Moral Relativism

[larkin31]

So is it relative to the situation as to whether or not mass genocide is justified?

Apparently for some. But not for me. But I don’t speak for others, and I don’t claim that genocide will NEVER be justified. I don’t feel that I can imagine every possible circumstance. If aliens invaded the earth and set out to destroy us, we might be justified in killing every last one of their species. But maybe not. It would depend on a number of things.

 

[sidbrown]

Apparently for some. But not for me. But I don’t speak for others, and I don’t claim that genocide will NEVER be justified. I don’t feel that I can imagine every possible circumstance. If aliens invaded the earth and set out to destroy us, we might be justified in killing every last one of their species. But maybe not. It would depend on a number of things.

But what about the situation with Noah’s Ark and the flood? Was that morally justified or not?

 

[larkin31]

But what about the situation with Noah’s Ark and the flood? Was that morally justified or not?

Just so you know, I think that the event is/was total fiction (myth) based only, perhaps, on a few large floods in the region.

But no. Accepting the facts as given in the account, I consider the intentional murder/extinction of those species on the planet as unjustified morally.

I really don’t see how this has any relevance, though.

 

[sidbrown]

Just so you know, I think that the event is/was total fiction (myth) based only, perhaps, on a few large floods in the region.

But no. Accepting the facts as given in the account, I consider the intentional murder/extinction of those species on the planet as unjustified morally.

I really don’t see how this has any relevance, though.

It would be relevant for a Christian who has the question concerning whether morality is relative or not. Generally, a Christian would consider genocide to be immoral. But there is this example in the Bible of the great flood.

 

[larkin31]

It would be relevant for a Christian who has the question concerning whether morality is relative or not. Generally, a Christian would consider genocide to be immoral. But there is this example in the Bible of the great flood.

I know.

 

[tonyrey]

tonyrey

*3. When shouldn’t you do what you are convinced is right? *

When you are eating too much buttered popcorn?

So far no one has given a better answer than that!

 

[Betterave]

I understand it but don’t see the point of making the claim, of why there need be any truths here. The way we evolved to make moral decisions is a messy process and it’s hard to see where absolutes might fit.

What you’re saying is pure assertion that isn’t grounded in any kind of reason-giving. What does “the way we evolved” (and/or that “messy process” you keep referring to, without explaining anything about it or its relevance to the question here) have to do with showing that moral claims are best not grasped as being true or false, but rather as simply expressions of what is de facto accepted in a given culture? You don’t even begin to make an argument for this implausible claim. You just make vague, seemingly irrelevant assertions, then seem to expect that I see what a good point you’ve made.

There should be a smiley for “circular”.

Why? So people like you, who seem not to understand circularity, could abuse it?

No, I think it’s tendentious even to claim there is a truth here. Sticking with the theme of artificial contraception, asserting that there’s a truth leads us down a garden path of thinking it must always be either good or evil, when it may be neither or else sometimes good and sometimes evil according to context.

Why is it a “garden path”? Again, that is tendentious, i.e., begging the question, i.e., circular.

The process isn’t like taking a vote. We have strong empathy towards each other, and this influences us as much as any rational arguments. As social animals we eventually come to see things the same way, but this is ongoing, our morals are slightly different from our parent’s generation.

Empathy and rational arguments are not mutually exclusive. They’re actually supposed to work together. There’s nothing praiseworthy about irrational empathy. There’s nothing moral about psychopathic rationality. In any case, the scenario you described implied that you thought that in the end determining an absolute would effectively be accomplished by getting the vote out so as to reach a consensus. You were/are wrong about this: that’s not at all how it works. You are also (obviously) wrong when you claim that as social animals we eventually come to see things the same way. What evidence could you possibly offer in support of such a claim? And what do you suppose it would imply if it were true (and WHY do you suppose it would imply whatever you think it would imply)?

