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CWBetts
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He just likes to try to make people think he’s intelligent
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thistle
Guest
He’s also translated the bible and thinks we should use his version even though the translation is not Church approved (of course he says he doesn’t need approval).He just likes to try to make people think he’s intelligent
Who was that other guy who thought he was the only one who could translate the bible properly? Oh yes! Martin Luther. Remember the mess he caused.
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chrysostim83
Guest
The concept of “moral object” interests me because—steeped as one tends to be in the temptation to conflate action with external deed—I find it a difficult one to understand properly. In the direction of gaining a better understanding of moral objects, I hope no one takes it amiss if I say this thread has been a disappointment. Perhaps Ron Conte could start another thread which either asks or attempts to explain how precisely one determines the object of any given action. For example, the action of getting trashed at a party on Saturday night has an evil moral object, but the action of getting trashed at a dentist’s office for the purpose of anaesthesia does not. Is this judgement correct, and how do we know what the object of an action is? In the case given, have circumstances or ends conspired to change a moral object? (Just to be clear, I believe in moral objects and think that we can know what they are. What I lack are clear criteria that go beyond intuition.)
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Ron_Conte
Guest
To determine the object of the action, one considers the act itself, i.e. the objective act (apart from subjective intention), and determines the end toward which the act is directed. This is not the purpose chosen for the act by the person. So the purpose of inebriation does not determine the object.The concept of “moral object” interests me because—steeped as one tends to be in the temptation to conflate action with external deed—I find it a difficult one to understand properly. In the direction of gaining a better understanding of moral objects, I hope no one takes it amiss if I say this thread has been a disappointment. Perhaps Ron Conte could start another thread which either asks or attempts to explain how precisely one determines the object of any given action. For example, the action of getting trashed at a party on Saturday night has an evil moral object, but the action of getting trashed at a dentist’s office for the purpose of anaesthesia does not. Is this judgement correct, and how do we know what the object of an action is? In the case given, have circumstances or ends conspired to change a moral object? (Just to be clear, I believe in moral objects and think that we can know what they are. What I lack are clear criteria that go beyond intuition.)
Also, it is not correct to equate mere exterior action with the chosen act and its moral object.
- a man kills an attacker in self-defense. The moral object is the defense of an innocent person, himself.
- a man directly and voluntarily kills an innocent person. The moral object is the deprivation of life from an innocent person, which is murder.
The exterior act may be much the same, but the end toward with the act is ordered is not at all the same.
An intrinsically evil act is always a direct and voluntary deprivation of some good related to love of God, neighbor, self. The moral object is always a deprivation of some good; this type of deprivation is either a type of harm to created things, especially created persons, or a type of disorder in the relationship between created things, especially created persons. Every evil moral object (‘proximate end’) is contrary to the love of God, neighbor, self, and therefore unable to be ordered toward God as our final end.
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Ron_Conte
Guest
[1] the intention, or end, or purpose, or motive, of the person
[2] the moral object, or object, or species, or nature, of the act itself
[3] the circumstances, or consequences, of the intentionally chosen act
The three fonts in magisterial documents:
Catechism of the Catholic Church: “The morality of human acts depends on: [2] the object chosen; [1] the end in view or the intention; [3] the circumstances of the action. The object, the intention, and the circumstances make up the ‘sources,’ or constitutive elements, of the morality of human acts.” (n. 1750)
Compendium of the Catechism: “The morality of human acts depends on three sources: [2] the object chosen, either a true or apparent good; [1] the intention of the subject who acts, that is, the purpose for which the subject performs the act; and the [3] circumstances of the act, which include its consequences.” (n. 367)
Pope John Paul II: “These are the acts which, in the Church’s moral tradition, have been termed ‘intrinsically evil’ (intrinsece malum): they are such always and per se, in other words, on account of their very [2] object, and quite apart from the ulterior [1] intentions of the one acting and the [3] circumstances. Consequently, without in the least denying the influence on morality exercised by circumstances and especially by intentions, the Church teaches that ‘there exist acts which per se and in themselves, independently of circumstances, are always seriously wrong by reason of their object’.”
