Moral Relativism

[Betterave]

For every claim of a supposed moral absolute there’s a counter claim, with no rational means of choosing. No one here has managed to find even one absolute that can’t be contradicted, doesn’t require a subjective context, or doesn’t need a list of ifs and buts.

Why do you think there is “no rational means of choosing”? - for example, between “do good and avoid evil” and “do not do good and avoid evil”?

First, from the arguments presented on this thread, moral absolutism relies on special glasses, a mystical metaphysics of transcendental baloneyism - either no truths can be divined (but really they must exist ‘cause someone said so) or truths are only in the eye of the beholder (if I really believe and hold my breath then it must be true).

From what arguments presented on this thread?? Your claim here is straw man baloney, certainly so far as what I have presented goes. This kind of argument is dishonest. Such dishonesty is immoral, no ifs or buts about it.

Second that in the real word, a world inhabited by messy human beings, morality is complicated and depends on personal and cultural context, where absolutes are no more use than angels on pinheads.

So morality is complicated, and it depends on personal and cultural context, at least from a descriptive perspective. But it does not follow that absolutes are no more use than angels on pinheads. That’s not even an argument. You’re just repeatedly asserting this. Maybe that’s all you’re capable of doing, and that’s why you want to reduce the difference between us to a brute difference in point of view, which is rationally intractable. But all problems are rationally intractable insofar as the person addressing a given problem refuses to be rational. The problem is mainlypeople who refuse to be rational about morality, not the irrationality of morality.

You’ll twig that I done lost my energy. Imho all of us are now so polarized that reasserting positions won’t help. It’s been interesting indeed but without new blood at this point there’ll be no meeting of minds. I enjoyed our sparring, so see you around?

So yes, reasserting positions quite possibly won’t help, but perhaps that is only because you plan to continue to refuse to engage the problem here in an open-minded rational way.

 

[Betterave]

By being an active member of society (non-dissident) you are giving credence and support of the that societies morality.

That’s not true (as our preceding discussion should have made perfectly clear), but even if it was, so what? How is that supposed to be an argument in support of the given proposition:

the truth or falsity of moral judgments, or their justification, is not objective or universal but instead relative to the traditions, convictions, or practices of a group of people.

 

[Betterave]

It’s a weird place for you to dig in but…

My insistence that you stop ignoring what I actually say and attributing things to me that I didn’t say is a “weird place to dig in”?? That all you have to say about that? Yikes.

In you example “my boss told me” - you don’t acknowledge that there is the option to say “no” to him.

But I in no way implied that it wasn’t an option! Do you get that?!? Do you know what a straw man argument is? With all due respect, how well do you understand English? I can try to be extra patient with you if you’re actually interested in understanding your own errors here, but you’re making it rather difficult to believe that you’re actually interested in increasing your understanding.

 

[jonfawkes]

That’s not true (as our preceding discussion should have made perfectly clear), but even if it was, so what? How is that supposed to be an argument in support of the given proposition:

the truth or falsity of moral judgments, or their justification, is not objective or universal but instead relative to the traditions, convictions, or practices of a group of people.

Morality is contingent and relevant to the society and time in which you live. It’s not absolute. If you are going along with society, you are giving tacit support of that morality.

 

[jonfawkes]

My insistence that you stop ignoring what I actually say and attributing things to me that I didn’t say is a “weird place to dig in”?? That all you have to say about that? Yikes.

But I in no way implied that it wasn’t an option! Do you get that?!? Do you know what a straw man argument is? With all due respect, how well do you understand English? I can try to be extra patient with you if you’re actually interested in understanding your own errors here, but you’re making it rather difficult to believe that you’re actually interested in increasing your understanding.

Again, it’s not the thrust of my argument, and only tangentially relevant. If you say “no” to your bosses request there is no supplanting of morality. It is the act of deferment that is the act of supplanting morality. That is the thrust. To focus simply on that part doesn’t address what I’m say in my argument. It’s diversionary.

I have provided an additional example of a conscientious objector to get away from your example entirely, so I won’t inadvertently misrepresent your position. How about we start there.

