"Moral Relativism Paves Way For Satanism", says expert

[Peepers]

To be clear, Peepers seems to be talking about descriptive moral relativism, i.e. the notion that we can describe the world’s moral systems in terms of the fact that each of them has a different idea of “good” that is “true” within that particular system.

You can use descriptive moral relativism while still being a moral objectivist.

Descriptive moral relativism is different from normative moral relativism, which asserts that good really is relative to each particular system or, in some cases, to each particular individual. To a normative moral relativist, the “goodness” of an act has to be measured in terms of a particular system, but the normative moral relativist holds that the act is actually, objectively “good” for that particular person or system (if that sounds contradictory, it is, because normative moral relativism is idiotic).

My own position, moral nihilism is indeed different for it denies that the term “good” has any objective meaning whatsoever. Under moral nihilism, we can’t say that “it’s actually bad to eat meat for Hindus, but it’s actually good for non-Hindus to eat meat,” like we can under normative moral relativism. To a moral nihilist, the eating of meat isn’t actually “bad” in any ultimate sense for a HIndu, and it isn’t actually “good” in any ultimate sense for a non-Hindu. It’s just the act of eating meat, nothing more.

To a moral nihilist, the fact that Hindus describe eating meat as “bad” is nothing more than an expression of their culture’s values – it is not an indication that it is “actually” bad to them (which is what a normative moral relativist would say).

Looks like I need to learn some of the terms used in these discussions.

 

[AntiTheist]

AntiTheist

My own position, moral nihilism is indeed different for it denies that the term “good” has any objective meaning whatsoever.

Does the above sentence have any “objective meaning whatever”?

Yes. Under my view, it is objectively true that the terms “good” and “bad” have no objective meanings.

Obviously, the word “good” always signifies something the speaker values and “bad” always signifies something the speaker does not value, but what I mean is that statements such as “X is good” or “X is bad” have no objective truth or falsity to them.

That is to say, statements like, “It is good to give to the poor” and “It is bad to spit on the poor” do not have truth values. They are, at best, expressions of values and nothing more. That’s the objective truth.

 

[Charlemagne_II]

**That is to say, statements like, “It is good to give to the poor” and “It is bad to spit on the poor” do not have truth values. They are, at best, expressions of values and nothing more. That’s the objective truth. **

It might serve you well to watch the movie Judgment at Nuremberg, and play close attention to the closing scenes when the chief magistrate (portrayed by Spencer Tracy) prepares to sentence those on trial for war crimes. He makes it clear to everyone in the courtroom that the values the world must uphold are objectively truthful values, while the values of the Nazis are objectively evil values; hence the need to judge and to sentence those who uphold objectively evil values, not just because they are relatively different values, but because they are objectively evil values that all the world (at least anyone who is not **truly **berserk) truthfully abhors.

 

[AntiTheist]

hence the need to judge and to sentence those who uphold objectively evil values, not just because they are relatively different values, but because they are objectively evil values that all the world (at least anyone who is not **truly **berserk) truthfully abhors.

We need to be careful and clear here. There certainly are values that all, or just about all, people hold; but it would be a mistake to make the leap to the conclusion that people value these things because these things are “objectively good.”

The case might, in fact, be exactly the opposite: people consider these things “objectively good” precisely because just about all people value these things.

As an example, it is pretty much universally agreed upon in all societies that “murder is bad,” and usually there are rules enforcing this. However, I would argue that the reason people tend to have a strong aversion to murder is not that murder is “objectively bad”; rather, the reason people label murder “objectively bad” is that they have a strong aversion to it.

“Good” and “bad” simply don’t enter into the question, except insofar as people use these terms to label and attempt to universalize their values.

 

[Charlemagne_II]

AntiTheist

However, I would argue that the reason people tend to have a strong aversion to murder is not that murder is “objectively bad”; rather, the reason people label murder “objectively bad” is that they have a strong aversion to it.

Which is why it is bad!

 

[John21652]

We need to be careful and clear here. There certainly are values that all, or just about all, people hold; but it would be a mistake to make the leap to the conclusion that people value these things because these things are “objectively good.”

Values that all, or most people hold as valuable, are discerned to have a universality from which we can derive an objective statement about what it is that makes the values valuable. In other words, the value holds across cultures, from person to person and is a value that is inherent in the thing itself, for its own sake.

The case might, in fact, be exactly the opposite: people consider these things “objectively good” precisely because just about all people value these things.

True. See above.

As an example, it is pretty much universally agreed upon in all societies that “murder is bad,” and usually there are rules enforcing this. However, I would argue that the reason people tend to have a strong aversion to murder is not that murder is “objectively bad”; rather, the reason people label murder “objectively bad” is that they have a strong aversion to it.

This is very circular.people have an aversion to murder because it is bad. Murder is bad because people have an aversion to it. That form of reasoning does not tell us why murder is bad, or why people have an aversion to it. Murder must have some inherent quality which objectifies it as a bad thing.

“Good” and “bad” simply don’t enter into the question, except insofar as people use these terms to label and attempt to universalize their values.

Relativiusm accepts whatever people ascribe to as ‘values’ wthout exploring why those values are what they are. I could think killing of old ladies is an ok value and moral relativism must accept it as a truly held value with as much merit as anyone else’s values.

Values based on an objective standard carry more weight because they find value which lies above the selfish and personal values which moral relativity accepts.

Question - do we not have moral duties which are ontologicaly independent from the beliefs or feelings of any person, or group of persons?