(Veritatis Splendor, n. 80; inner quote from Reconciliation and Penance, n. 17)
And in St. Thomas:
Saint Thomas Aquinas: “Nothing hinders an action that is good in one of the ways mentioned above, from lacking goodness in another way. And thus it may happen that an action which is good in its [2] species or in its [3] circumstances is ordained to an evil [1] end, or vice versa. However, an action is not good simply, unless it is good in all those ways: since ‘evil results from any single defect, but good from the complete cause,’ as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).” (Summa Theologica, I-II, Q. 18, A. 4.)
[2] the moral object, or object, or species, or nature, of the act itself
[3] the circumstances, or consequences, of the intentionally chosen act
The three fonts in magisterial documents:
Catechism of the Catholic Church: “The morality of human acts depends on: [2] the object chosen; [1] the end in view or the intention; [3] the circumstances of the action. The object, the intention, and the circumstances make up the ‘sources,’ or constitutive elements, of the morality of human acts.” (n. 1750)
Compendium of the Catechism: “The morality of human acts depends on three sources: [2] the object chosen, either a true or apparent good; [1] the intention of the subject who acts, that is, the purpose for which the subject performs the act; and the [3] circumstances of the act, which include its consequences.” (n. 367)
Pope John Paul II: “These are the acts which, in the Church’s moral tradition, have been termed ‘intrinsically evil’ (intrinsece malum): they are such always and per se, in other words, on account of their very [2] object, and quite apart from the ulterior [1] intentions of the one acting and the [3] circumstances. Consequently, without in the least denying the influence on morality exercised by circumstances and especially by intentions, the Church teaches that ‘there exist acts which per se and in themselves, independently of circumstances, are always seriously wrong by reason of their object’.”
(Veritatis Splendor, n. 80; inner quote from Reconciliation and Penance, n. 17)
And in St. Thomas:
Saint Thomas Aquinas: “Nothing hinders an action that is good in one of the ways mentioned above, from lacking goodness in another way. And thus it may happen that an action which is good in its [2] species or in its [3] circumstances is ordained to an evil [1] end, or vice versa. However, an action is not good simply, unless it is good in all those ways: since ‘evil results from any single defect, but good from the complete cause,’ as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).” (Summa Theologica, I-II, Q. 18, A. 4.)
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iglueasp
Guest
I understand what the word “moral” means but not this use of “object.”[2] the moral object, or object, or species, or nature, of the act itself
I’ve never heard of a type of object that could be synonymous with a species and/or a nature.
What definition of the word “object” is being used here?
Could you just as easily say “moral species” or “moral nature” as “moral object”?
Does “moral object” refer to the compatibility of the means with the end?
For instance, would adultery be said to have an evil “moral object” because, by nature, it is incompatible with loving your neighbor as yourself?
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Ron_Conte
Guest
The term ‘object’ is used to refer to a type of end; it is the end, in terms of morality, toward which the act is inherently directed.I understand what the word “moral” means but not this use of “object.”
I’ve never heard of a type of object that could be synonymous with a species and/or a nature.
What definition of the word “object” is being used here?
Could you just as easily say “moral species” or “moral nature” as “moral object”?
The moral object and the moral species (or moral nature) are not the same. The moral object determines the moral species (the type of act in terms of morality). An act is inherently directed at its moral object. The moral nature of the act is its inherent ordering toward the moral object.
Example: A man attempts to murder his neighbor, but fails. The moral object of the act is the killing of an innocent person; but in this case the moral object was not attained (no one died). Even so, the act remains inherently ordered toward that evil end, and so the moral nature (or species) of the act remains the same; it is the sin of murder.
The moral nature is the ordering of the act toward its end. The moral object is that end.
moral nature and moral species are synonymous.
The moral object is the end, not the ‘compatibility of the means with the end’.Does “moral object” refer to the compatibility of the means with the end?