 

[inocente]

Why do you think there is “no rational means of choosing”? - for example, between “do good and avoid evil” and “do not do good and avoid evil”?

Well OK then , one last time.

Apply In Spiration’s “One ought to do good and avoid evil” to something like the use of artificial contraception and some will say it’s evil, some good and some that it’s neither. “One ought to do good and avoid evil” is fine as a principle, no objections here, but it’s relative to what we define as good and evil.

Absolute constructs always rely in some way on prior assumptions. We don’t have this issue with the law of identity or the principle of conservation of energy. The central difficulty with moral absolutes is we have to lower our standards in order to accept them. This is what I mean by having to wear special glasses.

In addition, the objective empirical evidence is that morality is relative to context, that there are disagreements across societies, so not only are we being asked to accept a theory with lower standards of proof, the theory itself often contradicts real world evidence.

Even then I’m not done, because there isn’t just one theory but several competing theories from which differing moral conclusions can be drawn and with no adequate criteria to choose between them.

Aware of all this, some even retreat to a position where absolutes are objectively unknowable, which is where the mystical balonism comes in.

A moral code relates to the needs of a society. Some of these needs are basic and common (e.g. survival and cooperation) while others depend on culture (e.g. religious beliefs and technological advancement). A rational moral code therefore depends on both basic needs and societal values. As we are all one species, we may wish to say that our basic needs can be stated in a universal absolute form, for example a rational moral code must always include prohibitions on unjustified killing, while purposely leaving the exact meaning of “unjustified” gray (each society is then left to decide whether the execution of murders is justified or unjustified).

All this is fine and dandy if we’re content to leave absolutes at that level, statements of guiding principle as in:

All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood. - Article 1 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights

But one article later we have a problem for some absolutists:

Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.

It’s here where I and some absolutists part company, for the article says for example that it is morally indefensible to hold our own religion above all others, or to deny homosexuals the same rights for civil union as everyone else.

At the end of the day my argument isn’t about the angels on pinheads we often get into on this kind of thread, but only with those who would elevate their supposed absolutes above what we should hold common by convention.

 

[fhansen]

It’s here where I and some absolutists part company, for the article says for example that it is morally indefensible to hold our own religion above all others, or to deny homosexuals the same rights for civil union as everyone else.

But if there’s no moral absolute connected to your belief in these areas, on what basis would you even care about these rights-why would you bother with your beliefs? When all’s said and done, aren’t we really asking something like, ‘What would God do?’- and then at least assuming there’s an objectively right answer?

 

[Hastrman]

But if there’s no moral absolute connected to your belief in these areas, on what basis would you even care about these rights-why would you bother with your beliefs? When all’s said and done, aren’t we really asking something like, ‘What would God do?’- and then at least assuming there’s an objectively right answer?

You need to read Nietzsche. Not in the sense of “go read X, you’ll see how you’re wrong”; he agrees with you (so do I).

Basically, Nietzsche just read your post, and, twirling his Yosemite Sam mustache and smiling evilly, he says, “Exactly.”

And seriously, look at his mustache: he’s the rootinest tootinest pessimist-nihilist philosopher West of the Pecos.

 

[inocente]

But if there’s no moral absolute connected to your belief in these areas, on what basis would you even care about these rights-why would you bother with your beliefs? When all’s said and done, aren’t we really asking something like, ‘What would God do?’- and then at least assuming there’s an objectively right answer?

Surely we care because we’re all human, we all have compassion and a conscience whatever our personal beliefs. It’s perfectly viable to believe God wants us to form and use our consciences well and leave it at that. In real life dilemmas I’ve had, there’s been six of one and half a dozen of the other, and any assumption of an objectively right answer goes out the window.

But you’ll see by the sentence you quoted from me that my issue is really with those who would override the moral conclusions of others solely on grounds such as what they happen to think their god wants.

 

[Betterave]

Morality is contingent and relevant to the society and time in which you live. It’s not absolute.