 

[inocente]

What you’re saying is pure assertion that isn’t grounded in any kind of reason-giving. What does “the way we evolved” (and/or that “messy process” you keep referring to, without explaining anything about it or its relevance to the question here) have to do with showing that moral claims are best not grasped as being true or false, but rather as simply expressions of what is de facto accepted in a given culture? You don’t even begin to make an argument for this implausible claim. You just make vague, seemingly irrelevant assertions, then seem to expect that I see what a good point you’ve made.

We acquired some of what we call morality from ancestor species (watch links for possibilities) and developed other bits ourselves, and some of those bits vary across cultures. The whole business is a lot more messy and complicated than might have been thought 500 years back.

There’s no objective fact says all animals must have 4 limbs or we must have 10 toes so why treat one specific area of behavior differently? Fine if we say it’s a fact that most people have 10 toes, and it’s a fact that we’re probably better off for showing mercy instead of revenge. On the other hand stating that something like artificial contraception is always wrong or always right is clearly going too far when there’s no agreed gold standard.

youtube.com/watch?v=aAFQ5kUHPkY – Fairness and cooperation in capuchins
youtube.com/watch?v=3aGj-Y0shIs – Lying in capuchins

Why? So people like you, who seem not to understand circularity, could abuse it?

I translated your “Right, and some are right and some are wrong” as “we’re right because we’re right because we’re right”.

Empathy and rational arguments are not mutually exclusive. They’re actually supposed to work together. There’s nothing praiseworthy about irrational empathy. There’s nothing moral about psychopathic rationality. In any case, the scenario you described implied that you thought that in the end determining an absolute would effectively be accomplished by getting the vote out so as to reach a consensus. You were/are wrong about this: that’s not at all how it works. You are also (obviously) wrong when you claim that as social animals we eventually come to see things the same way. What evidence could you possibly offer in support of such a claim? And what do you suppose it would imply if it were true (and WHY do you suppose it would imply whatever you think it would imply)?

Agreed empathy and rationality work together. But that means sometimes we post-rationalize behavior according to our feelings. It’s not about a vote: the evidence, as I’ve been saying, is that moral standards vary less inside cultures than between cultures. For example, where Catholics disagree about a moral standard such as use of artificial contraception, it’s not unknown for one group to use the term Cafeteria for the other group, or at least to try to bring them back in line. This debate would have been over long ago if there was a provable gold standard, it only kept going because we’re trying to persuade each other. It’s how we’re made.

 

[Betterave]

We acquired some of what we call morality from ancestor species (watch links for possibilities) and developed other bits ourselves, and some of those bits vary across cultures. The whole business is a lot more messy and complicated than might have been thought 500 years back.

You should give an argument for this and explain its relevance. Since you haven’t, I’ll say no more.

There’s no objective fact says all animals must have 4 limbs or we must have 10 toes so why treat one specific area of behavior differently? Fine if we say it’s a fact that most people have 10 toes, and it’s a fact that we’re probably better off for showing mercy instead of revenge. On the other hand stating that something like artificial contraception is always wrong or always right is clearly going too far when there’s no agreed gold standard.

What does four limbs and ten toes have to do with anything? Again, please don’t state seemingly random facts like this and expect me to see the relevance. On “agreed gold standards,” see below.

I translated your “Right, and some are right and some are wrong” as “we’re right because we’re right because we’re right”.

Well, dude, that’s obviously a bad translation. And you apparently aren’t noticing that you are begging the question by assuming that there is no moral truth about contraception.

Agreed empathy and rationality work together. But that means sometimes we post-rationalize behavior according to our feelings.

Obviously. And sometimes we do so in a way that makes sense, sometimes not.

It’s not about a vote: the evidence, as I’ve been saying, is that moral standards vary less inside cultures than between cultures.

“The evidence”? Your statement is just a fact. But in respect of what proposition is it evidence? (What is the relevance? What are you trying to prove by mentioning this? How does it prove whatever you’re trying to prove?)

For example, where Catholics disagree about a moral standard such as use of artificial contraception, it’s not unknown for one group to use the term Cafeteria for the other group, or at least to try to bring them back in line. This debate would have been over long ago if there was a provable gold standard, it only kept going because we’re trying to persuade each other. It’s how we’re made.

