I suppose it is expected that you will continue to speak dogmatically on things you obviously have no grasp on. God’s will is his being, which is convertible with the good. I know you will probably misunderstand or misrepresent this, but it is still the actual teaching of the Church and needs to be said.
I neither misunderstand nor dispute that as the teaching of the Church. This is not Divine Command Theory, as one might find in Protestant circles. But this:
“God’s will is his being, which is convertible with the good.”
Is dogma, and a tautology to boot, Euthyphro’s question. To say “God’s being is convertible to the good” is to beg the question: what is good? If “good” is “whatever God is”, by definition, than you have an open and shut case; “good” obtains subjectively, as the *result of our own peculiar definitions.*And on this answer, the difference between Catholic grounding for moral value and, say the Protestant Divine Command Theorists, are more expressive than conceptual; Catholics look to conflate “being” with “good”, and the Protestant’s point to God’s “being” as the basis for saying “this is good”, but in the end, neither rendition of “good” obtains outside of the believer’s (subjective) definitions.
Euthyphro remains a problem, then. Aquinas never actually addresses this question directly, so far as I’m aware, but IIRC he made statements suggesting that God himself could not change the Ten Commandments, suggesting that Aquinas came down on the “first horn” of the dilemma. This has a paradoxical effect for Catholics who take this position: one the one hand, it
does provide grounds for truly objective values in principle. But on the other, now the Catholic God is distinct from them, subordinate to them, which is a major problem. We don’t need God for morality on such a view, as morality obtains prior to God.
The Catholic teaching seems to fail to recognization the operative distinction in the dilemma. God is good because he must be by nature, but that “must be” is not a “must be”, because God is not contingent or dependent upon anything else. It accepts and denies the Euthyphro’s “first horn” at the same time.
But that’s as much as will fit in here in this thread. Simply asserting “God is good” just provides a tautology. If one asks, “what is ‘good’”, one gets pointed back to God. A tight circle. And that’s the Catholic’s prerogative to just assert such a circular argument. But it’s not beholden to anything in the real world, it’s the very picture of the most purely subjective claim one can make.
If it’s not clear why that’s a problem, conider an analogous claim:
Potassium has supreme economic value, objectively and intrinsically.
Now, what is the nature of this claim? The proposition offered explicitly states an objective reality about the world. Potassium is
the stuff! It’s innate to potassium, it is just
inherently valuable. No doubt about the scope of the proposition itself (just like ‘God’s laws are objectively just’!). But what is the provenance of the claim
itself, not the proposition the claim presents?
Why it’s as subjective as can be. As it stands, I’ve offered nothing but my naked assertion. “God’s will is his being, which is convertible with the good.” is simlarly skyhooked, a purely dogmatic staring point. I can lay just as much claim to the ultimate, objective economic value of potassium as the Catholic can to the goodness of God as intrinsic to his being.
If you are interested in actually engaging in the teaching of the Church, instead of attacking straw men, you could begin here:
dhspriory.org/thomas/QDdePotentia.htm particularly question 7.
OK, thanks for the link. That’s a section I’ve been through before, previously, more than once.
What is ironic is your constant reference to metaphysical claims (this is subjective, this is objective, etc.) on the one hand, and your apparent dismissal of metaphysics as “intellectual fluff” on the other. Just another example of you using what you want, when you want, to substantiate whatever you want.
The “objectively” in “X obtains objectively” is not a metaphysical modifier. Neither is “subjective” in “X obtains subjectively”. These are descriptive adjectives, locating attributes and qualities. If I take away all the minds in the universe, “value” for the $20 bill lying on the ground becomes meaningless, incoherent. We descriptively locate value by observing its origins, its assignment, by minds. If I take away all the minds in the universe, the $20 bill on the ground still has “mass”. Mass obtains apart from minds, it obtains objectively (setting aside Catholic subjectivization of even mass for the time being).
These are descriptive terms that are useful in philosophy, and often crucial in discussions about aesthetics and ethics. But it doesn’t depend on anything more metaphysical than any natural description – we can look at a proposition and see how it applies with assigning minds involved, or without. That’s why saying that God’s goodness is subjective from our offering of the proposition as well as God’s willing of the good is not dependent on any state of being. It’s descriptive of the basis for the distinction itself, from mind/will or not from mind/will.
-TS