For instance, would adultery be said to have an evil “moral object” because, by nature, it is incompatible with loving your neighbor as yourself?
Adultery has an evil end because the act is ordered toward an end, sexual relations outside of the marriage bond, that is contrary to love of God, neighbor, self. Every evil moral object is contrary to love of God, neighbor, self. So the conflict between the end of the act and the positive precepts to love God, neighbor, self is what makes that end immoral. The act is deprived of a good required by the love of God, neighbor, self.
Evil is a privation of good. In order to be good, sexual acts must have a threefold moral object that is unitive, procreative, marital. So all sexual acts outside of marriage have an evil moral object because all such acts are deprived of the marital meaning.
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o_mlly
Guest
The preponderance of knowingly chosen acts are amoral, e.g. I choose to tie my left shoe before my right.…
Every knowingly chosen act is either moral or immoral before God.
“If any one or more fonts is bad (immoral, evil), then the overall act is immoral; it is always a sin to choose an act that has one or more bad fonts.” I think you go too far in naming an act that breaches even one font “always a sin.” Your third font, as I follow your comments, is only objective – the consequences of the act.… Once a knowing choice has been made, the act is either moral or immoral. Every knowingly chosen act has three fonts of morality; it is these three fonts and only these three fonts that determine the morality of each and every act without exceptioin. Every moral act has three good fonts. If any one or more fonts is bad (immoral, evil), then the overall act is immoral; it is always a sin to choose an act that has one or more bad fonts.
The entire moral law rests upon these three fonts.
- Yes, the effect(s) is/are evil but the subject may be invincibly ignorant – no sin.
- Yes, the effects(s) is/ are evil but there are corresponding effects which are good and proportionate to the evil. The actor intends the good, the act itself is not intrinsically evil, and the good effects are independent of the evil effects – no sin, rather the act has moral value.
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Ron_Conte
Guest
Such acts are moral, i.e. they are morally permissible.The preponderance of knowingly chosen acts are amoral, e.g. I choose to tie my left shoe before my right.
Some moral acts deserve a reward; other moral acts do not deserve a reward, but are still licit. All immoral acts deserve a punishment.
“every human action that proceeds from deliberate reason, if it be considered in the individual, must be good or bad.” – St. Thomas, Summa, I-II, 18, 9.
An act can be merely an objective sin, and not also an actual sin, if the person is invicibly ignorant. But the act is still referred to as a type of sin.“If any one or more fonts is bad (immoral, evil), then the overall act is immoral; it is always a sin to choose an act that has one or more bad fonts.” I think you go too far in naming an act that breaches even one font “always a sin.” Your third font, as I follow your comments, is only objective – the consequences of the act.
- Yes, the effect(s) is/are evil but the subject may be invincibly ignorant – no sin.
- Yes, the effects(s) is/ are evil but there are corresponding effects which are good and proportionate to the evil. The actor intends the good, the act itself is not intrinsically evil, and the good effects are independent of the evil effects – no sin, rather the act has moral value.
The third font is only the good and bad consequences reasonably anticipated at the time that the act was chosen, not the actual later outcome. If the good consequences outweigh the bad, then the third font is moral.
On the point that even one bad font causes the act to be immoral:
Saint Thomas Aquinas: “Nothing hinders an action that is good in one of the ways mentioned above, from lacking goodness in another way. And thus it may happen that an action which is good in its [2] species or in its [3] circumstances is ordained to an evil [1] end, or vice versa. However, an action is not good simply, unless it is good in all those ways: since ‘evil results from any single defect, but good from the complete cause,’ as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).”
USCCB Catechism: “Every moral act consists of three elements: the objective act (what we do), the subjective goal or intention (why we do the act), and the concrete situation or circumstances in which we perform the act… All three aspects must be good – the objective act, the subjective intention, and the circumstances – in order to have a morally good act.”
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o_mlly
Guest
I think it would have been more instructive if you had quoted the next sentence in Article 9. Thomas makes my point clearly by restating the former sentence’s conclusion as conditional on the presence of deliberate reason:Such acts are moral, i.e. they are morally permissible.