That’s a non sequitur. For your argument to be sound you would need the further premise: “A ‘provable gold standard’ is, as such, universally persuasive.” That premise is clearly either false or question-begging.

Your claim, “it only kept going because we’re trying to persuade each other,” seems thoroughly irrelevant.

 

[Betterave]

We acquired some of what we call morality from ancestor species…

I’ll add that this sounds like a rather naive claim. If we “acquired” it from them, from whom did they “acquire” it? I’m guessing you just mean that certain aspects of what would properly be called “moral behavior” in humans can be observed in other species. But so what? Why would you think that that “messes” morality up?

 

[In_Spiration]

Betterave,

With the unfortunate risk of perhaps giving ‘inocente’ a false confidence in his “argument”, I’ll point you to this study for his claim about ancestry. I think that’s what he’s referring to. As you’re probably well aware, this doesn’t help his case for cultural relativism.

 

[Betterave]

Betterave,

With the unfortunate risk of perhaps giving ‘inocente’ a false confidence in his “argument”, I’ll point you to this study for his claim about ancestry. I think that’s what he’s referring to. As you’re probably well aware, this doesn’t help his case for cultural relativism.

Can you summarize what is salient in the article, and *explain *its salience, i.e., how it provides evidence for inocente’s claim: We acquired some of what we call morality from ancestor species…?

 

[Betterave]

Betterave,

With the unfortunate risk of perhaps giving ‘inocente’ a false confidence in his “argument”, I’ll point you to this study for his claim about ancestry. I think that’s what he’s referring to. As you’re probably well aware, this doesn’t help his case for cultural relativism.

Can you summarize what is salient in the article, and *explain *its salience, i.e., how it provides evidence for inocente’s claim: We acquired some of what we call morality from ancestor species…?

 

[inocente]

You should give an argument for this and explain its relevance. Since you haven’t, I’ll say no more.

I’ll add that this sounds like a rather naive claim. If we “acquired” it from them, from whom did they “acquire” it? I’m guessing you just mean that certain aspects of what would properly be called “moral behavior” in humans can be observed in other species. But so what? Why would you think that that “messes” morality up?

Sorry, I’m wary of the ban. Here’s a fuller explanation, but if anyone wants to debate evolution we’ll have to shimmy on over to Back Fence.

From the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:

*Both scholarly and popular work on animal behavior suggests that many of the activities that are thought to be distinct to humans occur in non-humans. For example, many species of non-humans develop long lasting kinship ties—orangutan mothers stay with their young for eight to ten years and while they eventually part company, they continue to maintain their relationships. Less solitary animals, such as chimpanzees, baboons, wolves, and elephants maintain extended family units built upon complex individual relationships, for long periods of time.

…Coyotes, elephants and killer whales are also among the species for which profound effects of grief have been reported (Bekoff 2000) and many dog owners can provide similar accounts.

…It appears then that most of the capacities that are thought to distinguish humans as morally considerable beings, have been observed, often in less elaborate form, in the non-human world.*

I’m quoting that article (which is really about animal rights) to show that the weight of evidence has overturned the old philosophical assumption that moral capacity is purely human. Other species are not moral in the usual sense of the word, but it’s uncontroversial to claim that the underlying “engineering” first developed in ancestor social species, which humans inherited along with our four limbs and two eyes. This view of us is inherent in evolution, although I guess it was only relatively recently that it became mainstream.

*Professor Frans de Waal, a primate behaviourist at Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia, said: "I don’t believe animals are moral in the sense we humans are – with well developed and reasoned sense of right and wrong – rather that human morality incorporates a set of psychological tendencies and capacities such as empathy, reciprocity, a desire for co-operation and harmony that are older than our species.

