moral object

[twinc]

The direct targeting of centers of mass population, and any direct targeting of civilians in warfare, is the direct and voluntary killing of innocent human beings, which is murder. All such acts are intrinsically evil and always gravely immoral.

If a military target is attacked directly, and if some number of civilians are killed indirectly (unintended, unavoidable, indirect), this is not murder (not the moral object of murder). However, it is also not always moral. The intention and the circumstances must also be good. If the bad consequence of civilian deaths outweighs the good consequences of attacking the military target, then it would be immoral to attack.

The bombing of Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and the fire bombing of Tokyo were all acts of murder, not attacks on military targets.

The bombing of Dresden is a matter of some dispute among historians, as to whether or not there was a legitimate military target there. If not, then this bombing was also murder. If so, it is clear that the military targets there were not of sufficient necessity to attack that the very many civilian deaths would be out

weighed. So either way the bombing of Dresden during WW2 was gravely immoral.

Ithought that the haste and blanket bombing at Dresden was caused by the Germans using Dresden to manufacture and fit atomic warheads to the V2 rockets they were already using against London and Hiroshima and Nagasaki shortened the prolonged war and saved many allied lives - twinc

 

[thistle]

Ithought that the haste and blanket bombing at Dresden was caused by the Germans using Dresden to manufacture and fit atomic warheads to the V2 rockets they were already using against London and Hiroshima and Nagasaki shortened the prolonged war and saved many allied lives - twinc

Germany did not have atomic weapons. During World War II the only country to possess atomic weapons was America.

 

[twinc]

Germany did not have atomic weapons. During World War II the only country to possess atomic weapons was America.

here we go again - so the free world stands for ever grateful to those who got it right about Dresden,especially poor London and say the likes of brave Malta - the Germans were hiding their ultimate weapons of mass destruction behind innocent civilians as cover as also their gas chambers.There was no doubt a mad dash by the Russians and Americans to kidnap the german atomic scientists to take them out of circulation and turn them to their own use - btw sadly and alas and very regretfully innocent germans were caught up here as in the gas chambers and firing squads etc - twinc

 

[thistle]

here we go again - so the free world stands for ever grateful to those who got it right about Dresden,especially poor London and say the likes of brave Malta - the Germans were hiding their ultimate weapons of mass destruction behind innocent civilians as cover as also their gas chambers.There was no doubt a mad dash by the Russians and Americans to kidnap the german atomic scientists to take them out of circulation and turn them to their own use - btw sadly and alas and very regretfully innocent germans were caught up here as in the gas chambers and firing squads etc - twinc

I was not commenting on whether it was right or wrong to bomb Dresden.
I was merely pointing out that while the Nazis had a program to make atomic weapons (heavy water production in Norway was part of this) they did not in fact have any atomic weapons.

 

[Ultima_Ratio]

Ron,

This thread is about 9 months old, but if you are still there I’d like to discuss this topic with you. If you see this e-mail, I’ll begin by asking if you believe that circumstances can affect the moral object?

 

[Ron_Conte]

Ron,

This thread is about 9 months old, but if you are still there I’d like to discuss this topic with you. If you see this e-mail, I’ll begin by asking if you believe that circumstances can affect the moral object?

There are three fonts of morality:

1. intention
2. moral object
3. circumstances

Each font is distinct from the other. Intention and circumstances cannot change the moral object from good to evil, or from evil to good.

“It is therefore an error to judge the morality of human acts by considering only [1] the intention that inspires them or [2] the circumstances (environment, social pressure, duress or emergency, etc.) which supply their context. There are acts which, in and of themselves, independently of circumstances and intentions, are always gravely illicit by reason of [3] their object; such as blasphemy and perjury, murder and adultery. One may not do evil so that good may result from it.” (Catechism of the Catholic Church, n. 1753-1756).

I’ve labeled the three fonts in the quote above.

The term ‘circumstances’ in moral theology has a somewhat different meaning than in common speech. Things that pertain to intention, or to moral object, are not circumstances. Things that do not pertain to the morality of the act at all are not circumstances. The circumstances are everything that pertains to the morality of the act, other than intention and the nature of the act itself (which is determined by its moral object).

 

[Ultima_Ratio]

There are three fonts of morality:

1. intention
2. moral object
3. circumstances

Each font is distinct from the other. Intention and circumstances cannot change the moral object from good to evil, or from evil to good…

The term ‘circumstances’ in moral theology has a somewhat different meaning than in common speech. Things that pertain to intention, or to moral object, are not circumstances.

Ron,

Thanks for the reply. Let me begin by saying I am not trying to pick an argument with you. My purpose in this discussion is to deepen my understanding on this issue.