I have already pointed out that your claim here - “morality is contingent and relevant to the society and time in which you live; it’s not absolute” - is obviously true and no absolutist would deny it. The sense in which it is true, however, does not contradict absolutism or support relativism.

You seem to be forgetting what relativism claims.

From your vague claims above about “morality”, it does not follow that:
therefore, the truth or falsity of moral judgments, or their justification, is not objective or universal but instead relative to the traditions, convictions, or practices of a group of people.

If you are going along with society, you are giving tacit support of that morality.

That might be true, though not unqualifiedly so; but so what? Giving tact support to some moral judgment does not imply the truth of that moral judgment. So again, this assertion does not count as an argument in support of relativism.

 

[Betterave]

Again, it’s not the thrust of my argument, and only tangentially relevant. If you say “no” to your bosses request there is no supplanting of morality. [So what?] It is the act of deferment that is the act of supplanting morality. [If you’re trying to say anything more controversial than “it is immoral to act immorally,” then you need to explain yourself and give an argument for your position.] That is the thrust. To focus simply on that part doesn’t address what I’m say in my argument. It’s diversionary.

I have provided an additional example of a conscientious objector to get away from your example entirely, so I won’t inadvertently misrepresent your position. How about we start there.

What is “not the thrust of your argument,” etc.? (Please try to write in a more comprehensible way.) The thing you made up and attributed to me? So what if it’s not the thrust of your argument? That’s no excuse for thrusting all these straw man arguments onto me.

What is your conscientious objector supposed to prove?

 

[fhansen]

Surely we care because we’re all human, we all have compassion and a conscience whatever our personal beliefs. It’s perfectly viable to believe God wants us to form and use our consciences well and leave it at that. In real life dilemmas I’ve had, there’s been six of one and half a dozen of the other, and any assumption of an objectively right answer goes out the window.

But you’ll see by the sentence you quoted from me that my issue is really with those who would override the moral conclusions of others solely on grounds such as what they happen to think their god wants.

But even a statement such as “we care because we’re all human, we all have compassion and a conscience” implies that our personal beliefs are somehow based on something outside of our own personal control or creation. And so that when people act outside of “humaneness” and compassion they’ve apparently overridden or left behind their basic human nature-IOWs they’ve made morality relative to their own judgment.

We can argue that morality is always subject to our own judgment but then we get back to concepts such as humanness and compassion and there seems to be a choice we must make-a choice not so much between this specific moral or that but between whether or not we should live with compassion as the standard behind our actions or whether selfishness or maybe something else should be our rule. But even then we’re back to a doggone “should” again and that’s the very thing the Christian faith says Adam & Eve rejected-any moral constraints or limitations, that is.

 

[Betterave]

Apply In Spiration’s “One ought to do good and avoid evil” to something like the use of artificial contraception and some will say it’s evil, some good and some that it’s neither. “One ought to do good and avoid evil” is fine as a principle, no objections here, but it’s relative to what we define as good and evil.

What is implied by your use of the phrase “define as good and evil”? (That this “defining” is essentially irrational??)

Absolute constructs always rely in some way on prior assumptions. We don’t have this issue with the law of identity or the principle of conservation of energy. The central difficulty with moral absolutes is we have to lower our standards in order to accept them. This is what I mean by having to wear special glasses.

What do you mean when you say “we have to lower our standards”?

In addition, the objective empirical evidence is that morality is relative to context, that there are disagreements across societies, so not only are we being asked to accept a theory with lower standards of proof, the theory itself often contradicts real world evidence.

That’s descriptive relativism. The truth of descriptive relativism, of an empirical statement about moral judgments that people make, does not imply the falsity of moral absolutism, which is not a claim about the purely empirical phenomenon of moral belief. Do you or do you not understand that?

Even then I’m not done, because there isn’t just one theory but several competing theories from which differing moral conclusions can be drawn and with no adequate criteria to choose between them.

On what do you base your claim that there is “no adequate criteria to choose between them”?

Aware of all this, some even retreat to a position where absolutes are objectively unknowable, which is where the mystical balonism comes in.