“Human morality was not formed from scratch, but grew out of our primate psychology. Primate psychology has ancient roots, and I agree that other animals show many of the same tendencies and have an intense sociality.” - telegraph.co.uk/earth/wildlife/5373379/Animals-can-tell-right-from-wrong.html*

This vital emotive side to our machinery isn’t limited to hard-wired rules but necessarily helps us deal with the novel situations that arise in a social species. It is why we can often make rapid intuitive decisions and why we are so much more than computers. We use it, as you said, in tandem with our rational abilities, but the emotions are hard to put into words – in Luke 10:30-37 Jesus uses a parable because it’s very hard to evoke the feeling of mercy without using an example with which we can empathize.

The equipment developed to aid individual and collective survival, and one necessary feature is that we can adapt our moral judgments and standards in changing times. Standards help to define and aid the cohesion of our tribe but must allow for adaptation to prevailing conditions.

So, this little story explains why morality varies: some features remain fairly constant across all cultures (they always aid survival) while others differ. Everyone in a culture tends to have similar morality (cohesion), while close-knit groups tend to share an even more similar morality, and individual differences can still come into play. It is messy but explains the real world. It also allows for the two extremes we sometimes see (a) pick’n’mix relativity works against cohesion, and (b) warring over who thinks they are absolutely right.

Finally, it explains why it’s so hard to define absolutes (the emotive side is very hard to frame in words) and why they are so elusive (we are built to adapt, not to be set in stone).

 

[Betterave]

Sorry, I’m wary of the ban. Here’s a fuller explanation, but if anyone wants to debate evolution we’ll have to shimmy on over to Back Fence.

I have no interest in debating evolution here, so it shouldn’t be a problem.

From the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:

Both scholarly and popular work on animal behavior suggests that many of the activities that are thought to be distinct to humans occur in non-humans. For example, many species of non-humans develop long lasting kinship ties—orangutan mothers stay with their young for eight to ten years and while they eventually part company, they continue to maintain their relationships. Less solitary animals, such as chimpanzees, baboons, wolves, and elephants maintain extended family units built upon complex individual relationships, for long periods of time.

That’s a rather suspicious use of the passive voice: “…many of the activities that are thought to be distinct to humans occur in non-humans.” Oh really? Thought by whom? Anyway, how is this relevant?

…Coyotes, elephants and killer whales are also among the species for which profound effects of grief have been reported (Bekoff 2000) and many dog owners can provide similar accounts.

Therefore…?

…It appears then that most of the capacities that are thought to distinguish humans as morally considerable beings, have been observed, often in less elaborate form, in the non-human world.

Which capacities are those?? Having long lasting kinship ties?

In any case, a *morally considerable *being is not thereby a *moral *being, i.e., a being that understands morality, has a “moral capacity,” as you put it below; so this really seems irrelevant.

I’m quoting that article (which is really about animal rights) to show that the weight of evidence has overturned the old philosophical assumption that moral capacity is purely human. Other species are not moral in the usual sense of the word, but it’s uncontroversial to claim that the underlying “engineering” first developed in ancestor social species, which humans inherited along with our four limbs and two eyes. This view of us is inherent in evolution, although I guess it was only relatively recently that it became mainstream.

Your historical claims are just guesses, and in any case are not relevant. Other species are indeed not moral in the usual (i.e., proper) sense of the word. You can forget about the rest of what you say here - it is irrelevant.

*Professor Frans de Waal, a primate behaviourist at Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia, said: "I don’t believe animals are moral in the sense we humans are – with well developed and reasoned sense of right and wrong – rather that human morality incorporates a set of psychological tendencies and capacities such as empathy, reciprocity, a desire for co-operation and harmony that are older than our species.

“Human morality was not formed from scratch, but grew out of our primate psychology. Primate psychology has ancient roots, and I agree that other animals show many of the same tendencies and have an intense sociality.” - telegraph.co.uk/earth/wildlife/5373379/Animals-can-tell-right-from-wrong.html*

Sure, why would we expect otherwise? How is this relevant?

This vital emotive side to our machinery isn’t limited to hard-wired rules but necessarily helps us deal with the novel situations that arise in a social species. It is why we can often make rapid intuitive decisions and why we are so much more than computers. We use it, as you said, in tandem with our rational abilities, but the emotions are hard to put into words – in Luke 10:30-37 Jesus uses a parable because it’s very hard to evoke the feeling of mercy without using an example with which we can empathize.