To begin with, you are mistaken. Circumstances can and do affect the morality of the objective act. Circumstances can be accidental or substantial to the moral object. They become substantial to the morality of the objective act in so far as they regard a special order of reason. Typically, when “circumstances” are mentioned, they refer to accidental circumstances, rather than substantial circumstances.

Let me give you one example of how circumstances change to morality of the objective act: Let’s say that two people steal property that belongs to another. They both steal an apple off of another man’s tree. Now, if one of the people is starving to death, those circumstances change the intrinsic moral nature of the act - they change the species of the act - thereby rendering permissible an act that would otherwise have been intrinsically evil had the circumstances not been present. There are many other examples that demonstrate how circumstances can change the morality of the objective act. I’ll end with a quote from St. Thomas:

continue…

 

[Ultima_Ratio]

continuation

Q. 18, Article 10. Whether a circumstance places a moral action in the species of good or evil?

I answer that, Just as the species of natural things are constituted by their natural forms, so the species of moral actions are constituted by forms as conceived by the reason, as is evident from what was said above (Article 5). But since nature is determinate to one thing, nor can a process of nature go on to infinity, there must needs be some ultimate form, giving a specific difference, after which no further specific difference is possible. Hence it is that in natural things, that which is accidental to a thing, cannot be taken as a difference constituting the species. But the process of reason is not fixed to one particular term, for at any point it can still proceed further. And consequently that which, in one action, is taken as a circumstance added to the object that specifies the action, can again be taken by the directing reason, as the principal condition of the object that determines the action’s species. Thus to appropriate another’s property is specified by reason of the property being “another’s,” and in this respect it is placed in the species of theft; and if we consider that action also in its bearing on place or time, then this will be an additional circumstance. But since the reason can direct as to place, time, and the like, it may happen that the condition as to place, in relation to the object, is considered as being in disaccord with reason: for instance, reason forbids damage to be done to a holy place. Consequently to steal from a holy place has an additional repugnance to the order of reason. And thus place, which was first of all considered as a circumstance, is considered here as the principal condition of the object, and as itself repugnant to reason. And in this way, whenever a circumstance has a special relation to reason, either for or against, it must needs specify the moral action whether good or bad”.

The following are a few of the objections and replies from the same article:

Objection 1. It would seem that a circumstance cannot place a moral action in the species of good or evil. For the species of an action is taken from its object. But circumstances differ from the object. Therefore circumstances do not give an action its species.

Reply to Objection 1. A circumstance, in so far as it specifies an action, is considered as a condition of the object, as stated above, and as being, as it were, a specific difference thereof.

Objection 2. Further, circumstances are as accidents in relation to the moral action, as stated above (Question 7, Article 1). But an accident does not constitute the species. Therefore a circumstance does not constitute a species of good or evil.

Reply to Objection 2. A circumstance, so long as it is but a circumstance, does not specify an action, since thus it is a mere accident: but when it becomes a principal condition of the object, then it does specify the action.

In the very next Article (#11), he begins his answer by saying “As stated above, a circumstance gives the species of good or evil to a moral action in so far as it regards a special order of reason”. newadvent.org/summa/2018.htm#article10

Let me know what your thoughts are. After we reach an agreement on this point, we can discuss the species of the act, which is determined by the object.

 

[Bookcat]

Ron,

Thanks for the reply. Let me begin by saying I am not trying to pick an argument with you. My purpose in this discussion is to deepen my understanding on this issue.

To begin with, you are mistaken. Circumstances can and do affect the morality of the objective act. Circumstances can be accidental or substantial to the moral object. They become substantial to the morality of the objective act in so far as they regard a special order of reason. Typically, when “circumstances” are mentioned, they refer to accidental circumstances, rather than substantial circumstances.

Let me give you one example of how circumstances change to morality of the objective act: Let’s say that two people steal property that belongs to another. They both steal an apple off of another man’s tree. Now, if one of the people is starving to death, those circumstances change the intrinsic moral nature of the act - they change the species of the act - thereby rendering permissible an act that would otherwise have been intrinsically evil had the circumstances not been present. There are many other examples that demonstrate how circumstances can change the morality of the objective act. I’ll end with a quote from St. Thomas:

continue…

Just read this one post. (while I may disagree with Mr. Conte on a number of things…I thought I would add a bit here)

Anyhow…circumstances cannot “make an intrinsicaly evil act into a good one” that is the important point…

Regarding the “theft” of the apple…it is not the circumstances here that “changed” the object…the object is very different and actually “includes as defining it” those “circumstances”.