Oh really. Please explain. You claim: “If moral absolutes are unknowable, then mystical balonism comes in”? How does that work then? (I’m not defending the antecedent here, but your claim appears to be a non sequitur.)

A moral code relates to the needs of a society. …]

Sure, obviously. Question: Do you understand that absolutism does not imply that it is possible to write an absolute rule book that we could simply defer to in order to check which moral judgment is the right one in a particular situation? Do you understand that absolutism does not imply that a living *faculty *of moral *judgment *could in principle be replaced by a set of abstract absolute formulas?

Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.

It’s here where I and some absolutists part company, for the article says for example that it is morally indefensible to hold our own religion above all others, or to deny homosexuals the same rights for civil union as everyone else.

Not that I see the relevance of your mentioning this, but where does it say that? (I’m pretty sure it doesn’t say that.)

At the end of the day my argument isn’t about the angels on pinheads we often get into on this kind of thread, but only with those who would elevate their supposed absolutes above what we should hold common by convention.

What angels and pinheads?? What supposed absolutes are you talking about? Do you still take yourself to be arguing against absolutism, or just against *certain *absolutes, that *certain *people propose, with which you, rightly or wrongly, happen to disagree?

 

[jonfawkes]

Just so we are all on the same page - From Word IQ

wordiq.com/definition/Moral_relativism
wordiq.com/definition/Moral_absolutism

Moral absolutism is the belief or theory that there are absolute standards against which moral questions can be judged and suggests that morals are not determined by societal or situational influences.

According to moral absolutism, morals are inherent in the laws of the universe, the nature of humanity, or some other fundamental source. Moral absolutism is often contrasted with moral relativism.

VS

Moral relativism is the position that moral propositions do not reflect absolute or universal truths. It not only holds that ethical judgments emerge from social customs and personal preferences, but also that there is no single standard by which to assess an ethical proposition’s truth. Many relativists see moral values as applicable only within certain cultural boundaries. Some would even suggest that one person’s ethical judgments or acts cannot be judged by another, though most relativists propound a more limited version of the theory.

Some moral relativists — for example, Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980) — hold that a personal and subjective moral core lies at the foundation of our moral acts. They believe that public morality is a reflection of social convention, and that only personal, subjective morality is truly authentic.

Moral nihilists propound a view that bears some similarity to relativism. The most famous nihilist, Friedrich Nietzche (1844-1900), believed that morality is impossible without God, and as he argued there is no God, there is ipso facto no morality.

Moral relativism is not the same as moral pluralism, which acknowledges the co-existence of opposing ideas and practices, but does not suggest that they are equally valid. Moral relativism, in contrast, contends that opposing moral positions have no truth value, and that there is no preferred standard of reference by which to judge them.

 

[grannymh]

This thread is really above my gray head. However, there are three things which I highlighted that support the universal truth that human life is worthy of profound respect.

All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are** endowed with reason and conscience** and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood. - Article 1 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights

 

[inocente]

But even a statement such as “we care because we’re all human, we all have compassion and a conscience” implies that our personal beliefs are somehow based on something outside of our own personal control or creation. And so that when people act outside of “humaneness” and compassion they’ve apparently overridden or left behind their basic human nature-IOWs they’ve made morality relative to their own judgment.

We can argue that morality is always subject to our own judgment but then we get back to concepts such as humanness and compassion and there seems to be a choice we must make-a choice not so much between this specific moral or that but between whether or not we should live with compassion as the standard behind our actions or whether selfishness or maybe something else should be our rule. But even then we’re back to a doggone “should” again and that’s the very thing the Christian faith says Adam & Eve rejected-any moral constraints or limitations, that is.

Thoughtful post dude .

I agree we all have a basic human nature, and compassion is part of that nature. I’m wondering whether the absolute/relative model really tells the true story. Perhaps philosophers need to come up with a completely new way of seeing things.

For instance, research shows we may all have a built-in “moral grammar”, an innate ability to ask and answer moral questions, similar to our innate ability to learn a language. Every language has its own vocabulary and syntax but underneath there are many similarities in how they work because we all have the same innate abilities “wired” into us. The idea is that we all have an analogous ability to “process” moral decisions.

