doesn’t? He doesn’t say “although more properly”…

It is not jarring to me but I can understand how some people have difficult reading and understanding his works. His style is systematic and the sections must be considered in context and not as isolated sentences. As he explained the relation has no name but can be called spiration. It is so called. Why, because as he explained we name things after human relations, but this is only an analogy.

 

[thinkandmull]

One direct contradiction in Aquinas can be find in the First Book of the Summa Contra Gentiles:

*[8] In the second way, Aristotle proves the proposition by induction [Physics VIII, 4]. Whatever is moved by accident is not moved by itself, since it is moved upon the motion of another. So, too, as is evident, **what is moved by violence **is not moved by itself. Nor are those beings moved by themselves that are moved by their nature as being moved from within; such is the case with animals, which evidently are moved by the soul. Nor, again, is this true of those beings, such as heavy and light bodies, which are moved through nature. For such beings are moved by the generating cause and the cause removing impediments. Now, whatever is moved is moved through itself or by accident. **If it is moved through itself, then it is moved either violently **or by nature; if by nature, then either through itself, as the animal, or not through itself, as heavy and light bodies. Therefore, everything that is moved is moved by another. *

He says that animals move by nature through themselves, and then changes his mind; he says in the first sentence that accidental motion is the first of for non-by-itself motions, and than says they are all accidental. These however are changes in use of words, for an animal moves by it soul, for example. The part I put in bold is a direct contradiction though

 

[thinkandmull]

That was straying off the subject of the Trinity. I am discussing it with people on the philosophy forum in the forum on the Kalam argument. Do join in.

 

[Vico]

One direct contradiction in Aquinas can be find in the First Book of the Summa Contra Gentiles:

*[8] In the second way, Aristotle proves the proposition by induction [Physics VIII, 4]. Whatever is moved by accident is not moved by itself, since it is moved upon the motion of another. So, too, as is evident, **what is moved by violence ***is not moved by itself. Nor are those beings moved by themselves that are moved by their nature as being moved from within; such is the case with animals, which evidently are moved by the soul. Nor, again, is this true of those beings, such as heavy and light bodies, which are moved through nature. For such beings are moved by the generating cause and the cause removing impediments. Now, whatever is moved is moved through itself or by accident. **If it is moved through itself, then it is moved either violently **or by nature; if by nature, then either through itself, as the animal, or not through itself, as heavy and light bodies. Therefore, everything that is moved is moved by another.

He says that animals move by nature through themselves, and then changes his mind; he says in the first sentence that accidental motion is the first of for non-by-itself motions, and than says they are all accidental. These however are changes in use of words, for an animal moves by it soul, for example. The part I put in bold is a direct contradiction though

The phrase of St. Thomas Aquinas that you are considering is:

• Et si per se, vel per violentiam, vel per naturam.

Aristotle says: “Therefore the animal as a whole moves itself naturally: but the body of the animal may be in motion unnaturally as well as naturally…”

This is a key concept because St. Thomas Aquinas considers in the conculding logic, per se motion considered violently or naturally. He previously states that violently is an obvious case in which motion is from another, so that is therefore eliminated. The concluding logic: Omne autem quod movetur, vel movetur per se, vel per accidens. Et si per se, vel per violentiam, vel per naturam. Et hoc, vel motum ex se, ut animal; vel non motum ex se, ut grave et leve. Ergo omne quod movetur, ab alio movetur.
Aristotle Physics, VIII, 4 shows what Aquinas is writing about. He is just repeating Aristotle. classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/physics.8.viii.html

 

[thinkandmull]

Ye I thought of that explanation after I posted the quote. Its more of an example of confusing choice of writing style than anything else.

What do you think about Aquinas’s comment in De Anima about the pupil not having color because it could see brown, for example, if it already had brown in it. Was Aquinas color blind? That’s my assumption. Even if he was, I would like to know how he thought a clear eye could see another clear eye.