Some moral acts deserve a reward; other moral acts do not deserve a reward, but are still licit. All immoral acts deserve a punishment.
“every human action that proceeds from deliberate reason, if it be considered in the individual, must be good or bad.” – St. Thomas, Summa, I-II, 18, 9.
“If, however, it does not proceed from deliberate reason, but from some act of the imagination, as when a man strokes his beard, or moves his hand or foot; such an action, properly speaking, is not moral or human; since this depends on the reason. Hence it will be indifferent, as standing apart from the genus of moral actions” (emphsis mine).
I have never seen an intrinsically evil act referred to as a “type of sin.” Do you have a reference in support? Specifically, the teaching is that although intrinsically evil acts have always and everywhere evil effects, there are no instrinsically sinful acts per se. The subjective fonts also determine the culpability or sinfulness of the act.An act can be merely an objective sin, and not also an actual sin, if the person is invicibly ignorant. But the act is still referred to as a type of sin.
CCC #1793 “If - on the contrary - the ignorance is invincible, or the moral subject is not responsible for his erroneous judgment, the evil committed by the person cannot be imputed to him. It remains no less an evil, a privation, a disorder. One must therefore work to correct the errors of moral conscience.”
Not necessarilly. In its objective content, not only must proportion be considered but the act itself must be good or indifferent, and the good effects must not proceed from the evil effects. If all three objective conditions are met, then the third font is moral.The third font is only the good and bad consequences reasonably anticipated at the time that the act was chosen, not the actual later outcome. If the good consequences outweigh the bad, then the third font is moral.
Have you revised your position from being always “sinful” to simply “immoral”? While there is a correspondence between evil and sin there is also a grave difference – heaven or hell.On the point that even one bad font causes the act to be immoral:
Saint Thomas Aquinas: “Nothing hinders an action that is good in one of the ways mentioned above, from lacking goodness in another way. And thus it may happen that an action which is good in its [2] species or in its [3] circumstances is ordained to an evil [1] end, or vice versa. However, an action is not good simply, unless it is good in all those ways: since ‘evil results from any single defect, but good from the complete cause,’ as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).”
USCCB Catechism: “Every moral act consists of three elements: the objective act (what we do), the subjective goal or intention (why we do the act), and the concrete situation or circumstances in which we perform the act… All three aspects must be good – the objective act, the subjective intention, and the circumstances – in order to have a morally good act.”
And your argument does not follow your revised claim. The argument for determining a morally good act stated above is different from the argument needed to support your prior claim: “If any one or more fonts is bad (immoral, evil), then the overall act is immoral; it is always a sin to choose an act that has one or more bad fonts” or your revised claim “even one bad font causes the act to be immoral.”
The point is that acts that are always immoral are not always sinful.
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Verbum_Caro
Guest
O mlly,I have never seen an intrinsically evil act referred to as a “type of sin.” Do you have a reference in support? Specifically, the teaching is that although intrinsically evil acts have always and everywhere evil effects, there are no instrinsically sinful acts per se. The subjective fonts also determine the culpability or sinfulness of the act.
I think you answer your own question here. The difference would be that a objectively evil act (apart from the subjective intention or advertence of the actor) would be a material sin. As you say, the actor would not be culpable for sin, but his action would still be materially sinful (and not formal sin).
VC
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Ron_Conte
Guest
All immorality is sin. All sin is immorality. Sin is nothing else but a morally bad act.
Intrinsically evil acts are always objective sins. Whether or not the commission of an intrinsically evil act is an actual sin depends on the person freely and knowingly committing that act. But all intrinsically evil acts are sinful.