Looked at in this way, fanatics learn how to override their nature to impose hard-line morals, and others to short-circuit their nature to do whatever they please. Don’t know if there’s anything in the idea, but it’s an intriguing new way of seeing us.

Can’t find a really good description online but have a look at a discussion here ethics-etc.com/2009/10/05/sentimentalism-and-moral-grammar/

 

[inocente]

What is implied by your use of the phrase “define as good and evil”? (That this “defining” is essentially irrational??)

The example I gave, use of artificial contraception, is controversial – it may be good, evil or indifferent depending on our point of view. The resolution is more about unraveling the potential goods (family planning, reducing spread of AIDS) and potential evils (increase in promiscuity, devaluing parenthood) to define its good/evilness than any prior assumptions.

What do you mean when you say “we have to lower our standards”?

There doesn’t seem to be any universal acclaimed way of proving absolutes, they appear to depend to some extent on our personal beliefs, and we don’t usually allow this in philosophy.

That’s descriptive relativism. The truth of descriptive relativism, of an empirical statement about moral judgments that people make, does not imply the falsity of moral absolutism, which is not a claim about the purely empirical phenomenon of moral belief. Do you or do you not understand that?

Understood. Well, -ish. Why make the claim, where’s the value?

On what do you base your claim that there is “no adequate criteria to choose between them”?

Do we go with conclusions from, e.g., a version of utilitarian ethics or from a version of natural law? Every theory has its critics, and it seems we choose whichever one comes up with the answers we happen to like anyway.

Oh really. Please explain. You claim: “If moral absolutes are unknowable, then mystical balonism comes in”? How does that work then? (I’m not defending the antecedent here, but your claim appears to be a non sequitur.)

I can’t see a way to distinguish unknowable absolutes from superstitions.

Sure, obviously. Question: Do you understand that absolutism does not imply that it is possible to write an absolute rule book that we could simply defer to in order to check which moral judgment is the right one in a particular situation? Do you understand that absolutism does not imply that a living *faculty *of moral *judgment *could in principle be replaced by a set of abstract absolute formulas?

Yes, but I’m questioning the need to elevate anything beyond a guiding principle.

Not that I see the relevance of your mentioning this, but where does it say that? (I’m pretty sure it doesn’t say that.)

Art. 2 embodies the whole Declaration “without distinction”, including “freedom of conscience” in art. 18, hence no religion can force its morals on others. Persuade yes, force no.

What angels and pinheads?? What supposed absolutes are you talking about? Do you still take yourself to be arguing against absolutism, or just against *certain *absolutes, that *certain *people propose, with which you, rightly or wrongly, happen to disagree?

I guess neither of us would see any point in debating abstract concepts here that have no bearing on peoples’ lives. I’m arguing against the tendency we sometimes see to override the values of others in the name of religious or ideological beliefs – absolute belief in absolutes has its dangers, just as the pick’n’mix form of relativism has its dangers.

 

[grannymh]

Thoughtful post dude .

I agree we all have a basic human nature, and compassion is part of that nature. I’m wondering whether the absolute/relative model really tells the true story. Perhaps philosophers need to come up with a completely new way of seeing things.

For instance, research shows we may all have a built-in “moral grammar”, an innate ability to ask and answer moral questions, similar to our innate ability to learn a language. Every language has its own vocabulary and syntax but underneath there are many similarities in how they work because we all have the same innate abilities “wired” into us. The idea is that we all have an analogous ability to “process” moral decisions.

Looked at in this way, fanatics learn how to override their nature to impose hard-line morals, and others to short-circuit their nature to do whatever they please. Don’t know if there’s anything in the idea, but it’s an intriguing new way of seeing us.

Can’t find a really good description online but have a look at a discussion here ethics-etc.com/2009/10/05/sentimentalism-and-moral-grammar/

That “moral grammar” – could it be also described as an inner voice leading to a judgment about the moral quality?
Is it what distinguishes good from bad?
Is it the perception of basic principles which respect human life?
Is it the use of reason which makes a person responsible for chosen actions?