I don’t see how the fact that “we can often make rapid intuitive decisions” is at all relevant. So what? Also your implication that such decisions are not rational (are arational) is groundless, and again, not obviously relevant.

The equipment developed to aid individual and collective survival, and one necessary feature is that we can adapt our moral judgments and standards in changing times. Standards help to define and aid the cohesion of our tribe but must allow for adaptation to prevailing conditions.

I’m not sure what you’re referring to here.

You do seem to be suggesting that the essential function of morality is tribal cohesion (a rather vague claim), but obviously this function would necessarily be fulfilled in a way that is adapted to prevailing conditions. So your “but” doesn’t make sense.

So, this little story explains why morality varies: some features remain fairly constant across all cultures (they always aid survival) while others differ. Everyone in a culture tends to have similar morality (cohesion), while close-knit groups tend to share an even more similar morality, and individual differences can still come into play. It is messy but explains the real world. It also allows for the two extremes we sometimes see (a) pick’n’mix relativity works against cohesion, and (b) warring over who thinks they are absolutely right.

So your underlying premise is what? That morality is essentially whatever produces tribal cohesion? That’s nonsense. That morality is essentially an abstract term which expresses features of social interaction that aid survival? Again, that’s nonsense.

 

[Betterave]

Finally, it explains why it’s so hard to define absolutes (the emotive side is very hard to frame in words) and why they are so elusive (we are built to adapt, not to be set in stone).

These are awfully vague conclusions, drawn from awfully vague premises. Hopefully you can clarify your position before getting to attached to your seemingly “set in stone” wishy-washy version of “adaptable” morality (which in itself could mean any number of things in the context of relativism or absolutism - obviously each view includes an ability to ‘adapt’ to new situations).

 

[inocente]

That’s a rather suspicious use of the passive voice:

You’ll have to raise that with the guy who wrote it at Stanford.

Which capacities are those?? Having long lasting kinship ties?

Both linked articles refer to many similarities between humans and other species, a causal evolutionary chain.

Your historical claims are just guesses, and in any case are not relevant. Other species are indeed not moral in the usual (i.e., proper) sense of the word. You can forget about the rest of what you say here - it is irrelevant.

It is highly relevant because as the next quote said “Human morality was not formed from scratch”. We make moral judgments in part by non-rational means using abilities inherited from ancestor species.

I don’t see how the fact that “we can often make rapid intuitive decisions” is at all relevant. So what? Also your implication that such decisions are not rational (are arational) is groundless, and again, not obviously relevant.

Intuition uses those sub-conscious parts of our brain that were not formed from scratch. They are irrational, feelings like love.

You do seem to be suggesting that the essential function of morality is tribal cohesion (a rather vague claim), but obviously this function would necessarily be fulfilled in a way that is adapted to prevailing conditions. So your “but” doesn’t make sense.

Survival and cohesion. Thriving if you will. Adaptation involves change.

So your underlying premise is what? That morality is essentially whatever produces tribal cohesion? That’s nonsense. That morality is essentially an abstract term which expresses features of social interaction that aid survival? Again, that’s nonsense.

Nonsense? Hmmm . It’s a fairly standard version of relativism, that fits with research and explains the real world and who we are. It’s about reality as it is rather than as we might like it to be. Morality involves values and values change. If values were entirely rational we could use science alone to derive all morals, but thankfully they’re not.

Meanwhile the absolutist camp hasn’t put forward any equivalent explanation. How are changing values and differences between cultures accommodated? Up to now their case seems to be (a) anyone who disagrees is blind to the truth, and (b) no agreed absolutes can be stated, but then of course anyone who disagrees is blind, etc. At best it looks a little like wishful thinking and at worst takes on the appearance of an unexamined belief.

These are awfully vague conclusions, drawn from awfully vague premises. Hopefully you can clarify your position before getting to attached to your seemingly “set in stone” wishy-washy version of “adaptable” morality (which in itself could mean any number of things in the context of relativism or absolutism - obviously each view includes an ability to ‘adapt’ to new situations).