Pope John Paul II: “If acts are intrinsically evil, a good intention or particular circumstances can diminish their evil, but they cannot remove it. They remain “irremediably” evil acts; per se and in themselves they are not capable of being ordered to God and to the good of the person. “As for acts which are themselves sins (cum iam opera ipsa peccata sunt), Saint Augustine writes, like theft, fornication, blasphemy, who would dare affirm that, by doing them for good motives (causis bonis), they would no longer be sins, or, what is even more absurd, that they would be sins that are justified?”. Consequently, circumstances or intentions can never transform an act intrinsically evil by virtue of its object into an act “subjectively” good or defensible as a choice.” (Veritatis Splendor, n. 81.)
Intrinsically evil acts are always objective sins. Whether or not the commission of an intrinsically evil act is an actual sin depends on the person freely and knowingly committing that act. But all intrinsically evil acts are sinful.
Pope John Paul II: “If acts are intrinsically evil, a good intention or particular circumstances can diminish their evil, but they cannot remove it. They remain “irremediably” evil acts; per se and in themselves they are not capable of being ordered to God and to the good of the person. “As for acts which are themselves sins (cum iam opera ipsa peccata sunt), Saint Augustine writes, like theft, fornication, blasphemy, who would dare affirm that, by doing them for good motives (causis bonis), they would no longer be sins, or, what is even more absurd, that they would be sins that are justified?”. Consequently, circumstances or intentions can never transform an act intrinsically evil by virtue of its object into an act “subjectively” good or defensible as a choice.” (Veritatis Splendor, n. 81.)
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o_mlly
Guest
The Chruch teaches us about intrinsically evil acts but never intrinsically sinful acts. Sin is always personal and, therefore, subjective. Evil, on the other hand, may be known objectively by its effects. It’s misleading, to say the least, to conflate the notions of “objectvity” and “sin.”O mlly,
I think you answer your own question here. The difference would be that a objectively evil act (apart from the subjective intention or advertence of the actor) would be a material sin. As you say, the actor would not be culpable for sin, but his action would still be materially sinful (and not formal sin).
VC
Classical writers aplied the adjectives “material” or “objective” to sin in mis-guided attempts at building parallesim in writing about objective versus subjective morality and sin. Since the parallel meaning they sought did not fully obtain, the terms led to more confusion than clarity. In his chapter, “A Radical Theology of Sin,” Vincent Genovesi writes, “It is for this reason that today many theologians consider the concept of material or objective sin to be unhelpful and a source of pedagogical confusion. They prefer to talk simply of ‘objective moral wrongs’…”
In pursuit of love: Catholic morality and human sexuality (Vincent J. Genovesi, S. J. Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical Press, 1996)
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Verbum_Caro
Guest
O mlly,
That didn’t seem to be the point of your query. You asked about never having seen an intrinsically evil act referred to as a type of sin. I mentioned to you that yes, indeed, it has been referred to as a type of sin (material). I think that is the way Ron was using it.
If you want to discuss why or why not the material/formal distinction isn’t helpful, that seems a different issue, right?
VC
That didn’t seem to be the point of your query. You asked about never having seen an intrinsically evil act referred to as a type of sin. I mentioned to you that yes, indeed, it has been referred to as a type of sin (material). I think that is the way Ron was using it.
If you want to discuss why or why not the material/formal distinction isn’t helpful, that seems a different issue, right?
VC
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o_mlly
Guest
You make my point by quoting JP II in Veritas Splendor: “… intrinsically evil, …remain “irremediably” evil acts [not sinful acts!]…” And he concludes, “Consequently, circumstances or intentions can never transform an act intrinsically evil by virtue of its object into an act ‘subjectively’ good or defensible as a choice.” While intrinsically evil acts cannot be converted to good acts, nor may they be always condemned as sinful acts.All immorality is sin. All sin is immorality. Sin is nothing else but a morally bad act.
Intrinsically evil acts are always objective sins. Whether or not the commission of an intrinsically evil act is an actual sin depends on the person freely and knowingly committing that act. But all intrinsically evil acts are sinful.