By very definition --such would not be theft if the person was in real need etc…

The Catechism puts it nicely:

2408 The seventh commandment forbids theft, that is, usurping another’s property against the reasonable will of the owner. There is no theft if consent can be presumed or if refusal is contrary to reason and the universal destination of goods. This is the case in obvious and urgent necessity when the only way to provide for immediate, essential needs (food, shelter, clothing . . .) is to put at one’s disposal and use the property of others.190

Note it is the very “nature of the object” here that is in question …the definition of what is theft and what is not…

This too will help…especially in regards to the his observation that some “objects” by nature “contain” a circumstance that is part of the nature of the object (this is not the circumstance that is meant when one says a circumstance can not change an intrinsically evil object into a good…that is the circumstance per se of the moral action…)

jimmyakin.typepad.com/defensor_fidei/2006/11/intrinsic_evil.html

 

[Ultima_Ratio]

Just read this one post. (while I may disagree with Mr. Conte on a number of things…I thought I would add a bit here)

Anyhow…circumstances cannot “make an intrinsicaly evil act into a good one” that is the important point…

Regarding the “theft” of the apple…it is not the circumstances here that “changed” the object…the object is very different and actually “includes as defining it” those “circumstances”.

Bookcat,

I think we are saying the same thing. I agree that circumstances will not change an intrinsically evil act into a good act. What they do is to determine the intrinsic nature the an act. An act that otherwise would be intrinsically evil (theft, for example) is not intrinsically evil if the necessary circumstances mentioned earlier exist. If stealing (meaning taking what belongs to another without their permission) was absolutely necessary, the the act would not be theft, properly so called. In this example,* the circumstances would be such that the nature of the act would not be evil*, but good.

Just as an aside, when I used the example of taking the apple off another’s tree without their permission, I was careful not to refer to the act as “theft”, but simply as “stealing” (which is the word St. Thoma used when he discussing taking another’s property without permission in a time of necessity.

bookcat:

This too will help…especially in regards to the his observation that some “objects” by nature “contain” a circumstance that is part of the nature of the object (this is not the circumstance that is meant when one says a circumstance can not change an intrinsically evil object into a good…that is the circumstance per se of the moral action…)

Yes, that is an important point and does add some clarity. Let me re-phrase what you wrote to make sure I understand. Let’s say that the object of the act was theft, which would make the species is evil. In order for theft to be the object, it must contain a circumstances the is part of the very nature of the objective act. In the example we are using, one necessary circumstances for an objective act to be “theft” is that there is no reasonable necessity for the one taking the other’s property. In other words, if the person who took the other’s property was starving to death, the act of stealing would not contain a necessary condition for it to be considered “theft”.

So, it seems to me that a necessary circumstance for an act of stealing to be considered theft, is that the act must be unjust. If circumstances render the act reasonable, and therefore just, whatever those circumstances happen to be would change the objective nature of the act from evil to good.

Sound right?

 

[Bookcat]

Yes, that is an important point and does add some clarity. Let me re-phrase what you wrote to make sure I understand. Let’s say that the object of the act was theft, which would make the species is evil. In order for theft to be the object, it must contain a circumstances the is part of the very nature of the objective act. In the example we are using, one necessary circumstances for an objective act to be “theft” is that there is no reasonable necessity for the one taking the other’s property. In other words, if the person who took the other’s property was starving to death, the act of stealing would not contain a necessary condition for it to be considered “theft”.

So, it seems to me that a necessary circumstance for an act of stealing to be considered theft, is that the act must be unjust. If circumstances render the act reasonable, and therefore just, whatever those circumstances happen to be would change the objective nature of the act from evil to good.

Sound right?

It would by definition not be theft. Just as sex in marriage is not fornication.

It is a different moral object (not that some outside circumstance changed theft/stealing into a good thing)

The circumstances the Catechism and Moral theology is speaking about is not the circumstance that is part of the very nature of the moral object. (See Jimmy on this…he does it blow by blow…)

 

[Ultima_Ratio]

It would by definition not be theft. Just as sex in marriage is not fornication.

It is a different moral object (not that some outside circumstance changed theft/stealing into a good thing)

The circumstances the Catechism and Moral theology is speaking about is not the circumstance that is part of the very nature of the moral object. (See Jimmy on this…he does it blow by blow…)

Yes, I realize that. The “circumstances” referred to the in Catechism are those that are *accidental *to the moral object. However, there are other circumstances that are substantial to the intrinsic nature of the moral act.

I am pretty sure we are in agreement on this point. If you have any other comments, let me know. If not, I’ll write another post later today dealing with another aspect of this topic.