At least they’re conclusions dude.

But you intrigue me by saying that absolutism has an ability to adapt, an unusual view compared to absolutists in previous debates. How does the view that some actions are absolutely right or wrong deal with adaptation? Perhaps you could lay out your stall, including whether absolutes can include imperatives such as “use of artificial contraception is always right/wrong” or exist only as one or a few high-level inviolate principles.

 

[Betterave]

You’ll have to raise that with the guy who wrote it at Stanford.

No, I raise it to you. I’m not interested in that guy (who is actually a gal, and is at Wesleyan University, not Stanford ).

Both linked articles refer to many similarities between humans and other species, a causal evolutionary chain.

Yeah; so what?

It is highly relevant because as the next quote said “Human morality was not formed from scratch”. We make moral judgments in part by non-rational means using abilities inherited from ancestor species.

Yeah; so what?

Intuition uses those sub-conscious parts of our brain that were not formed from scratch. They are irrational, feelings like love.

What is this “formed from scratch” you keep talking about? How is it relevant? (Our rational capacities are also not “formed from scratch,” I would think.)

Survival and cohesion. Thriving if you will. Adaptation involves change.

This comment makes no sense as a response to what I wrote.

Nonsense? Hmmm . It’s a fairly standard version of relativism, that fits with research and explains the real world and who we are. It’s about reality as it is rather than as we might like it to be. Morality involves values and values change. If values were entirely rational we could use science alone to derive all morals, but thankfully they’re not.

First of all, it (which “it”?) is not only not a “fairly standard version of relativism,” it’s not a “version of relativism” at all. In any case, you didn’t answer my question. You’ve just indulged in more seemingly irrelevant pontificating.

Meanwhile the absolutist camp hasn’t put forward any equivalent explanation. How are changing values and differences between cultures accommodated? Up to now their case seems to be (a) anyone who disagrees is blind to the truth, and (b) no agreed absolutes can be stated, but then of course anyone who disagrees is blind, etc. At best it looks a little like wishful thinking and at worst takes on the appearance of an unexamined belief.

What absolutists are you talking about, inocente?? (Or are you just BS-ing?)

Or on second thoughts, is what you’re saying just completely banal? If Jose thinks that a true statement is false, then obviously Jose is “blind to the truth”… yet you seem to be suggesting that there is something controversial about admitting that??

At least they’re conclusions dude.

Let me suggest that conclusions that are so vaguely expressed are worse than no conclusions. You’re just offering a form of fundamentalism. It’s better to leave it with an honest question than to pretend to offer a ‘conclusion’ which is in fact groundless, i.e., not supported by any of the ‘premises’ cited in its behalf.

But you intrigue me by saying that absolutism has an ability to adapt, an unusual view compared to absolutists in previous debates. How does the view that some actions are absolutely right or wrong deal with adaptation? Perhaps you could lay out your stall, including whether absolutes can include imperatives such as “use of artificial contraception is always right/wrong” or exist only as one or a few high-level inviolate principles.

Obviously if morality addresses concrete situations, then absolute principles have to be applied to concrete situations. And obviously concrete situations change in the course of history, so obviously our understanding of the application of moral principles to those changing concrete situations must be adaptable to whatever new realities arise. If there is any absolutist that you have talked to previously that denied this, he or she must have been rather naive, I should think. Isn’t that all obvious?

As far as a specific question like contraception goes, certainly I see no reason why there shouldn’t be an objectively correct application of absolute principles to such questions. Do you?

 

[inocente]

What is this “formed from scratch” you keep talking about? How is it relevant? (Our rational capacities are also not “formed from scratch,” I would think.)