Pope John Paul II: “If acts are intrinsically evil, a good intention or particular circumstances can diminish their evil, but they cannot remove it. They remain “irremediably” evil acts; per se and in themselves they are not capable of being ordered to God and to the good of the person. “As for acts which are themselves sins (cum iam opera ipsa peccata sunt), Saint Augustine writes, like theft, fornication, blasphemy, who would dare affirm that, by doing them for good motives (causis bonis), they would no longer be sins, or, what is even more absurd, that they would be sins that are justified?”. Consequently, circumstances or intentions can never transform an act intrinsically evil by virtue of its object into an act “subjectively” good or defensible as a choice.” (Veritatis Splendor, n. 81.)
Notice that he **does not **conclude, as you have, that such acts are always “sin.” You will not find the phrase “objective sin” in Veritas Splendor. Sin is always personal and involves personal culpability.
To that end, JP II goes on to write, “The Council reminds us that in cases where such invincible ignorance is not culpable, conscience does not lose its dignity, because even when it directs us to act in a way not in conformity with the objective moral order, it continues to speak in the name of that truth about the good which the subject is called to seek sincerely.”
See my previous post as it relate to St. Augustine.
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o_mlly
Guest
I think the issue is understanding the difference between evil and sin. If we agree the former is always objective (an intelligible privation of the good) and the latter always subjective (right reason informing the will), then what clarity does the term “objective sin” bring to a the discussion?O mlly,
That didn’t seem to be the point of your query. You asked about never having seen an intrinsically evil act referred to as a type of sin. I mentioned to you that yes, indeed, it has been referred to as a type of sin (material). I think that is the way Ron was using it.
If you want to discuss why or why not the material/formal distinction isn’t helpful, that seems a different issue, right?
VC
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o_mlly
Guest
Actulally, as I look back at the posts, the first claim I took exception to was “always a sin.” If the OP modifies that to “always an objective sin” we have two very different cliams, don’t we?I think the issue is understanding the difference between evil and sin. If we agree the former is always objective (an intelligible privation of the good) and the latter always subjective (right reason informing the will), then what clarity does the term “objective sin” bring to a the discussion?
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Verbum_Caro
Guest
Hi O mlly,
That might be the issue that you are discussing with Ron. But my post was limited specifically to your question about never having seen intrinsically evil acts referred to as a type of sin. I was just taking that question at face-value, and responding to it. I’ve seen it in various places (Catholic Encylopedia, Baltimore Catechism, numerous moral theology manuals, etc.) and I was just pointing it out, and theorizing that Ron meant sin in the sense of “material sin” (i.e. a “sin” with no culpability).
Thanks,
VC
That might be the issue that you are discussing with Ron. But my post was limited specifically to your question about never having seen intrinsically evil acts referred to as a type of sin. I was just taking that question at face-value, and responding to it. I’ve seen it in various places (Catholic Encylopedia, Baltimore Catechism, numerous moral theology manuals, etc.) and I was just pointing it out, and theorizing that Ron meant sin in the sense of “material sin” (i.e. a “sin” with no culpability).
Thanks,
VC
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o_mlly
Guest
Thanks, VC, for the clarification. I could not find the phrase “objective sin” in either the Catholic Encyclopedia or the Baltimore Catechism. Do you have any url’s to those citations you found?Hi O mlly,
That might be the issue that you are discussing with Ron. But my post was limited specifically to your question about never having seen intrinsically evil acts referred to as a type of sin. I was just taking that question at face-value, and responding to it. I’ve seen it in various places (Catholic Encylopedia, Baltimore Catechism, numerous moral theology manuals, etc.) and I was just pointing it out, and theorizing that Ron meant sin in the sense of “material sin” (i.e. a “sin” with no culpability).
Thanks,
VC
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Verbum_Caro
Guest
O mlly,
You are welcome. Actually, I wasn’t referring to the phrase “objective sin” above when I mentioned those two sources, but rather “material sin”, which they do mention. Apologies if I wasn’t clear.
VC
You are welcome. Actually, I wasn’t referring to the phrase “objective sin” above when I mentioned those two sources, but rather “material sin”, which they do mention. Apologies if I wasn’t clear.
VC
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