Check out the Catechism of the Catholic Church, Second Edition, paragraphs 1776-1778 for a voice calling man to love and do what is good and to avoid evil. Also, the Index has nearly a half page of paragraph references to moral grammar which in Pig Latin is conscience.

Blessings,
granny

:snowing:

 

[inocente]

That “moral grammar” – could it be also described as an inner voice leading to a judgment about the moral quality?
Is it what distinguishes good from bad?
Is it the perception of basic principles which respect human life?
Is it the use of reason which makes a person responsible for chosen actions?

Yes and no. The idea is based on findings that the emotional and rational parts of our brains light up in MRI scanners when we make moral decisions, and so there may be a tension between emotional and rational thoughts that we’re not really aware of. According to this idea, the “grammar” mediates between the two, between the instinctual and the logical.

It might not be very productive to think of Paul as a neuroscientist but we could even read it into his aside in Rom 2:15 - They show that the requirements of the law are written on their hearts, their consciences also bearing witness, and their thoughts sometimes accusing them and at other times even defending them. The requirements of the law written on our hearts would be our instinctive compassion, etc. (as well as I guess our more base instincts) and they are mediated via the grammar to negotiate and wrestle with our rational thoughts.

As I understand it anyway.

 

[Betterave]

The example I gave, use of artificial contraception, is controversial – it may be good, evil or indifferent depending on our point of view. The resolution is more about unraveling the potential goods (family planning, reducing spread of AIDS) and potential evils (increase in promiscuity, devaluing parenthood) to define its good/evilness than any prior assumptions.

Okay… So what is your answer to my question: What is implied by your use of the phrase “define as good and evil” (or "unraveling potential goods and evils)? That this “defining” (or “unraveling”) is essentially irrational??

Please note: You can’t “unravel potential goods and evils” without making “prior assumptions,” i.e., without knowing anything about the reality of good and evil.

There doesn’t seem to be any universal acclaimed way of proving absolutes, they appear to depend to some extent on our personal beliefs, and we don’t usually allow this in philosophy.

There doesn’t appear to be any universally acclaimed way, you mean? In any case, so what? Lots of people have lots of trouble understanding lots of things; in this case, some people have trouble understanding morality (maybe because of their “personal beliefs” - but so what?). Your claim that “we usually don’t allow this in philosophy” seems false; please substantiate.

Understood. Well, -ish. Why make the claim, where’s the value?

Why make which claim?

Do we go with conclusions from, e.g., a version of utilitarian ethics or from a version of natural law? Every theory has its critics, and it seems we choose whichever one comes up with the answers we happen to like anyway.

We go with the conclusions we believe to be true, obviously. There is no need to decide in advance what that is, before trying to find the truth. You have to believe in the possibility of a true answer before you can search for what it actually is. That’s a big problem with relativism: it seems to undermine the coherence of undertaking such a search.

I can’t see a way to distinguish unknowable absolutes from superstitions.

Unknowable absolutes are true statements that are not known to be true. Superstitions are not true statements. That’s a pretty big distinction.

Yes, but I’m questioning the need to elevate anything beyond a guiding principle.

How does ‘absolutism’ elevate anything beyond a ‘guiding principle’?

Art. 2 embodies the whole Declaration “without distinction”, including “freedom of conscience” in art. 18, hence no religion can force its morals on others. Persuade yes, force no.

So what? That clearly does not imply, as you claimed, that it is “morally indefensible to hold our own religion above all others, or to deny homosexuals the same rights for civil union as everyone else.”

I guess neither of us would see any point in debating abstract concepts here that have no bearing on peoples’ lives. I’m arguing against the tendency we sometimes see to override the values of others in the name of religious or ideological beliefs – absolute belief in absolutes has its dangers, just as the pick’n’mix form of relativism has its dangers.

Well that’s just a banal observation, it seems to me. It certainly isn’t an argument in favor of relativism over absolutism.