From your comments, before we go on can I check your understanding of the basic idea? It isn’t controversial in many circles, and here’s a reasonable description we can kick around:

*… recent evidence from neuroscience and neighbouring disciplines indicates that moral judgement is often an intuitive, emotional matter. Although many moral judgements are difficult, much moral judgement is accomplished in an intuitive, effortless way. An interesting feature of many intuitive, effortless cognitive processes is that they are accompanied by a perceptual phenomenology. For example, humans can effortlessly determine whether a given face is male or female without any knowledge of how such judgements are made. When you look at someone, you have no experience of working out whether that person is male or female. You just see that person’s maleness or femaleness. By contrast, you do not look at a star in the sky and see that it is receding. One can imagine creatures that automatically process spectroscopic redshifts, but as humans we do not. All of this makes sense from an evolutionary point of view. We have evolved mechanisms for making quick, emotion-based social judgements, for ‘seeing’ rightness and wrongness, because our intensely social lives favour such capacities, but there was little selective pressure on our ancestors to know about the movements of distant stars.

… We have here the beginnings of a debunking explanation of moral realism: we believe in moral realism because moral experience has a perceptual phenomenology, and moral experience has a perceptual phenomenology because natural selection has outfitted us with mechanisms for making intuitive, emotion-based moral judgements, much as it has outfitted us with mechanisms for making intuitive, emotion-based judgements about who among us are the most suitable mates. Therefore, we can understand our inclination towards moral realism not as an insight into the nature of moral truth, but as a by-product of the efficient cognitive processes we use to make moral decisions. According to this view, moral realism is akin to naive realism about sexiness, like making the understandable mistake of thinking that Tom Cruise is objectively sexier than his baboon counterparts. - wjh.harvard.edu/~jgreene/GreeneWJH/Greene-NRN-Is-Ought-03.pdf*

It’s worth reading the whole paper (four pages). Many people do instinctively believe in absolutes, but the key word is instinctively – we are looking at our own navels and being fooled in our introspection. To use the author’s metaphors, we acknowledge that beauty is in the mind of the beholder and therefore a sunset is not absolutely beautiful, beauty is relative. Yet we may instinctively think Tom Cruise or Nicole Kidman is absolutely sexy compared to a baboon or a frog, even to the extent that a male frog would find a fairytale princess more attractive than a female frog. On reflection we realize this is entirely naive, that sexiness is in the eye of the beholder, that sexiness is also relative.

In both cases we evolved to make rapid decisions emotively and intuitively. All that is being said is that morality is similar in kind, and just as we can’t determine beauty or sexiness entirely rationally, the way we process morality and come to decisions also involves instinctive intuition. It is so much a part of us that we fooled ourselves into believing in absolutes, and this in turn explains why there’s no real agreement as to what they are - they’re an illusion, personal and cultural artifacts.

Then of course beyond that the content of morality itself involves subjectivity. If you decide to take your wife and kids on holiday, knowing you could instead donate the cost to starving kids on the other side of the world, you are making a value judgment, weighing the well-being of yourself and your family with the well-being of others you’ll never meet. Your personal values are partly decided by our evolved state, our culture and your own life experience, none of which were determined rationally.

The evidence from different fields is that this is who we are, and by understanding this about ourselves we can understand the history of morality and make better decisions. It’s reasonable to conclude it will shortly be taught in Psychology 101 and Ethics 101, if it isn’t already.

Whether or not you agree with any of this, do you see where it’s coming from?

*Obviously if morality addresses concrete situations, then absolute principles have to be applied to concrete situations. And obviously concrete situations change in the course of history, so obviously our understanding of the application of moral principles to those changing concrete situations must be adaptable to whatever new realities arise. If there is any absolutist that you have talked to previously that denied this, he or she must have been rather naive, I should think. Isn’t that all obvious?

As far as a specific question like contraception goes, certainly I see no reason why there shouldn’t be an objectively correct application of absolute principles to such questions. Do you?*

There are absolutists on CAF who say artificial contraception is so wrong in all circumstances that a condom with holes in it (to allow the chance of procreation) must be used to produce a semen specimen for the doctor (although how a single guy would use it is left unsaid).

 

[tonyrey]

The only way to evade the **absolute **principle that we should do what we are convinced is right is to deny that we should do anything at all!

In other words moral relativism = moral nihilism.